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HENRY II

King of France 1547–1559

Frederic J. Baumgartner

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
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PREFACE

In 1909 Henri Hauser wrote: "The reign of Henry II has been largely ignored, and that king is far less known than his father, Francis I."[1] Little has changed eight decades later despite the existence of a number of works that deal with Henry II. There still is no scholarly biography of Henry or study of his reign, which need this work is intended to fill.

There are several possible explanations for this lack of interest in Henry II. Perhaps the most important is that he has been badly overshadowed by his father, whose impetuous character, brilliant victories and disastrous defeats, and reputation as the father of the French Renaissance all have claimed the attention of historians. A second reason is the comparative brevity of Henry's reign. The twelve years that he was king made his the shortest reign, except for that of his ill-fated son, Francis II, in almost five centuries from 1328 to 1793. Third, Henry has been overlooked in the enormous attention given to his wife, Catherine de Medici, and his mistress, Diane de Poitiers. Both women have been the subject of a vastly greater number of biographies than the king. Last, the date of his accession, 1547, marks no major turning point in history. To a large extent Henry continued the policies of his father, and there was no dramatic break with the past.

One may ask, then, whether this biography of Henry II is needed. Certainly the lack of an adequate scholarly study of his reign provides a practical justification, but, more significantly, it can be argued that Henry's reign was a pivotal period in French history. During the twelve years that he ruled, French Protestantism became an organized, dynamic force in the realm; the eastern borders of France were extended into Lorraine; and Calais was recovered from the English,

finally putting an end to the five centuries of Anglo-French conflict that had begun with William the Conqueror. Henry's reign was a period of extensive changes in the system of taxation and the royal bureaucracy, creating a more modern-appearing governmental structure. One of the few works that has dealt extensively with Henry II, Henri Noëll's *Henri II et la naissance de la société moderne* (1944), described Henry's rule as creating "a new France, a new society was born."[2]

Noëll's statement surely is an exaggeration, since much of what Henry did was to complete trends begun under his father. For Noëll, Henry was a capable king and an admirable person: "Une figure hautement française." If Francis I was *le roi chevalier*, and Henry IV *le roi galant*, then Henry II was *le roi gentilhomme*. In places virtually a panegyric of the king, Noëll's biography is at times too willing to overlook the failures and problems of Henry's policies and personality.

The only English-language biography of Henry II came from the pen of H. Nöel Williams in 1910. The focus of *Henri II: His Court and Times* is directed on the person of the king and his courtiers.[3] It would appear from this work that Henry did little else besides engage in war and the frivolities of the court. The author paid close attention to court gossip; and while he can hardly be called sympathetic to his subject, he did make an effort to disprove the most calumnious of the tales of the gossipmongers. Williams was well versed in the memoirs of the era of Henry II, and his biography serves as a useful source on the king's personal life and the activities of his court.

Quite the opposite of Williams' book is the work of Nicolas Delabarre-Du Parcq, *Histoire de Henri II, 1547–1559* (1887).[4] This author, a respected military historian, was primarily concerned with the wars and foreign policy of Henry's reign. While quite sympathetic to the king, Du Parcq accepted uncritically the statements found in the sixteenth-century memoirs and histories, and was heavily dependent on the *Mémoires de Vieilleville*. That work, redacted around 1600, attributed to Maréchal de Vieilleville much that was done or said by others or was outright fanciful. Nonetheless, Du Parcq's work is informative on the French military under Henry.

The tone for many historians who have written on Henry II was set by Jules Michelet whose talented but often vicious pen has permanently branded numerous figures in French history for better or, far more frequently, for worse. Michelet saw Henry as melancholy,

gloomy, uneducated, and bigoted and tagged him as having "un visage de prison,"[5] referring to the four years that Henry spent as a hostage for his father in a Spanish prison. His reign was a "sinister vestibule to the civil wars."

Numerous historians since Michelet have seen Henry in much the same light, although they usually have not used the highly charged and evocative terms that he did. Henri Lemonnier's volume in Lavisse's *Histoire de France*, likely the most-often cited history of the era, depicts Henry as largely a failure, having accepted a disgraceful peace with Philip II in 1559 and pursuing a shameful policy of persecution of the French Protestants.[6] This view of Henry was taken up by authors like J. E. Neale, who wrote that Henry's folly and prodigality had brought France to the edge of ruin, and it can be found in the works of such well-informed current historians as Nancy Roelker, who has described Henry as "the heavy-handed son who, lacking his father's personal flair and political skills, yet pursued his father's least successful policies to the brink of bankruptcy and civil war."[7] I do not intend to argue that these authors are completely wrong, for the fact that Henry has had so negative a press over the ages suggests that at the very least there were some truly controversial aspects of his reign and character. Clearly, however, a more balanced reassessment of the king and his reign is in order.

In several respects the best history of Henry's reign is Lucien Romier's two-volume work, *Les origines politiques des guerres de religion*.[8] It is not a biography of Henry but a highly detailed study of the foreign relations of his reign. Romier concentrated very heavily on the French involvement in Italy, and he made extensive use of documents in Italian archives, in particular the reports of the ambassador of the duke of Ferrara at the French court. Romier presented Henry largely in terms of the bitter struggle for power between the major factions at his court, the Montmorencys and the Guises. But he was ready to give credit to the king when he felt it due, such as for his handling of affairs after the disastrous defeat of Saint-Quentin in 1557. Even as a diplomatic history of Henry's reign, however, there are several curious lacunae in Romier's volumes, such as almost completely ignoring relations with England.

This work had already been written in first draft when Ivan Cloulas's *Henri II* appeared.[9] Fortunately, I still had the opportunity to incorporate his more significant points and new information. Cloulas, as *Conservateur-en-chef* of the Archives Nationales in Paris,

had easy access to the collection of manuscript scources from Henry's reign. Thus, his book has detailed information on such topics as royal finances, the composition of the royal household, the royal entries, and patronage of art and architecture. Despite his font of new detail on the king, Cloulas presents Henry in a largely traditional point of view, little criticizing the opinions of the nineteenth-century historians who wrote about him. Furthermore, the biography is clearly intended for a mass readership. Cloulas did not provide notes, although he has a very thorough bibliography, so scholars will have a difficult time following up on his information.

This work is meant to be a political biography of the king. By that term I mean that the book will cover Henry's life in its entirety but will give particular attention to the political events of his reign and to some extent will slight his personal life. Like most biographers, who become sympathetic to their subjects in the course of writing their biographies, I have, I am sure, become more appreciative of Henry's virtues. Certainly I have become less inclined to paint him only in black and white, but now tend to shade in the gray as well. I do not expect that this work will move Francis I from center stage in the general histories of the French Renaissance, but I hope that I will provide future historians with a balanced perspective from which to judge Henry II and his reign.

This work is based in large part on extensive research in the manuscript collections of the Bibliothèque Nationale and the Archives Nationales in Paris, and on the contemporary materials that have been printed. There also are large depositories of pertinent documents in Moscow and several Italian cities. A Russian duke prior to 1900 bought up a vast amount of French historical materials and carried them to Moscow. In respect to Henry II, the collection now in the Soviet Central Archives consists largely of the correspondence of Secretary of State Duthier and deals almost exclusively with Italian matters under Henry. A. Lubinskaja has published the documents for the first fifteen months of Henry's reign in her *Documents pour servire à l'histoire des guerres d'Italie*.[10] Michel Antoine made use of the collection, the first westerner to do so since 1900, for his "Institutions françaises en Italie sous le règne de Henri II: gouverneurs et intendants."[11]

A great number of the relevant documents in the Italian archives have been printed in various works, which will be cited in the appropriate notes. As for those in places such as Mantua, Ferrara, and

Turin, which have not been edited, Lucien Romier and Ivan Cloulas have thoroughly exploited them in their works. The reports of the ambassadors of Charles V and Philip II in the Archives of Simancas are available on microfilm in the Archives Nationales. Most have also been printed, especially in the *Calendar of State Papers*, Spanish series. The editors of the various series of the *Calendar of State Papers* took a very broad view of what was pertinent to English history; thus, the Italian, English, and Spanish series all include documents more properly French in content and are invaluable but little exploited sources of information for Henry II. Last, a great deal of the documentation in German archives has been used by Jean-Daniel Pariset in his *Relations entre la France et l'Allemagne au milieu du seizième siècle*.[12]

Henry's own letters, of which there are a considerable number extant, are not particularly informative of either events or motives. All too often a letter of that era states that the courier who was bringing the letter would inform the recipient of the details of the royal orders or the events that prompted the correspondence. Henry's spelling in those letters written in his own hand was exceptionally erratic even for an age that had no standards for spelling. I have made limited and very careful use of the histories and memoirs from later in the sixteenth century because the factionalism of the religious strife and civil wars had a profound and largely negative impact on perceptions of Henry II within a decade of his death.

I have used the English version of the names of the French kings and of foreign rulers and princes: e.g. Henry II, not Henri II; Duke Francis of Lorraine, not Duc François de Lorraine. All other names are in the proper form for their native language: e.g., Duc François de Guise, Ottavio Farnese. French place names will be given in the French spelling. All dates will be new style: i.e., the year begins on January 1, not at Easter. Monetary sums will be given in the same currency found in the sources, either *écus* (crowns) or *livres* (pounds). Until 1550 the ratio between the two units was 2.25 livres to the écu; after that it became 2.5. When a non-French source uses the term crown, I will express the sum in écus if it is clear that the French coin was meant; if it is not clear, I will use crown. See appendix A for a further description of the French monetary system.

Every author of a work such as this knows that there is always a vast number of persons who contributed to it. Those who deserve special thanks include my fellow historians Delamar Jensen,

M.-N. Matuszek-Baudouin, David Buisseret, Lynn Martin, Carl Hood, Patricia Thompson, Albert Hamscher, Mack Holt, and Wylie Sypher. Dr. Thomas Ollendick provided me with valuable advice on child psychology. Rennie Givens, Patty Mills, and Debbie Rhea typed the manuscript with their usual diligence and skill. Dorothy McCombs and Interlibrary Loan librarians of the Newman Library have been most helpful, as always. Cathy Gorman prepared the maps. I owe special thanks to Joanne Ferguson, editor-in-chief of Duke University Press, and her staff for their good advice and hard work in seeing this book to publication. Financial support came from the American Philosophical Society. The editor of *The Sixteenth Century Journal* has kindly given permission to use portions of three articles that first appeared in his journal: "Henry II's Italian Bishops: A Study in the Use and Abuse of the Concordat of Bologna," XI (1980), 49–58; "Henry II and the Papal Conclave of 1549," XVI (1985), 301–14; and "The Final Demise of the Medieval Knight in France," XVIII (1987). As has been true for twenty years now, Lois, my wife, has given the support and encouragement needed to see my scholarship reach fruition, but I dedicate the book to my sons, in hope that they too will come to see history as being as exciting and important as I do.

1 SECOND SON



On the first Sunday of April 1519 the church bells throughout the kingdom of France resounded in the streets of the cities and towns for an hour's time. They were ringing by order of the king to celebrate the birth six days earlier of a new prince, Henry, duke of Orléans. The new prince was born into the ruling dynasty of the realm, the Valois, and was destined to take the throne twenty-eight years later as Henry II.

In many respects the kingdom that his ancestors had ruled since 987 was, in the early sixteenth century, the most important and powerful in Europe. Its territory of 450,000 square kilometers made it the largest state west of Poland-Lithuania, although it was some 20 percent smaller than the present-day Republic of France. The vast expanses of the realm were rather loosely held together under the monarch; one of the major tasks of the reigns of Francis I and Henry II was to bring the outlying provinces more directly under royal control. Linguistically, the kingdom was becoming more uniform. French, the *langue d'oïl*, was spoken by the educated and the elite throughout the realm, but the ordinary people in Brittany, Gascony, and the Midi still spoke one of the regional dialects and likely had difficulty understanding more than a few simple phrases of French. For the king, life centered on Paris and the châteaux within two or three days' journey from that city. Although the court was highly peripatetic, only rarely did it reach cities like Limoges or Bourges, to say nothing of the cities of the south or southwest.

France's population probably had reached 18 million people in 1547. While exact figures are impossible to obtain, there is no question that it was increasing at a good rate.[1] France in that era was still overwhelmingly rural. Perhaps as high as 90 percent of the popula-

tion lived in the small villages that served as centers of life for all of the rustic population except the great nobility. Rural society had two meaningful social divisions: the nobles, who varied enormously in wealth and political influence, but in law stood completely equal, and the *roturiers*, who worked with their hands. The latter also varied from the poverty-stricken day laborer, so called because he was paid at the end of each day's work, to the relatively well-off tenant holder. France was for the most part blessed with fertile soil and a favorable climate, so its agriculture was highly productive and the envy of the rest of Europe. The export of grain, despite the monarchy's frequent attempts to prevent it, was one of the more important sources of foreign exchange. France was largely free of disastrous crop failures during Henry's lifetime, but he did see one in 1556.[2]

Most of the urban population lived in some 100 cities that had populations between 5,000 and 10,000. For the most part, these cities were local markets for their rural districts. A small number of merchants and artisans made use of the urban day laborers to carry on commerce. Most of these cities were also cathedral cities, for there were nearly 120 bishoprics in France. The cathedral chapters, however, were often more influential than the bishops in local politics and economies.

On the next level of urban centers were the twenty-five cities with populations between 10,000 and 40,000. Most had important foreign trade, like Bordeaux's wine trade with England and Marseille's imports from the eastern Mediterranean. Several were manufacturing centers, such as Amiens with its woolen cloth industry or Tours for silk. Most were also administrative centers. Six of the eight major law courts, the parlements, fourteen of the seventeen generalities of the royal fiscal system, and twelve of the fifteen universities were located in cities of that size. Lyon and Rouen were both well over 40,000 by 1547 and competed for second place among French cities. By far the largest was Paris, with its vast number of government officials, merchants, and university students. Its population during Henry's reign has been estimated conservatively at 220,000.

Urban society was even more stratified than the rural. The wealthy merchants and government officeholders, who often came from the same families, found themselves in fairly cordial competition for control of the cities. In the cities that had parlements, the men of the "long robe," the officeholders, clearly had the upper hand. The rest of the bourgeoisie, a term that carried the legal sense of a person with

political rights in the city, were the petty merchants and the artisans. In most cities, Paris being the exception because of its great number of officials and students, a large majority of the population were wage laborers. Of all the major social groups, they were most vulnerable to economic fluctuations, and a small downturn in economic fortunes of a region would quickly reduce many to dire poverty.

For the most part, however, the French economy during Henry's lifetime was healthy and expanding. The first appearance of American treasure via Spain, and increased silver production from Europe's mines through better mining technology, were stimulating the economy without yet causing disruptive inflation, as happened later in the century. France was said to have imported gold worth 1,500,000 crowns in 1558 from Spain, most of which, however, quickly left France for Italy. Besides the traditional production of cloth, wine, salt, and grain, the early sixteenth century saw the creation of silk and printing industries. Lyon became the French center for both and became as well the financial capital of the realm, rivaling Antwerp as a source of borrowed capital for northern Europe.

In general the era of 1519–1559 was one of the more fortunate periods in French history. Harvests were good; commerce and population were expanding; no major epidemics erupted; war was the only serious blight. But, by the end of Henry's life, the climatic changes, the fiscal problems, and the disruptions in the economy that made the next hundred years so dismal were beginning to show their hand.

At the moment of his birth, however, Henry was not expected to rule this kingdom since he was the second son of Francis I and Claude de France. His brother, Dauphin Francis, was fourteen months older and strong and healthy. Henry's birth itself, on March 31, 1519, was uneventful, although his mother had been taken seriously ill on the trip from Paris to the Château of Saint-Germain-en-Laye at the beginning of March and had to remain at Neuilly for a week. The king preferred hunting to waiting for the arrival of his fourth child and did not return to Saint-Germain until the second day after. The birth of a prince was an occasion for calculating the political advantage that baptism, marriage, and similar events in the royal child's life could bring. Well before his birth, it had been decided that Henry VIII of England would serve as godfather for a male child, hence the name. Francis apparently hoped to gain more from the young prince's baptism by dangling the honor before the duke of Savoy in hope that he would be drawn away from the Swiss Confederation.

Consequently, Henry's baptism was delayed until June 4, when the English ambassador, Sir Thomas Boleyn, stood as proxy for his master in a late evening ceremony. The Scottish ambassador held the child at the font, and his aunt, Marguerite d'Angoulême, served as godmother. Francis I pronounced himself very pleased with the gifts that Henry VIII had sent and declared that he hoped the English king would soon have a son so he could repay in kind.[3]

After the flurry of excitement over the duke of Orléans's birth and baptism had passed, the sources have little to say about the young prince for the next seven years. Shortly after his baptism he was moved to the Château of Blois, where he joined his brother and sister in the royal nursery.[4] Henry had become a member of a family thoroughly dominated by his father, despite his frequent absences. Francis I was the only surviving male member of his generation of the House of Valois-Angoulême.[5] This cadet line of the royal family began with Jean d'Angoulême, the second son of Louis of Orléans, who had been assassinated in 1407. Two notable female members of the family were Valentina Visconti, the daughter of the last Visconti duke of Milan, who had married Jean d'Angoulême, and Francis's own formidable mother, Louise of Savoy, whose father Philippe was duke of Savoy for one year before his death in 1496. Francis owed his throne to the fortuitous circumstance that both Charles VIII and Louis XII, his cousins, died without male issue. On January 1, 1515, Francis had become king at the age of twenty years.

Francis I was physically the most active and vigorous king of France since his great-great-great-grandfather, John II (died 1364). He was both *le roi chevalier* and *le père des lettres*, combining a life crammed full of war, battles, and hunting with generous and well-informed patronage of art and learning. Furthermore, he was a womanizer of notorious reputation who, as a contemporary put it, "attended to business when he had no more women."[6] In all, he came closest to being the ideal monarch of his era in the eyes of most contemporaries and historians. The reputation and place in history of his son and successor have suffered considerably when the inevitable comparisons have been made.

Henry's mother, Claude de France, had many of the same ancestors as her husband since they were second cousins, having a common forebear in Louis of Orléans. The daughter of Louis XII and Anne de Bretagne, her marriage in 1514 at the age of fifteen to the heir presumptive, Francis, was seen as necessary not only because it

would facilitate an orderly succession of the crown but also because Claude had become duchess of Brittany early in 1514. The reversion of that large duchy to autonomous status would have been a serious blow to the monarchy's efforts to create a unified kingdom. Claude, all contemporary accounts agree, was not a beautiful woman; but she had a sweet and kind nature and considerable personal charm.

Royal marriages have usually had two purposes—the political advantage of the families involved and the procreation of royal-blooded heirs for the royal succession. Queen Claude fulfilled her duty well in both respects, in the latter regard by giving birth to seven children before her premature death in 1524. Her first child, Louise, had died before Henry's birth, so he joined two older siblings in the royal nursery—Charlotte, born in 1516 and dead by 1524, and the dauphin, Francis, fourteen months older than Henry. Seventeen months later another sister, Madeleine, joined the nursery; in 1522 a brother, Charles, duc d'Angoulême; and in 1523, the last sister, Marguerite, the only one of Henry's siblings to survive him, dying in 1573. For his early formative years Henry was surrounded by four siblings, all of them close to him in age if not necessarily in affection.

In addition to his parents and siblings, two other family members must have played a significant role in Henry's early years—his grandmother, Louise of Savoy, and his aunt Marguerite, Francis's sister. Both women were totally committed to advancing the fortunes of Francis, "mon César," as Louise called him, and, one can presume, of his children as well. Louise, a skillful and determined politician in her own right, as well as a truly avaricious person, took good advantage of her position as the king's mother and the regent during several occasions that Francis was out of the kingdom to accumulate extensive political influence and a vast fortune. Henry almost certainly was too young to appreciate her role in the disgrace of two powerful royal servants, the constable Charles de Bourbon and the royal financier Jacques de Semblançay. Since the existing record of Louise's role in negotiations to release Henry and his brother from their captivity in Spain from 1526 to 1530 is quite impersonal, there is little note of affection. Louise, however, was portrayed as being deeply afflicted when her usher Baudin related his account of the mistreatment of the two brothers in their Spanish jail. Shortly before Louise's death in 1531, Marguerite d'Angoulême wrote to the king that their ill mother improved greatly "when she has three little doctors who make her forget her pain."[7] His grandmother's death when

Henry was twelve precluded any extensive influence on his political views.

Marguerite d'Angoulême became surrogate mother for her brother's children after their mother had died; she declared to him in 1530 that she loved his children more than her own.[8] Her letters to Francis and to Bishop Guillaume Briçonnet are the only sources of information about the life of the royal children prior to the two older brothers' imprisonment in Spain.[9] In February 1526, for example, she wrote that several of the children, including Henry, had had the measles but had recovered.[10] In general, her letters are more informative about her nieces than about Henry.

Marguerite outlived her brother by two years and thus saw Henry wear the crown. In later life aunt and nephew had a respectful relationship, but the affection between them was harmed by the fact that they found themselves on opposite sides of the factionalism that marked Francis's last years. After he became king, Henry asked her to stay at court, but she preferred to return to her own court in Navarre. Henry confirmed her pension of 25,000 livres and asked her to stand as godmother for his daughter Claude. There is no evidence of any sense of loss on Henry's part at her death in 1549.[11]

In a royal household, with the frequent absences of the royal parents, the children often turn to governors, governesses, and tutors for affection. The household of the royal children at Blois, its usual place of residence, was large in size. A statement of its accounts for 1523 has been preserved, and it indicates that some 240 persons earned salaries in it, including fourteen *enfants d'honneur* and six *demoiselles d'honneur* as playmates for the royal children at salaries of 200 and 100 livres, respectively. Guillaume Gouffier, better known as Admiral Bonnivet, was the first governor of the household, a position he gave up in 1523 to command the Italian campaign. His brother-in-law René de Cossé-Brissac succeeded him as governor; Brissac's wife had been governess for the dauphin since 1518. Their sons Charles and Artus were among the *enfants d'honneur*.[12] The presence of the respected captains-of-war Bonnivet and Brissac in the household was to direct the training of the royal sons in rough sports, riding, and hunting. The young princes were particularly fond of their hunting dogs, despite Brissac's efforts to inspire a taste for falconry in them.[13] Physically, young Henry developed rapidly; the English ambassador reported in 1522 that Louise of Savoy had said he was one of the

biggest children for his age (a month short of his third birthday) she had ever seen.[14]

In 1524 another influential figure entered the lives of the young princes—their tutor Benedetto Tagliacarno (Theocrenus), an Italian humanist who had served as secretary for the republic of Genoa as a protégé of the Fregosi family.[15] When the Fregosi lost power in Genoa in 1522, Tagliacarno fled with them to France. He already had a reputation for his skill in Latin verse and his knowledge of Greek. It was apparently the latter that brought him to the attention of Francis I, through the influence of Guillaume Budé and François Robertet. Robertet had already appointed Tagliacarno as tutor for his own sons. The choice of the Italian humanist, "beloved of the Muses" as a contemporary styled him, for royal tutor in July 1524 reflected the king's great interest in and love for the culture of the Italian Renaissance and his desire that his sons would be well versed in the classics, the foundations of that culture.

Some sense of the type of education the royal princes received can be gained from a letter of Gaspard de Coligny, the future admiral, who was two months older than Henry and an *enfant d'honneur* at the court in 1534. Writing to his own tutor, Coligny stated that "the majority of my time is committed to the reading of Cicero and the study of the tables of Ptolemy, under [Guillaume] Du Maine [Henry's second tutor], who, adopting a different method from Tagliacarno, adds cosmography at the same time, especially the part relative to the longitude and latitude of places with the addition of meridians and parallels."[16] It would appear that Henry's interest in maps and overseas exploration may well have been stimulated by Du Maine. Henry's program of study may also explain why his library had a copy of Copernicus's *De Revolutionibus*.

Another important source of support for a humanist education was Marguerite d'Angoulême, whose deep love for the classics and own knowledge of Greek, Latin, Hebrew, and Italian were celebrated by the humanists. The first mention of Henry as a student comes from his aunt, who wrote to the king in Spain in February 1526, that "Monsieur the Dauphin is doing wonders in his studies. . . . Monsieur d'Orléans is riveted to his books and says that he wishes to be wise; but Monsieur d'Angouléme knows more than the others."[17] Note that Henry was already being compared unfavorably to his younger brother.

While Henry's younger sister Marguerite took full advantage of these educational opportunities to become one of the most learned women of the sixteenth century, there is less evidence that Henry took well to learning. He was a person who took much better to vigorous sports and exercise. Later in life he was fluent in Latin, Italian, and, of course, Spanish; Brantôme described how he loved to read Spanish literary works and spoke the language very well.[18] Henry was also said to be able to speak Italian as if it were his mother tongue.

Henry also was a patron of humanists, but there is a sharp conflict in opinion whether he himself took an active interest in learning and scholarship. One Venetian ambassador, Lorenzo Contarini, writing in 1547, described Henry as "not well lettered, and he simply knows how to read and write." The next ambassador, Giovanni Capello, writing seven years later, stated that for some time each morning "he devoted himself to the study of letters, because he knows well that they can be more useful and honorable for princes than anything else."[19] Brantôme wrote that "he well loved learning and learned men."[20] The royal historiographer of Louis XIV's reign, admittedly writing over a century later, stated that Henry had a "marvelous facility of expression both in public and in private." Two foreign ambassadors, writing at different times in Henry's reign, noted his ability to read and speak Latin well.[21] His program of study as a child, his later patronage of humanists, the impressive range of manuscripts and books that he collected,[22] and the testimony of Brantôme all suggest that Henry was not the grossly ignorant and uncultured man that he is often portrayed, but he was not a scholarly person. His poetry, written to his mistress Diane de Poitiers, is judged to be "imaginative and sincere but with rather little literary merit."[23] In all, however, he seems to have had an appreciation of art, theater, and learning that transcended their use as mere decoration. He was especially fond of music, "of which he has the best ideas," and tapestries.[24]

Until his seventh year Henry seems to have had a pleasant and protected childhood, except for the deaths of his mother and sister, but affairs far distant from the château of Blois that made the later years of Henry's childhood a nightmare were beginning to cast their shadows over the royal nursery. The king, having taken leave of his children in July 1524, had gone off to Italy to make good the French monarchy's claim to Milan and Naples. Six months later came the devastating news that their father and several nobles from their household were captives, while others, including their former gov-

ernor, Bonnivet, had been killed on the battlefield of Pavia. Almost exactly a year after that disastrous defeat, the dauphin and Henry were taken from Blois on February 17, 1526, to be exchanged as hostages for their father in Spain. Henry's lifetime of service to his kingdom had begun.

2 HOSTAGE

The long and complicated chain of events that put the young French princes Francis and Henry on the road to Bayonne in February 1526 must be traced back a full century earlier to two assassinations of the early fifteenth century. Few events in European history have had such enduring consequences as did the assassination of Louis of Orléans in 1407 and John of Burgundy in 1419. With the Burgundians responsible for the first and the Valois dynasty implicated in the second, the consequence was the most bitter and long-lasting family feud in European history.

The feud was a major factor in the third phase of the Hundred Years' War, in the form of the Burgundian alliance with England; it appeared again in full vigor in the war between Louis XI and the Burgundian dukes; and it was very much a part of the rivalry between Francis I and Charles V. Francis was a great-grandson of the assassinated Louis of Orléans, and Charles was two generations further removed from the fallen John of Burgundy. The emperor had been named for his great-grandfather, Charles the Bold of Burgundy, killed at the Battle of Nancy in 1477, and he had been raised at the Burgundian court, since 1477 located at Ghent. That the feud was still very alive at the time the two young rulers came of age is demonstrated by a remark in a letter of Emperor Maximilian to his grandson Charles in 1513 calling the French "the ancient and still now natural enemies of our House of Burgundy," and by the demands for retribution for these distant murders made by both sides during peace negotiations in 1523. In his instructions to his son, Charles referred to Burgundy as "nôtre patrie." [1]

The bitterness engendered by the ancient hatred was exacerbated by the conflict over the principal territories of Charles the Bold's

domain: Flanders and the duchy of Burgundy had been fiefs of the French monarchy throughout the Middle Ages, while the free county of Burgundy (Franche-Comté), to the east of the Saône river, was a unit of the Holy Roman Empire. After the death of Charles the Bold, Louis XI claimed Flanders and the duchy of Burgundy, but Flanders remained in the Burgundian dynasty and passed to Charles of Habsburg upon the death of his father, Philip, in 1506. The French kings were left with only a shadowy feudal claim to Flanders, but the Burgundian dynasty had lost the duchy of Burgundy, a key part of its domains. Both sides were determined to use any means necessary to make good their claims to their respective lost provinces.

In itself, the heritage of the Burgundian feud was sufficient to embitter the relationship between the Habsburgs and the Valois, but legacies of other conflicts further poisoned the atmosphere and gave ample opportunity to turn the festering hatreds into war. One of these other points of conflict was the kingdom of Navarre. In the late Middle Ages, Navarre straddled the Pyrenees with roughly equal area on either side of the crest of the mountains. The ruling family had been the de Foix from southern France, but the title passed to the Albrets, another southern French noble house, when Jean d'Albret married Catherine de Foix, heiress to Navarre and Béarn, in 1484. Ferdinand of Aragon maintained the claim of his second wife, Germaine de Foix, from a collateral branch of the family, and used it to seize the southern half of Navarre in 1512, incorporating it into Castile. The acquisition of Haute-Navarre was crucial for the Spanish monarchy because it closed off a dangerous invasion route into the Iberian peninsula and facilitated communications between northern Aragon and northern Castile. From the French point of view, Ferdinand's annexation of Haute-Navarre was threatening because it involved a land considered a fief of the French crown, ruled by a French family, and it put Spanish power at the crest of several passes into the recently recovered province of Gascony. After 1512 the return of Haute-Navarre to the Albrets was an important theme of French diplomacy and military strategy, and it received added impetus in 1527, when Francis I's sister, Marguerite d'Angoulême, took as her second husband Henri II d'Albret and became queen of Navarre.

Another cause of rivalry between the two young monarchs, Francis and Charles, was their competition for election as Holy Roman Emperor in 1519. Francis contested the imperial election with Charles out of a desire to deprive his rival of the authority and

prestige that the imperial crown conveyed and to enhance his own. The election cost Francis some 300,000 gold *florins*, but Charles spent 800,000 for his successful campaign. Not that the emperor had extensive real authority in Germany, but the title did give Charles control of the empire's foreign policy and enable him to call on the German cities and princes for support in his wars with France, aid that was given very reluctantly, if at all. Charles's election as emperor certainly galvanized in the minds of the French the opinion that Charles intended to make himself universal emperor of western Christendom by incorporating France into his domains. When one considers the extent of his domains and his aunt Catherine's position as queen of England, it is easy to understand how the French would be nearly paranoid about the possibility.

It was the conflict over Italy, however, that precipitated the chain of events that put the two royal sons in a prison in Spain. The French military involvement in Italy was more than thirty years old, having begun with Charles VIII's invasion of Italy in 1494. Charles VIII was lured into Italy partly by the Valois dynasty's claim to Naples. This last point dated back to the papal grant of Naples and Sicily to Charles of Anjou in 1264. Within twenty years, the French princes had been driven from Sicily during the Sicilian Vespers (although not from Naples until 1435) and their place taken by members of the House of Aragon. Old dynastic claims were forgotten very reluctantly in the late Middle Ages and could be resurrected at any opportune moment, as the claim to Naples was in 1494.

The memory of the ease of the French army's victorious march down the peninsula to Naples in 1494 veiled the recollection of the same ease with which the French were driven out by Ferdinand of Aragon's coalition. Thus the French returned a second time, in 1499, under Louis XII, who also had a dynastic claim to the duchy of Milan through his grandmother, Valentina Visconti. (As devoted as the French kings were to the Salic Law that prohibited the French crown from passing to or through the female line, they were not in the slightest inhibited from claiming foreign lands for their wives or daughters or through their female ancestors.) The French stay in Italy after the second invasion was longer than after the first, but again, a coalition succeeded in forcing the French army back across the Alps.

At the moment of the accession of Francis I, the French had no foothold in Italy. But Francis, driven by a lust for military glory

and conquest, a zeal to make good his family's claim to Italian possessions, a deep curiosity about Italian culture and learning, and a need to avenge the previous French defeats in Italy, almost immediately embarked on what is known as the Third French Invasion of Italy. He was further motivated by appeals from the Italian allies of France, many of whom had lost power during the previous French retreat from Italy, or were being threatened with such. It was at the beginning of Francis's reign that the Italian exiles in France, the *fuorusciti*, began to gain influence at the French court, an influence that steadily increased to its height during the regency of Catherine de Medici after 1560.

Francis concentrated on his dynastic claim to Milan as a great-grandson of Valentina Visconti because it was more immediate than his pretensions to sovereignty in Naples. Furthermore, Milan was thought to be less likely to draw Ferdinand of Aragon into a war, and, of course, Milan was far closer to the French border. In July 1515 the French army began to move across the Alps, and in September it fought and defeated the Swiss forces defending Milan in the battle of Marignano. Francis had himself installed as duke of Milan and forced a treaty on the Swiss that permitted the French monarchy to recruit mercenary troops from among them. Perhaps most important, the French victory persuaded Pope Leo X of the need to meet with the French king. Although neither man had anticipated that the status of the French church would become the key issue of the conference, the negotiations resulted in the framing of the Concordat of Bologna, which governed the church in France until 1790.[2] It provided the king with a vast font of patronage to reward the service and loyalty of important families and officers and created an episcopate far more amenable to the "gifts" of *décimes* (tenths) that the kings annually required from the clergy after 1516. The concordat made it far less attractive to the monarchy to contemplate breaking with Rome when Protestantism made its appearance.

The Concordat of Bologna was by far the most enduring accomplishment of Francis's 1515 campaign in Italy, for his territorial conquest proved to be very fleeting. In 1521 the city of Milan fell to the forces of Charles V, who was involved there on the grounds that Milan was still a fief of the empire. An attempt to retake it the next year resulted in the French disaster at La Bicocca, and in the spring of 1524 the last French stronghold in Piedmont fell. Francis's rage at these defeats at the hands of Charles V's forces was compounded

by the treason of Charles de Bourbon, the constable of the French army, who, having failed to organize a revolt in France, had offered his services to the emperor.

In July 1524 the king took leave of his children at Blois and headed for Marseille, where Bourbon, now commander of an imperial army, had the city under siege. Having forced him to retreat, Francis pursued Bourbon across the Alps. The imperial army in Piedmont decided to abandon Milan and make its stand at Pavia to the south of Milan. Forced to fight because the lack of money threatened the imperial commanders with the desertion of much of their army, they attacked the French army on February 24, 1525. The French cavalry was repulsed by the Spanish musketmen and fled, leaving the king and a handful of the nobles of his court to fight on alone. Having had his horse killed under him, Francis was obliged to surrender. It was reported that he refused to concede to Charles de Bourbon but waited until the viceroy of Naples, Charles de Lannoy, arrived to give up his sword.[3]

Pavia was a military catastrophe for the French. The roll of great nobles killed or captured was seemingly endless with Admiral Bonnivet, the former governor of the royal children, and François de Lorraine among the dead, and Henri d'Albret and Anne de Montmorency among the captives. Francis I wrote to his mother to assure her that he was still alive, adding the poignant phrase "nothing remains to me but my honor and my life, which are safe."

Now that the imperials had the king, they had to decide what to do with him and how best to exploit their enormous good fortune. Frightened by the almost immediate escape of Henri d'Albret, Lannoy decided to send Francis to Spain, where he arrived on June 19. Having been very generously treated by his captors and given what can best be described as a triumphant welcome to Spain, the king was shocked to find himself rigidly confined in the rude tower of the Alcazar. Unable to hunt or engage in rough sports, his usual pastimes, deprived of the company of women, and faced perhaps for the first time with the full psychological impact of his defeat and captivity, Francis fell seriously ill, to the point that the emperor was told that he was dying. While word of his impending demise carried back to France by his sister Marguerite was exaggerated, his illness prompted both sides to begin serious negotiations.

Charles expected to make good all of his claims against the French monarchy, with special emphasis on gaining the duchy of Burgundy.

Despondent over the heavy demands, Francis proposed that he abdicate and the dauphin be crowned king under the regency of Louise of Savoy.[4] Whether the proposal was at least momentarily sincere or a ploy to prod the emperor to reduce his demands cannot be determined; but if the latter,[5] it succeeded since Charles made a less demanding proposal shortly after. Louise urged that Francis accept it because, as she argued, the dauphin could not rule and she was getting too old to bear the regency much longer. It was better, she said, to lose a duchy (Burgundy) than to destroy the kingdom. Thus the Treaty of Madrid was signed in January 1526.

The peace terms called for the transfer of Burgundy to Charles and the renunciation by Francis of any claim to sovereignty over Flanders, Artois, Naples, and Milan. Bourbon was to be given amnesty and reinstated in his French lands, but without Provence. The French king was to withdraw his support for Henri d'Albret's claims to Haute-Navarre. Francis had proposed that he marry Charles's sister, Eleanor, widow of the king of Portugal, to seal the treaty and that he be released immediately because he alone could effect the transfer of Burgundy. Because of this latter request, it was agreed that Francis's two older sons be given up as hostages until the fulfillment of the treaty's clauses. The treaty had, in fact, given the French the option of providing as hostages the two princes or the dauphin and twelve of the great nobles of the realm, including Anne de Montmorency, Claude de Guise, and Louis de Brézé, husband of Diane de Poitiers. Since the option involved only the second son, whose value was lessened by the existence of the third son, who would remain in France, Louise rejected it. She certainly foresaw the likelihood of war since she had to have been informed of Francis's secret oath of August 1525, sworn in the presence of the Cardinal de Tournon and Philippe Chabot, that declared null and void any promise to surrender Burgundy into which he might be coerced.[6] The regent dared not permit the principal French captains who had survived Pavia to take the place of the duke of Orléans.

Nothing is known of how or when the news that they were to take their father's place in captivity was broken to the two boys, but it was likely their aunt who did so, since she was at Blois in early February. On February 13 their grandmother arrived at Blois from Lyon amid some of the worst weather in years. Her journey from Blois to Bayonne with the two princes is well described in the reports of John Taylor, the English ambassador, who accompanied them in order to

discuss an Anglo-French alliance with Francis upon his release.[7] At Blery, Taylor had an audience with the regent and the princes and reported to Wolsey that "Verily they be two goodly children. The king's godson [Henry] is the quicker spirited and the bolder as seemth by his behavior."[8]

The entourage reached Bayonne on March 15, in time for the appointed date of exchange on March 17. When word of their arrival was passed to the Spanish, Francis was brought to the border. At seven in the morning, March 17, two boats left the shores of the bay formed by the Bidassoa River, which marked the border between France and Castile. The area for ten miles around the rendezvous point was completely deserted, as established in the exchange protocol.[9] The two boats met at a raft moored in the middle. For a moment, the king embraced his sons, told them he would send for them soon, and made the Sign of the Cross over them. Francis then entered the French boat and the princes the Spanish, and they were rowed to the opposite shores. "All was done very peaceably as it had been arranged."[10] Whether Francis looked back at his forlorn sons is not recorded; if he did, it was not for long. The moment he touched the French shore, he leapt on a horse, shouted "Now I am king; I am king once again," and dashed off to Bayonne where his mother, sister, and a number of courtiers had gathered.[11]

Dauphin Francis, who had just celebrated his eighth birthday, and Prince Henry, who was six weeks shy of his seventh, were escorted to Vitoria in Castile to join Queen Eleanor and await the fulfillment of the terms of the Treaty of Madrid, after which all would go to France. The princes were accompanied into Spain by their governor, René de Cossé-Brissac, his wife, and his youngest son. Other notables in the entourage included their tutor, Tagliacarno, and their maître d'hôtel, Louis de Ronsard, the father of the famed poet. Some seventy attendants and servants completed the French party. The French were treated cordially, and Eleanor took to the boys as the mother she shortly expected to become. The constable of Castile, Don Iñigo Hernandez de Velasco, was given responsibility for the princes until his death in October 1528, when the duty passed to his son Don Pedro, the new constable.[12]

Shortly after his sons' arrival in Spain, Francis I received word that Henry was ill. The king confronted the viceroy of Naples, Lannoy, who was at the French court for negotiations, with the report. Lannoy reported to Charles V that he answered Francis that the air

and temperature of Spain clearly disagreed with the princes and for that reason the king ought to fulfill at once the conditions of the Treaty of Madrid.[13] As the weeks passed and it became increasingly clear that the king had no intention of giving up Burgundy, the treatment of the princes and their entourage became more rigorous. Francis based his refusal to concede the duchy of Burgundy on two points: that he had been coerced into signing the treaty by the harshness of his captivity, thus voiding it; and that the Burgundian people did not want to be removed from French rule.[14] For his part, the emperor was willing to concede every other point in the treaty, except perhaps the marriage of his sister, to secure Burgundy.

To put pressure on Francis, Charles ordered that the honorable captivity of the princes be ended. They were removed from the care of Queen Eleanor and taken from Vitoria to a castle farther south, near Valladolid, to prevent any attempt at rescuing the princes. Such an attempt, or at least a plot for their escape, was reportedly uncovered in February 1527. The Spanish responded by taking the princes still further into Castile and dismissing "well nigh all of their attendants."[15] Nonetheless, in March, René de Brissac wrote to Francis requesting more money for his household and stated that it was obvious to the eye that the king's sons were increasing in virtue and size.[16]

The French monarch hoped to force Charles to give up both his demands for Burgundy and the two hostages by organizing the League of Cognac, which included the papacy, Venice, and Florence, and England as an associated state. The League's Italian members were already at war with Charles, but the sack of Rome by imperial forces in May 1527 forced Francis to take a more active role in the war. Negotiation with England resulted in an agreement in August 1527, in which the duke of Orléans was pledged to marry Princess Mary. Confident of his new alliance with England and persuaded by Cardinal Wolsey that success in Italy would bring his sons home quickly, Francis sent a French army across the Alps in the same month.[17]

Charles's response was to increase greatly the rigor of the French princes' captivity. At the end of August, the English ambassador at the French court reported that all of the servants of the dauphin had been sent back to France, which was in fact untrue, although several did return to France then, and the princes taken deeper into Spain.[18] On October 24, 1527, the English ambassadors in Spain went

to interview them to demonstrate their kingdom's friendship with France. They found the boys in a castle four leagues from Palencia. They reported:

> They be goodly children and promising, as we might, for so short a time, judge. Tagliacarno could not enough praise the duke of Orléans of wit, capacity, and great will to learn, and of a prudence and gravity passing this age, besides treatable gentleness and nobleness of mind, whereof daily he avoweth to see great sparks, as may be seen in this tender age. He much passeth his brother in learning, and in manner hath overcome the rudiments of his grammar. Tagliacarno said that one day, on their removal to the castle where we found them, "he called nothing of them for learning"; but the Duke, seeing him sit alone, came running to him, and said, "Ah, master, now I have you, you shall not go from me or ever you teach me my lesson."

The Englishmen also added the complaint that they were not permitted to see the princes a second time. Their protests to the constable of Castile were of no avail.[19]

The harshness of the two boys' imprisonment was increased a great deal more when Francis I declared war on Charles V. The emperor gave vent to his anger in his order of January 21, 1528, to remove every French attendant from the princes except for their tutor and a dwarf and replace them with Spaniards.[20] The harshness of this treatment caused "a great outcry throughout Castile . . . and the Queen [Eleanor] hearing that the French princes had been thus treated has fallen melancholy and retired to a monastery."[21] The ambassador of Ferdinand of Bohemia reported that "the emperor has had the king's sons more closely confined and watched in a spot where they ought to have been from the very beginning."[22]

The effectiveness of the closer confinement of the royal hostages is made clear by the greatly reduced number of references to them in the diplomatic dispatches from Spain, [23] although this situation was also a result of the confinement of the ambassadors of France and England. Thus, one reads only that in April 1529 Henry was very ill and as of June 2 had recovered. The statement of Jean Du Bellay to the English court that he was "in danger of his life" was perceived as seeking to arouse indignation against the emperor.[24] It was shortly after Henry had returned to good health that a French spy was discovered in the vicinity of their place of confinement and

executed. This event frightened the princes' Spanish custodians who in mid-June moved them to the fortress of Pedraza, high in the Sierra de Guardarrama north of Madrid.[25]

Pedraza was a cold and isolated place where the princes' already Spartan existence became even harsher. Surprisingly, however, information about their year at Pedraza is more extensive than that available for the previous year of captivity. In July 1529 a French spy saw the boys twice, once while they were going to Mass and the other time going out to play. On the way to church a Spanish prince and eighty soldiers accompanied them; when out to play, fifty horsemen. The spy commented on how big Henry had become and on his defiance of the Spanish: the townspeople had told him that the prince constantly hurled verbal abuse at the Spanish. When he was taken out to play or ride, two lackeys had to hold his donkey because he always tried to escape.[26]

This report is valuable because it occurred shortly before and contrasts sharply with the much more famous and dismal account of Louise of Savoy's usher, Baudin, which has come to represent the entire circumstances of the princes' ordeal. His mistress had sent Baudin to Spain to check on the condition of the princes after the signing of the Peace of Cambrai on August 3, 1529. While the emperor and the French king had been busy posturing, challenging each other to a duel at the Bidassoa River, the two most influential women of the era, Louise and Margaret of Austria, Charles's aunt and regent of the Netherlands, took matters into their own hands. They agreed to begin peace negotiations on July 5, 1529. A month later an agreement, *la paix des dames*, was hammered out. It reaffirmed the Treaty of Madrid with the very important revision that Francis would pay 2 million écus for the ransom of his sons instead of conceding Burgundy, with 1.2 million to be paid upon the release of the hostages. Charles never gave up his claim to Burgundy, but, as he told his son Philip, the claim should be maintained without being made the cause of war.[27]

Once the treaty had been signed, Louise requested permission to send someone to inform her grandchildren that they would soon be released. So her usher was sent south several days after the agreement. He was delayed twenty-three days at Narbonne waiting for a safe conduct, and he spent another three weeks on the road, reaching Pedraza in mid-September. Always kept under the close guard of eight to ten soldiers, he was at last presented to the commander

of the fortress, the marquis de Belanga, brother of the constable of Castile, who took him in to see the princes.

Baudin's report begins by describing the room where he first saw the princes:

> In a dark, disordered chamber with no adornments except straw mattresses were my lords, seated on little stone seats opposite the windows of the chamber, which is furnished both within and without with large iron bars, while the wall is eight to ten feet thick. The window is so high that only with great difficulty can my lords enjoy air and light. It is an unhealthy place and most unhealthy for those of the young and tender age of my lords. They were poorly clad in a sort of black-velvet riding-costume, with black-velvet caps, without silk ribbons or ornaments of any kind, white stockings, and black-velvet shoes. Seeing them so, it was impossible for me to refrain from shedding tears."[28]

When Baudin told the dauphin in French that his father and grandmother had sent him to inform the princes of the treaty and expected release, Francis turned to the Spanish captain and said in Spanish that he did not understand him and wished that the visitor would use the language of the country. Baudin, who knew Spanish, incredulously asked how it was possible that he had forgotten French. He replied that he could not remember it since he never saw anyone with whom to speak it. Henry then told his brother that the visitor was the usher, Baudin. The dauphin replied that he did in fact know him but had not wished to say so. The brothers then proceeded to bombard Baudin with questions about their family and the court. (There is no indication in what language this conversation was carried on.) The party moved on into another room that was more disorderly, equally poorly furnished, but better lit. There were, as well, two little dogs for them to play with. One of the Spanish guards who was always with the boys remarked: "You see how the sons of the king of France are treated, living among the soldiers of the mountains of Spain, with no education or exercise." Baudin replied that he hoped that they would find better treatment in less than three months, but the marquis of Belanga replied that it would be more than three or four months before they left Spain. He then insisted that Baudin leave, despite the Frenchman's annoyance at the short time of the visit.

The next day Baudin returned with the reluctant permission of

Belanga to give the princes ornate velvet caps and, having noticed that they had grown substantially, to take their measurements for new clothes upon their release. The Spaniards, however, refused to allow him to give the gifts or take the measurements, apparently on the grounds that they were afraid that Baudin was a magician and would use these means to spirit the prisoners out of Spain.

Despite the poignancy and pathos of Baudin's account, which has been accepted uncritically by historians, certain aspects create problems that make it difficult to accept the account as a completely valid picture of the princes in captivity. It seems implausible that the two boys had forgotten how to speak French in the eighteen months since their French attendants had been taken away. The dauphin was nearly eleven when his French companions were removed, and he had his brother with whom to speak French. Furthermore, the emperor's order of February 1528 isolating them exempted their tutor and dwarf, although it is obvious that by the time of Baudin's visit even that exemption had been revoked.[29]

Nonetheless, one must accept Baudin's statement as accurate since he had no reason to disguise the truth. Consequently, one can explain the incident as a fit of juvenile petulance on the part of the princes or, more likely, a case of identification with the aggressor, to use a concept from modern psychology. In a situation where a person is under the complete control of another in an alien environment, he often begins to take on the characteristics of his captor. That this may well have happened to the French princes is supported by their habit of dressing in the first years of their release in a manner considered more Spanish than French.[30]

Another problem in the Baudin report is the statement attributed to a Spanish officer that the princes had neither exercise nor education. The report of the French spy of July 1529 stated clearly that they had been taken out for exercise. What was the purpose of the Spanish comment if in fact it was not really true? One may presume that the Spanish captain, to whom the statement about no exercise is attributed, knew enough of the Spanish government's purpose in holding the princes as hostages to present their circumstances in the worst light, so as to increase the pressure on the French to fulfill quickly and exactly the terms of the Treaty of Cambrai. Baudin's reception at Pedraza seems to have been designed with that end in mind. In that regard, one must note that the Spaniards constantly stated how distasteful it was to them to treat princes in that way.

There is sufficient evidence available to suggest that when there were no known French observers about, they may well have been treated better.

As noted, the marquis de Belanga had expressed the opinion that the release of the princes would not occur as quickly as the French hoped. And he was correct, for the date for their repatriation as set in the Treaty of Cambrai, March 1, 1530, passed without their release, in large part because Francis I had enormous difficulty in raising the 1.2 million écus needed for their exchange. But Charles V did take steps to ease the severity of their imprisonment.[31] René de Brissac, who had been allowed to return to France because of ill health, but without his wife and son, was allowed to rejoin his charges in March 1530. With him came Côme Clausse, the future secretary of state under Henry II, who described the princes' living condition as "extremely noisome" in a letter to Montmorency.[32] He stated that he found the dauphin and his brother in very good health and "marvelously happy at the coming of Sieur de Brissac." He gave their daily routine, noting that their meals were served by their own squires and attendants. In the afternoon they were taken out for exercise and hunting, although under the strict watch of twenty-five foot soldiers and ten mounted guards. Between six and seven in the evening they had their supper, after which all of their French attendants were put out of the fortress.[33]

At the end of March 1530 the French princes were brought down from Pedraza and sent north toward the border.[34] The problems of collecting the huge sum for their ransom had been staggering. In 1527, representatives of the nobility, the clergy, the parlements and the Hôtel de ville of Paris had agreed to raise 2 million écus, either for the ransom of the royal sons or for a war with Charles V. When the Peace of Cambrai was signed, collection of the money had not proceeded very far but was quickened after August 1529. In April 1530 the last French-minted gold coin in circulation in France had been collected, and the ransom commission had to turn to foreign coins, which were melted down and reissued as écus. In early June the imperial representative was called in, and he and Cardinal de Tournon, in charge of the ransom commission, proceeded to the weighing of the coins. They were found to be light because of debasement, and another 41,000 écus were added to make the necessary weight.[35]

The dauphin and the duke of Orléans, still under the guard of the constable of Castile, reached Vitoria in early June, where Queen

Eleanor, still waiting to be married to Francis I, rejoined them. At the end of the month, arrangements for the exchange, delayed by disputes over protocol, were completed, and a train of thirty-two well-guarded mules carrying the ransom left Bayonne for the exact place on the Bidassoa where the first exchange had taken place in 1526. The second exchange, in the evening of July 1, 1530, was exactly the same as the first except for the complication caused by the many heavy boxes of coins that had to be transferred. Queen Eleanor, meanwhile, crossed the Bidassoa in her own boat; and once the princes had reached the French shore, the entire company set off for Bayonne. A messenger was sent to inform Francis at Bordeaux of the successful exchange, and he and his court went immediately to Bayonne. On July 3, the father and his sons were reunited, and on the seventh, the marriage of Eleanor and Francis, already effected by proxy, was celebrated.[36]

There is no reason to suppose that their lengthy imprisonment at a key period in their physical development stunted the princes' growth or physical skills. Both had grown a great deal, as Baudin had noted, and they apparently were well nourished.[37] All accounts agree that Henry grew to become a fit, physically powerful, and imposing young man, while too little is known of the cause of Dauphin Francis's death in 1536 to suggest any causal relationship with his captivity.

Psychologically, the impact seems to have been greater, especially on the younger brother. The dauphin seems to have accepted the rationale for his imprisonment reasonably well. When on the banks of the Bidassoa, the constable of Castile asked his forgiveness for any injury he may have caused him, he replied that he was content. Henry, for his part, reportedly broke wind.[38] The constable gave each brother a pair of horses for which the dauphin wrote a letter of thanks and signed it "vôtre bon ami."[39] Nonetheless, he became something of a loner, preferring to wear black clothes and appearing sober and reflective in a manner looked upon as more Spanish than French.[40]

Given the fact that observers had previously commented on the outgoing and bright character of the younger brother, the change that his ordeal effected in Henry appears to have been more extensive and negative. According to Noël Williams:

> In the Duc d'Orléans the change was even more marked. Awkward, taciturn, morose, unsociable, he seemed an altogether different being from the bright, intelligent lad whom the English

> Ambassador had seen at Amboise [*sic*] on the eve of his departure for Spain. The boy's spirit, in fact, had been crushed by the dreary existence which, as we have seen, had been his lot for more than four years—an existence in which he had not only been deprived of the affection and sympathy so necessary for one of his age, but subjected, it is but too probable, to constant petty humiliations at the hands of his callous gaolers. So profound was the impression which his sufferings had left upon him, that in 1542—that is to say, twelve years after his return from Spain—Matteo Dandolo, the Venetian Ambassador in France, wrote that few people at the Court could ever remember to have heard him laugh from the heart.[41]

Williams's opinion reflects the virtually unanimous consensus of contemporaries and historians that the Spanish captivity drastically and negatively transformed Henry's character.

This commonsense conclusion would find support in a modern theory of the psychology of child development that sees the period of childhood corresponding to the age of Henry's imprisonment as the key time for social development. Cut off from the guidance of adults and interaction with his peers, Henry emerged from Spain considerably retarded in social skills. Unable to adjust and learn socially acceptable behavior quickly, he withdrew from extensive social contact and appeared taciturn and melancholic. He would take refuge in the sort of physical exercise in which he excelled and found opportunities to act out his aggressions and relieve his frustrations in wrestling and, later, jousting. His intense loyalty to two considerably older persons, Anne de Montmorency and Diane de Poitiers, can be seen as reflecting a belated development in relationships with paternal figures, which he could not achieve with his father, who made no effort to improve his relationship with Henry until two years before his death.

There is, however, another possible interpretation of the psychological impact that the Spanish captivity had on Henry, which would play down the impact on him. This view would note that the English ambassador, just before the exchange for Francis, had called Henry "the quicker-spirited and the bolder, " which suggests a more aggressive personality. His behavior in Spain clearly was more aggressive than his brother's. His captivity would have prevented him from learning how to socialize these aggressive tendencies inherent

in him. He may have felt that the loss of the French entourage and the ever-stricter confinement of the brothers were punishment for his behavior and felt guilt about how it affected his brother. Having returned to the French court, where his aggressive behavior was frowned on, Henry's response was to become rigidly controlled, expending his energy and anger in rough sports and exercises and not allowing himself displays of emotion. A person with this sort of personality would have had a difficult adolescence under any circumstances; the imprisonment would have further exacerbated his adolescent problems. Among them would be a serious conflict with the father or a father-figure, which Francis's attitude did nothing to alleviate. Compounding Francis's indifference to Henry was the deep resentment that Henry felt toward his father for abandoning him to the Spanish. Acutely aware of his father's disapproval and used in his marriage to Catherine de Medici as a pawn in Francis's diplomacy, the sibling rivalry inherent in his character would have been made even more bitter by his father's obvious favoritism to his younger brother.

This approach to assessing Henry's psychological development would propose that the Spanish imprisonment would not have profoundly changed his personality, but would have made it far more difficult for him to deal with the antisocial tendencies in it. Freed at last from his father's disapproval upon Francis's death, Henry could at last relax the rigid tendencies he had used to control his emotions and mask, without complete success, his resentments. Observers noted a significant change in him after he became king, including the ability to laugh freely. Nonetheless, the characteristics of his youth did not disappear entirely; he displayed them in a strong stubborn streak, an aggressive foreign policy, especially toward Charles V, and an unforgiving attitude toward those who disapproved of what he held dear, whether his mistress or his religion.[42] Blaise de Monluc, the tough Gascon captain, described Henry as never forgetting a service nor allowing malice to change his opinion of a faithful servant, "but he never forgot a fault or an injury and could not easily conquer his resentments."[43] As much as such a short statement can possibly sum up a person's character and career, Monluc saw to the heart of Henry's domestic and foreign policy.

3 HUSBAND AND DAUPHIN

Having returned from Spain, the two princes settled back into the routine of being dauphin and second son. A triumphal tour of western France with their father and new stepmother took them to Amboise in September 1530, where the entire family was together for the first time in more than six years.[1] In March of the next year the brothers attended Queen Eleanor at her coronation. At about the same time the king reconstituted the dauphin's household, to which his two younger brothers were attached. Its members included the scions of the greatest families of the realm. Artus and Charles de Cossé-Brissac were also members since their father remained as governor of the prince's household and their mother its governess. Still another member of the household appeared in 1530, when Jean d'Albon de Saint-André was named as Henry's personal governor. He had been involved with Montmorency in the process of freeing the princes. His son Jacques, the future marshal and confidant of Henry II, also joined the household as an *enfant d'honneur*.[2]

Tagliacarno also returned as tutor, but his interests began to turn to the several clerical benefices with which the king had favored him, culminating in his nomination to the bishopric of Grasse. He gave up his position as tutor in 1533. He was succeeded by Guillaume Du Maine, a poet and humanist of some reputation who, like Tagliacarno, had previously served as tutor for the sons of Guillaume Budé.[3]

Life in the household of the royal sons was described in April 1531 in a long letter by the tutor of one of its less prominent members, François de La Trémoille, to the boy's father.[4] The activities of the household seem to have consisted largely of rough sports and horseplay, in which the dauphin several times bullied the younger

La Trémoille to tears. Henry was noted as enjoying wrestling, tennis, and jumping. His older brother was described as often preferring to spend his pastime in solitude, but "whatever he wishes to do, good or bad, he is little contradicted." When he was corrected, the dauphin would reply that the king wanted him and his brother nourished in this freedom so they would forget the terror of their captivity in Spain. Although Henry is only mentioned in passing in this letter, it suggests that Brantôme's often-cited quotation of Francis I's remark that "the mark of a Frenchman was to be always gay and lively and he did not care for dreamy, sullen, sleepy children" applied as much to the older brother as to Henry.[5] There is no question, however, that the king found the personality of his third son, Charles, much more to his liking and bestowed little parental affection on his older sons.

Nonetheless, Henry was a prince of France and, as such, the subject of numerous marriage schemes to advance the foreign policy of his father. As early as 1523, there was a suggestion that he be betrothed to the daughter of Queen Eleanor of Portugal, his future stepmother.[6] The principal subject of these schemes, however, was Princess Mary of England, who was three years older than Henry. The hand of Mary Tudor was used as a negotiating ploy by her father on numerous occasions, involving Francis I himself and his two older sons. Those proposals involving Henry were the most seriously considered, especially during the negotiations between France and England while the princes were in Spain. The Peace of Cambrai included a clause affirming their future marriage.[7] In September 1530 the negotiations on the matter were still moving forward, but in October the Milanese ambassador in London reported that the discussions had stalled because Francis suspected that Henry VIII wanted to bring his son to England to serve as security for the debt that he owed the English king.

Francis delayed the formal betrothal on the grounds that his son was not old enough to consummate the marriage, but certainly the cloud over Mary's legitimacy created by her father's quest for an annulment of his marriage to Queen Catherine was a factor. This point was made clear in February 1532, when the Venetian ambassador in England reported the delay of the marriage until Henry VIII's case was settled, because Francis did not want it to be said that his son had married a bastard.[8] Nevertheless, discussion continued until September 1532, when all mention ceased, presumably because of the forthcoming conclusion of Henry VIII's suit.[9]

By that time a new candidate for the position of spouse to Henry had come to the fore—Caterina Maria de' Medici, daughter of Lorenzo de' Medici, duke of Urbino and grandson of Lorenzo the Magnificent, and Madeleine de La Tour d'Auvergne, a member of a prominent French noble family.[10] Catherine was the cousin twice-removed of Pope Clement VII, but was usually referred to as his niece. As the only member of her generation in the legitimate line of the Medici family, she was the topic of a great deal of matrimonial diplomacy on the part of Clement VII. She had been born April 13, 1519, two weeks after her future husband, and her childhood was probably even more distressful than Henry's. Both her parents died within a month of her birth. Pulled back and forth in the political tug-of-war between the commune of Florence and her family, and shunted about between Florence and Rome and from one convent to another, the moments of security in her first fourteen years must have been few and far between.[11]

Like Henry, Catherine was the subject of numerous marriage proposals, such as to the duke of Richmond, Henry VIII's illegitimate son, or to the duke of Milan, Francesco Sforza, the candidate of the emperor. In January 1531, however, the Venetian ambassador in France reported that the pope was urging the marriage of his niece to the duke of Orléans and hoped to gain the duchy of Milan for the couple.[12] Henry's age was a stumbling block, since he was still two years from the canonical age for marriage. Clement objected to Francis's suggestion that Catherine go to France for the betrothal and then wait several years for the marriage.[13] He was mindful of the many marriage contracts broken by the European royalty, and he was determined to protect his niece and family from such humiliation, as well as to avoid the loss of time and opportunity that a long but eventually broken betrothal would incur.

When the French offered a marriage contract in April 1531, Clement raised several objections and delayed accepting it. A year later, however, the Venetian ambassador affirmed that the marriage would take place, as would a conference between Clement and Francis.[14] Negotiations concerning the marriage and the conference were concluded in early September 1533. Within a month a fleet of papal galleys arrived at Marseille, where the French court joined Clement and Catherine two days after their arrival. On October 28 Pope Clement presided over one of the more spectacular marriage ceremonies of

the century. Afterward, as the scandalmongers have taken great delight in detailing, the king and the pope remained in the wedding suite to see whether Henry at age fourteen was mature enough to consummate the marriage.[15] He was.

Catherine's dowry was considerable—130,000 écus, most of which came from the city of Florence rather than the pope, although he added 30,000 in exchange for her concession of her rights to Urbino. She also received several notable precious jewels, including a famous pearl necklace that she gave eventually to her daughter-in-law, Mary Stuart, from whom Elizabeth I seized it. For his part, the French king provided his son with an annual income of 50,000 livres from the duchy of Orléans and his new daughter-in-law an income of 10,000 livres. Catherine also had an inheritance of French lands from her mother Madeleine de La Tour, with an estimated income of 9,000 écus.[16]

The marriage had been arranged strictly for political purposes, and politics occupied the attention of Clement and Francis for the five weeks that they were together at Marseille. Secret clauses of the marriage contract promised that the pope would support the French conquest of Milan, Pisa, Parma and Montferrat, which would be given to the young couple to rule. Clement agreed to create four new French cardinals, including Anne de Montmorency's nephew, Odet de Châtillon, later to become an embarrassment to the Curia, and to allow Francis to collect a clerical tenth. Disappointed because Catherine failed to show any signs of being pregnant, Clement left Marseille at the end of November. Nine months later he was dead, and the Franco-papal alliance that the marriage was to seal was dissolved as well. The new pope, Paul III, refused to recognize any obligations involving the marriage, including the last installment of Clement's share of Catherine's dowry.

Francis's failure to make any permanent gains in Italy only added to the unpopularity of the marriage. Most Frenchmen resented it as a *mésalliance* between a prince of royal blood and an "Italian shopkeeper's daughter," ignoring her French noble ancestry. Many felt that the king had been duped in the matter of Catherine's dowry, believing that the Medici heiress ought to have brought a great deal more.[17] Henry himself appears to have been of much the same opinion. He, of course, had had nothing to say about the choice of his mate, and he would later indicate his resentment over the fact that he

had been married to a spouse who brought him no significant lands or fortune, while his younger brother Charles expected to marry the emperor's daughter.

It seems fair to say that Catherine had no special sexual attraction for Henry. Her physical appearance has been the subject of so many contradictory statements that one can hardly reach any conclusions about it. Nonetheless, judging from the many portraits and descriptions of her as a young woman, she was outshone by the beautiful women of the French court, many of whom Francis I had placed there precisely because of their beauty. Her charm, intelligence and, perhaps most important, her interest in riding and hunting won her more support, particularly from the one whose opinion mattered the most in the first years of her marriage—her father-in-law. It is true that in early 1535 the Spanish ambassador in France wrote that the duchess of Orléans was being treated as usual but "some of her maids say that they heard the king say he had not been well-advised when he made his son marry her."[18] Later in the same year, however, the Venetian ambassador reported that "the king, the Dauphin, her husband as well as the king's youngest son seem to love her much."[19] How accurate that statement was in regard to Catherine's husband is, however, open to some question. Although their marriage had been consummated on their wedding night, it appears that for some time afterward they lived as brother and sister because Catherine had not reached puberty.[20]

Equally a threat to Catherine's place as wife to Henry was the dominating presence of the famous Diane de Poitiers, Henry's mistress. The subject of numerous biographies, few of which have any value as history,[21] Diane has been the object of as much malicious gossip as anyone in history. Clearly the worst piece is the report that "in her youth Diane redeemed by her virginity the life of Sieur de Saint-Vallier, her father"[22] who had been condemned to death in 1524 for his role in the treason of Constable de Bourbon. The precise point of that charge is disproven by the fact that at that date Diane, born in 1499, had been married for ten years to the Grand Sénéchal of Normandy, Louis de Brézé, and had two daughters. The broader charge, that she had been Francis I's mistress before becoming Henry's, is disposed of less easily, but Georges Guiffrey, editor of her letters, has convincingly argued that the characters of Francis, Louis de Brézé and Diane made it highly implausible that such a

relationship occurred prior to Brézé's death in 1531, by which time Anne de Pisseleu had a firm grip on the king's affections.

Henry and Diane met for certain for the first time at his return from Spain, in 1530. Largely ignored because of the emphasis on his older brother and the marriage of his father and Queen Eleanor, the eleven year-old boy was permanently smitten by the beautiful, mature woman of thirty who took an interest in him and gave him her scarf to wear in the tournament that celebrated the marriage.[23] Shortly after her husband's death in the following year, Diane began a relationship with Henry that was seen by some as being entirely maternal as late as 1547.[24] At what point the relationship ceased being maternal and became sexual is unknown, but it certainly occurred before 1547, perhaps in 1536. Whatever qualms Henry might have had about adultery were reduced, if not eliminated, by the examples of his father and his godfather Henry VIII. Francis's mistress, Anne de Pisseleu, openly flaunted her control over him, and a bastard son of Henry Tudor was sent to be raised with the French princes in 1532.[25]

Diane's attention to the young prince must have perked up a great deal in 1536, when Henry suddenly became the successor to the French throne. The dauphin Francis, who had impressed observers at his brother's wedding in 1533 with his poise and quiet charm,[26] died in August 1536, four days after he had taken ill after a vigorous game of tennis. Any unexpected death was, in this era, cause for suspicion of poisoning, and an Italian squire of the dauphin, who had the misfortune of possessing a book on toxicology, was tortured into a confession.[27] Although he subsequently retracted his confession, he was executed by being torn apart by horses. In the confession the Italian named Charles V as the perpetrator, but suspicious eyes were also cast toward those who clearly would benefit the most from the dauphin's death—Henry and Catherine. Since all Italians were considered expert toxicologists (and Catherine certainly enhanced that view in her later years), many Frenchmen believed that she had plotted the death in order to rise from ignored wife of the second son to the exalted position of dauphine. Catherine never was able to shake completely the suspicion that she had risen to power through the murder of her brother-in-law.

Henry's reaction to the death of his brother is unknown. One would like to think that the two brothers who had spent four years as

one another's only companion had remained close, but there is little evidence available on the relationship after 1530. In 1534, however, Henry had asked the king to give him Brittany as an appanage, but Francis had already decided to crown the dauphin as duke. The refusal of his request is said to have strained his relationship with both father and brother.[28] Francis I had attempted to make good Henry's claim to the duchy of Milan by sending an army into Italy in 1535, but it had failed to take the city. Thus Henry's ambition to take a place among the important figures of Europe had remained unfulfilled. His unexpected elevation to successor to the throne, therefore, certainly balanced any sadness he felt at the loss of his brother.

Shortly before the dauphin's death, the Venetian ambassador Giustiniano wrote a description of the king's children. Henry was said to be eighteen years old (he must have been seventeen), melancholic like his older brother, and like him enjoyed hunting and exercising with weapons. Giustiniano added: "The integrity of his judgment is already remarkable."[29] The value of his report as an accurate assessment of the French court, however, comes into question when one finds that he had Catherine de Medici as the wife of the youngest brother, Charles, who became the duke of Orléans upon his brother's death.

After his son's death, the king decided to separate the households of his younger sons. Henry chose for his the bravest young gentlemen of the court and, in particular, Jacques de Saint-André, François de La Châtaigneraie, Claude de Dampierre, Jean d'Andouins, and François d'Escars. For the next ten years this group of gay young blades was inseparable, and together they fought in war, hunted, played tennis, pulled off practical jokes, and defended their position at court. For his part, Prince Charles, feeling insulted at the choices left to him, refused to name anyone until Francis intervened in the quarrel. Thus the rivalry and jealousy between the two brothers was manifested from the first days of Henry's status as dauphin, although as late as 1542 the Venetian ambassador described Henry as bantering and playing practical jokes with his brother like "an excellent comrade."[30]

Once he had become dauphin, Henry was determined to take advantage of the prerogatives of the office, which included the right to serve in the field as the commander of a royal army. Eager to prove himself in battle (he had been knighted immediately before his marriage), he persuaded his father to let him join Anne de Montmorency

in Provence, where the French and the imperial armies had been waging a particularly brutal war. After its failure in the previous year to take Milan, the French army had been driven out of Piedmont and pursued by the emperor's army into Provence. Montmorency was conducting a scorched-earth policy of unusual thoroughness in Provence to prevent the enemy from supporting itself in the field. He was beginning to have some success by the time Henry arrived on the scene.

Montmorency had always been close to all of the royal children, but it was during the several months of this campaign that he and Henry forged the close ties and mutual respect that endured until Henry's death. As Henry wrote shortly after, "Be sure that whatever happens, I am and shall be for my life as much your friend as anyone in the world." Although he was nominally in command of the French army, the dauphin deferred to his second-in-command in all respects and learned a great deal about waging defensive warfare, at which Montmorency excelled. The successful expulsion of the imperial army substantially raised Montmorency's credit with the king and the people, and lifted Henry's as well. The duke wrote in the following spring when he and Henry were campaigning in Artois that Henry's presence "gives great pleasure to this army . . . and the troops are eager to fight well so that, if it please God, he will come out victorious and with great honor."[31]

A truce, however, prevented a conclusive battle in Artois, and Francis's attention again turned to Milan. Henry was appointed commander of the vanguard of the royal army crossing the Alps, with Montmorency as his chief of staff. The duke's capable generalship cleared the passes of Piedmont for the royal army, and by November 1537, the French were on the Po in full strength. The emperor's forces had been thrown back in large part because of the war with the Turks in the Mediterranean and in Hungary, which was going badly for Charles V. The looming threat of the infidel in central Europe was creating a major embarrassment out of the infamous alliance that Francis had concluded with the sultan in 1536. Pope Paul III, eager to create a united Christendom to face the Turks, pressed Charles and Francis to make peace. Thus in June 1538, after a conference at Nice where the pope served as a go-between for Charles and Francis, a ten-year truce was signed. It maintained the status quo in Piedmont with the French in control of most of the region but not the key prize—Milan.

Henry was thus deprived of the duchy that he considered to be rightfully his as well as the great battle in which he had hoped to have proven his mettle. But the Piedmont campaign was not a complete loss for Henry; while there he fathered a daughter with a Piedmontese girl.[32] The child, named Diane, was taken to France and raised in the royal household, where she occasioned gossip that she was in fact the child of Henry and Diane de Poitiers. By siring this child, Henry put the responsibility for the lack of offspring from his legitimate union on his wife, putting greater pressure on Catherine to produce an heir.

Another benefit for Henry from the Provence–Piedmont campaign was that his mentor and confidant, Anne de Montmorency, was raised to the office of constable in February 1538. His investiture with the office, left vacant since the defection of the last constable, Charles de Bourbon, took place, with intentional irony, at a château once owned by Bourbon. With his close friend elevated to a position of the highest influence, Henry could hope to see royal policy reflect his interests. It may have been the dashing of such expectations that caused Henry to become so upset at the decision of his father to pursue the acquisition of Milan by means of a different tack—the proposed marriage of his youngest son, Charles, to Charles V's daughter Mary. The bad blood between the two brothers, already obvious to court observers, was brought to a boil by this proposal.

The feud had multiple causes. Henry clearly resented the fact that he had been sent off into captivity while his younger brother remained at home to capture the deepest affection of their father. But the king's favoritism toward Charles was motivated in large part by their close similarity in both appearance and personality. Francis clearly saw himself in the bright, vivacious, and impetuous Charles in a way he never could in his son Francis, and certainly not in Henry. If the *Mémoires de Vieilleville* can be trusted, Charles openly revealed his ambition to be more than a younger son of the king. In 1547 Henry's companions at Francis I's obsequies, Jacques de Saint-André and François de Vieilleville, told him how Charles had celebrated the false report that the two older brothers had drowned in a boating accident and had become depressed and ill when word came that his brothers were still alive, saying: "God's curse on this news. I shall never become anything but a nonentity."[33]

The rivalry between the two brothers became a far more serious matter when it expanded to include the two most powerful women at

the French court—Anne de Pisseleu and Diane de Poitiers. Anne, the duchesse d'Etampes, Francis's mistress since his return from Spain in 1526, clearly enjoyed the vast gifts of jewels, property, and patronage her royal lover bestowed on her and quickly moved to eliminate any threat to her power and influence. Diane, as mistress to the dauphin, presented an obvious rival to Anne's position and, of course, would displace her as the most powerful woman in France as soon as Francis died. Spurred on by a deep personal antagonism as well, the two women's relationship grew from dislike to open hatred. The duchesse d' Etampes, terrified by the prospect of being displaced by her enemy, sought to build a party around herself that would enable her to retain a position of power upon the king's death. The center of her plans was Charles d'Orléans, who was all too willing to serve her purposes. The two became the center of a faction at court that was made up largely of ambitious young nobles such as Gaspard de Tavannes, a future marshal of France and author of an important set of memoirs, but also included several established courtiers, such as Marguerite d'Angoulême and the Admiral Philippe Chabot.[34]

Henry's circle came to be centered on Constable Montmorency, who had a personal feud with Chabot dating to before 1530.[35] In the immediate aftermath of the truce of 1538, the constable, who had been the leading advocate of seeking peace with the emperor, had reached the pinnacle of influence at the court. He dominated the making of foreign policy for the next two years; he acted largely on the belief that Milan could be gained for France by maintaining peace with Charles V. When, in October 1540, Charles V made clear the fallacy of that policy by investing his son Philip as duke of Milan, the constable's influence collapsed rapidly. After several humiliations at the hands of the king, he left the court in June 1541, not to return until Henry's accession to the throne.[36] With Montmorency gone from the court, the Etampes-Orléans faction had the upper hand, and it set about to win for Prince Charles a position of power that could not be lost after the death of Francis, which, given the king's health in 1541, was seen as not far in the future.

The collapse of the constable's policy and his disgrace led to a renewal of war with the emperor in which the two brothers vied with one another for military glory.[37] Charles gained the advantage in this regard, for he was the nominal commander, with Claude de Guise as his chief of staff, of the French army that took the excellent fortress of Luxembourg in 1542. Henry was given an army in the Midi, serv-

ing with Marshal Claude d'Annebault, to attack the Spanish province of Roussillon. Having taken Luxembourg, and hearing that a great battle was forthcoming in the south, the duke of Orléans disbanded his army and rushed to Perpignan to win further glory. But Henry, unable to attack Perpignan because of its extraordinarily strong fortifications, was forced to retreat without a major battle. Meanwhile, the imperial forces retook Luxembourg. The rivalry between the two brothers had cost the French a major gain, although the French did recapture Luxembourg the following year. It was near Perpignan that an incident occurred that showed Henry to be capable of a graceful touch. Charles de Cossé-Brissac, son of his former governor and his companion in Spain, led a very courageous sally to save some French guns from capture. Henry said to his officers: "If I were not Dauphin, I would wish today to be Monsieur de Brissac."[38]

The war continued through 1543 and into 1544. Henry was involved in considerable hard fighting but with only mixed success. His request that Montmorency be recalled to serve with him was brusquely refused. Invading Champagne, Charles V outmaneuvered the dauphin and for a time threatened Paris. Reduced by desertion and disease, the imperial army could not push on to Paris, but the fright that the incident caused Francis, along with the near bankruptcy of the treasury, convinced him of the need for peace.

The Peace of Crépy, signed in September 1544, pledged the French monarch to aid the emperor against the Turks and, in a secret codicil, against the German Protestants.[39] More pertinent to the members of the French court, the treaty called for the marriage of the duke of Orléans to the daughter of either the emperor or his brother, Ferdinand. If the former, the couple would receive the Netherlands and Franche-Comté as a dowry; if the latter, the duchy of Milan. In either case Charles would receive from his father the duchies of Orléans, Angoulême, Bourbon, and Châtelleraut. The emperor had four months to decide on which bride to give to the duke, and in the end he offered the daughter of Ferdinand.

This agreement may well have been the most reckless act of Francis's reign. It would have created a dangerous threat to the unity of the kingdom, for it would have made Prince Charles an enormously powerful man within France and provided him with a very potent power base outside of the realm. The Burgundian situation of the previous century would probably have been recreated. One suspects that Francis agreed to these provisions not only because he wished

to be generous to his favorite son and secure Milan for his dynasty, but also because Anne de Pisseleu encouraged him as a way to secure her own future. She reportedly received a promise to be made governor of the Netherlands if Charles received them.

Dauphin Henry was enraged when he received news of the treaty. He was motivated, of course, by envy of his brother, but equally by the threat it posed to his future power as king. Speaking of the peace treaty, the papal nuncio wrote that "it can only been seen as provoking discontent between the duke and the dauphin."[40] Henry had hoped for a marriage between his brother and Jeanne d'Albret, who was about to be released from her marriage to the duke of Cleves. Henry signed the Treaty of Crépy, as he put it, out of "fear and reverence for my father," but he proceeded to write a secret protest in December 1544, witnessed by three prominent young noblemen—Antoine de Vendôme-Bourbon, François d'Enghien, and François de Guise.[41]

Henry's anger at this turn of events was less than it might have been because the birth of a son the previous year had reduced the likelihood that his brother would gain the French throne. By 1542 the failure of Henry's marriage to produce a child had given rise to suggestions that it be ended. Catherine sought to quiet them by appealing first to her husband who, "because he loved her," assured her he had no thought of it. More important, she also went to Francis and pledged to go to a convent if that was what he wanted her to do. His reply, as reported by the Venetian ambassador: "Since God has willed for you to be my daughter-in-law and wife to the dauphin, I do not wish to change it and perhaps it will please Almighty God to grant to you and me the gift we greatly long for."[42] The papal nuncio wrote at about the same time that "Madame la Dauphine is much loved by the king."[43]

Despite these assurances, Catherine, as well as Henry, must have been enormously relieved when she became pregnant in 1542 and far more so when she gave birth to a son in January 1543. The child, named Francis for his grandfather and godfather, was always rather weak and sickly, but the fact of his existence was all that mattered.[44] After the first child, others came rapidly—ten in all, seven of whom survived infancy. The latter were Francis, Elisabeth, born in 1545, Claude, in 1547, Charles, in 1550, Edouard (Henry III), in 1551, Marguerite, in 1553, and Hercule François, in 1555.

One can presume that, with the birth of his son, Henry slept more

easily, knowing that his brother was no longer directly behind him in the line of succession. That problem disappeared entirely twenty months later when Charles suddenly died. Tavannes, his boon companion, reports that while Charles was on campaign with the army in Picardy, he was advised that several persons had died of the plague in a certain house. Charles arrogantly declared that no prince of royal blood had ever died of the plague and entered it. In four days he was dead. The king was heartbroken over the death of his favorite son, and Henry himself is said to have wept. Eight times he was prevented from entering the sickroom of his brother for fear that he would become ill as well.[45]

The death of the son whom Francis probably would have preferred to see as his heir meant that in his old age he had to turn to Henry and prepare him more thoroughly to take over the government after his death. Francis's efforts at improving his relationship with his surviving son and preparing him for rule continued, despite the embarrassing episode recorded by Vieilleville, in which Francis's jester overheard Henry telling his friends what offices they would receive after he became king.[46] As early as 1537 the king had associated his heir with him in royal authority by having Henry sit at his right hand in a *lit de justice*. Francis invited Henry to attend the *conseil d'état* on a regular basis. Nonetheless, he offended his son by his statement that he intended to be king until his death and no one was to act or speak to the contrary.[47] Henry, for his part, was reluctant to identify himself too directly with the decisions of the old court so as not to be blamed for their failures, and he absented himself frequently. Furthermore, he refused to preside over the council.[48]

The memoirs of Blaise de Monluc show that Henry was present in the council in March 1544, when Monluc made his appeal to the king to permit the French army in Italy to give battle to the imperial forces. The dauphin, he noted, stood behind the king's chair and said nothing. Monluc remarked that "I believe it is not the custom for the Dauphin to speak although the king would have him present to learn." When Monluc began to press his point, "the Dauphin gave me a nod with his head by which I guessed he would have me speak boldly."[49] Clearly, Henry was given the opportunity to participate in the government in the last years before Francis's death, although the relationship between the two continued to be troubled by such matters as the feud between Guy de Jarnac and François de La

Châtaigneraie, representatives of the court's two factions, which was to be resolved early in the next reign.

With the demise of the old king expected soon, the foreign powers began to seek to use the dauphin, known to be at odds with him, for their purposes and to gain influence over the coming reign. Heinrich Bullinger, among others, thought that Henry might embrace the Reform. In 1546 the German Lutheran princes made contact with Henry through the city of Strasbourg and Martin Bucer and Jacob Sturm, in hopes of joining France to the Schmalkaldic League in its war against Charles V.[50] The dauphin, on his part, let it be known that he was opposed to his father's religious policy and reportedly even promised to introduce the Reform into France. But he said that at the moment he was without power and could do nothing since he was not even assisting at the royal council. Nonetheless, Henry did attempt to formulate his own policy for Germany. He proposed a marriage between Duke Joachim Frederick of Saxony and Anne d'Este, the daughter of Renée de France, Henry's cousin. The opposition of the princess's father was one reason why nothing came of it.

The Germans, again through Bucer and Sturm, wrote to Henry thanking him for his efforts. They proposed electing a new emperor to replace Charles, "if not the king then the dauphin," and offering to him the imperial lands that used the French language, like Lorraine. Although the plan was rendered useless by the Lutheran defeat at Mühlberg, it would be resurrected by Henry in 1552. His motto, *Donec Totum Impleat Orbum* (Until It Fills the Whole World), has an imperial connotation that suggests that he had greater ambitions than simply king of France.[51]

By the end of 1546 the French court did not expect Francis I to live much longer. A serious illness had afflicted him for much of 1546, although he had recovered from it sufficiently to engage in a furious round of hunting and traveling. The court and the government were biding time until the new king and his new policy took over. It was at this time that Marino Cavalli, the ambassador in France from Venice, produced his description of Henry for the signori. He described Henry as tall and powerful in appearance, dark in complexion with black hair, dark eyes, and a short black beard, two fingers in length, and bothered by bad teeth.[52] The dauphin, he wrote, has "such qualities that promise to France the most worthy king it has had in 200 years. This hope is now a great comfort for this

people who console themselves on the present misfortunes by the thought of good fortune to come." Cavalli made it clear that Francis was not very popular in his last years. He continued by saying that the prince was skilled in the exercise of arms in which he loved to participate. His courage in war was highly esteemed. Cavalli described Henry as having a disposition somewhat melancholic and an intelligence not the most prompt, but firm and decided in his opinions. "What he has said once, he holds with tenacity." Cavalli suggested that this sort of man is the best, "like autumn fruits which ripen latest but are for that reason better and more durable than those of spring or summer." The Venetian gave his opinion that Henry would seek to maintain a foot in Italy and to keep Piedmont. "For this purpose he supports those Italians discontented with the affairs of their homeland." Cavalli remarked on the relationship between Henry and Diane as that of mother and son, Diane being a counselor devoted to bringing out the best in the dauphin. In most matters "he is prudent and honorable, and in all he has corrected several little faults of his youth and has become wholly another man."

In many respects Henry was the most promising heir to the throne of any European kingdom in the sixteenth century. At age twenty-eight, he was more mature than most new kings of the era, yet had the promise of a long reign before him. He was well trained in military command, and Blaise de Monluc declared that "he was the best king whom God has ever given soldiers."[53] Despite his disagreements with his father, he had been given a reasonably thorough training in the working of the royal government. Henry's more sober personality seemed to promise a court less dominated by frivolous pursuits and less expensive. Thus, Francis's passing would not be widely mourned outside of the circles of Anne de Pisseleu and his sister Marguerite.[54]

In mid-March 1547 Francis realized that he was seriously ill and halted his travels at the château of Rambouillet to prepare for death. On March 31 the king had what all agreed was a very edifying death, asking the forgiveness of his enemies and those whom he had injured and of God for his many sins. He gave Henry last words of parental advice, urging him not to injure his subjects by going to war on minor pretexts or to tax them too heavily and not to allow himself to be ruled by others as he had been ruled by the duchesse d'Etampes. He asked that Henry take care of her, his wife, Queen Eleanor, and his only surviving daughter, Marguerite. Francis also urged Henry to

persevere in the Christian religion and to uphold it to the best of his ability. The bad blood between father and son seems to have been forgotten in these last hours as Henry was said to have fainted on his father's bed in his grief, while Francis was reported to have told his son: "You have been a good and obedient son."[55] Two days after his father's death, Henry was seen playing tennis, but his courtiers were quick to inform observers that, since he had spent four days and nights at the deathbed, his physicians had ordered him to take some exercise.[56]

Henry's feelings for his father, pent up all those years of their estrangement and probably given exaggerated form in compensation for that, were made manifest in the grand funeral he gave Francis. Since his two brothers were only temporarily interred in churches near where they had died, their bodies were brought to Paris to be buried at the same time with their father in the abbey church of Saint-Denis. Although by tradition the new king was not to take part in the obsequies of his predecessor, Henry viewed the funeral procession from a house on the route, disguised as an ordinary person. When the funeral cortege passed under his window, Henry "began to be very troubled and grieved even to the point of tears." His companions Saint-André and Vieilleville turned his grief to anger by recounting the inordinate ambition and envy of his younger brother.[57]

On May 23 the dead king and his sons were entombed in Saint-Denis. After Francis's coffin had been placed in the vault, a herald shouted three times: "Le roi est mort," and the banner of France was dipped into the vault. Then the herald shouted: "Vive le roi! Vive Henri, deuxième du nom, par la grâce de Dieu roi de France!" and the banner was raised upright again. The first official recognition of the new reign had been proclaimed.[58]

4 VIVE LE ROI HENRI

n his twenty-eighth birthday, Henry, dauphin and duke of Brittany, became king of France, the second of his name but the first Henry since 1060. As king, Henry was heir to the thousand years of tradition that had gone into the creation of the French monarchy as it was found at mid-sixteenth century. A millennium of Frankish and French kings had seen royal power ebb and flow, but Henry was the beneficiary of the work of several recent predecessors, whose success at enhancing royal authority placed the French monarchy at the pinnacle of its power up to that time.

The French concept of kingship was ambiguous since it included a sense of both absolutism and limitation. While the royal lawyers advocated an absolutist interpretation of the monarchy's tradition of authority, it is unlikely that the kings gave the problem much thought as they made decisions. If the kings believed themselves to be in a strong enough position, they could break with the conventions that limited their authority and make an arbitrary decision in an absolutist manner. If, on the other hand, the customs and conventions that limited their authority on the issue at hand were important enough to a sufficiently influential group, the king easily, and probably without much reflection, accepted the bonds on his arbitrary power and consulted that group. It was not unheard of for a king on occasion to break with a tradition that enabled him to act arbitrarily and to accept a new limitation.

To some extent, then, it is futile to attempt to define the nature of the French monarchy as Henry found it; it was largely what each king was capable of making it. If he had the drive and ambition to aspire to be all-powerful and the hardheadedness to ignore the com-

plaints of powerful elements in society, tradition gave him sufficient opportunity to work toward that goal with the expectation of considerable success. Should the king lack those qualities, custom provided as well for a style of government that limited royal authority and required consultation without necessarily causing a permanent decline in royal power or resulting in anarchy. Henry, like most kings of the early modern period, thought of himself as absolute but was unable to rule absolutely, nor did he make any strong effort to do so.

One of the powers any king had was to settle old scores and reward old friends upon gaining the throne, and Henry immediately set himself to those tasks as soon as his father had died. Henry's settling of old scores was, one must say, less harsh than the depth of hard feelings might have suggested; but old friends were indeed rewarded, likely beyond even their expectations.[1]

The member of the old court who had the most to fear was Anne de Pisseleu. She had fled from the court at the time of Francis's death. Emboldened, however, by a courteous letter from Henry, she requested permission to return to her apartments at Saint-Germain. The new king brusquely informed her that Queen Eleanor would have the final say in the matter and she must make her request of her. Meanwhile Constable Montmorency had already occupied the lodging. Henry ordered Anne to return the jewels valued at 50,000 écus given to her by Francis, which Henry then gave to Diane de Poitiers.[2] More seriously, Anne was charged with conspiring with Charles V in 1544, but the only consequence was that she had to concede lands to the crown.[3] Although she lost much of her property and all of her influence, Henry did not take everything from her. Perhaps heeding his father's dying request to treat Anne well, he allowed her to retire to one of her châteaux, where she died in 1580.

While Anne de Pisseleu lost the most as an immediate result of the royal succession, numerous other members of Francis's court were also turned out of their offices. The extensive change has been called—in an often-quoted comment from Francis Decrue, Montmorency's biographer—a palace revolution, resembling somewhat the Ottoman Empire in its almost complete replacement of major officials. Decrue in turn took his cue from Saint-Mauris, who wrote: "In short this court is a new world."[4] Among the most influential figures demoted from power were Cardinal de Tournon and Admiral Claude d'Annebault, who had served as the late king's principal advisers and had in particular directed foreign policy. D'Annebault lost all of his

offices except the title of admiral, and Tournon was placed "entirely in the shade."[5] He was ordered not to come to the court after the forty days he attended the body of the dead king at Rambouillet. Further, he was deprived of his estates. In June he did go to the court, where he was poorly received. "In good truth the king hates to hear his name mentioned."[6] A well-regarded military commander, Jacques de Montgommery, who had recently put down with inordinate bloodshed a revolt at Lagny-sur-Marne, lost his estates and was disgraced. The irony of this harsh treatment of Montgommery was the fact that it was his son whose lance fatally injured Henry II in 1559. It must be noted, however, that the "palace revolution" applied only to close advisers of the dead monarch. The routine administration of the state remained in the hands of largely the same men and families.

With the old favorites almost entirely repudiated, the way was clear for different, but not necessarily new, faces to fill the highest offices. Those offices that appeared to sixteenth century observers to have the most power were the provincial governorships and seats on the two royal councils.

The governors had first appeared as military officers for the frontier provinces during the fourteenth century, and in the sixteenth century they still served as captains of companies of *gens d'armes*. Although no edict stated that they had to be military captains, only one governor of a major province during the reigns of Francis I and Henry II was not. The governors were also responsible for the execution of royal edicts in their provinces and the maintenance of law and order. Their instructions usually included the order "to represent our person in all the offices of the said province."[7] The governor also had extensive patronage, both at the local level and at the royal court. The governors' own wealth and sources of patronage, when added to that of their offices, clearly placed them among the most powerful men of the realm.

Accordingly, the governors had accumulated considerable power independent of the monarchy. As J. H. M. Salmon has said, "The over-mighty subject who replaced the feudal prince was more likely to be the governor of a province than its hereditary duke."[8] The fact that the kings continued to nominate the governors ought not disguise the fact that in many instances the monarch had little choice but to appoint a member of a prominent family for a particular province. For example, no one disputed the governorships of the southwestern provinces with the d'Albrets. Once installed, a governor often

acted at odds with royal policy, but the removal of a recalcitrant governor was difficult for the king to achieve, as Francis I found when he tried to remove Anne de Montmorency from his governorship of Languedoc in 1541.[9]

It is an interesting paradox of Henry II's reign that at no other time during the sixteenth century were the governorships more controlled by the greatest nobles of the realm, yet never did the monarchy have less trouble with the governors. The explanation for this situation lay in the type of governor of Henry's reign: nearly all came from the circle of great nobles who were closest to the king. In 1547 the Montmorencys, the Saint-Andrés, and the Guises already controlled six of the eleven major governorships that constituted some three-quarters of the realm. A seventh soon went to Robert de La Marck, Diane de Poitiers's son-in-law. The Bourbons and the d'Albrets, relatives of the king, held another two. The duc d'Etampes was governor of Normandy. Despite being the husband of Anne de Pisseleu, or perhaps because of it, he was deeply beholden to Henry. Only Claude de Tende, appointed by Francis as governor of Provence, fell outside the intimate circle of the court, but even he had a tie to it as the brother-in-law of the constable.

It is probably because of this close relationship with Henry that there was no serious threat of revolt or disobedience from any of his governors. He brought a measure of peace to his reign by having so many of his close friends in the governorships, but he did create a most dangerous and troublesome situation for his successors, who were faced with the rebellious sons of Henry's intimate friends in power in the provinces.

If the governorships tended to reduce royal authority in the major provinces, the royal councils were the institutions through which the king worked to increase his power. There were two councils: a small and very secretive body of intimate advisers known as the *conseil étroit* or *conseil des affaires*, the latter term being used more often during Henry's reign, and a larger body of advisers for more routine decisions called the *conseil privé* or *conseil des parties*.[10] Three days after his father's death Henry established the procedure and the membership of these councils, both of which remained largely unchanged during his reign. The *conseil des affaires* met in the morning shortly after the king's *lever* and before he attended Mass, and it usually lasted for about three hours. Its purpose was "to treat of matters of state and finances." It rarely met without the king.

The usual membership of this council in the first years of Henry's reign included Montmorency and his cousin, Jean d'Humières, the two Guise brothers and their uncle, Cardinal Jean de Lorraine, the two Saint-Andrés, Henri d'Albret, Antoine de Bourbon, Robert de La Marck, the chancellor, François Olivier, and Nicolas de Villeroy, a *secrétaire des finances*, who died in 1549.[11] The four secretaries of state attended as well, but without taking part in the deliberations. Occasionally, for the most crucial or secretive matters, only the constable, the two Guises, and the younger Saint-André were present.

The membership of the *conseil des parties* was considerably broader and more flexible. In addition to the members of the secret council, it included at the beginning of the reign (if they were at court) the cardinals Louis de Bourbon, Odet de Châtillon, Jean Du Bellay, and Ippolito d'Este, bishops Philippe de Brissac of Coutances and Mathieu de Longwy of Soissons, dukes Claude de Guise (who rarely attended), Louis de Nevers, and Jean d'Etampes; Pierre Raymon, first president of the Parlement of Rouen; and André Blondet, the treasurer of the *Epargne*, who on occasion attended the *conseil des affaires* as well. This council met in the afternoons, and the king rarely attended. Besides routine administrative decisions, it heard appeals from the Parlement of Paris because of the special significance of the persons or the points of law involved. Under Henry II, the *conseil des parties* began to take a more active role in supervising royal finances, which by the end of the century had become its principal function.[12]

Most prominent among those who held positions of power under Henry II was Constable Anne de Montmorency. On the afternoon after Francis's death the new king and the constable had a two-hour private talk, and Montmorency emerged as president of the new royal council in charge of all matters of the government. He held the signet; with it he had the authority to sign routine administrative orders. On April 12 the king received his oath as constable of France and issued a declaration to all civil and military officers to obey Montmorency, who regained his charges as captain of the forts of the Bastille, Vincennes, Saint-Malo, and Nantes, and of the company of gendarmes of the king. He also resumed the governorship of Languedoc he had held in 1541. He had not been stripped of these offices during his disgrace, but others had exercised his authority. Nor had he received the income attached to them. Accordingly, Henry made good the duke's claim with a sum of 25,000 écus a year for

four years, above his regular annual income of 24,800 livres from his royal offices.[13]

A reason for the extraordinarily close relationship between Henry and Montmorency may have been that in appearance and character they were more alike than Henry and his father. The constable was born one year earlier than Francis into a very ancient house that claimed to be descended from the first Frank baptized after Clovis. Despite its reputed ancestry and pretensions to the title of first baron of the realm, the family had not played a significant role in French affairs until Anne rose to high levels of public office. A boon companion of Francis as a youth, he had fought in every major campaign of his reign and had become successively marshal, grand master of the royal household, and constable, the highest military office in the realm. He was regarded at the beginning of 1547 as the best field commander in France, although his ability lay far more in effective defensive tactics than in taking the offensive. Montmorency was willing to take the most draconian measures against those he perceived as the enemies of the French monarchy, whether foreign or domestic. Nonetheless, he was less eager for war than most of the French captains were, and in his later years he was usually vocal in support of peace. In 1552 he candidly stated to the papal nuncio his reasons for pursuing a policy of peace: "I seek peace as a Christian, as an old man, and as one who finds himself in a good position." The contemporary perception of the constable was that he, more than any other member of the court, was dedicated to promoting the greatness of the king.[14]

Among the constable's virtues were a strong sense of loyalty, especially to Henry, which was strongly reciprocated, and an ability to take care of matters entrusted to him down to the smallest details. He was very devout and conservative in religion and gained a reputation for being particularly harsh in meting out punishment if the matter disturbed him at his prayers. Montmorency was not very appreciative of learning and scholarly pursuits. He was said to have regarded learning as being conducive to heresy and to "have little esteemed savants and their books."[15] He was also considered arrogant and narrow-minded and was unpopular among the courtiers. In the politics of the court he was largely a loner, little interested in dispensing patronage and aiding the rise of others outside of his family. An English ambassador wrote in 1550: "No man may have anything

by his will save his own kinfolks and . . . he feedeth every man with fair words and performeth nothing."[16] Under Henry II, however, he hardly had need of his own party.

Montmorency did indeed support his kinfolk, and several rose rapidly to prominence. His brother, François de La Rochepot, was restored to his governorships of the Ile-de-France and Picardy that Francis I had taken from him. The constable had a large family—four sons and seven daughters—and he would do well for them as they matured. Since his eldest son was only seventeen in 1547, it was his sister's sons, the Châtillons, who profited most from Montmorency's position at the beginning of Henry's reign. The oldest nephew, Cardinal Odet de Châtillon, moved into the same apartment at Saint-Germain with his uncle and was noted by the imperial ambassador as "beginning to compete with the Cardinal of Ferrara [Ippolito d'Este] for precedence" among the clerics at court.[17] The next brother, Gaspard, was shortly named colonel-general of the infantry and later became admiral of France, going down in history as the famous Admiral Coligny. He also became governor of the Ile-de-France and Picardy after his uncle La Rochepot's death. The third nephew, François, seigneur d'Andelot, received notice from the English ambassador as one of the chief favorites of the new court.[18] Many further honors and offices would come to these young men in the next decade until their loyalty to Catholicism became suspect. Montmorency's influence also carried his cousin, Jean de Humières, into the *conseil des affaires* and the office of governor of the household of the king's children.

The English ambassador, Nicholas Wooton, included among the chief favorites of the new king all of the sons of Claude de Guise, but three in particular—the oldest, François, known as the duc d'Aumale until his father's death in 1550, the second, Charles, archbishop of Reims, and the fourth, Louis, bishop of Troyes.[19] No family in the sixteenth century and few throughout European history had as fascinating a history as did the Guises. The family was a branch of the House of Lorraine, which claimed Charlemagne as an ancestor. In 1503 René de Lorraine sent his second son, Claude, to the French court to make his fortune and to take over the French fiefs of the family, in particular the county of Guise near the border with the Netherlands. Claude was naturalized as a French subject and became acquainted with his second cousin, Francis, then the heir presumptive. As king, Francis gave him a number of military commands, in which he demonstrated that he was one of the great soldiers of his

generation. In 1526 Guise was rewarded for his services in France during Francis's captivity by being made duke and peer. The county of Guise was raised to a duchy, and several estates added to it to make it worthy of its tenant's new rank. As members of a foreign princely family prominent at the French court, the Guises occupied an ambiguous position that could be played to their advantage, but equally well could be used by their enemies to foment resentment toward them.

The ten children of the duc de Guise who survived infancy, among them six sons, were raised in easy familiarity with royalty. The oldest child, Marie, in fact, was raised to royalty by her marriage to James V of Scotland in 1538. It was the second marriage for both, as James had married Francis's daughter Madeleine and Marie had wedded Louis de Longueville. Both marriages had been quickly ended by death, and Marie de Guise went to Scotland to become consort to its king, despite the persistent courting of Henry VIII, who was determined to make her his fourth wife. Marie's married life in Scotland was brief and filled with tragedy. Her two infant sons died a week apart in April 1541, and her husband in December 1542, a week after the birth of a daughter. This daughter, the famous Mary, queen of Scots, put a throne in the Guise family and gave her uncles a much wider sphere for their political ambitions in the future.

The oldest Guise brother, François, born in February 1519, followed in his father's footsteps as a military captain. He suffered a serious wound in 1545 outside of Boulogne, then held by the English. A lance thrusted through his right cheek left him with a jagged scar for life that gave him the tag of *le Balafré*, "the scarfaced." A casual acquaintance with Dauphin Henry, a month younger, had blossomed into deep friendship. He was one of the three nobles who witnessed Henry's protest against the Treaty of Crépy. Nonetheless, Francis I gave him the governorship of Dauphiné in 1546. By the time Henry became king, François de Guise had become his usual opponent at tennis. Guise was a very talented military captain, but he was more than just "a man of war with a sort of naïveté in the practice of nonmilitary affairs."[20] His sense of the importance of planning and attention to detail carried over to politics as well. With only rare lapses, he also had a keen sense of how to avoid offending others, especially, of course, those whose opinions counted most.[21]

The second brother, Charles, six years younger, may well have been the most complicated and controversial public figure in

sixteenth-century France. Friend and foe alike acknowledged his many talents and virtues and his equally numerous faults and vices. All were in awe of him. His intelligence enabled him to move quickly to a degree in theology at the Collège de Navarre, and he was a noted orator and preacher, moving Theodore Beza to say that "If I had the graces of the Cardinal of Lorraine, I should hope to convert half the people in France to the religion I profess." Morally austere at the frivolous French court, he was called *un santarello*, "one without sin," by Cardinal Farnese, yet he had at least one illegitimate child.[22] A dedicated patron of Renaissance artists and humanists, he also demonstrated the same tendency to acquisitiveness in collecting antiquities and art works as he did in collecting wealthy church benefices. It was his reputation earned after 1559 as one of the most ardent, articulate, and effective defenders of Catholicism that was most responsible for his controversial place in history.

Charles was as surely a born churchman as that species was possible. But his ascent to church power depended far more on the credit his father and his uncle, Cardinal Jean de Lorraine, had with Francis I than on the brilliance of an oration he made before the king at the age of fifteen as a student at the University of Paris, despite what one historian of the Guises has maintained.[23] Francis did not appoint men to major sees on the latter type of consideration. Guise's appointment to the archbishopric of Reims in 1538 gave him the most prestigious church office in France, and one of the wealthiest. Catching the king's ear with his eloquence, however, may well explain why Charles was invited to the court in 1540 and in February 1547 named as "chief of the council of the Dauphin and governor of his household and all his affairs."[24] Henry had sought for several years to raise him to the rank of cardinal, but it was only after Henry's coronation in July 1547, at which Charles presided as archbishop of Reims, that the pope agreed to grant the red hat. A contemporary of Charles de Guise stated that from the beginning of their friendship, Henry loved him as Jonathan loved David.[25]

The two Guise brothers, likened to "the lion and the fox," although that phrase tends to denigrate François's mental and administrative abilities more than it ought, worked extraordinarily well together to promote the family's prestige and position. Their four younger brothers dedicated themselves equally to the task, and one of the things about the Guises that both amazed and confounded observers and rivals was how well they worked together without the usual in-

ternal conflicts and jealousies that marked most families with power and influence. In 1547 only two of the younger brothers were old enough to be active at court: Claude, duc de Mayenne, then twenty-one years old and married to the daughter of Diane de Poitiers, and who became duc d'Aumale when François became duc de Guise in 1550; and Louis, nineteen years old, who had been made bishop of Troyes in 1545. All of the brothers, even the youngest two, who never received major offices, were capable men.

Every knowledgeable Frenchman and foreign diplomat expected that the Guises would move into the highest levels of the government upon Henry's accession to the throne.[26] Events quickly proved them correct. Saint-Mauris noted that in the weeks after the death of Francis I, the two oldest Guise brothers were lodged with the king, a clear sign of favor. They were appointed to the *conseil des affaires* along with their uncle, Cardinal Jean de Lorraine. Charles was made "chief of the council as regards judicial affairs under the supervision of the constable." He was also named chancellor of the Order of Saint Micheal. François de Guise was made the chief of the royal hunt and was reconfirmed in his governorship of Dauphiné. In November 1547, Henry informed the *Chambre des comptes*, which had been slow to release the 4,000 écus due to Guise as governor of Dauphiné, that he was one of those "whom I wish to exempt from the usual scrutiny and to be treated with all grace and favor."[27] Clearly, Montmorency was in ascendancy in the first months of the new reign; but if the old adage that two heads are better than one has any validity, then the Guise brothers, who worked together virtually as one, were in excellent position to challenge that dominance.

The two Saint-Andrés also profited greatly from the change on the throne. Both Jean, the father, Henry's former governor, and Jacques, the son, his close companion, were seated in the *conseil des affaires*. The older was made governor of Bresse, and the younger became grand chamberlain and a marshal of France. Jacques de Saint-André was the only one of the group of noble youths who had grown up with Henry to gain high office. Jean d'Andouins had been killed in battle in 1545; Claude de Dampierre lost favor for criticizing Diane de Poitiers; and François d'Escars was dead by 1547. The fifth member, François de La Châtaigneraie, lost his place by his death in the famous duel with Jarnac in 1547. Saint-André did not form a faction at the court, nor did his position benefit his relatives or friends to any significant extent. A contemporary opinion about him was that

he was only interested in becoming rich and could be led wherever one wished as long as there was a promise of profit for him. His opinions were rarely noted by the ambassadors at the French court. Saint-André was, however, royal chamberlain, and as such he slept in the king's chamber. This constant access to the king presumably gave him considerable influence, but to what end he used it besides for personal gain is unknown.[28]

One prominent house that did not do well under the new regime was that of Bourbon. As the only princes of blood except for the sons of the king, the Bourbons ought to have been given a major role in the government, but they had not yet fully recovered from the blow that the treason of Charles de Bourbon had dealt to their position. While they were not completely ignored in the allocation of offices in April 1547, they were not as well represented as befitted their status. Antoine de Vendôme-Bourbon was given a place in the *conseil des affaires*. His uncle, Cardinal Louis de Bourbon, kept his seat in the wider *conseil des parties*. In 1548 Antoine's brother, Charles, already bishop of Saintes and Carcassone, would receive the cardinal's hat. His other two brothers were still too young at that point for high office. The favor of the Bourbons would rise considerably when Antoine agreed to marry Jeanne d'Albret in 1548. His decision avoided a potentially serious crisis as her parents wanted to marry her to Prince Philip of Spain.

Two individuals who were outside of the above four families and their circles were invited to join the privy council. Henri d'Albret clearly owed his selection to his status as the king's uncle. François Olivier, one of the most respected royal officers of the century, remained in his office as chancellor and kept his place on the council that had been given him in 1543. Jacques-Auguste De Thou later wrote about him that he had "such unusual virtue that no office was beyond his merit."[29] The office of the chancellor had been greatly enhanced in the previous century, and he had become the king's most important administrative officer. The chancellor was first of all the head of the royal chancellery, which drew up edicts and formal papers; he was also the keeper of the three royal seals, at least one of which was used to stamp every royal decree. He was entitled to refuse the seals for decrees that seemed to him to violate the law or to be unjust, but the king could order him to seal the decree. The chancellor was also head of the royal judicial system and presided over the parlement when he attended it, as he did for the presenta-

tion of royal edicts and the election of its officers. The chancellor was the chief of royal administration and inspired and prepared the important edicts; thus such legislation usually showed his hand.[30] The chancellor, furthermore, presided over the two royal councils in the absence of the king.

The chancellor received his appointment for life, and Henry inherited François Olivier in the office. Like most chancellors of the sixteenth century, he had previously been first president of the Parlement of Paris. He was one of the few high officials of Francis I who kept their offices in 1547, but he was not close to Henry and may have kept his office because of the chancellor's life tenure. According to several late sixteenth-century writers, he had incurred the wrath of the Guises and Diane de Poitiers because of his objections to the large gifts the king was bestowing on them. Considering the number of times that Henry called on him for advice and the importance of several missions that he gave him, it seems more probable that declining eyesight and health were the reasons why he agreed in January 1551 to give up his duties. The edict giving most of his duties to Jean Bertrand (or Bertrandi) specifically referred to Olivier's ill health. Bertrand had recently been promoted to first president of parlement and been given the title of *garde des sceaux*. Olivier retired to his estates but continued to perform services for the king. Shortly before his death, he was recalled to active service in the first months of Francis II's reign. Given the Guises' thorough domination over that reign, his return to office calls into question the assertion that the Guises were responsible for his retirement.[31]

Bertrand was from Languedoc and had risen in the government through the influence of Montmorency, but it is not clear whether he was still the constable's client in 1551. He was said to have become a favorite of Diane de Poitiers, whose influence was regarded as propelling Bertrand's rapid rise to high office. Bertrand was less well regarded than Olivier, but he was more amenable to Henry's policies. In 1551, having been widowed, he became the bishop of Comminges, then in 1557 archbishop of Sens and a cardinal. The numerous gifts and favors he received from Henry suggest that he was considered a valuable member of the royal government.

While the office of chancellor underwent little change during Henry's reign, the office of *secrétaire d'état* was greatly transformed. The office arose out of the *clercs du secret*, who had been the king's private notaries. By the beginning of Francis I's reign, several had

emerged as the *secrétaires des finances* and had received a number of privileges; the most valuable was their automatic ennoblement should they have come from common stock.

Upon his father's death, Henry dismissed all but two of his *secrétaires des finances*, retaining Guillaume Bochetel and Claude de L'Aubespine. Two additional secretaries were immediately named: Côme Clausse, who had been serving as chief secretary in Henry's household, and Jean Duthier, "a creature of the constable." About a week after his father's death, Henry issued letters patent that explicitly set out the duties of these four secretaries in order to "expedite his affairs of state and prepare the despatches and responses" for the provinces and foreign lands. The decree listed the regions of responsibility for each; Bochetel, for instance, was assigned Normandy, Picardy, Flanders, Scotland, and England. The title that the edict gave them was "Conseillers et secrétaires de ses commandemens et finances." By 1559 they were being called simply *secrétaires d'état*, which title historians have used for Henry's reign as well.

In September 1547, Henry further clarified the status of the four secretaries by raising their salaries to 3,000 livres from 1,623, because of their importance and the need to travel continually with the king.[32] The expense of staying with the court in its nearly constant movement alone justified the increase in salary. The four secretaries, who were all related through marriage, were well rewarded for their services. Six of their close relatives were given French bishoprics, and Clausse and Bochetel passed on the offices to their sons-in-law when both died in 1558. All four also received large gifts from Henry, such as the 10,000 livres given to Bochetel in 1547.[33]

The change in the nature of the secretaries' duties and competence was among the most important and enduring of the administrative decisions of Henry's reign. The fact that he made it immediately after he became king strongly suggests that he had given the situation serious thought beforehand, which further suggests that he was far more prepared for rule than is usually thought. The reorganization of the secretaries' functions indicates as well an appreciation on the part of Henry of the need for a more orderly system to replace the confusion previously in existence. Nonetheless, Henri Noël's statement: "This reform is one of the most characteristic of the constant care of Henry II to assure to the realm a rational and perfected administration" must be regarded as an exaggeration.[34]

The beginning of Henry II's reign, therefore, differed considerably

from his father's first days in that the royal favorites and powerful advisers were more clearly defined and came from outside of his immediate family, having no equivalent to Francis's mother and sister in power and influence. Henry took care to be kind to his stepmother, Queen Eleanor, expressing "his great desire to treat her well whether she decide to remain in France or reside elsewhere"; but she had no more influence under him than with her late husband. She replied that she knew he would continue to be a good son as he had always been, but by late 1548 she had returned to the Netherlands.[35] She died in Spain in 1558.

Henry's sister, Marguerite, found her position considerably improved upon his accession, although she never had the influence that her aunt and namesake had had over Francis. She was always kept well-informed, even if she usually had little to do with making policy. She remained very close to Catherine de Medici, which, however, did not increase her influence in government. In all other respects she was treated as befitted *Madame la soeur unique du roi*, and in 1549 had a household of 150 persons who received 22,834 livres in wages.[36] Unwedded despite her twenty-three years, Marguerite was the object of considerable matrimonial diplomacy throughout Henry's reign, but she would not marry until its last days.

The influence and patronage power of the two principal women in Henry's life was very disproportionate in the first years of his reign. His wife, Catherine de Medici, who had an annual allowance of 200,000 livres, was able only to procure royal office for her cousins, the Strozzi, the sons of the aunt who had been her surrogate mother in her early years. Piero Strozzi was named captain-general of the Italian infantry in French service, and his brother Leone was made captain-general of the royal galleys. A third brother, Lorenzo, received the bishopric of Béziers six months after Henry's accession; Catherine immediately set to work to gain him the red hat but was successful only in 1557.[37] The few Italians favored by the king in the first years of his reign confirm the remark of the imperial ambassador: "An infinite stream of Italians came to the new court to offer their services but they are not being placed on the pension list." After 1550 the Italians were far more successful in gaining royal favor, in part because Catherine's influence over her husband increased considerably later in his reign. In 1557 Cardinal Carlo Carafa, after a stay at the French court, described how news was treated there: "The King consults with the Constable . . . and then his Majesty an-

nounces them to the Queen and Madame de Valentinois [Diane]." Carafa's words, spoken in the context of a complaint of how fast state secrets became public knowledge at the court, suggest that he saw Catherine as being by then a person of importance.[38]

Diane de Poitiers was far more successful in reaping a plentiful harvest of patronage and gifts from her relationship with the new king. A week after Francis's death the English ambassador, with considerable understatement, reported that "of the dames Madame la Grande Sénéschalle [from her late husband's title] seemth to be highly esteemed." There is a strong consensus in the reports of contemporaries that she was a powerful force in royal decisionmaking, although specific examples of her influence are hard to find. Early in the reign she received requests to use her influence for the benefit of the solicitors, but there is no evidence that she did. The requests soon ended. There is, furthermore, one documented case in which Diane's influence was not sufficient to win the king's approval for a request. In September 1548 she asked Henry to give the position of auditor of royal accounts to d'Humières's son. He refused, despite Diane's solicitation, because the importance of the post for royal finances required someone with fiscal experience.[39]

According to Saint-Mauris, writing in June 1547, Henry discussed all decisions and policy with her after the noon meal, giving her an account of all the business he had transacted in the morning. It is difficult to determine, however, whether Henry simply kept her informed, used her as a sounding board, or actively sought and took her advice. A thorough analysis of the diplomatic correspondence between the French court and Germany in Henry's reign found no mention of her name. But Saint-Mauris was convinced that "the king allows himself to be led and approves everything that [Diane] and his nobles advise. . . . He continues to yield himself more and more to her yoke and has become entirely her subject and slave."[40]

Through her influence Robert de La Marck, her son-in-law, was given the baton of a marshal of France and added to the *conseil des affaires*. Three of her nephews received bishoprics in the next two years. Her confidant André Blondet received the position of treasurer of the *Epargne*. But the claim that he informed Diane each day of the judgments confiscating property so that she could demand the choicest pieces seems in the original source to have been restricted to the properties of Anne de Pisseleu.[41]

There is no question La Grande Sénéschalle was avaricious, and

Henry catered to that flaw in her character. He gave her the beautiful château of Chenonceaux almost immediately upon gaining the throne, two of the estates seized from the late king's mistress, and the jewels worth 50,000 écus also taken from her. A year later Diane received the title duchesse de Valentinois with additional property to support the title. She was equally successful in gaining huge sums of money as gifts from her lover. French tradition dictated that all office and fief-holders pay a special fee to the new king for reconfirmation of their titles and offices. Henry gave the sum, or at least a large part of it, to Diane.[42]

According to two contemporary memoirs, all of the king's favorites were avaricious. "Nothing escaped their greedy appetites as little as a fly escapes a swallow. Positions, dignities, bishoprics, abbeys, every good morsel was greedily swallowed." They were accused of having their creatures everywhere in France to inform them of newly vacant positions and even of bribing physicians of Paris to hasten the demise of holders of valuable offices.[43] Nonetheless, one must take the statements from Tavannes and Vieilleville in the context of their disappointment in their search for offices, since Henry gave few favors to those outside of his intimate circle.

Within the new court occupied by so many ambitious and talented individuals, clashes over royal favor were necessarily numerous. In the triangle of persons who were closest to the king—Montmorency, the Guises and Diane de Poitiers—Diane's position was in one sense the most precarious, since she could not prove herself to be indispensable by military and diplomatic victories, and she faced the real possibility of being shunted aside as she aged. Shrewd and intelligent politician that she was, she saw the need to balance the other two dominant influences against each other, lest one would become overwhelmingly preeminent and turn the king against her. If power and influence remained divided three ways, Diane could hope to serve as the determining voice between the often contradictory advice of the constable and the Guises.

Such an approach required that the Grande Sénéschalle support the Guises in the first several years of Henry's reign, since Montmorency had the king's ear more than did the two brothers.[44] In Vieilleville's memoirs it is said that "in the first days of the reign, the constable took possession of the King in such a way that he carried him off to all his residences and, wherever the prince was, no one could approach his person, save by his favor and introduction."[45]

These comments were supported by the reports of the various ambassadors, who noted frequently that Henry was at one of Montmorency's châteaux, usually to hunt. When an Italian sought to present his credentials from Cosimo de Medici, duke of Tuscany, to the king through Catherine, she told him that it was necessary to go through the constable, as did all the foreign ambassadors until at least 1552.[46] Blaise de Monluc, no friend of Montmorency's it is true, wrote that "the king abdicated his power and his dignity before this baron of the Ile-de-France." Another contemporary related in 1552 that it had been difficult to tell whether the king loved the Grande Sénéschalle or the constable more.[47]

The relationship between Diane and Montmorency, by far the two eldest members of the inner circle of the court, was largely one of cordial competition for the king's favor. They were often in disagreement over points of policy, and especially patronage, but united in devotion to and support of the king.[48] But they were not close, and the royal mistress had reason to seek to prevent the complete ascendancy of the constable until the last two years of the reign.

The Guises, for their part, had cultivated the Grande Sénéschalle well before Henry had become king; after March 1547 they became even more assiduous. For two years Charles de Guise gave up his own table to dine with Madame, as all at the court, even the king, called Diane.[49] In 1547 a marriage was arranged between the third Guise brother, Claude, and her daughter, Louise de Brézé. In 1548, when Charles de Guise had been in Rome for six months, Montmorency reportedly sought to convince Henry to require him to remain there, having already persuaded the king to order François de Guise to inspect the frontier fortresses in Dauphiné. When Diane became aware of the constable's machinations, she informed Charles, who quickly returned to the court. The authenticity of the story, however, is called into question by the fact that the French representatives in Rome knew the date of the cardinal's return well in advance.[50]

While Montmorency and the Guises also had a common bond in their mutual desire for promoting the well-being of the king and his realm, their relationship was clearly less cordial. In August 1547 Saint-Mauris wrote to Prince Philip that "the Constable is all powerful in this court at present, but there is bitter jealousy on the part of the Guises, who bear secret enmity to him, and many obstacles are thrown in the Constable's way."[51] The ambassador reported ten months later, when Charles de Guise returned from Rome, that

Montmorency referred to him as "that great calf." François de Guise retorted by calling the constable a robber.[52]

For most of Henry's reign the struggle for power and influence was intense and fairly evenly matched. The Guises' greater ability, youthfulness and the presence of the two brothers—which nearly always allowed one to be with the king—combined with the usual support of Diane de Poitiers, nearly balanced the great, almost filial reverence that Henry had for the constable.

According to Lucien Romier, Montmorency dealt with the situation with bad grace. He threw gross insults at his rivals, systematically opposed all their projects, and contradicted without scruple their advice. His hostility extended as well to the Guises' clients, like Vieilleville and Blaise de Monluc. As for the Guises, their attitude toward Montmorency revealed itself in the accusations against him of poisoning when Duke Claude died in 1550 and his son François was seriously ill at the same time.[53] However, a keen observer of the French court, Simon Renard, the Habsburg ambassador for two terms, advised Philip II in 1558 against allowing Montmorency, then in captivity in Flanders, to return to the court to help formulate the French terms for peace: "It would be a mistake to allow him to go to France on the plea that he is at odds with the House of Guise, for the quarrel between them is not as serious as is made out. They understand each other far better than they allow it to appear."[54] Despite episodes of real bitterness, the two rival families worked relatively well together for advancement of their mutual interest: the well-being and authority of their king. Rarely was there serious conflict over policy, and only over the issue of peace or war in 1556 and 1558 did the rivalry create serious embarrassment for the king.

Even if it was not as serious as often made out to be, the factionalism was apparent to all observers and must have been obvious to Henry II as well. Yet he did nothing to resolve it. Each favorite filled an essential need in his personality, and he could not bear to be without Diane, Montmorency, or the Guises for any length of time. When one of the group was absent, Henry wrote letters to the absent person filled with declarations of love and welcomed him or her back to the court with extravagant displays of affection. Since the Guises and Montmorency did have differing views on royal policy, Henry's policy, as a consequence, was often the product of his efforts to balance them; but if one point of view did prevail it was Montmorency's, with one major exception: the decision to send Guise to Italy with

a French army in 1556. Nonetheless, one must not see Henry as a mere cipher; as the Venetian Contarini said in 1551: "It is seen that from day to day his Majesty tends to act more of himself."[55] Many policy decisions, especially later in his reign, appear to be entirely his.

The factionalism of both the old regime and the new intruded in the first months of Henry's reign in the form of the famous Jarnac–La Châtaigneraie duel.[56] Guy Chabot de Jarnac was part of the party of Anne de Pisseleu, since he was married to her sister. He was able to maintain a high style of life at the court in the last years of Francis I largely through the financial support of his stepmother. This situation gave rise to rumors spread by the party of Dauphin Henry that Jarnac was his stepmother's lover. Jarnac publicly denied the accusation, which was attributed to Henry. The prince and the nobleman were placed in an embarrassing situation that called for a duel in defense of honor, but it could not take place because Henry's rank prohibited him from taking part.

Then La Châtaigneraie, one of Henry's close friends from his youth, stepped forward to claim responsibility for the allegation and accept the challenge to a duel. Francis I had refused the request for formal judicial combat, which required the consent of the king (not true of a private duel), because Anne de Pisseleu was convinced that Jarnac would be easily killed by his much stronger and more experienced foe. Within a month of Henry's accession La Châtaigneraie requested permission for the duel to death, which Jarnac seconded in his own letter. In May 1547 the royal council agreed to permit the combat to occur and set the date of July 10.

The combat took place at Saint-Germain-en-Laye with an "endless array of persons of all sorts" present. The factionalism of the new court revealed itself in this feud left over from the old in the choice of seconds for the combatants. François de Guise served as La Châtaigneraie's second, while Jarnac's second, Claude de Boisy, the *grand écuyer*, was a friend of Montmorency. Once the combat had begun, Jarnac disabled his opponent with a quick and unexpected thrust to the back of the knee. That manner of attack in dueling was known for centuries after as *le coup de Jarnac*.

With his prostrate enemy slowly bleeding to death on the field, Jarnac appealed to Henry to declare his honor restored and to accept the life of La Châtaigneraie, which according to the rules of judicial combat was now in the hands of Jarnac. Henry, stunned by the quick

defeat of the man all saw as his champion, refused to answer until both his sister Marguerite and the constable added their voices to the call for mercy. Even as the king recognized Jarnac as victor and freed him from the obligation of killing his fallen enemy, he refused to add the customary phrase: "You are a man of honor." Jarnac had the good sense to refuse the victory march to which he was entitled. Henry, having recovered his composure, embraced Jarnac and told him that "he had fought like Caesar and spoken like Aristotle." La Châtaigneraie for his part, recognizing that he had been dishonored, cut off the bandages on his leg and bled to death, despite the physicians' opinion that he had not been mortally wounded.

Beyond providing a grand spectacle for the court, the affair had several consequences and implications for the new regime. Perhaps most significantly, Gaspard de Coligny, Montmorency's nephew, received the office of colonel-general of the infantry that was to have gone to a victorious La Châtaigneraie. Jarnac served as a captain of fifty lances under Coligny at the siege of Saint-Quentin in 1557.[57] The duel is illustrative of the fact that medieval attitudes of personal honor and combat had not disappeared from the France of this era and that Henry was more sympathetic to them than his father had been. This latter point was further demonstrated early in the reign by the several large tournaments that Henry held. He did, however, outlaw the settling of disputes by judicial combat. The Jarnac affair also underscored the existence of a certain obstinacy in the king's character that had nearly caused his own disgrace in his handling of Jarnac's victory. Last, the defeat of the king's champion at the very beginning of his reign was seen as a bad omen. It helps to explain the numerous predictions of impending tragedy and violent death for the king, which, of course, were all too accurate.

For Henry, the sour note struck by the duel was shortly rectified by the harmony of his coronation-consecration ceremony at Reims, the traditional site of the crowning of French kings since Clovis had been baptized there.[58] The long delay before his coronation reflected the growing sense among French legalists that coronation was not necessary to confer royal power, since authority was transferred to the new king at the moment of death of his predecessor. Therefore, the coronation did not confer the power of kingship but was seen as the last step in giving public and ecclesiastical recognition of the successor's right to rule. Nonetheless, a king who remained uncrowned would have certainly been disregarded by the people. No longer con-

sidered a sacrament, as it had been in the early Middle Ages, the *sacre* still was seen as a unique and necessary opportunity for the new king to receive heavenly sanction and divine grace to rule his people as *le roi très-chrétien*.

On July 25 Henry made his formal entry into Reims, the first of many such entries into French cities that marked the early years of his reign. As in all such entries, the city government and guilds put on a fine show to impress the new king, but Reims's was always overshadowed by the coronation itself. The ceremony began early the next morning when the tenants of the four most ancient baronies, including Montmorency, who had to be represented by his oldest son since his office required him to be elsewhere, went to the abbey-church of Saint-Rémy to command the abbot to take the ampulla of sacred oil to the cathedral. The four nobles remained there as hostages for the return of the ampulla.[59]

Meanwhile, at the archbishop's palace, the two bishop-peers of Langres and Beauvais attended the king at his *lever* and then escorted him to the cathedral, with the constable leading the procession, carrying the naked sword of the king. Charles de Guise, as archbishop of Reims, presided over the ceremony, and each of the other five ecclesiastical peers and the six lay peers had his own special role in it.[60] For example, the peer of Burgundy fixed the golden spurs on the heels of the king. The bishop-peers of Beauvais and Langres demanded of the assembly in the cathedral whether it accepted Henri de Valois as king. When the congregation, speaking for the entire people of France, shouted its assent, Henry, dressed in a long robe of silver cloth, took the royal oath. It began with a pledge to conserve the Catholic church in peace and to aid it at all times; it then moved on to pledge the king to preserve Christendom in peace and protect his people against attack and injustice, and to be just and merciful in his decisions. Finally, the royal oath required the king to drive from his lands all heretics denounced by the church.[61]

After the oath had been sworn, the anointing with the holy oil took place, using a minute quantity of the solidified oil from the ampulla of Saint-Rémy mixed with the chrism used in anointing a bishop. Then, invested with all of the coronation robes, newly made for Henry, the most important being the blue tunic, Henry received from the archbishop of Reims the royal sword, the diamond ring that symbolized his espousal to his kingdom,[62] the scepter, and the hand of justice. Aided by the other eleven peers, the archbishop held the

heavy crown of Charlemagne over the king's head while they said the prayer *Accipe coronam*. Having placed it on Henry's head, the archbishop shouted: "Vivat Rex in aeternam!" and the cry was taken up by all in the cathedral and those outside as well. The ceremony then proceeded to a solemn high Mass in which the king received the Eucharist in both forms, demonstrating the quasi-sacerdotal quality of the king in the eyes of the church. Afterward, a great sum of money was distributed to the crowds outside, including newly minted coins bearing Henry's image, apparently the first time that such royal largess was shown at a coronation.[63]

During the ceremony, the Venetian ambassador reported, Henry was seen praying long and devoutly. When Diane de Poitiers asked him afterward the reason for his prayer, he replied that he had been praying that "God would be pleased to leave the crown to him for a long time if it promised good government and assured the happiness of his people; but if otherwise, that He would deprive him of it very quickly."[64] For the next twelve years less two weeks, Henry was the personification of the power and authority of the kingdom of France. Whether that length of time represented God's favor or displeasure with Henry's rule is up to the reader.

5 THE FIRST YEAR

After his coronation Henry and his court went to Fontainebleau, where they remained until April 1548. The nearly eight months that the court was at Fontainebleau was the longest span of time that it was in one place during Henry's entire reign, although the king himself was absent on numerous occasions, largely for hunting trips to royal châteaux and at Montmorency's. The sixteenth-century French monarch was extraordinarily peripatetic, and Henry was no exception, finding it very difficult to stay in one place for any length of time.

French royalty's great fondness for hunting was one reason for the court's frequent moves and the usual choice of the châteaux as places of residence. The châteaux were mostly located in broad forests, but the massive hunting parties, often involving hundreds of men, quickly depleted the easily accessible game of any locale and required movement on to another château. Like his father, Henry took a passionate interest in hunting and riding. He spent at least two afternoons a week hunting virtually every week of the year, even when in residence in Paris, and when at a château he often hunted every day except Sunday. The English ambassador noted on several occasions that he was unable to have an audience with Henry because the king was off hunting. On one occasion Henry passed up an opportunity to inspect the gift of six great horses that Edward VI had sent him because the hunting party was about to depart. In 1557 he put off receiving a declaration of war from Mary Tudor for two days because he was hunting.[1]

Henry preferred hunting stags with dogs to birding with falcons and had two packs of dogs—black ones that he inherited from Francis and white ones that he had selected himself. In 1555 his dogs

and their handlers cost the crown 3,600 livres. The two chief huntsmen, the *grand veneur*, François de Guise, and the *grand fauconnier*, Charles de Brissac, were among the great officers of the realm and received salaries of 3,900 livres for their offices. Catherine de Medici was also fond of the chase and, at the beginning of Henry's reign, the hunt was virtually the only opportunity she had to talk with her husband away from Diane de Poitiers, who did not like to hunt, despite her image as Diane la Chasseresse. Henry also had a small zoo of African animals that he had received at the beginning of his reign.[2]

The king's preference for his châteaux as his usual places of residence was also a consequence of the general suspicion of cities found among most French nobles. They disliked the confined spaces of a city and the presence of so many commoners. Furthermore, being in a city meant that the kings had to deal directly with the municipal commune, whose more popular nature they distrusted. Consequently, Henry spent little time in French cities, not even Paris. However, the English ambassador reported that in March 1548 Henry and several courtiers had slipped into Paris incognito to visit his friends and to partake in the amusements of the city in secret.[3]

The need to visit Paris secretly reflected the fact that the king had not yet made his formal entry into the city, in part because the city government needed time to prepare for the elaborate and highly expensive ceremony. Henry, nonetheless, insisted on the full sum of 300,000 livres that the bourgeois of Paris owed for the confirmation of their offices and privileges. The imperial ambassador proposed that Henry treated Paris, and Orléans as well, in this fashion to keep the cities from having the funds to build up their fortifications and cause future trouble.[4]

When the king secretly visited Paris or went on a brief hunting trip, he left the court behind. In the sixteenth century the court was essentially the *maison du roi*. It was regarded as being separate from the king in that the two could be in different places. The court included the adult members of the king's family, the principal officers of the realm, the foreign ambassadors, the French cardinals if they were not in Rome, and an enormous supporting entourage.

In 1556 the *maison du roi* numbered 807 persons with clearly defined salaries; the total was 292,258 livres, up from 214,918 in 1535 for 622 people.[5] There were sixty-six different categories of members of the household. The greatest prestige and salary were attached to the hundred *gentilshommes de la chambre*, at 1,200 livres

a year. Since they had ready access to the king, their roll included some of the highest-ranking nobles. Claude Gouffier de Boisy was their captain. Another category of high-ranking officials was that of the *maîtres d'hôtel*, who oversaw the smooth functioning of the household. The grand master, an office held by Montmorency under Henry, was a major official of the realm and had an important role in both diplomacy and royal ceremonies. Other categories included the almoners and chaplains of the court, singers and instrument players, physicians, surgeons, apothecaries and barbers, librarians, painters and tapestrymakers, and a vast army of clerks, ushers, aides and porters. Even a position such as the *premier panetier* (breadcarrier) was occupied by a member of the well-placed Brissac family at 600 livres a year.

Associated with the royal household but kept as separate departments were the *argenterie*, which purchased furnishings, plate, and clothing for the court, the *écurie*, which was in charge of the royal stables and furnished messengers and couriers for the king, and the above-mentioned two divisions of royal huntsmen. In addition to the enormous salary outlay for all of these people, there were the vast sums needed for food, supplies, and furnishings for the royal household. Separate household accounts were maintained for the queen, at 200,000 livres, Henry's sister Marguerite, 50,000, and the king's sons, 200,000. These households were organized very similarly to the king's. Furthermore, there were the 800 royal guards whose salaries totaled 120,000 livres.[6]

Adding to the nearly 2,000 guards, officials, and servants were several thousand merchants and hangers-on. The movement of the court was an enormous logistical undertaking that involved the transportation of vast quantities of food and drink, clothing, armor and weapons, musical instruments, and the accoutrements of hunting, including dogs and falcons. In traveling from one place to another the court took almost all of the furniture, bedding, and even the tapestries along, stripping the current place of residence nearly bare of furnishings and servants to take to the next. Despite the difficulty and expense of moving so vast an amount of people and furnishings across often rough terrain over the muddy ruts that served as roads, the French court moved frequently, much to the annoyance of the foreign ambassadors, who had to pay their own expenses, for which their salaries were usually insufficient.

Wherever he was, Henry always engaged in vigorous physical

exercise, such as tennis, wrestling, and jousting, in addition to riding and hunting, and in more sedate pastimes like pallmall (croquet) and card games. Brantôme, who stated that the king was never idle, described how he enjoyed ice skating at Fontainebleau when the lake froze over. Nonetheless, Brantôme and Monluc both emphasized that he also worked hard at the business of being king. The former related how he spent two or three hours, or more if affairs demanded it, in the morning on matters of state and a similar amount of time in the evening. Brantôme's tone suggests that he thought Henry was unusual in devoting so much time to public business.[7]

While at Fontainebleau in 1547, Henry attended to organizing his government and distributed gifts to his favorites and the influential persons of the realm. The carefree life-style of the king and the court in the second half of 1547 disguised the fact that military and diplomatic affairs were never far from the minds of the king and his advisers. The dispatches of Saint-Mauris make it clear that Henry felt his father had left the army and the frontier defenses in a state of unreadiness. Henry ordered all the captains to join their commands under threat of dismissal. With the exception of the governors, he did not allow captains to hold offices in his household so they would have no excuse for failing to join their commands. They were ordered to strengthen the fortifications in their districts, and several high ranking officers were sent to the frontier provinces to inspect their defenses.[8]

The French insisted that all of this activity was strictly defensive in purpose. Henry told Saint-Mauris through Montmorency that he had only goodwill toward the emperor and had no intention of going to war with him. One reason why Henry was eager to convey that message to Charles V was the situation in Scotland, which was threatening to draw France into war with England. Scottish affairs had long been of importance to France because of Scotland's usefulness as a check on English ambitions on the continent. With Henry II's accession, they took on added importance because the child-queen of Scotland, five-year old Mary, was the niece of the Guises. Their influence with Henry ensured that he would take a special interest in Scotland and its queen.

Very shortly after Mary's birth in 1542 the Scottish court had agreed on a marriage compact between her and Henry VIII's son, Edward. When Edward became king in 1547 the English began to insist that the marriage take place. Neither Henry II nor the Guises were

willing to let it happen. Henry also had not forgotten the humiliation of his defeat by the English at Boulogne in 1544 and was fiercely determined to win back the town.[9] He certainly was not prepared to see the English monarchy enhance its position by union with Scotland, thereby removing what had been for centuries a most useful distraction of English power away from the continent.

By July 1547 the situation in Scotland seemed to be disintegrating. The several recent defeats of the Scots at the hands of the English and the turmoil caused by the murder of Cardinal Beaton in 1546 made it appear obligatory for the French to take a direct role in Scotland to prevent an English takeover. Therefore, Henry sent fifteen galleys under the command of Leone Strozzi, Catherine de Medici's cousin, to Scotland to recapture the castle of Saint Andrew, which the assassins of Beaton had held for nearly a year. Among those whom Strozzi captured and condemned to serve on French galleys was John Knox. The English response to French intervention in Scotland was to send an army across the Tweed that engaged the Scots in September 1547 at Pinkie Cleugh. The devastating defeat inflicted on the Scots placed Marie de Guise and her daughter in real danger of being captured by the English and taken to London. Saint-Mauris recognized the importance to Henry II of what was happening in Scotland in his comment that Henry was eager to mix the French in Scotland: "He sees clearly that otherwise Scotland will be utterly lost and totally ruined. He has this subject much at heart and would avoid such a wound at the beginning of his reign."[10]

The opportunity had clearly come to broach a proposal to Marie de Guise that certainly must have been in the minds of the French leaders, and Marie's as well, for some time: bring the girl queen of Scotland to France to be reared at the French court and among her Guise relatives. No mention was made of any French marriage for her at this point, but the presence at the French court of the young Dauphin Francis, two years younger, could not have gone unnoticed. In November 1547 the Scottish leaders agreed to permit Mary to be taken to France. In the following January a contract between Henry II and the regent of Scotland, the Earl of Arran, in the name of the Scots nobility, called for the marriage of the queen of Scotland and the French dauphin, her removal to France, and the garrisoning of several Scottish fortresses by French troops. Arran was to receive a French duchy.[11]

In June 1548, after several irritating delays, a French fleet with

some 6,000 men aboard sailed for Scotland. Shortly after they landed, augmented by 8,000 Scots, they laid siege to the town of Haddington held by the English. In an abbey near the ruined town the Scottish Parliament met and agreed to the marriage compact. Henry II was acknowledged as the protector of the realm of Scotland. Meanwhile, four French galleys sailed around Scotland to Dumbarton, where Queen Mary was waiting to embark for France. After a week's delay at Dumbarton because of bad weather and a suspenseful two weeks at sea, during which an English fleet had to be outrun, Mary and her court were landed at Roscoff in western Brittany. At Tours she met her grandmother, Antoinette de Guise, and in mid-October she and her party reached Saint-Germain-en-Laye, where she met her future husband.[12]

On August 24, 1548, Henry had written that the marriage between his son and the queen of Scotland was assured, but there was strong objection to the Scottish alliance at the French court. Many important persons, in particular Marguerite d'Angoulême, objected to it on the grounds that it benefited only the Guises, while it exacerbated the already bad relations with England. Modern historians have picked up on Marguerite's complaint that the king "gives in so much to the House of Guise which has nowadays acquired so much power that it can make the king do anything as this last alliance clearly proves."[13] Henry, however, had to be so well aware of the enormous potential benefit of the proposed marriage for France, and especially for his dynasty, that he hardly needed the Guises to persuade him to act. Nonetheless, their family ties with Mary Stuart did provide a useful justification for bringing her to France and keeping her out of English hands. The comments against the Guises do demonstrate the depth of resentment and envy toward the brothers by late 1548.

The betrothal of Mary and Francis and their subsequent marriage in 1558 did not bring the long-term advantages that the French expected; it was, in fact, a significant factor in the events that precipitated the eventual loss of French influence in Scotland. Nonetheless, it is easy to see why Henry's first foreign initiative was regarded at the time as a major success. French troops were manning several Scottish forts against the traditional English enemy, and the Scottish queen was in France, pledged to marry the successor to the French throne, who would become king of Scotland at the appropriate time. Furthermore, there was a distinct possibility that his son and daughter-in-law or a grandson might rule England, as well.

French control of England's northern neighbor seemed set for a long time to come.

The success of Henry's Scottish policy contrasted with the failure of his first Italian initiative. Henry was as determined to win control of northern Italy as his father had been, with perhaps greater justification since his claims to Milan, Parma, and Piacenza were more immediate because of the compact of his marriage to Catherine de Medici. At the time of Henry's accession, the French controlled most of western Piedmont, including Turin, where the prince of Amalfi, Giovanni Caracciolo, was governor for the French monarch. But the main prize, Milan, was controlled by Charles V's forces. In November 1547 Saint-Mauris, the imperial ambassador, reported Henry's protests of peaceful intentions but added his suspicions that the move was in preparation for war the next spring since "the king says that Piedmont belongs to this crown and he speaks only of the defense of his realm."[14]

Henry insisted that he had only peaceful intentions toward Charles V. Seeking to use marriage diplomacy to gain his goals in Italy, he had already arranged a marriage contract for his legitimized daughter, Diane de France, then nine years old, with Pope Paul III's grandson, Orazio Farnese. Farnese was to receive Parma and Piacenza in Italy, and Avignon and Comtat-Venaissin, the papal enclaves in France. His older brother, Ottavio, had already married Charles's natural daughter, Margaret, and had hopes bolstered by promises from Charles of becoming the duke of Parma.

The marriage compact further complicated an already enormously complex situation in northern Italy and drew Henry much more deeply into the quagmire of Italian politics. Paul III's ambitions to carve out principalities for his two sons and several grandsons clashed with both French and imperial interests, especially the latter since Charles V controlled most of the region in question. In September 1547 Pier Luigi Farnese, the pope's son and Orazio's father, was assassinated by men whom all assumed were imperial agents. Paul's rage at Charles V, his erstwhile ally, provided an opportunity at the papal court for French diplomacy of the sort that had not existed since he had been elected in 1534. Charles de Guise, who had gone to Rome to receive his cardinal's hat, was instructed to convince the pope to agree to a defensive alliance with France. Paul, who had declared that he was ready to die a martyr in order to punish the assassins, was ready to listen to French proposals. He stated to Guise

that he hoped to see Henry raised to be one of the most powerful princes in the world.[15]

The proposed alliance depended upon the addition of Venice, and the Venetians were reluctant to involve themselves in a war that they saw as largely for the personal revenge of an eighty-four-year-old man. Henry II and the Guises, who were eager for a victory in Italy in order to be successful where Francis I had failed, were nonetheless reluctant to involve France in a war without a more substantial ally than the papacy. Feelers sent to the Turks about an attack in southern Italy were not encouraging. The French army was not well prepared for war, since, in the words of Saint-Mauris, "their troops are very badly equipped." The ambassador noted that the French king was finding it difficult to accumulate the financial resources for a war since Henry did not have much ready cash. Therefore, he was forced to be very careful with his gifts and "is as stingy as his father was liberal."[16]

Perhaps the most important restraint on war was Montmorency who argued persuasively against a war fought largely for the advantage of an old pope and of the Guises, who had pretensions to the crown of Naples through their descendency from the dukes of Anjou, rulers of Naples in the fourteenth century. The constable's case was clinched when word came from Venice that it would not join the alliance. Ultimately, the only benefit for Henry that came out of the negotiations with Paul III was the issuance of the *indults* needed to keep the Concordat of Bologna in effect in Provence and Brittany, since they had to be renewed for every new French king. Paul III, who was in principle opposed to the concordat, had delayed issuing the *indults* in hope of securing more rights for the papacy in episcopal appointments in France.[17]

Henry had intended to lead an army into Italy in the spring of 1548; with the decision not to go to war, he decided to journey to Italy anyway in the hope that his presence would settle some of the disputed points in his favor. In April Henry took leave of the court at Fontainebleau and began the journey to Piedmont with many of the great nobles of the realm. He left Catherine de Medici at Mâcon with a governing council of five notables, including Chancellor Olivier and Cardinal Jean de Lorraine, to govern the kingdom in his absence.

As the king traveled southeastward, he made his formal entries into several cities, the first such ceremonies except for the one at Reims associated with his coronation. These entry ceremonies were

lavish and expensive, with the one at Beaune on July 18 perhaps the most extravagant. A large mock fort was built that was defended by some 1,500 locals and attacked by a comparable number. The mock combat was real enough to result in "numerous broken limbs and concussions" but no deaths. The king pronounced himself most pleased with the entertainment and the decorations in the town, about which "even the greatest nobles raised cries of delight declaring that they had never seen anything so beautiful."[18]

At Chambéry, in western Savoy, one such entry led to an incident that presents perfectly the conflicts over position and status that so completely permeated the French court. Antoine de Bourbon, in his rank as first prince of the blood, was accustomed to ride or walk alone immediately behind the sovereign in any formal procession. He was surprised to find François de Guise at his side during the entry into Chambéry. When Bourbon objected, Guise replied that since he was governor of the region, a conquered territory, he had the right to be directly behind the king. Bourbon was so angry at this challenge to his prerogative that he made a move to leave the procession. Henry ordered him to return and march with Guise. While those who saw the incident attributed it to Guise's being "the slave of honors and glory," it was also indicative of the Guises' constant effort to enhance their status and Henry's willingness to humor such efforts.[19]

After crossing the Alps, the royal party reached Turin in August. Montmorency had advised Henry to impress the Italians with his power and wealth by the magnificence of his entry into Turin and his suite while there.[20] Among the ways Henry sought to impress the population was to assume all the debts owed to the Piedmontese by the French troops who had died or deserted. He also arranged that all the soldiers who had been disabled in the previous campaign in Italy be returned to France and given residence for life in various abbeys. It has been suggested that this act was the first recognition on the part of a European monarch that the state had an obligation to those who had suffered in its service.[21]

Among the Italians who came to salute the French king at Turin was the duke of Ferrara, Ercole d'Este. He had a further purpose: arranging the details of the marriage of his daughter Anne to François de Guise. Anne d'Este, reputed to be the most beautiful princess in Italy, was the daughter of Renée de France and thus the granddaughter of Louis XII, which made her a first cousin to Henry II. Another in a series of brilliant successes for the Guises, the marriage brought

the family into closer affinity with the royal family and also annoyed the constable, who had hoped for the princess's hand for one of his nephews.

The d'Estes were already well represented at the French court in the person of Ippolito, the cardinal of Ferrara. He was one of the few persons who was prominent at the courts of both Francis and Henry; he had French benefices worth 80,000 livres. After the death of Cardinal Trivulzio in 1549, d'Este became the protector of French affairs at the Curia, which position conveyed revenues of 150,000 livres. The d'Estes had their own ambitions in Italy that meshed well with the Guises'. Accordingly, the cardinal was their ally at the French court and in Rome.[22] D'Este was Henry's principal candidate for the throne of St. Peter in the three papal elections that took place during his reign.

The French presence in northern Italy was very expensive; in the month of August 1547 alone, it had cost 36,912 livres to maintain the French garrisons in Piedmont. Henry also needed to provide 80,000 livres in 1547 for work on fortifications in the region.[23] These expenses were vastly compounded by other fiscal needs and helped to create enormous pressure on royal revenue-raising. Thus, the festivities and negotiations in Turin came to an abrupt halt in early September 1548, when news arrived from France that a violent rebellion had broken out in the southwestern provinces against the huge increase in the tax on salt, the *gabelle*, recently imposed on that region.

In 1541 Francis I, always searching for new revenues, had mandated a huge increase in the salt tax in the provinces of the southwest, raising them to the same level as the other provinces, and imposed the tax on salt for export and the fish trade. A revolt in the region of La Rochelle in 1543 and 1544 persuaded Francis to back down for the moment. A new edict imposing a system of farming the gabelles at a uniformly high rate across the realm was issued in 1546, but it did not go into effect until Henry confirmed it in 1547.

The resentment toward the new tax was compounded by the appearance of the tax farmers, the *gabelleurs*, who swarmed into the southwestern provinces "as locusts devouring the substance of the people and going away when they had made enormous fortunes." In early April 1548 the first tremors of revolt were felt in the province of Saintonge.[24] As was common in peasant revolts, the specific grievances that the peasants had against the tax collectors were broadened

to include attacks on the nobility and royal officials. The city of Saintes fell to the rebels, some 5,000 strong, and by August the revolt had spread into the province of Guyenne and to Bordeaux. The king's absence from France delayed an effective response to the crisis.[25]

By the time Henry was fully informed of the situation in early September, the number of people killed and the damage done by the rebels were substantial. Most ominously, Henri d'Albret's lieutenant in Guyenne, Tristan de Moneins, had been struck down while negotiating with the rebels, and the first president of the Parlement of Bordeaux had been coerced into declaring for the rebellion.

Badly shaken by the news, Henry left Turin immediately for France. On September 7 he crossed back into Dauphiné and gave commissions to Montmorency and François de Guise, as the constable's lieutenant, to crush the revolt.[26] Montmorency was to lead an army of 1,000 *gens d'armes* to Guyenne via Languedoc, and Guise an army of 4,000 landsknechts via Tours and the Loire valley. By the time the constable reached Toulouse, the leaders of the city of Bordeaux met him to inform him that their city and much of the surrounding region had been pacified. They told him that only a small number of men were needed to complete the pacification. They also asked for clemency for their city.

In accepting his commission from the king, Montmorency had revealed his intentions of dealing harshly with the rebels, which he did not tell the representatives of Bordeaux. According to Vieilleville's memoirs, the constable noted that the region had revolted five years before, and he proposed that the population be completely removed or exterminated and replaced by a more docile one. To Henry's credit, he had flatly rejected such extreme vengeance and informed the constable that his troops were not to plunder or slay and all executions of rebels were to be done through completely legal procedures.[27]

Nonetheless, Montmorency, with Henry's approval, exacted harsh penalties on the rebellious regions upon his arrival in the southwest. Hundreds of rebels, including 150 in Bordeaux, were executed, many only after the most excruciating tortures. The city of Bordeaux lost its charter granting its citizens the rights and privileges of bourgeois status. The charter was burned at the same time as the city hall was razed. Bordeaux was fined 200,000 livres and surrendered to the crown property with revenues of 40,000 livres a year. The city also had to give up bells to furnish bronze for cannon. The Parlement of Bordeaux was dissolved and replaced by a council of royal commis-

sioners. The body of the dead Moneins was exhumed[28] and carried in procession to be reburied in the cathedral. As a city, Bordeaux perhaps had more to lose for its participation in the revolt, but similar draconian measures were imposed in all of the rebellious provinces. The repressive measures were, however, of rather short duration. The Bordelais had not forgotten the communal liberties that they had enjoyed under the English a century earlier, and with tensions between England and France running high, the court feared that the Bordelais would call on the English for aid.[29] Within six months amnesty was granted, and the fines and repression of civic institutions were rescinded.

The harsh measures inflicted on a region that had already largely returned to obedience before Montmorency's arrival reflected badly on him and on Henry, who gave his approval to the constable's actions. Historians of the later sixteenth century were particularly outspoken in their denunciation of what they saw as unnecessary cruelty on Montmorency's part, although some contemporaries like Brantôme thought the punishment had not gone far enough.[30] Certainly one must keep in mind the prevailing attitude of the time, which saw rebellion as one of the most heinous of crimes. Furthermore, the region had rebelled earlier and, having been treated very leniently by Francis I, rebelled again. Henry and Montmorency were determined to make Bordeaux an object lesson of the penalties for rebellion, especially since it was early in Henry's reign and he and the constable may have felt that they were being tested by the affair.[31]

The salt tax revolt was the only significant popular uprising during Henry's reign, but one must attribute that largely to good luck, the brevity of his reign, and, probably, the lingering reputation for severity created in 1548.[32] It certainly was not a consequence of Henry's tax policy, which continued to impose heavier taxes on the population. Nonetheless, despite the complaints about the heavy taxes that his wars inflicted on the people, there was little open opposition to the king during his reign.

The nobles were much taken with Henry since he was very much one of them. In the decades after his death, nobles like Brantôme and Monluc would look back with unabashed nostalgia to the good times under Henry. His wars provided numerous opportunities for the nobility to exercise its God-given right to fight and win glory; for many nobles the monarchy's only purpose was to provide wars. Henry was also a consummate sportsman, who reveled in the same rough

sports like hunting and jousting that the nobles did, and enacted a harsh edict against poaching by non-nobles in 1555. He was regarded as being of champion quality in the more genteel sport of *jeu de paume* (tennis) that had recently caught the fancy of the well-born. Shortly after he became king, Henry issued an edict that restricted the use of silk to the nobles, an act that one presumes greatly pleased them since they were always at odds with the wealthy bourgeoisie over such issues as dress and conspicuous consumption. When the Venetian Contarini referred to Henry's kindness, graciousness, and courtesy to all, never refusing an audience to anyone, even the most humble, he was reflecting the opinion largely of the nobles, who had the greatest opportunity to appreciate those virtues. The ordinary soldier also had cause to appreciate Henry, since he paid promptly and well and was as solicitous of their well-being as any king of the century.

Henry also was well liked by much of the the bourgeoisie. The financiers appreciated the vast business he gave them and the prompt payment of interest. Many of those involved in making loans to the French king were French merchants, who were eager for the great profits that lending to the king at high rates of interest promised. Despite the fact that many other merchants were forced to make loans to the monarchy at low rates of interest through the *rentes*, Henry's popularity with the merchant class remained high. The English ambassador Pickering wrote: "This king continueth wonderfully the augmenting of his credit with the merchants, which kind of men he maketh much of." The various ambassadors frequently noted that Henry recognized the value of mercantile activity for his treasury. Pickering's comments about Henry's efforts to lure foreign merchants to France are suggestive of mercantilism: "To allure them more and more into the realm, he giveth them such privileges and exemptions from the ordinary payments, as they come from all parts daily hither to inhabit. This is reckoned a notable policy to avoid always extremities that may come by lack of money."[33]

The heavy burden of lending to the monarchy and taxes for the wars of the king had not yet had a negative impact on the affection that the people of Paris had for Henry at the time of the battle of Saint-Quentin in 1557. Vast sums were needed to rebuild the French army after that defeat, and the king looked first of all to Paris, where "very great inclination is visible on the part of everyone to contribute for this need, much affection being demonstrated universally for his

Majesty who, by reason of his natural graciousness and from the opinion entertained by all Frenchmen of his valour and prudence, is so generally loved that they will not deny him anything."[34]

As for the common peasants or day laborers, they had little contact with the king, although he is noted as being very courteous to them when they did; and they left no record of their opinion of their monarch, although Claude Haton, the parish priest from Champagne, asserted that they loved him.[35] On occasion Henry showed that he had concern for their interests. While returning from Italy in 1548, he attended a meeting of the Estates of Dauphiné at Grenoble and resolved a bitter dispute over the removal from the tax rolls of taxable properties by wealthy bourgeoisie in favor of the less affluent villagers.[36] Henry also touched the lives of some of the common people in a more direct way than by taxes and general edicts. In 1549 he eliminated the last vestiges of serfdom on the royal lands in the Bourbonnais and in 1554 he did the same in Burgundy: "It is our will and desire that all men and women born and dwelling in these lands . . . with their heirs and issue shall be free and unconstrained as regards both their persons and property, and they shall remain hereafter in a condition of complete and total liberty."[37] In the same year, while campaigning in Artois, Henry stood as godfather for the newborn child of the peasant woman in whose hovel the royal party had taken shelter. Charles de Guise baptized the boy, named Henri, and the king gave the woman ten silver coins.[38]

It was by such acts of charity that the king usually came into contact with the lower classes, most frequently when he touched for scrofula. His first official act after his coronation was to touch for the king's illness, and the ambassadors' reports note several times that he did so. Claude Haton provided a description of Henry touching for scrofula at Fontainebleau on the feast of John the Baptist in 1556, at which Haton was present. After touching the sick persons, the king gave the group an admonition to be good and faithful Catholics and devoted servants of God, Mary, and their local seigneur. Henry's almoner, Louis de Brézé, bishop of Meaux (Diane de Poitiers's nephew), gave each person touched a small coin and asked that they pray for the king.[39]

There is no question that Henry had a strong sense of the duty of the king to see to the welfare of his people, but his sense of what was best for his subjects was almost entirely molded by the nobility around him. He had little understanding of and sympathy for the life

of the common folk. He expected that their response to him would be one of gratitude and obedience.[40] Thus, when commoners revolted, as they did in the southwest in 1548, his sense of betrayal led him to approve of the draconian acts of Montmorency, whose very similar but even more strongly felt attitudes certainly helped to form Henry's.

6 SILVER IS THE SINEW OF WAR

Henry II was confronted with only one violent tax protest during his reign, despite an ever-increasing tax burden on the French people and a royal fiscal system that was jerry-built, inefficient, and decidedly unfair. His good fortune was in large part a consequence of the fact that he ruled a realm whose economy seems to have been quite robust until the last year or two of his reign. The vast increase in specie in circulation during the previous two decades was stimulating the economy without as yet creating high inflation. In the first half of the reign, the price of wine, meat, herring, wood, and coal all remained steady, but manufactured goods were more inflationary, probably reflecting the increase in wages that had occurred in the previous decade. Wages were almost completely stagnant in Henry's reign, and by the end of it, the consequence was the impoverishment of the rural and urban day laborers. Under Henry, however, the pause in inflation in basic commodities, coupled with increases in prices of manufactured goods, resulted in large profits for merchants and some artisans. But by 1559 both nature and economic trends had conspired to hit the French people with a deadly combination of bad harvests, spiraling inflation, and a decline in productivity and profits.[1]

Henry's policy of confronting the emperor in every possible arena and in every possible way, and his insistence on maintaining the type of court, cultural patronage, and building projects that he felt were necessary for a king of a great realm like France, put tremendous pressure on the system of revenues. Thus Henry, like all the sixteenth-century French monarchs, was always in desperate need of new revenues since expenditures outstripped income. In seeking to remedy the problem, the kings constantly made changes in

the fiscal system and taxation, and the system for collecting revenue and making expenditures that Henry inherited in 1547 had already undergone vast changes in Francis's reign.[2] Francis had created a new office, the *tresorier de l'Epargne*, to receive the royal revenues that exceeded the expenses of the local royal bureaucracy. Local royal *receveurs* always paid local officials from the gross revenues before forwarding the surplus on to the *Epargne*. The royal treasury gathered together the net revenues from the king's "ordinary" income, such as rents and feudal dues from royal lands, and his "extraordinary" income, which came from tolls and taxes. The latter, however, had become as ordinary and as sure as death. The *Epargne* was responsible for paying all expenses of the central government and the court except those that went unchanged from one year to the next. The *Epargne* now paid the *décharges*, warrants issued by the king for payments of pensions, royal gifts, or emergency expenditures. The establishment of the treasurer of the *Epargne* did not eliminate the previous high-level financial officers, the *gens de finances*, but it reduced their power and status.

The creation of the treasurer of the *Epargne* did little, however, to change the system of financial courts that had emerged in the late Middle Ages. Broad fiscal policy was decided by the two royal councils, but the fiscal courts also had a voice in policymaking as well as in judging fiscal disputes. The two principal fiscal courts, the *Chambre des comptes* and the *Cour des aides*, were sovereign courts, which gave them the power to serve as the court of last appeal in financial matters, although the royal councils often heard further appeals in important cases, and to register or refuse to accept royal edicts affecting royal finances. If a fiscal court refused to register a royal edict, the king could order it to do so with a *lettre de jussion*.

The major area of jurisdiction of the *Chambre des comptes* was over the disputes that arose between the government and tax officials, while the *Cour des aides* was concerned with disputes between tax officials and taxpayers over the various royal taxes. They also served as an archive for the tax-collecting system since all account books had to be forwarded eventually to them. Since ennoblements meant a loss of tax revenue for the crown, the *Chambre des comptes* also had competence over patents of nobility and disputes over noble status.[3] Henry II sought to give sovereign status to a third court, the *Cour des monnaies*, in an edict of 1552. This court, which controlled the coinage in the realm and was therefore charged with finding out

and prosecuting counterfeiters, was not accepted by the other courts as sovereign, despite the royal edict. All three financial courts had counterparts, or branches, in the view of the Parisian members, in the major provinces, several of which were created in Henry's reign.

The reforms of Francis I's reign and the enhanced status and effectiveness of the fiscal courts were not very successful in eliminating the corruption that pervaded the royal fiscal system, nor did they greatly increase the flow of revenues into the king's war chest. They did, however, give him far greater control over expenditures and better information about the amount of money available for war. The actual money chests of the *Epargne* were fixed in the Louvre in 1532 after the system of moving them with the court in its travels had become too unwieldy. Each chest had four keys; the king and the chancellor were among the four officials who held a key.

The expenses of the wars with Charles V usually kept the sums in the treasury well below the 500,000 écus that Francis had considered the minimum reserve. A further reform was necessary to bring royal revenues up to the appropriate level. In the Edict of Cognac of 1542 Francis divided the four existing *généralités des finances* into seventeen, each with a *receveur général* responsible for collecting royal revenues and payment of local expenditures. In regard to the latter the *receveur* now had much broader authority to expend money, especially for military matters, so that far fewer payments had to come from Paris. The result was an obvious increase in efficiency, since there was far less movement of cash to and from Paris, and the attendant delays were reduced.[4] At the beginning of Henry's reign there had emerged essentially seventeen regional treasurers who had competence over most of the royal financial transactions. Only payments connected with the court and major extraordinary expenditures came out of the *Epargne*, although the *tresorier de l'Epargne* did have the authority, frequently used, to order payments from the regional *généralités*.

Having left his successor a somewhat more rational system of revenue collection and expenditure, Francis also left him both substantially increased revenues and expenses. Total revenues from the royal lands, tolls, and taxes increased from 5 million livres in 1515 to over 9 million by 1546, an increase of 2.6 percent per annum at a time when inflation was slightly lower. The key taxes were the *tailles*, the *aides*, and the *gabelles*. The first was a tax on nonseigneurial land and wealth—land that did not confer a noble title on its holder.

The taille applied to urban property owners as well as rural, but a good many cities were entirely exempt from the tax by royal patent. The total sum of the tailles expected to be collected each year was determined by the royal council. The appropriate sums to be levied on each province were then determined, and on down to the local parish. These sums were fixed for the year; if a piece of property had escaped from the taille, every other taillable parcel in the parish had its levy increased. Thus, the question of whether a recently sold property could be removed from the rolls of the taille was a source of never-ending litigation, often carried to the *Cour des aides* in Paris and occasionally to the royal council. In 1547 the taille contributed 4,889,000 livres to the crown, or nearly 80 percent of the total revenue raised from the three major taxes.[5] Since the major cities were exempt from the taille, they were asked to contribute a subsidy known as the *soldes des 50,000 hommes de pied* to help finance the army.[6]

Second in value among the major taxes were the aides, a sale tax placed on almost every commodity usually sold in large amounts, ranging from grain to wine to stones for building. In 1547 it was assessed at 700,000 livres. The tax was usually one sol per livre of retail price (5 percent); but some items were taxed at wholesale, and wine was taxed at both. Items sold at less than five sous were exempted from the aides, which freed the ordinary transactions of a small village from the tax and also freed the government from the expenses that the huge bureaucracy needed to collect the small sums would have cost. The government rarely collected the aides directly; it farmed them out to tax farmers, who paid the government a sum set by auction for the right to extract that sum and more from the people. Nobles and clerics were forbidden to farm the aides, and the government preferred established businessmen who knew well both the businesses and the businessmen generating the tax. Royal gifts of the right to collect a specific aide in a region or the entire realm were quite commonly given to favorites and pensioners, as well as to cities to maintain their fortifications. By the time of Henry's reign the late medieval prejudice against farming the aides for several provinces or several different aides together was disappearing. By 1559 such *grosses fermes* were numerous and could last for several years. The system of collecting the aides obviously was open to vast corruption and conflict, but contemporaries still regarded them as the most equitable tax because all members of society paid them, despite numerous exemptions to specific aides for nobles and clerics.

Because of the nature of the aides as a sales tax, which made it difficult to establish beforehand a set amount to be collected from each province, the farming of the aides at a vast number of auctions, and the alienation of numerous aides, it is most difficult to determine the total of the aides that the crown collected in any given year. In 1558 Soranzo placed the sum at only 600,000 livres.[7]

The third major *impôt* was the tariff on salt, the gabelles. Salt, as a necessary but none too plentiful commodity, lent itself well to royal revenue-raising. Salt sold in central and northern France, the provinces of the *grand gabelles*, was purchased only from royal warehouses (*greniers*), where its price had been augmented by 75 percent or more by the tax. Each family was required to buy a set amount considered appropriate for a household's use in a year; for many households the required amount was far more than was needed. In the southwest, the Midi, and Burgundy, the tax was considerably lower, at 20 to 25 percent of the sales price. In Brittany, the gabelle was not imposed at all, and the enormous difference in price with the provinces to the east encouraged wholesale smuggling. The gabelles had increased in the sixteenth century from 483,000 livres in 1523 to 720,000 in 1547, and one million by 1557, but the proportion of total tax revenues the gabelles represented declined from over 10 percent to 8 percent.[8]

The total of taxes and tolls for 1547 was 8.4 million livres, an increase of 22 percent since 1523.[9] To that substantial income the crown added another 1 million livres from the royal domain. The sums raised in these ways came nowhere close to providing the money needed for the monarchy. The kings had to turn to a source of funds increasingly tapped by the French monarchy in the sixteenth century—the Catholic church. The monarch had been collecting the clerical tenth (*décime*) under the guise of a gift—which the clergy always insisted it was—since 1516. By 1542 the tenth had become an annual contribution, and after that year four *décimes* (about 1.4 million livres) were regularly collected. The only exceptions in Henry's reign were 1550, when two were levied, and 1557, when he demanded eight. The *décime* in fact did not come close to being a tenth of clerical income. Thus the four *décimes* that became standard after 1542 was likely closer to such a percentage for most of the higher clergy. The clerical tenth had become a regular element of royal income and could not be counted on to make up the shortfall caused by the war. Even the exemption from the clerical tenth granted in 1549

to the theologians of the Sorbonne was revoked in 1551. In 1552, Henry called a meeting of five cardinals and thirty bishops to raise funds for war. They agreed to a new levy of 1.4 million livres, to be raised through a tax of twenty livres on each church steeple. The sum implied that France contained the staggering number of 70,000 steeples.[10]

Another way in which the church was milked for money involved a delay in sending the nominations to bishoprics and abbeys to Rome. While these major benefices were vacant, the king collected their revenues. Various other schemes to raise money from the clergy, reported by the various foreign ambassadors, involved the sale of church lands or requiring each parish to support a soldier by selling a chalice. The more elaborate schemes did not materialize; it is not clear whether some of the more modest were implemented.[11]

Despite the substantial income of nearly 11 million livres, the king's expenses nearly always outstripped his revenues, in 1547 by 3,131,000 livres. To make up the deficit, the crown turned to new taxes and borrowing vast sums. In 1549 Henry created a new tax, the *taillon*, which was announced to the public as a means of supporting French troops so they would not have to pillage French villages and towns. As initially levied, it collected 720,000 livres for the crown, but it was hardly of real significance in terms of the needs of war.[12]

Far vaster sums were made available through borrowing. One system of making loans was the *rente*. Usually defined simply as an annuity, a rente was an arrangement by which the lender (*rentier*) bought the income from a source of revenue, whether a piece of property, a toll, or a tax, for a period of years in exchange for a large sum of money, the principal. The annual income served as interest for the principal, which was to be repaid in a lump sum at the end of the contract. The contract was often renewed or extended indefinitely. The arrangement was necessary to avoid the church's prohibition on interest-taking, since the rentes were not regarded as involving interest.

The rentes predated Francis I, but in 1522 that king raised the first such loans from the city government of Paris. Such loans became known as the *rentes sur l'Hôtel de ville*, because the city government took responsibility for raising the loans and paying the interest. Certain taxes and tolls that were considered dependable, such as those on meat and wine, which city hall was already collecting for the king, were designated to pay the interest. Francis used the rentes sparingly

so that rentes outstanding at the end of his reign totaled 725,000 livres.[13] Henry found the practice a seemingly painless way of raising money and created a great many more rentes, increasing the funds available by an average of 500,000 livres a year.

The rentes, however, did not fill the king's need for more money; he was forced to resort to outright borrowing, primarily from the bankers of Lyon, both French and Italian. By 1542 Francis I was borrowing regularly at the four Lyon fairs, paying 16 percent interest. It is clear that Francis borrowed more than he spent in his last years, leaving some 500,000 écus in his war chests in the Louvre and a substantial sum in the *Epargne*. Presumably he was preparing for the next war, although there has been the suggestion that he was seeking to ruin his enemies by creating a capital shortage in the rest of Europe.[14]

The sum of 500,000 écus that Francis left to Henry in the Louvre has been used by historians hostile to Henry to argue that his father left him a full treasury, which he quickly bankrupted through war and his spendthrift ways.[15] But Saint-Mauris made it clear that such was not the case. Writing in April 1547, he reported that "there was less money in the Louvre than had been reported—500,000 or 600,000 écus at most. Money is still owed to the Lyon merchants, and it is considered important to pay them their interest. . . . In short the finances are not so brilliant as they boast."[16]

Henry quickly went through that money and was soon seeking huge loans at Lyon, primarily from the Italian banking community there. Albisse del Bene, a Florentine exile, served as Henry's liaison with the Lyonnais bankers. He raised 1,177,165 livres in 1552, and 1,691,168 in 1553, just for use in Italy alone.[17]

The usual rate of interest was 4 percent from one of the four banking fairs of Lyon to the next, a rate of 16 percent a year.[18] Not all of Henry's loans had that high a rate of interest. He had an excellent reputation for paying interest on time and for repaying the principal when the lender requested it.[19] For those reasons, loans to the French court were very attractive, and the banks of Lyon attracted money from Germany and Flanders, as well as Italy. As a result, the interest rates often dropped to 12 percent and even lower—as it did in 1550, when there was little demand for money—down to 5 percent. By the time of the Easter fair of 1553 interest had mounted to 16 percent because of the demands of the war. Henry had loans outstanding of 3,658,400 livres. German financiers had contributed nearly half

of that sum, despite the war against the emperor.[20] Despite such a large debt, Henry had no problem in raising another 120,000 *scudi* (300,000 livres) at the Easter fair.[21] By October 1553 the Lyon fair had attracted so much money that Henry was able to get a loan of 400,000 livres at 14 percent interest.

Henry continued to borrow huge sums at the Lyon financial fairs, even when his immediate needs do not appear to have been so urgent. Part of his purpose was apparently to build up his war chests, as the various ambassadors noted a number of times. But Henry appears to have had another motive as well—drying up the credit available to the emperor. The regent of the Lowlands, Mary of Hungary, wrote to her brother Charles in 1552 to report that she had prohibited the Lyonnais bankers from receiving credit on the Antwerp exchange because of her fear of that possibility.[22] Thirty years later Jean Bodin ascribed such a motive to Henry but criticized him for it, because, he argued, the rate of interest required for the effort eventually bankrupted the crown.[23]

In 1555 Henry reorganized his debts and borrowing in a fashion that for a time was most pleasing to the bankers. In March 1555 he consolidated all of his previous loans from the Lyonnais bankers, some 1,521,000 écus, and raised a new loan equal to a third of that by means of what became known as the *Grand Parti*.[24] Any loan to a prince was known in Italian as a *partito*, or *parti* in French; since this one was open to all, it was the *Grand Parti*. Henry pledged to the Grand Parti the most secure revenues of the generalities of Toulouse, Lyon, and Montpellier. This pledge made it attractive to a great number of foreign bankers, Italian, German, Flemish, Portuguese, and even Islamic, at a time when the emperor was finding it difficult to pay his interest. The scheme seems designed to siphon capital away from the principal Habsburg money centers—Antwerp and Genoa—as well as to provide funds for war. A *receveur* was appointed to handle the funds and payments for the king.

What made the Grand Parti especially attractive to lenders was its system of payment of interest and principal. At the time of each fair of Lyon (four a year) the king would repay a sum equal to 5 percent of the original loan. The first payment consisted of 4 percent for the interest (16 percent per year) and 1 percent to repay the principal. But since the interest was on only the unpaid principal, a larger part of the 5 percent payment at every fair went to amortizing the principal. The loan was to be repaid in full in forty-one fairs (ten years and four

months). The Venetian ambassador Soranzo reported in 1557 exactly how the system was to work:

> The King has contracted a loan bearing interest at the rate of 16 per cent, of which the fourth part is to be paid at each fair, the King disbursing simultaneously at each fair one per cent of the capital, which being diminished at each fair yet will the disbursement not be diminished, although at each succeeding fair the amount due for interest will be lessened; but the surplus in the King's hands through the debasement of the interest will be added to the repayment of the capital; so that in 41 fairs, which will have been held in 10 years and one quarter, the payment of the capital and the interest will be completed; and in the said term of ten years and one quarter his Majesty, to those who now disburse 100 crowns capital, will have paid only 204 crowns, including capital and interest, thus saving 60 per cent on what he would have had to disburse had he during the said period paid interest at the rate of 16 per cent, and on its expiration chosen to repay the capital.[25]

It was the first time that any monarch in Europe had set up a definite schedule of amortizing a loan. In order to avoid being charged with breaking the church's laws against usury, the interest was described in the contract as a *don gratuit*.[26]

Substantial loans continued to be made in the same way. In 1557, the Venetian ambassador Soranzo reported 1.5 million écus raised from the bankers of Lyon and the prospect of a similar sum from mostly German financiers.[27] By the end of that year the king had borrowed some 9,658,000 écus but was forced momentarily to halt payment on it at the November fair. The brief interruption in amortizing the loans did little to reduce confidence in the French monarchy before Henry's death, as he continued to obtain substantial loans on essentially the same terms.[28]

But the demands of the war efforts required money beyond that available from taxation and loans. One document placed military expenses in 1553 at 13,193,260 livres.[29] That total did not include the money needed for building or repairing fortifications and for the political side of the conflict. For the latter purpose Henry distributed 234,960 livres in Italy alone.[30]

Any monarch with financial troubles usually resorted to tinkering with the currency, and Henry II was no exception. In 1550 he reduced the gold content of the écu and renamed it the *henri*, as which

it was officially known until 1561. Shortly after its appearance, the regent of the Lowlands ordered the imperial ambassador in France to complain that the new coin did not contain the amount of gold established for its exchange rate—as established by its value in the money of account, the livre.[31] The official ratio between the écu and the livre had already been adjusted, although apparently not enough to reflect the reduced gold content. The gold écu had been pegged at two livres five sols (twenty sols to the livre) in 1533; in 1550 it was changed to 2 livres 10 sols. The change in the exchange rate reflected at least two factors. One was that it made the gold reserves of the crown more valuable, since the royal accounts were calculated in livres, the money of account, but paid in écus or other real coins. The second factor was the increase in the ratio of silver to gold in circulation, in large part a result of Spanish exploitation of the Americas. The livre was based on the value of silver, and the change reflected the inflation of the era and the monarchy's attempt to adjust to it.

Many of the *dizains* and other small coins of the realm, those made of billon (copper), had already been badly debased by 1550. In January 1550 Henry issued an edict that prohibited the circulation of the most common of these debased coins and ordered that they be exchanged for new coins, but at a rate profitable for the monarchy. The edict created serious problems at the level of the petty retail transactions in the cities and villages, since many people had not exchanged their coins. Merchants refused to accept all old coins, whether they were the proscribed type or not. This real crisis for the ordinary Frenchman was alleviated only by time after the new coins began to circulate in large enough numbers. The episode demonstrates how a rather insignificant decision by the monarch could have a serious economic impact on the common people.[32]

Still another source of revenue for the monarchy was the royal bureaucracy. The French kings had long been using venality, the payment of money for a royal office, as a source of income.[33] Francis I had made a substantial number of offices venal; Henry II greatly accelerated the trend. In 1552 he introduced the semester system to the fiscal courts in order to augment the number of offices available for sale. Each office had two incumbents who exercised its functions for six-month terms. Far more significant was the extension of the semester system to the parlement, which gave the king hundreds of offices to sell at a very good price. In January 1554 the English

ambassador reported that new offices in the Parlement of Paris were being sold for 4,000 écus apiece.[34] The magistrates objected to the semester system because the change reduced the prestige and income of their offices.

Until the dispute over the presence of Protestants in the Parlement of Paris erupted in late May 1559, the semester system was the biggest point of contention between Henry and the judges. It proved to be highly inefficient since many cases had to be heard twice. In 1558 Henry ordered a return to the old system but without eliminating the new officers. The semester system was maintained in the fiscal courts.

Financial exigencies also played a major role in the major change in the judicial system made during Henry's reign. The French judicial system of mid-century provided for an almost unlimited right of appeal for even the most petty cases to the parlements, and even to the king. Cases often lasted seemingly forever; and minor litigation choked the parlements. Henry, likely responding to complaints from the parlementaires, issued an edict in 1551 that created the *siège présidial* as an intermediate court to serve as the court of final appeal for civil and criminal cases with a value of less than 250 livres. The new courts were erected on top of the some sixty local *baillis* and *sénéchaussées*. (The latter term was used in the Midi.) Eight venal offices were created for each new court. The civil lieutenant and the seven magistrates for the new présidial court came from the lower court and continued to serve in it, as well. The districts for the présidial courts consisted of several *baillis*.[35]

In 1557 Henry created a chancery and the office of president for the présidial courts. At the same time, a new upper limit of 1,000 livres was imposed, but it failed to take hold. In general, the system of the *siège présidial* worked well, effectively reducing the case load of the parlements and rendering justice more quickly and cheaply for the small cases. However, constant tinkering by both Henry and his successors, designed largely to increase the number of venal offices, did reduce the potential effectiveness of the new courts.

While the new courts made an improvement in the judicial system, Henry also saw the sale of these new offices as a source of revenue for the crown. Venality was a factor of some weight in every change in administrative structure that Henry made, such as the erection of a new parlement at Rennes in 1552, and the institution

of the semester system in the parlements. First President of the Parlement of Paris Pierre Séquier reproached Henry in December 1558 for the open sale of offices.

At the meeting of the Estates of 1560 the annual payroll of the new offices created by Henry was calculated at 1,200,000 livres, which was a third of the total sum gained for the treasury through venality and therefore amounted to an interest rate of 33.3 percent.[36] In one respect, however, Henry appears to have refused to allow his quest for revenue to compromise his principles. The sale of patents of nobility seems to have declined during his reign and may well have been at the lowest level of the century. Only ninety-four such patents were issued, usually at a hefty price.[37] This fact is illustrative of the great respect Henry had for the nobility of the sword, and his sense of the proper structure of society left little room for social mobility, even at a loss of revenue for the monarchy.

A proper sense of the structure of society in that era also called for the extensive giving of alms to the unfortunate; it was as much a cost of government as was the military. Henry cannot be regarded as especially generous in that regard. Royal charity was largely the concern of the royal almoners, who served as chaplains of the court as well. The *grand aumônier* was a major figure at court. He was, in a way, the bishop of the court, although in Henry's reign he was always a bishop of his own see, as were many of the other almoners. The great almoner escorted the king from his chamber to Mass every morning and alone administered him the Eucharist. He supervised the royal chapel and the clergy attached to it. He also filled all ecclesiastical benefices at the disposal of the king except bishoprics and abbeys. Pierre Du Chastel, bishop of Mâcon, was *grand aumônier* for most of Henry's reign; he was followed by Louis de Brézé, Diane de Poitiers's nephew.[38]

By title, at least, the great almoner's first concern was the supervision of royal charity. He had ultimate authority over hospitals and leprosariums of the realm and the distribution of royal alms. If the sporadic accounts still extant of Henry's almsgiving can give a reasonably accurate picture, the sums given as alms varied greatly from year to year and even month to month. In September 1551 Chastel signed receipts totaling 1,323 livres. The next month the total was only 495. These sums, however, included a number of donations to priests for Masses at thirty-five sous apiece; the money did not all go to the poor. The year 1551 seems to have seen Henry at about

his most generous, with an average sum for alms of 950 livres a month. In 1548 his almoners distributed an average of 700 livres, and for 1557, 620.[39] The salaries of the almoners came close to matching those amounts as the great almoner had an annual *gage* of 1,200 livres, the first almoner, who was also the royal confessor, 600, and the fifteen *aumôniers ordinaires*, 180.[40] Most of the sums given as alms were distributed in and around Paris and the major royal châteaux.[41]

The total royal almsgiving, as suggested by the extant documents, appears to have been only an infinitesimal part of the monarchy's budget. Most of the royal income went to pursue Henry's foreign policy by diplomatic and military means, but the costs of the royal court, building projects, and patronage also required vast sums. Henry never was miserly when he felt that the prestige and grandeur of the monarchy were on display, but it was largely in the first four years of his reign that he had both the time and the funds to devote to his building projects and grand pageants. After 1551 war occupied most of Henry's attention and funds.

7 LIFE AT COURT

For the most expensive pageantry of the French monarchy, the royal entry into a major city, the kings drew on the financial support of the urban commune. The greatest such pageants were the entries into the three largest cities—Paris, Lyon, and Rouen. Having entrusted the suppression of the gabelle revolt to Montmorency and Guise, Henry prepared for his entry into Lyon. Returning from Italy in early September 1548, he met his wife and his mistress south of Lyon on the Rhône to prepare for his formal entry into the city, the realm's financial center and a clear rival to Paris as France's cultural center. Henry had already made at least a dozen such entries, but the ceremony at Lyon was matched or surpassed in splendor and significance only by his Parisian entry.

Few events of a sixteenth-century king's reign were as replete with symbolism and significance as was his first entry into one of the kingdom's major cities.[1] The *joyeuse entrée* had developed rapidly in the fifteenth century and, it can be argued, reached its apex under Henry II. It was based on the feudal *jocundus adventus*, in which a new lord received the homage of his vassals and cities. The major nobles of the realm still had the obligation to receive the king into their châteaux, and the new king collected a substantial sum from his vassals and nonurban officers upon his *joyeux avènement* (accession). However, the ceremony of the "joyous entry" had become restricted to the large cities. It emphasized the nonfeudal relationship between a city and the crown. The royal entry demonstrated the constitutional position of the city as a corporate whole that had to make a formal act of obedience to the king and had to have its officers reconfirmed in their authority.

By Henry's time the king had acquired a number of distinct rights

associated with the formal entry. He received a substantial gift from the city, which also bore the heavy expenses of the ceremony, banquet, and entertainments for the king. He had the right to fill a vacant church benefice in the city and to create a new master in every guild. Furthermore, the new king could reduce or eliminate various taxes, which the city fathers usually vigorously petitioned him to do, pardon criminals, and remit fines.[2]

The pageantry associated with the royal entry usually overshadowed the constitutional elements. In a society where pomp and ritual were intimately associated with power and status, the entry ceremony gave king and bourgeoisie the opportunity to impress each other and the lower-class residents of the city, and to forge the bonds of common purpose and goodwill that such endeavors usually help to create. The royal entry was indeed "a most effective form of royal propaganda" to impress the subjects with royal splendor,[3] but it was equally an opportunity for the cities to enhance their status and solicit special favor from the new king.

It was because of the mutual benefits obvious to the royal and urban participants that the entry ceremonies were among the most spectacular events of a king's reign. Hoping to outdo their rival, Paris, the city leaders of Lyon organized a magnificent entry for Henry.[4] The aspect of the event that most caught Henry's fancy was the mock combat of twelve gladiators dressed in what was regarded as authentic Roman garb and using two-handed swords. He asked that it be repeated six days later. Others noted the beauty of the Lyonnais girls who participated in the pageantry, including those who "more naked than Lady Godiva" rode on the backs of beflowered oxen.[5] Particularly striking was the beauty of the young woman who represented the goddess Diana leading a tame lion on a silver chain. She led the lion, the symbol of the city, to Henry and presented the keys of the city to him.

The clear homage to Diane de Poitiers was a result, according to Brantôme, of her request to Jean de Saint-André, the governor of Lyon, to ensure that she was properly honored during the Lyon entry.[6] It was made more obvious in the extensive use of the famous

monogram and the crescent, Diane's symbol. The monogram is usually regarded as an interlaced H and D. It is true that some historians

have argued that it stood for the ménage à trois C, D, and H—and there is nothing in the appearance of the device for ruling that out—and a few even for C and H. But the livret recording the royal entry of the king into Rouen in 1550, in noting the use of the device, described it as two Ds interlaced and an H. The nephew of the Venetian ambassador Capello left a record of an audience with Henry in 1551 in which he described the king as wearing the H-D device "even as the two souls of the two lovers are united and reunited in close attachment."[7] His letters to Diane de Poitiers are signed with the device, while those to Catherine are not. One only has to view Diane's château of Anet or the ceiling of the Sainte-Chapelle in Vincennes, decorated under Henry, to be convinced that the device stood for Henry and Diane.

On the day after the king's ceremony Catherine made her formal entry into Lyon. According to the imperial ambassador, who stated that he was present, the slight given to the queen the previous day was compounded by her husband's decision to delay her entry until darkness was setting in "so that her ugliness should pass unnoticed." Brantôme agreed that Catherine's ceremony took place in late evening but found the explanation in the general confusion of the event. He declared that the appearances of the ladies of the court "rivaled each other in making light and beauty everywhere."[8]

Even if the queen's Lyon entry was not a purposeful slight, it made manifestly clear the exalted status of Diane and the subordinate position of Catherine at this point in Henry's life. Henry's colors were black and white, which Diane wore because of her widowhood, but also, according to the court gossips, because the simplicity of dress and color enhanced her beauty. He also adopted her crescent as his device, and his motto, *Donec Totum Impleat Orbum*, "Until it fill the whole world," reflected it. Time saw no wavering in his love and obeisance, and every Venetian ambassador reported that she occupied the center of Henry's attention and affection. A number of letters from Henry to Diane have survived and reveal the depth of his feelings for her. The following letter is undated but probably dates from late 1547:[9]

> I beg you to send me news of your health, because of the distress with which I have heard of your illness, and so that I may govern my movements in accordance with your condition. For, if your illness continues, I should not wish to fail to come and see you,

> to endeavour to be of service to you, and also because it would be impossible for me to live so long without seeing you. And, since I did not fear, in time past, to lose the good graces of the late King, in order to remain near you, I should scarcely complain of the trouble that I might have in rendering you any service, and I assure you that I shall not be at my ease until the bearer of this returns. Wherefore, I entreat you to send me a true account of the state of your health and to inform me when you will be able to start. I believe that you understand the little pleasure that I experience at Fontainebleau without seeing you, for, being far from her upon whom all my welfare depends, it is very hard for me to be happy. With which I will conclude this letter, from fear that it will be too long, and will weary you to read it, and will present my humble recommendation to your good graces, as to that which I desire ever to retain.

Diane also moved Henry to write poetry. The literary critics have termed it mediocre but, for Henry's clearly unpoetic personality, the fact that he wrote any at all is noteworthy and demonstrates how Diane alone sparked any artistic creativity in him.[10]

The only challenge to Diane's ascendancy over Henry involved a Scots woman, Lady Fleming. She was a lady-in-waiting for Mary Stuart, and had accompanied the young queen to France. One of her own daughters was a *fille d'honneur* for Mary, as she was a widow in her mid-thirties. Like Diane, she had been able to preserve her beauty, and she took advantage of Diane's absence from the court while recovering from a broken leg to infatuate the king. According to the Venetian ambassador, Anne de Montmorency encouraged Henry's interest in Lady Fleming as a way of reducing Diane's influence over him.[11] In early 1550 she had persuaded Henry to use his influence to free her son, a captive of the English. By the fall of 1550 she had become pregnant and openly revelled in the royal paternity of her unborn child. Neither Diane de Poitiers nor Catherine de Medici could ignore this open challenge to their own relationships with the king. They combined to pressure Henry into exiling Lady Fleming from the court. In early 1551 she gave birth to a son named Henri d'Angoulême, whom the king acknowledged as his. Ironically Catherine gave birth shortly after to her third son, Edouard-Alexander, the future Henry III, in whose service his half-brother Henri d'Angoulême would be killed.

Lady Fleming returned to Scotland in October 1551 with Marie de Guise after Marie's year-long stay in her homeland. She eagerly awaited an opportunity to return to the French court. The English ambassador watched the situation carefully because of her potential influence on French diplomacy in the British Isles. He reported: "The Lady Fleming departed hence with child by this King; and it is thought that . . . she shall come again to fetch another. If she do so, here is like to be combat, the heart-burning being already very great. The old worn pelf [Diane de Poitiers?] fears thereby to lose some part of her credit, who presently reigneth alone, and governeth without impeach."[12]

The episode of Lady Fleming had a more important point than what it revealed about Henry's morals. Both the queen and La Grande Sénéschalle were furious with the constable for his role in the matter. He was able to convince Catherine that he had directed his scheme against Diane and so she remained on good terms with her "good gossip." As for Diane, if, as likely, she heard of Montmorency's explanation, it could only have infuriated her further. Much to the king's annoyance, they refused to speak to one another for a time. At Henry's insistence they made a show of making up, but the antagonism remained present for several years. Despite the Lady Fleming affair, all of the evidence suggests that Henry's love for Diane never really waned. Nonetheless, the only point of policy on which she definitely was reported as using her influence was the question of peace or war before both the Truce of Vaucelles and the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis. The foreign ambassadors mentioned her infrequently in their routine reports. When she was referred to, it usually was either in the context of Henry going to Anet or her presence with the other great ladies of the court at a major court event.[13]

After the Lady Fleming affair, Henry's generosity to Diane increased for a time beyond its usual high level, as if he were making amends. Diane was the major recipient of Henry's gifts of patronage, money, and property. Although she was usually described as avaricious, a tag well deserved, Diane did give generous support to art and literature. Most French poets of the era, in particular the Pléiade, wrote works in her praise. Obviously it was a literary convention to honor the royal mistress, but the poets Melin de Saint-Gelais and Joachim Du Bellay made it clear in their works that they had received patronage from Diane. On the other hand, Pierre de Ronsard, the

most noted poet of the era, was badly disappointed in his failure to secure more than token support from her.[14]

Diane was better noted as a patron of artists. Her reputation as a truly beautiful woman and her pride in that reputation meant that she was the subject of a vast number of paintings and sculpture pieces, a number of which she or Henry commissioned. It was, however, her beautification of her châteaux of Anet and Chenonceaux that was most responsible for her reputation as *Mécène*. Shortly after her royal lover gained the throne, Diane began a building program at Anet, her late husband's residence, which made it the centerpiece of late Renaissance art and architecture in France.

Philibert de L'Orme, the supervisor of royal buildings, was chosen to redo Anet. He had already received the commission to do the tomb for Francis I. His close association with Henry, and the king's close attention to the work being done at Anet, prompted L'Orme later to write that "all I did at Anet was by command of the late king who was more anxious to learn what was being done there than in his own residences. . . . All I did there was for the king."[15]

When the rebuilding of Anet was completed, the château had become one of the masterpieces of French art. The noted Italian artists Primaticcio, Cellini and Rosso produced art works for it, but the artist who produced its most notable piece, *Diane Chasseresse*, which is frequently called the greatest French sculpture piece, is unknown.[16] The happy coincidence of the name of the Greek goddess of the hunt and the royal mistress was unabashedly exploited. According to a recent study, Diane de Poitiers hoped to defuse the implications of her adulterous liaison with the king by becoming Diana the goddess, who, by a curious Christian appropriation of the myth, had become the symbol of purity and chastity as well.[17] Thus Anet became the temple of Diana, but the king who made it possible was not forgotten, since the H-D monogram was profusely emblazoned throughout the château.

Henry's close attention to the reconstruction of Anet was matched by his enthusiasm for the palace when it was completed, an enthusiasm that was shared by everyone who saw it. Although Henry had spent some time there before its reconstruction, the number and duration of the visits increased markedly after. Anet was, however, more distant from the northern frontier than several royal châteaux and residences of Montmorency and certainly more isolated; thus the

wars of Henry's last years forced a reduction in the amount of time he spent at Anet. But there is no hint of any slackening in the king's love for Diane, a love, it seems fair to say, that had no equal in the history of French monarchs.

While the perseverance and depth of Henry's love for Diane was probably unique among royal loves, the situation in which Catherine de Medici found herself was not at all unusual. For most of European history royal marriages were based on politics, not on love; and the spouse of a king knew very early that she would have to share him with other women. What was unusual about Catherine was the extent to which she obviously loved her husband and the manner in which she appeared to have reconciled herself to the royal ménage à trois. Clearly, however, she never really accepted the situation. Three decades after Henry's death, she wrote to her confident Bellièvre: "If I was cheerful toward Madame de Valentinois, it was the king that I really was entertaining; and furthermore I always made him understand that I was doing it against the grain since never did a woman who loved her husband love his mistress.[18]

Certainly Catherine was forced to endure a great deal in regard to Diane, even having her as a nurse when the queen was seriously ill in 1552. Diane had already received a gift of 5,500 livres from Henry in 1551 for "her good services to the queen."[19] According to the Venetian ambassador Contarini, reporting in 1552, "the queen is continually in the company of the duchess, who for her part renders her excellent service in winning for her the king's good opinion and often she urges him to go and pass the night with the queen."[20] This last remark is sufficient proof of the fact that Henry largely ignored his wife in his private life, although by 1553 he had come to use her talents in the public realm. Catherine was usually cordial to her husband's mistress, but occasionally her resentment overtook her, as in the incident reported by the ambassador of Ferrara in late 1558, at the time of the bitter debate over whether to abandon French interests in Italy in order to gain peace. Diane now supported the constable in urging peace, against the Guises and Catherine, who could not abandon her Florentine friends and relatives. Diane reportedly entered the queen's chamber and, seeing her with a book, asked what it was. Catherine's reply: "I am reading the history of this kingdom and I find that from time to time courtesans have been influential in the affairs of state."[21] Certainly illustrative of Catherine's anger over Diane's interference in that particular affair of state, the report

also demonstrated Diane's easy familiarity with the queen. And there may have been a blacker element to Catherine's resentment. There is circumstantial evidence that at one point she plotted to have the duc de Nemours arrange for acid to be thrown in Diane's face to disfigure her famed beauty.[22]

There is no question, however, that Henry began to make more extensive use of Catherine's political talents after 1550. She served as regent the several times that the king was outside the realm with enthusiasm and a certain flair, being especially successful in raising money from Italian bankers. By 1554 Henry seems to have given her opinions more weight. Despite Henry's indifference to her in their personal life, it must be said that Catherine had more influence and a larger role in government than any other royal wife of the sixteenth century. In several edicts Henry enhanced the queen's authority, apparently because he was concerned about the public perception of her position. She used that influence largely to champion the interests of her Italian relatives and clients, with fair success.[23]

Catherine de Medici's increased influence with her husband was likely a factor in the far greater number of Italians at the court and in positions of authority in France after 1552. Henry's generosity to Italian petitioners was also a reflection of his pursuit of military and diplomatic victory in the peninsula and the wealth of many of the Italian families on which Henry drew for loans. Italians began to appear in large numbers in lucrative positions in the French church. In 1557 a quarter of French sees had Italian bishops, although a number of them had been appointed by the popes under various clauses of the Concordat of Bologna. Henry had made extensive promises of wealthy French benefices to the Italian cardinals who would vote for Ippolito d'Este in 1555; d'Este's failure to win the papacy saved the king from having to fulfill his pledges. The rolls of royal pensioners included an extensive number of Italians, many of whom were still in Italy.[24] By the end of Henry's reign, the presence of so many Italians in the church and the military and on the pension rolls sparked bitter complaints from Frenchmen.[25]

The consequences of the nights that Diane persuaded Henry to spend with Catherine were ten children, the last born only a few years before Henry's death. Even in regard to her children, seven of whom survived infancy, Catherine had to contend with the domineering presence of Madame. It was Diane who chose the nurses for the children and ordered the removal of one wet nurse because her

milk was thought to be no good, and who informed the governor of the children's household, Jean d'Humières, how to treat an injury to one of the daughters. Her letters to d'Humières and his wife, the children's governess, and theirs to her, were generally very informative about the royal children's activities.[26]

There is, therefore, far more information available about Henry's children than there is about his own childhood. Few, if any, of the kings of France were as solicitous of their children as Henry was. The duties of state and his love of hunting kept him apart from his children for lengthy periods, but clearly he remained in close contact with them through d'Humières. About a quarter of Henry's extant letters were written to d'Humières concerning his children. For example, in October 1548 he wrote that he had not written for a long time to inquire on the health of his children. His previous extant letter to their governor was dated four weeks earlier. The king's affection and concern for his children is the most engaging aspect of his personality.[27]

Henry decided to move the nursery to Saint-Germain in 1547 because of the plague in the vicinity of Blois, and gave detailed instructions for its furnishings. On several other occasions he ordered d'Humières to move the children because of plague near Saint-Germain. Once he was ordered not to allow anyone from Paris into the château. It is probable that one reason for placing the nursery at Saint-Germain was Henry's desire to see his children often, since that château was a frequent choice of residence when the king had business in Paris. On several occasions in the first years of the reign, Saint-Mauris reported that Henry had gone to see his children. For instance, in late 1548 he noted that the court was at Saint-Germain, for "the king keeps his children, whom he would like to have always near him, as much about him as he can." In 1555 the next imperial ambassador, Simon Renard, reported that the French king was planning to spend Christmas at Blois with his children.[28]

An example of Henry's affection for his offspring appeared in a letter to d'Humières when the dauphin was about four. Apparently the boy had been asking to be dressed like an adult male. Henry wrote that he agreed with his son: "It is quite reasonable that he should have breeches, since he asks for them."[29] The memoirs of Henry's youngest daughter, Marguerite, who was only six when her father died, contain the affectionate memory of sitting on her father's knee and talking about the boys of the court. That Henry was very good

with children is further shown by his close relationship with Mary Stuart and the story told about him and Henry of Navarre. When the four-year-old prince came to the French court for the first time in 1557, Henry playfully asked him if he would like to be his son. Navarre turned to his father and replied: "Here is my father." The king, amused by that quick answer, then asked him if he would like to be his son-in-law, to which young Henry answered yes.[30]

While extravagant spending for one's children does not serve as a true indication of fatherly love, Henry did provide plentiful financial support for his children's household. At first, Henry tried to be frugal because of the need to build his war chests, but the arrival of Mary Stuart in 1548 led to a vast expansion of the household. The Scots did contribute 50,000 livres a year for her upkeep, but the king added another 30,000. In 1553 the establishment of a separate household for the dauphin gave positions to an additional 300 persons and cost 68,000 livres in salaries alone.[31]

Among the officers of the children's household were the chief tutors, Pierre Danès and Jacques Amyot. Both men were well-regarded Greek scholars and humanists; the latter was noted as the translator of Plutarch. Despite such learned tutors, the dauphin was not a good student. Taking after his father in this regard, he much preferred hunting and playing at war, despite his frail health and physique. His father took him to tour the frontier garrisons in October 1557, giving him his own coat of mail, "whereof he rejoiced not a little." His younger brothers were considered much better students.[32] Henry's daughters were regarded as bright, attractive, and virtuous, with Marguerite, the youngest, the best student but also the most rebellious child.

The already vast attention paid to the household of the royal children increased still more when Mary Stuart joined it in mid-1548. Henry ordered that the little queen be given precedence over his daughters, for she was a queen and would be the wife of the dauphin. He also arranged for her to share a room with his oldest daughter, Elisabeth, who was two years younger. Henry met the queen of the Scots for the first time in November and immediately was very taken with her. His reaction to her was summed up in his statement that "the little Queen of Scots is the most perfect child I have ever seen."[33] Charles de Guise soon reported to his sister in Scotland that the king was content to spend hours in conversation with the little princess. Dauphin Francis also took enthusiastically to his new playmate and

intended spouse. In December 1548, after the young twosome danced together at the wedding of François de Guise and Anne d'Este, Henry wrote to Marie de Guise about what a beautiful pair they made.[34]

An earlier marriage in 1548 had also occupied the attention of Henry. The marriage of his cousin, Jeanne d'Albret, to the duke of Cleves had been annulled in 1545, and the question of a spouse for the princess, eighteen years old in 1547, was again an issue. Shortly before the death of Francis I, rumors had begun to circulate that Jeanne was intended for Antoine de Bourbon. Her father, Henri d'Albret, had far more ambitious plans for Jeanne—to become queen of Spain by marrying Prince Philip, Charles V's son. Through such a marriage he hoped to regain Haute-Navarre from the Spanish. Jeanne's mother, Marguerite d'Angoulême, also supported the proposal after her brother had died, since she no longer felt as compelled to support royal policy.[35]

Henry II, who at first thought of arranging the princess's marriage to François de Guise, sharply objected to the proposed Spanish marriage, for the obvious reason that it would pass the extensive d'Albret holdings in the southwest to the Habsburgs. For her part, Jeanne supported the idea of marrying Antoine de Bourbon since she was personally attracted to him. Perhaps because of his own experience, Henry was reluctant to force marriages on his kin, but Jeanne's preference for Bourbon made it easy for him to settle the issue by ordering her to marry the prince, despite her parents' annoyance. The wedding took place at Moulins on October 21, 1548, but, as Saint-Mauris reported, "everything was arranged too quickly for the ceremonies to be very imposing." Henry was present and wrote to Montmorency: "I have never seen a happier bride than this one."[36] The fruit of these happy early years, before the marriage soured because of Antoine's promiscuity, was, of course, Henry IV.

After the wedding the court went to Saint-Germain for the winter. Saint-Mauris summed up the concerns of the court at that time:

> The king is continuing the jousts in which he has had little luck up to the present, whereas it was hoped he would do far better, being held to be a good horseman, and of a good figure. He usually rises early, plays tennis the greater part of the time, rides a great deal, taking all this exercise so as to avoid getting fat. He is beginning already to fill out and take on a paunch. He is going hunting for about a fortnight, and will return to Saint-Germain in time for

> the christening of the son he hopes to have. A few days ago, 2,000 soldiers were shipped to Scotland from La Rochelle. There is a loud rumour here that next year he will send over a large army, if he can feel sure of keeping the peace with his Majesty.[37]

Sports and Scotland were the centers of attention in what was probably the most carefree period of Henry's reign, and his entire life. Henry had always been fond of jousting, and upon his accession the court began to give tournaments to an extent not seen since the end of the fourteenth century.[38] The foreign ambassadors frequently mentioned the tournaments at the court, although they also noted, as Saint-Mauris did, that the king had not done as well as they seem to have expected him to do. His reputation as an expert horseman and strong wrestler, as well as the fact that he was the king, may have led observers to expect better of him in the tilts. His often poor showing, however, may well have been a consequence of his refusal to allow any deference to his royal status when he engaged in sports. As the Venetian Capello noted about his tennis playing, "no one would know that it is the king who is playing because they observe neither ceremony nor etiquette for him. They even discuss his faults, and I have observed on several occasions that a disputed point has been given against him."[39] Those accustomed to seeing royalty being invincible on the playing fields were surprised to see Henry defeated.

Henry's fondness for jousting reflected his enthusiasm for the last medieval romance, *Amadis de Gaule*. A lengthy series of romantic tales with obscure fifteenth-century Iberian origins, its translation into French was begun in 1540. The inspiration behind its publication in France was made clear when the last two volumes were dedicated to Diane de Poitiers. Brantôme reported that Henry and Diane read the tales to each other during their afternoon tête-à-têtes. The *Amadis* emphasizes the true knight-errant, constant in his love for his lady and in his defense of the defenseless. In his quests, Amadis is involved in an enormous number of tilts with friend and foe alike. Because of his true love for his lady, the fact that they have premarital intercourse is not in the least blameworthy. Quite literally, the ideal knight in this work is either jousting or making love.[40]

It has been argued that Diane encouraged the dissemination of the *Amadis de Gaule* because it would serve to elevate her relationship with the king to a higher, more idealized plane than that of mistress. Henry, for his part, seems to have taken the romance seri-

ously as an ideal way of life. In that attitude he was followed by much of the court, so that the romance was "less a mirror in which a generation was reflected than a model it chose to emulate." Even the very practical Parisian bourgeoisie made the romance a best-seller in that city.[41]

Something of the spirit of the medieval romance was present at the formal entry ceremony of Henry II into Paris in June 1549, in the tournaments, mock combats, and decorations, but for the most part it was far more a Renaissance ceremony.[42] It can, in fact, be termed the exemplary model of French Renaissance culture. Only the funerals and coronations of the kings were the equal of the Parisian entry for pomp, ceremony, symbolism, and expense, but those events were far more bound by tradition. The entry was a unique opportunity to introduce new themes and techniques to the court and the public.

Henry's entry into Paris took place unusually long after his accession. Except for the unique case of Henry IV, the delay was the longest for any French king after Charles VII; Francis I, for example, made his formal entry six weeks after reaching the throne. Only four days after Francis's death, Henry had authorized the city leaders to begin to prepare for the entry, but it was in fact delayed for more than two years. Since one reason for the formal entry was to confirm the incumbents of the royal and municipal offices in the city (a new king theoretically had the right to replace every officer of the realm), part of the explanation for delay was apparently Henry's goal of reducing the city government's control over "an infinitude of offices." If such was the reason, it did not in fact take place; but the delay did enable the king to extract large subsidies from the Parisians anxious about losing their offices.[43]

The length of the delay meant that Prince Philip had already made several elaborate entries into the cities of Brabant as governor of the Lowlands. Henry II and the French were determined not to be outshone by their rival. The Parisians succeeded in making the royal entry of 1549 the most significant such ceremony of the century, and perhaps in the history of the French monarchy, in both the expense (40,025 livres) and the splendor of the decorations and pageantry. Equally noteworthy were the significant presence of extensive classical motifs and symbols and the caliber of the artists called upon to create the artworks. Extensive records are available to study the entry.

The formal entry of the king was preceded by the coronation of

Queen Catherine at Saint-Denis on June 10, and the entry of the dauphin into Paris the next day. Torrential rains forced several days' delay so that it was not until June 16 that the royal entry took place. An enormous number of princes, nobles, and high churchmen assembled in Paris for the event; it was a gathering of notables matched at no other time during Henry's reign. On the morning of the entry, at 8:00 A.M., the procession of the corporations and guilds of the city began to pass by the royal reviewing stand located in the faubourg Saint-Denis. It took some five hours for everyone to reach the king. The various guilds then carried the royal litter their assigned distances into the city to Nôtre Dame, passing through elaborate arches and over lavishly ornamented bridges on the way. It was exactly the same route in reverse that the funeral entourage of a dead king took to his final resting place at the abbey of Saint-Denis.

At the cathedral, Henry was met by the clergy and entered for a solemn Mass. In the evening an immense banquet was given for the huge throng of princes, great nobles, high churchmen, and civic leaders. The banquet was marred, as all such functions were, by squabbling among the wellborn over their proper places close to the king.

After the customary delay of two days, Queen Catherine made her entry. As at Lyon the chronicles make note of the striking appearances of the ladies of the court, expressing a threefold admiration of their dignity, beauty, and jewelry.[44] Unlike the entry at Lyon, Diane de Poitiers received rather little attention and homage, although the H-D monogram was much in evidence.[45] The queen's entry was also concluded by a banquet and a dance.

On June 20 the city of Paris presented its gift to the king. Jean Cousin was the principal designer of the silver statuary set, costing 10,085 livres, that joined together images of Louis XII, Francis I, and Henry, representing the beginning, the prime maker, and the perfection of a new age.[46] The court remained at the Tournelles for another month because the entry festivities were not yet completed. Among the continuing events was a tournament on June 23. To prepare for it, a street near the Bastille had to be cleared of its paving stones. The city also prepared a fort on an island in the Seine that was stormed in a mock assault. A last-minute addition to the schedule was a mock battle between galleys on the Seine, which Henry apparently had personally requested. Its cost was 14,171 livres.[47]

The entry ceremony continued into the next month when, on July

2, Henry went to the Parlement of Paris to honor it with his presence. The queen was present with a vast entourage of courtiers. The magistrates were dressed in their red robes reserved for the most solemn occasions and knelt bareheaded before the king at the opening of the session. Chancellor Olivier gave a lengthy address, in which he discussed the nature of the authority of the parlement and its dependency on the king.[48] In this era the term parlement could refer to the entire judicial complex that included the Parlement of Paris and the six provincial courts at Rouen, Bordeaux, Toulouse, Aix, Grenoble, and Dijon (Henry created a seventh at Rennes in 1552); or it could refer only to the Parlement of Paris.[49] The Parisian magistrates always thought of themselves as forming the sovereign court of the entire realm and looked on the provincial parlements as mere branches of their own court. The case for the Parisian view did have both historical and jurisdictional grounds, in that appeals from the provincial parlements were heard in Paris.

The parlements were the courts of first instance for cases involving offenses against the royal person and the king's rights and demanse, and they heard appeals from the presidial and seigneurial courts. All the parlements were divided into four chambers: the *requêtes*, for determining what cases the court would hear; the *enquêtes*, which heard appeals from lower courts; the *tournelle* or *chambre criminelle*, which heard criminal cases, usually involving persons of lower status; *the grand' chambre*, which heard cases involving important persons or points of law and was the place of final appeal (although the royal council could overturn its decisions). This last chamber also announced the decisions of the other chambers.

Henry had comparatively little conflict with the Parlement of Paris over its most important power—the right to register royal edicts before they could be published and enforced. (Papal edicts also had to be so registered.) The magistrates could declare that royal edicts violated the fundamental laws of the realm, as they did in 1526 in declaring that the proposed concession of Burgundy violated the law against alienation of any part of the realm. Another reason for refusing to register a royal edict was that it violated the traditional privileges of any of the orders or corporations of the kingdom, as the magistrates did in refusing to register the Concordat of Bologna in 1516 for violating the rights of the clergy. The king could request them to reconsider in a *lettre de jussion*. If the magistrates still re-

fused, he could come in person in what was called a royal *séance* to reclaim the authority he had given them and order them to register the edict.[50] The parlement, having arisen out of the *curia regis* in the thirteenth century, drew its authority from the king, despite occasional statements by parlementaires that their authority really came from the nation.

The monarch kept a close watch on the Parlement of Paris because of its power and its location. He filled its major offices of first president and the four presidents *à mortier*, and, although the magistrates themselves usually filled vacant offices of *conseiller*, he could impose his choice. In 1547 Henry II attempted to upgrade the caliber of new magistrates for the Parlement of Paris by fixing the minimum age for admission at thirty years and requiring a mandatory examination for all candidates except those already members of another parlement. The protests of those magistrates who wanted to hand on their offices to their sons led to a lowering of the minimum age to twenty-five.

Nonetheless, the relationship between the monarchy and the Parlement of Paris was the least contentious of any time in the sixteenth century. Henry rarely resorted to royal *séances*, appearing in person only once to demand that the parlement register an edict, and he avoided the harsh language that his father had customarily used in dealing with the magistrates. He also kept them well informed on matters of state. There were points of contention over such matters as the creation of the semester system, taxation of parlementaire revenues, and filling of offices, but Henry's overall respect for the Parlement of Paris was made manifest in the extensive broadening of its authority over heresy cases.

After Henry's appearance in the parlement, the king and the courtiers continued to enjoy a vast range of entertainments and displays of art. The Parisian entry thus provides a unique opportunity to examine the artistic and literary trends associated with the French court at the beginning of Henry's reign. Because the ceremonies and artworks were carefully planned and coordinated and involved a vast number of people, the entry provides a better sense of the prevailing artistic attitudes than the study of individual artworks, or even of construction of a contemporary château. The Parisian festival made use of the talents of mostly French artists, many of them young and eager to make their reputation. The native origins of the entry's artists

resulted from the fact that Paris did not have as large or as powerful an Italian community as Lyon did, and from Henry's preference for a different, more French coterie of artists than Francis I had preferred.

Prominent among those responsible for the entry decoration were Jean Martin, Philibert de L'Orme, Jean Cousin, and Jean Goujon. These artists were heavily imbued with neoclassicism; therefore, myths and symbols from antiquity were predominant. A major theme was *Hercule-Gaulois*—the idea that Hercules was the original Gaul. The myth enabled the artists to make reference to Henry's past military exploits and designate him the new French Hercules. The Parisian entry placed considerable emphasis on the Gallic origins of the French nation; it reflected much the same spirit of appreciation of French culture and literature as was found in Joachim Du Bellay's *Défense et illustration de la langue française* of the same year. The members of the literary circle, the Pléiade, however, were little involved in the entry festivities.[51]

The Parisian entry served as a very visible presentation of the talents of French artists and architects, demonstrating a high level of skill and learning that all greatly admired. Having been given this opportunity to show their talents to the leading patrons of the realm, many of the artists would receive commissions from Henry and the leading courtiers in the future. Clearly, the kings had only marginal responsibility for the artistic achievements of the entry festivals, but each king set the tone for the cultural style in his reign by his commissions and patronage. For the most part Henry continued the cultural tradition begun by his father.

In regard to architecture, the Venetian ambassador Soranzo stated in 1558 that Henry was not that fond of building, although he did hope to build a grand palace if the war with Philip II were ever to end.[52] But in fact Henry's reign saw an enormous amount of construction. One reason was the presence of several architects and designers of real genius, whose talents probably spurred the king on to find projects for them. Another was that Francis I's plans for several new royal châteaux barely had been undertaken at his death; they were continued largely unchanged. But Henry's tastes did impose themselves in at least two of these châteaux. At Fontainebleau two major rooms, the gallery of Ulysses and the great ballroom, were completed according to plans revised with Henry's approval, and much of the interior decoration was done during Henry's reign. His H-D monogram appeared prominently in several rooms. Primaticcio, who had

lost his position as royal architect to Philibert de L'Orme in 1547, continued as the principal designer for Fontainebleau, and in 1552 he was joined by Niccolò dell'Abbato, regarded as one of the great Mannerist artists.[53] Similarly, the idea of rebuilding the Louvre was Francis's, but the impact of Henry's accession was far greater since the work had barely begun in 1547. The principal architect for the project was Pierre Lescot, who was on Henry II's payroll as a royal architect at 500 livres a year.[54] Lescot's work well exemplifies the impact of the classical tradition on French architecture, producing a style that combined the straight lines and symmetry of the classical period with the decoration of the sculptor Jean Goujon, said to be of a refined delicacy entirely in tune with the architecture.

Henry's most productive relationship was with Philibert de L'Orme, who was described prior to Francis's death as the architect of the dauphin. Immediately upon Henry's accession he received the office of *architecte du roi*, which gave him complete authority over all royal buildings except the Louvre. Perhaps his best piece of work was the château of Anet, done for Diane de Poitiers but with close supervision from Henry. The design of Anet demonstrated extensive classical and Italian influences put in a profoundly French context. L'Orme did a great amount of work for Henry directly, as well. The long-destroyed château of Saint-Léger is believed to have been a less ambitious version of Anet. The last major project he did for the king was the *château-neuf* at Saint-Germain-en-Laye. It was a small outbuilding intended to serve the king as a place of retreat away from the crowded main château. Construction of the building had barely begun when Henry was killed, and it was completed under Henry IV. L'Orme also designed chapels for the royal châteaux of Villers-Cotterêts, Saint-Germain, and Vincennes. The latter was done in a Gothic style fully compatible with its fourteenth-century origins. L'Orme's most highly regarded project is the tomb of Francis I, which has endured the centuries with little change. Drawing largely on classical inspiration for its basic design, the architect gave commissions to Pierre Bontemps and the young Germain Pilon for its decoration, which is more clearly French in inspiration. L'Orme's biographer, Anthony Blunt, concludes that the architect was one of the founders of modern French architecture.[55] Extensive work along much the same lines was done for Henry at Chambord, for Diane at Chenonceaux, for the Guises at Joinville, and for Saint-André at his château of Villery. Jean Bullant's designs for

two of Montmorency's châteaux, Ecouen and Chantilly, were further examples of the French adoption of styles and techniques imported from Italy.[56]

Very much the same can be said about painting and sculpture in Henry's reign. The influence of the Italian Renaissance, brought to France by Italian artists in Francis's lifetime, bore results among the French artists after 1547. Henry preferred to patronize French artists, but he was appreciative of the Italian Mannerist style. Consequently, the artwork of his reign was Italian and classical in inspiration, but done by French artists. Perhaps the best example of that was Jean Goujon's gallery in a new wing of the Louvre. His statuary follow Greek prototypes so closely that "they might be mistaken at first sight for Greek statues . . . but these graceful reinterpretations of the Greek ideal are treated in a very personal manner."[57] Goujon, who had already received commissions from Henry and Diane de Poitiers before 1547, such as the tomb of her husband in the cathedral of Rouen, did a number of pieces in Paris in collaboration with Lescot the architect, including some brilliant bas-relief fully classical in style. The other great sculptor of the era, Germain Pilon, was somewhat younger, and his first major commission was the tomb of Francis I, for which he received 9,110 livres. His more solemn style, in contrast to Goujon's sensual figures, brought him numerous commissions for funerary pieces, including the tomb of Henry himself in 1560. Pilon's monument for the heart of Henry II, originally placed in the Church of the Celestins in Paris, has been called one of the most beautiful items now in the Louvre. His tomb for Henry has been described as a work in which French funeral sculpture came to terms with Italian methods and was, therefore, a model for all of Europe.[58]

Both sculptors are sometimes said to be representatives of the Fontainebleau school, so called because of the influence of the Italian artists who decorated that château, particularly Rosso and Primaticcio, both Mannerists. Mannerism, with its movement away from the classical simplicity of the high Renaissance toward a greater enthusiasm for movement, a crowding of figures, and the transcendental, caught the lingering taste for the gothic still present at mid-sixteenth century. The Fontainebleau school, however, produced no important French painter. The greatest painter of the era was François Clouet, who revealed little of the Fontainebleau style. Son of Jean Clouet, the Flemish court painter for Francis I, he demonstrated far more the influence of the Flemish school with his close attention to detail in

the portraits of the members of the royal family and the court. His position as court painter gave him an annual pension of 250 livres.[59] Clouet had done the funeral effigy for Francis I from the king's death mask and would receive the same commission in 1559.

In the allied field of armor emblazoning, Henry also proved himself to be a connoisseur of fine craftsmanship. Henry's personal armor is exceptionally well regarded for its beauty. In 1548 he brought the Gambres brothers from Milan to establish a shop in Paris. Their work and that of their French assistants, called the Louvre school of armor, has been described as brilliant in design, superbly executed, and magnificent in effect. Because of its remarkable workmanship, Henry's armor is considered one of the best examples of artistic metalwork.[60]

While not as avid a book collector as his father was, Henry did arrange for exceptionally beautiful bindings for his literary acquisitions. His books were bound "with an expense and an elegance that testified to his taste and the favor he had for them." In particular, his *Book of Hours*, which he had commissioned for his own use, is one of the most beautiful examples of the art of the miniature from the Renaissance.[61]

French art did achieve a high level of style and technique during Henry's reign, but it was in literature that the period made its greatest mark. Again, it was a situation where Italian and classical influences reached fruition among French authors. The reign did see the publication of the last works of Marguerite d'Angoulême and Rabelais, but the emergence of the Pléiade, or the Brigade, as this group of poets was first called, was largely responsible for the literary brilliance of the period. Joachim Du Bellay's *Défense et illustration de la langue française* of 1549 came almost as a manifesto of the new reign in its reflection of Henry's preference for things French. While declaring that French was as legitimate a language for literature as Latin, Du Bellay revealed the same attitude as the artists of the era in admitting that native French talent could be improved only by studying the classics and imitating and incorporating Latin words and classical genres into French literature. Du Bellay's career corresponded almost exactly with Henry II's, since he published his last work in 1559 and died in 1560.

Even more closely identified with Henry II was Pierre de Ronsard, generally regarded as the greatest of the Pléiade.[62] His first poetry was published in 1550. This work, the first four books of the *Odes*,

with its bold new style, provoked considerable opposition. In 1551 Henry and the court were listening to a poetry reading by Melin de Saint-Gelais, the current poet laureate of the court, when the king asked about Ronsard. Saint-Gelais denigrated him and provoked considerable laughter by reading Ronsard's poems in a mocking fashion. Henry's sister, Marguerite, came forward to read the verses as they were intended, and Henry gave the verdict to Ronsard and named him a royal poet. As a consequence, Ronsard joined Saint-Gelais, Jean Dorat, Antoine de Baïf and Du Bellay on the royal pension roll as royal poets, at 1,200 livres a year.[63] Ronsard and the latter two were members of the Pléiade, as was Pontus de Tyard, a royal almoner. This group of rather similar poets received extensive royal patronage and in turn dedicated numerous poems to the king and members of his family and court.[64]

Henry II was very much involved in one of the noteworthy events of French literary history: the first French tragedy was performed for him at Paris in 1552. Etienne Jodelle, then barely twenty years old, wrote the play *Cléopatre captive*, and played the title role. Several other poets, including Remy Belleau, had parts. Henry's enthusiasm for the play led him to give Jodelle 500 écus. In the same year Jodelle published the first French comedy, *Eugène*. It is not known whether Henry attended the premiere, but in 1558 a performance of Jacques Grevin's comedy, *La Trésorière*, was performed at his request. When the sire de Gouberville visited the court at Blois in 1556, he attended a French comedy put on for Henry.[65]

Henry was also interested in seeing to the writing of an official history of his reign. At least three writers, Mathieu Bosseillure, Pierre Paschal, and Bernard Du Haillan, were given the title of *historiographe royal* and paid 1,200 livres from the royal treasury. It appears, however, that none of the works produced by these historians during Henry's reign are extant.[66]

Henry added to the royal library at Fontainebleau a wide range of history works, including histories of the church, the ancient world, and France.[67] It also included the entire corpus of Plato, numerous works of Aristotle and commentaries on them, studies of canon and civil law, grammar and rhetoric, Greek and Latin classics, and a broad range of religious works. Machiavelli's *Art of War* was also present with several other works on military matters. Among the strongest areas were science and mathematics. Represented were many of the classics of the ancient tradition, such as Galen and Ptolemy, but there

were a number of contemporary examples: George Agricola on mining, Jean Fernel on medicine, and Copernicus's *De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium*. Perhaps the king's apparent interest in Copernicus can help to explain why the decade after 1550 saw the publication of a very large percentage of the sixteenth-century French works that made mention of the Polish astronomer. In 1557 this early French interest in Copernicus peaked with the publication of eight books that took note of the heliocentric theory, although none of the authors openly adopted it. The most enthusiastic author was a royal almoner, Pontus de Tyard, whose reputation as a poet earned him entrance into the Pléiade and patronage from Henry and Diane de Poitiers. Despite his high regard for Copernicus's work, he did not accept it as providing the true description of the universe.[68]

Without question Henry was an active patron of art and literature. Claude Haton called him "protector of letters and sciences," and Brantôme said that "he loved men of letters and treated them as had his father, even if himself was not as well-lettered." Shortly after he became king, he released the famed anti-Aristotelian, Peter Ramus, from the royal censure of 1544 that had prohibited him from teaching. In 1551 Ramus received an appointment to the Collège Royal. In January 1559, at a time of serious fiscal crisis, Henry granted an exemption from the *décimes* to six men named as professors of Greek, Latin, and Hebrew. Among them were the noted scholars Ramus and Pierre Galland.[69] But historians are inclined to take the word of the Venetian Contarini, who stated that he was less liberal than his father in that regard.[70] It seems accurate to say that his interests were less inclined toward genteel culture. His sister, Marguerite, who certainly deserves greater recognition as a patron of literature during this era, probably was responsible for much of the support of the Pléiade. Kings generally have been given more credit than they deserve for the cultural achievements of their reigns. To treat Henry fairly, one must acknowledge that he was king when the French Renaissance reached its highest achievements, but note as well that he had rather little to do with creating the spectacular burst of talent of his reign. Nonetheless, he did provide support and encouragement beyond what he is usually given credit. In doing so, he enabled the French artists and writers to assimilate the classical and Italian traditions that Francis I had done so much to bring into the realm.

8 LE ROI TRES-CHRETIEN

The Paris entry, so much a showcase for the brilliance of French culture, ended on a much more somber note. On July 4 the king led a religious procession through the streets of the city, preceding several thousand clerics, university students, and major officers of the realm and the city, to Nôtre Dame for a solemn Mass.[1] After the Mass the royal party paused on its return to the Tournelles at the Place Maubert to witness the execution of four "Lutheran" heretics.

This event dramatized two major aspects of Henry's reign— his role as head of the French church and the rise of French Protestantism. One reason why many have found the Reformation so difficult to understand is that they fail to appreciate the predominant role of the head of the political system in making decisions concerning religion and the church. Catholic rulers decided most issues involving the corporate body called the church without reference to Rome, and they forced the pope to negotiate the remainder with them. Even decisions involving doctrine and morals were implemented by cooperation between pope and ruler. Few men of the era challenged the right of the king to decide the major questions of religion for his realm, including the possibility of schism or worse.

In France, therefore, the king was the head of the church in a way only slightly less complete than the authority that Henry VIII claimed for the English monarchy. He controlled the corporate bodies that made it up and delegated to them their authority. As with every other government institution, the king could recall his authority and decide the issue at hand himself. However, far more than for the other corporate bodies, such an act on the part of the king raised

a storm of protest from the hierarchy that inhibited the king from acting too arbitrarily in regard to religious issues.

The precise nature of royal authority over the French church had been made much more explicit by the Concordat of Bologna of 1516, in which the papacy acknowledged the king's right to nominate the 112 French bishops and some 600 abbots subject to confirmation by the Roman Curia. By 1547, having been in effect for thirty years, the system of royal nomination and papal confirmation was fairly well established. While the paucity of records concerning the episcopal nominations makes any generalizations difficult, it became the pattern that within six months of the incumbent's death, as required by the concordat, the king sent the nomination to Rome, praising the candidate's moral character and learning. But he also made mention of the usually more pertinent reason for the choice—the service of the cleric himself or his family to the crown.[2] Within another six months, the Curia acted on the nomination, nearly always confirming it. In the period between 1516 and 1559 only one French candidate was rejected for episcopal office on the grounds of his unsuitability for the office.

If the standards to which the pre-Tridentine papacy held the French episcopate were not so high as to cause friction with the monarchy, several other aspects of the concordat were extraordinarily productive of disputes. One involved the point that while the basic concordat itself was permanent, several codicils, called indults, had been added that had to be renewed by every new pope and for every new king. The most significant indult added Brittany and Provence, referred to as the *pays d'obédience*, to the territory originally covered by the concordat.

When Henry II became king in 1547, he sent a memorandum to his ambassador in Rome outlining his ideas on relations with the papacy. In particular, he objected to the annates, the papal tax of the first year's revenues on a newlyfilled clerical benefice. The tax was drawing money from France, to Henry's vast annoyance. He also objected to the numerous papal appointments of Italian prelates to French benefices.[3] Pope Paul III, for his part, sought to increase the opportunities for papal appointments by refusing to renew the indults for the *pays d'obédience*, in part because he had been opposed to the concordat in 1516 for yielding too much to the French king and in part because he felt that the monarchy had not been fulfilling its

obligations under the agreement. The principal point of contention regarding the latter was the right of the papacy to fill the sees of prelates who had died at Rome, referred to as *ad Sedem Apostolicam*. With many French bishops in residence at Rome, the popes had been able to appoint to numerous French sees, and Henry was determined to reduce those opportunities. He accordingly refused to allow several papal appointees to take their offices and was reluctant to permit the French cardinals to reside in Rome. Paul's reluctance to renew the indults for the *pays d'obédience* disappeared when Henry agreed to the marriage between Orazio Farnese, Paul's grandson, and Diane de France. But upon Julius III's election, the dispute became far more heated, since Julius was even more hostile to the concordat and was determined to exercise the prerogatives of the papacy to their fullest.

The contentiousness over the concordat was made all the more bitter because relations between the French court and Rome were perhaps at their lowest point of the sixteenth century during Julius III's reign. The death of Paul III in late 1549 had given rise to hope among the French that a French cardinal, like Jean de Lorraine, or a client, like Ippolito d'Este or Giovanni Salviati, the queen's relative, could be elected.[4] Because of the length of the electoral conclave and the very loose enforcement of the restrictions against outside communications, the papal election of 1549 serves as an excellent example of how the rulers controlled and manipulated the ballots of the cardinals. Although the absence of all but two French cardinals from Rome at the beginning of the conclave gave the imperial party the upper hand, it was unable to get the two-thirds majority for its candidate, Reginald Pole of England. Thus, the French cardinals were able to reach Rome before a decision was reached, and their presence deadlocked the conclave even tighter.

Consequently, the conclave of 1549, at seventy-two days, was the second-longest of the sixteenth century, and the length gave Charles V and Henry ample opportunity to learn of the direction of the balloting and to send orders to their parties in the conclave. Henry sent the leader of the French party, Cardinal Charles de Guise, to the conclave with a vast sum to be used for bribes.[5] Simon Renard, the new ambassador from Charles V to the French court, reported that the French cardinals had given a pledge to their king that they would accept no other guide in their conduct than the commands and will of the king. In particular, they agreed not to vote for Cardinal

Pole, who was distrusted as an imperial candidate and a native of a land traditionally hostile to France. The cardinals in conclave corresponded regularly with the courts, despite the prohibitions against such activities. Renard, in discussing the deadlocked conclave, wrote with intentional irony that the cardinals might eventually be forced to elect "a poor stranger whose only recommendations are his virtues."[6]

On February 14, 1550 news came from Rome via a courier called "the Cripple," who made the journey in five days and seventeen hours, of the election of Julius III. Julius was a compromise candidate, not especially pleasing to the French but acceptable because he was the papal legate who had closed the Council of Trent three years earlier. Thus he was regarded as anti-imperial. The French had examined him thoroughly and became convinced that he was malleable to their interests. They expected that their role in electing him would pay dividends. Immediately one payoff came: Julius, in return for the part that Cardinal Alessandro Farnese had played in electing him, restored the duchy of Parma, a papal fief, to Ottavio Farnese. Since Charles V was strongly opposed to the aggrandizement of the Farnese, Ottavio turned to Henry II and signed an alliance with him in March 1550. Julius, however, had strongly warned Farnese, his vassal, against dealing with foreign powers. When Farnese proceeded with the French alliance, the pope threatened to deprive him of Parma. Henry reacted to the threat with rage, in part because he intended to use Parma as a base to attack Milan, and in part because the French cardinals had led him to believe that Julius would be a compliant French client.

Compounding Henry's anger were the clear signals from Rome that Julius intended to reconvene the Council of Trent. Francis I had refused to endorse the council when first called in 1544 because he objected to its location in an imperial city, which was presumed to have made the council a tool of Charles V. Furthermore, the French had little desire to help settle the religious problems in Germany that so usefully distracted Charles from France and reduced his ability to raise troops and money in Germany. In addition, the French church prior to 1560 had a sense of self-sufficiency and lacked a sense of a community of interests with foreign Catholics, making it difficult for Frenchmen to concern themselves with what was happening elsewhere. Neither monarchy nor clergy saw any reason to be placed in a position to be asked to agree to decisions that might reduce their

prerogatives and incomes. Ultimately, Francis I had agreed to send a small number of bishops to Trent, but their presence was more a hindrance than an aid to the work of the council.[7]

Henry's attitude toward the council was even more negative; he worked to prevent its reconvening and, when that failed, to break it up. His attitude was formed by the belief that the French church remained "holy and Catholic"; thus there was no need for the council, or its reforms, since he had no difficulty in enforcing the Catholic rite in his realm. In August 1551 he told the papal nuncio that his kingdom had no need of a general council to regulate its religious affairs; if a reform of practices was necessary, he had his pious bishops to accomplish it without involving France in the quarrels of others. The king later wrote to his ambassador in Rome that he had made a call for a national council to provide an excuse for refusing to send French prelates to Trent.[8]

Developments in Germany had demonstrated further the advantage to France of the religious ferment there. Now that the German Lutherans were again in arms against the emperor, after several years of uneasy truce following their defeat at Mühlberg in 1547, the French were not about to let Charles off the hook by working for religious peace in the empire. Thus Henry on several occasions proclaimed his intention of making an alliance with the English and Swiss to prevent the council from meeting.[9]

In the midst of Henry's growing distrust of Julius III came word that the see of Marseille had become vacant in early 1550 with the death of Giovanni di Cibo. Since the pope had refused to renew the indults for Provence and Brittany, he proceeded to name his nephew, Christopher del Monte, to Marseille. Henry had already nominated a French cleric and was deeply angered with the pope's action. The governor of Provence was ordered to refuse the episcopal revenues to Del Monte, who had intended to treat the appointment as a sinecure by naming Cibo's vicar as his administrator. Julius insisted on his prerogative, not only to favor his nephew, but also to reestablish papal rights under the concordat. But with the king holding the better hand through his control of episcopal revenues, Julius was obliged to negotiate on the matter of the indults. These negotiations were described as drawing up the "ultimate concordat." In exchange for a pledge to observe exactly the clauses of the concordat and to suppress abuses in the French church, Julius issued the indults in October 1550.[10]

Despite the temporary resolution of the problems involving the

concordat, relations between pope and French king grew more bitter. The bull convening the Council of Trent of November 1550, triggered a sharp outburst from Henry, who regarded it as proof of Julius's defection to the imperial camp. The following February, Henry ordered the French bishops to take up residency in their dioceses and make visitations in order to deal with heresy and to inform themselves on conditions there in preparation for a national council. The threat of such a national council, over which the king would preside, had always terrified the popes, but Julius did not retreat. He took the offensive by threatening to depose Henry if he went ahead with the national council and hinted that he would offer the French throne to Prince Philip of Spain.[11]

Henry II, perhaps not expecting so vehement a response, pulled back a little from his threat and wrote to Julius that he was not planning a schism. Charles de Guise, now known as the Cardinal de Lorraine, said the same to the papal nuncio. Henry, however, had sent the noted commander Paul de Termes to Rome as his ambassador in order to have him present in Italy in case of war. De Termes, a gruff military man, was hardly the right choice to deal with the temperamental pope. When, in May 1551, Julius declared Ottavio Farnese forfeit of Parma for signing the alliance with France, de Termes declared that should the pope take Parma from Farnese, the king would take Avignon from the pope. If he should try to deprive the French cardinals of their revenues, perhaps the king would forsake obedience to Rome.[12]

Julius was not to be outdone in the use of threatening rhetoric. In early August he sent a letter to Henry lacking the customary formal greetings, which bluntly summoned Henry before the tribunal of God to answer for the destruction that French troops were wreaking in Italy. The papal legate who carried the letter to France also told the king that the pope had spoken of excommunicating him if he persisted in his alliance with the Turks. In his anger Henry all but broke relations with Rome, withdrawing all of his diplomats from the Holy See except for a secretary, and ordering the legate to retire to his see of Toulon. He prohibited French clerics from going to Rome to receive their benefices, cut off the flow of money from the annates to the Holy See, and spoke further of a national council.[13]

It was fitting that, at the time of the monarchy's most extreme Gallicanism of the sixteenth century, Henry commissioned the Gallican jurist Charles Du Moulin to write a book attacking papal pretensions

to governing the church of France and abuses in curial appointments to French benefices. Certainly more radical than Henry wished, the book created a sensation and prompted Swiss Protestants to give thanks that "enlightenment had come to France."[14]

On August 5, 1551, the royal council discussed an explosive proposal: Cardinal de Bourbon would be erected provisionally as patriarch of the French church until the papacy admitted defeat. Henry summoned several prominent bishops to establish the necessary offices for a patriarchate. Imperial ambassador Renard reported that the patriarch would have been established if it had not been for the opposition of the Parlement of Paris and, perhaps more important, the Cardinal de Lorraine. The cardinal, who could have reasonably expected to become the French patriarch in the future, curbed his ambition and argued against an independent church for the sake of Catholic unity against the Protestants and the Turks.[15] His objections apparently carried weight with Henry, who may well have been speaking so bellicosely only to terrify the pope into retreating. On September 4 the English ambassador Pickering reported that "the French were once about to choose a patriarch . . . but since then I have heard no more of the matter." Nonetheless, Henry refused to back down on the questions of French benefices, the annates, and attendance of French bishops at the council, sending Jacques Amyot to Trent to explain the absence of French representation. There Amyot created a scandal by addressing the assembly as a "congregation" rather than a council. The council fathers refused to allow him to continue reading the letter from Henry.[16]

By early September Henry had received a very conciliatory letter from Julius that conceded most of the disputed points to the king. Henry, while accepting the offer of reconciliation, refused to restore full relations with the papacy but did send Cardinal de Tournon, in disgrace since 1547, to Rome.[17] By early 1552 war with Charles V was raging, and Henry was reluctant to push his dispute with Julius beyond the breaking point. The "Crise gallicane" of 1551 did have its positive aspects. Henry's letter to the bishops in February resulted in at least fourteen bishops providing for the visitation of their dioceses. Another consequence was the holding of a provincial synod for the archdiocese of Narbonne late in the same year, as required by the king's order. The vicar-generals who met (no bishops were present) produced an important set of decrees for regulating religious life in Languedoc.[18]

Nonetheless, relations with Rome remained very rocky. Again it was a dispute over a clause of the Concordat of Bologna that triggered the next dispute—over the right of the pope to fill benefices of French prelates who died in Rome. In April 1553 Claude de La Guiche, bishop of Mirepoix, died *ad Sedem Apostolicam*. Before his death he had resigned his bishopric, transferring it to his brother, a client of Montmorency's. Canon law declared invalid such resignations if they occurred within twenty days of the incumbent's death, as La Guiche's had. Thus, Julius III claimed the right to fill the see of Mirepoix and named another nephew, Innocenzo del Monte. The pope, having just agreed to extend the concordat to cover Savoy and Piedmont, as the French monarchy had been demanding since 1516, an act that recognized French sovereignty there, was enraged to find that Henry refused to allow Del Monte to take the bishopric. It appears that the king was determined to undermine the clause, despite his pledge in 1550 to honor the concordat exactly. Until Julius's death in March 1555, he constantly demanded that Del Monte be seated at Mirepoix or, more precisely, receive his revenues. Upon Julius's death, Del Monte immediately resigned the see for a pension of 1,500 écus, obviously taking what he could get since he no longer had papal support.[19]

The conflict over the see of Mirepoix had broader implications beyond serving as a further example of the bad blood between pope and king and of the disputes involving the concordat. Henry's response to Julius's action was to order all French prelates to leave Rome and reside in France, so as to prevent the pope from having any further opportunity to invoke the disputed clause. For the next several years, the popes pleaded with Henry to send some of the French cardinals to Rome; the concordat did in fact require such a French presence. Certainly the papal insistence that French cardinals reside in Rome reflected the pope's desire to fill an occasional French benefice, since the French cardinals were all pluralists of the highest degree. Furthermore, the presence of French cardinals at the Curia was seen as necessary for the orderly handling of curial business relating to France, and it had the symbolic value of reaffirming the ultimate jurisdiction of the papacy over the French church.

Henry's pique in refusing to allow his cardinals to reside in Rome proved damaging to French interests. It left the Curia dominated by the imperial party and helps to explain why Henry continued to have difficulties in getting decisions favorable to France. When Julius III

died in March 1555, there were no French cardinals in Rome to advance the French candidates, again primarily Ippolito d'Este, in the preconclave negotiations. The French party did not arrive in time to prevent the election of Marcellus II, whom Henry II sharply opposed. Fortunately for Henry, Marcellus was dead in two months. The French cardinals, still in Rome, were present to elect Paul IV, not Henry's first choice but very acceptable since Paul was anathema to Charles V.[20] Under Paul, relations between papacy and French monarchy improved enormously. Paul was far more supportive of French goals in Italy and less concerned about maintaining papal prerogatives under the concordat. He routinely issued waivers of *de non vaccando* to French prelates at Rome, by which the pope gave up the right to fill their benefices should they die *en curie*.

Henry's determined effort to reduce the opportunities for the pope to fill French benefices resulted in fair success for him, but the issue was not completely resolved until the end of the century, with victory for the monarchy. By his efforts Henry complicated the aggrieved relations with Rome to the point that a schism nearly occurred. Would Henry have accepted a schism if Julius III had not backed down? Henry was thoroughly imbued with a monarchical Gallicanism that viewed the French church governed by the king as an autonomous institution; he may well have been willing to take that step with encouragement from Montmorency. The Guises, with their own interests in Italy, were opposed and made use of the argument that such a step would encourage the spread of heresy in France.[21] Regardless of the king's real intentions, his threats were taken seriously in Rome, and they helped to produce considerable change in papal policy.

Making Henry's threats appear even more plausible to the papacy were his relations with foreign Protestants. For Henry, the religion of a potential ally was inconsequential if he could be used in the struggle against Charles. Henry followed his father's policy in that respect, making alliances with the German Lutherans and the Turks, but he carried it out with an even clearer conscience. The policy of alliances with non-Catholic states and groups outside of France was consistent with the Gallican position that religious problems in other lands were of no concern to the French. Swiss and German troops in French service were permitted to hold Protestant services in their camps and were accused of proselytizing, with no reaction from the king.

Henry also had no qualms about using suspected heretics as

diplomatic agents in other lands. Among them were a number of Italians, such as Piero Vergerio. Vergerio, who fled to Switzerland in 1549, continued to receive a pension of 200 crowns from Henry at least until 1554, for the last two years reporting on events at the court of the duke of Württemberg. As Frederic Church has written: "The agents of Henry II were appointed with the same disregard for religious opinion as had characterized his father from a class of heretics and other semi-heretics or cultivated freethinkers."[22]

In several respects Henry's dealings with the English were most indicative of his attitude. One aspect was his willingness to work with the English to prevent the reconvening of the Council of Trent. Simon Renard reported that Henry was trying to attract the English into an alliance, "having as a special object to oppose the council."[23] More important was Henry's acceptance of a marriage between his oldest daughter, Elisabeth, and Edward VI. The discussion of such a marriage had begun in 1550, when the princess was only five years old. The negotiations took place during the dispute with the papacy, and the possibility of a marriage between Henry's daughter and a heretical prince had greatly increased concern at Rome, for it seemed to augur a religious union between France and England independent of Rome.

In June 1551 it was reported that Julius "will excommunicate both" (Henry and his daughter?) if the marriage took place. Such a threat probably only made Henry more determined to see the marriage through. In July the marriage compact was agreed upon; Henry was to provide 200,000 écus as a dowry.[24] Certainly European monarchs never regarded marriage compacts as sacrosanct, but there is no evidence to suggest that Henry would have broken the compact with Edward when Elisabeth reached the age of marriage in 1557 if Edward had not died in 1553. In November 1551 there was further evidence of the warming relations between England and France, and of Henry's willingness to ignore the religious issue, when Edward was called on to serve as godfather for his son, the duc d'Angoulême, the future Charles IX.

Equally serious in the minds of conservative Catholics[25] was Henry's latitude in allowing the English ambassadors in France to practice their religion openly. In June 1550 the imperial ambassador reported in some pique that the English ambassador "is as free to observe the new religion here as he was in England." A year later, when an English delegation arrived to negotiate the marriage compact and

to induct Henry into the Order of the Garter, there were several incidents in which the more zealous among the English flaunted their beliefs. At Angers they paraded a sacred image about with a hat on it; at Nantes they desecrated the religious images in the house in which they were lodged; at Orléans they pretended to consecrate bread in public and distributed it to the crowd; at Saumur they insulted a priest carrying the sacrament to the sick. All of this went without interference from the French government to the point that some Frenchmen were asking "if they had become Turks or English or heretics." All was reported to Rome, as well.[26]

Unlike Francis, however, who tended to relax the pressure on French Protestants when he was actively courting the Protestant princes, Henry made few concessions to domestic Protestantism. He refused to reduce the pressure on French Protestants, even if persecution was at best making his negotiations with foreign Protestants more difficult. When, for example, five young Protestants, natives of France but students at Lausanne, were sentenced to death at Lyon in 1553, Henry refused to pardon them, despite urgent appeals from several Swiss cantons, crucial sources of mercenaries for the French army. The English ambassador in the empire reported late in 1551 that the French king's persecution of pious men strongly alienated the Germans from him. The imperialists were busy disseminating the harsh Edict of Châteaubriand to incite the Germans further. If anything, negotiations with foreign Protestants seem to have increased Henry's severity at home, perhaps as a means of salving his conscience for dealing with the foreign heretics.[27]

Despite Henry's boasts to pope and emperor that France had no need for a reforming council since it was free of heresy, he and some church leaders clearly had become concerned about the rapid growth of religious dissent in the realm.[28] Henry's sincere but uncritical commitment to the established faith and his determination to maintain religious unity led him without hesitation to use the power and legal violence of the state for that purpose. Almost no one of the sixteenth century disagreed with the operative political theory that religious disunity naturally led to civil strife and even civil war. In a society that depended so completely on personal oaths, how could someone who swore to a false god or on a false bible be trusted to keep his oath? Unity of state dictated unity of religion, and no one of the period believed that dictum more strongly than Henry II. There was, as well, the ancient tradition that heresy was a matter for the

civil government. The Christian emperors of Rome had made heresy a civil crime, as did the early Capetians, who mandated the stake for heretics. Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II defined heresy as lèse-majesté divine and therefore high treason against the monarch.

When Henry came to the throne, the Protestant movement had been present in France for more than twenty years. The first execution of a "Lutheran," as most who had a belief in the basic principles of Protestantism were usually called until 1559, had occurred in 1523. Francis I's attitude toward heresy was that it was a crime of sedition and sacrilege found mostly among the lowborn. Even after the Affair of the Placards had aroused his anger to mount a brief but sharp persecution of the "sacramentaires," the term for those who denied the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist, the wellborn had little to fear from the heresy courts. With a small number of exceptions, like the nobleman Louis de Berquin, executed in 1529, and the noted humanist Etienne Dolet in 1546, the nobles and the favored intellectuals were not found among the martyrs of early French Protestantism. Of course some, like Jean Calvin, were not prepared to test that thesis and fled into exile.

Early French Protestantism was a disorganized and diverse movement, with no single set of doctrines or system of church governance. Calvin's organizational skills and the publication in 1541 of the *Institutes* in French gave the movement a focal point previously lacking, but it was not until 1550 that Calvinism began to have a strong impact in France. French Protestantism at the beginning of Henry's reign was largely a lower-class movement with strength among the urban artisans and the lower clergy. It was part of Calvin's genius that despite his own bourgeois origins and inclinations, his theology attracted much of the French nobility.

In the last years of Francis I's reign he had made greater use of the repressive power of the state against the reformers, including the destruction of the Waldensian villages in Provence, but persecution was unsuccessful in halting the growth of heresy for a multitude of reasons. The absence of any clear definitions of doctrine, whether Protestant or Catholic, enabled the many less reactionary authorities to be lenient in their application of the heresy laws. Francis's inclination to halt or at least reduce heresy prosecution when he wanted good relations with Protestant states tended to confuse the judicial authorities and increase the hopes of the Protestants that he would join their cause. When trials on heresy and blasphemy charges did

occur, they were judicial rather than theological in nature and were drawn out by legal procedures and appeals. Nor were the penalties for heresy convictions uniform; they varied according to the nature of the offense, the locale of the trial, and the status of the convicted.[29]

Perhaps the most important factor in reducing the effectiveness of the heresy laws was the conflict between the civil and the ecclesiastical authorities. The nature of the relationship between the two judicial systems had been changed drastically in the Edict of Villers-Cotterêts of 1539. It had turned about 80 percent of the cases formerly tried in the church courts over to the civil courts. The parameters of the new relationship were still being worked out in 1547. The civil authorities, especially the parlements, were intent on pushing their authority even further into ecclesiastical jurisdiction, including heresy cases. The particular device for doing so was the *appel comme d'abus* by which anyone convicted in a church court could appeal to the parlement on the grounds that the ecclesiastical judges had exceeded their authority.

The parlementaires' intervention in heresy cases, however, was further motivated by their perception that the bishops had abdicated their responsibility to eradicate heresy in their sees. Indeed, from a conservative point of view, the record of the hierarchy's pursuit of heretics was sorely deficient. A Protestant historian has put it in another way: "The reformers might be well justified in regarding the negligence of the bishops as a providential arrangement. Many a feeble germ of truth was spared the violence of persecution until they had achieved greater power of endurance."[30] It is also true that a number of humanist bishops and other prelates sympathetic to the Reform appear to have decided not to use the legal machinery that they controlled against the early Protestants.

In large part because of the lack of enthusiasm for prosecuting heresy cases among the high churchmen and the local civil magistrates, Francis began to make changes in the judicial system. An edict of 1540 extended to all the parlements the right first given to the Parlement of Toulouse in 1539 to take the initiative in prosecuting heresy. The edict defined heresy as sedition so that it was now clearly a criminal matter, to be tried as such in the *chambre criminelle* of the parlements. Clerics, however, remained under the jurisdiction of the church courts.[31]

The enhancement of the parlements' competence over heresy greatly irritated the churchmen, who protested strenuously. Their

complaints caused both Francis and Henry to make adjustments in the laws governing heresy jurisdiction, and the resulting confusion over the exact nature of authority in heresy cases of civil and church courts greatly complicated the task of eradicating heresy—and the job of the historian trying to explain the legal process.

Early in his reign Henry II favored the parlement in the dispute over heresy jurisdiction, which he was determined to make more effective. There is nothing obvious in his life before 1547 to explain his determined anti-Protestantism. He had even given hope to the German Lutherans in 1546 that he would support the Reform. Certainly those closest to him, Constable Montmorency, Diane de Poitiers, and Jacques de Saint-André, were conservative Catholics, while the reputation of the Guises for orthodox Catholicism hardly needs to be repeated. The constable's faith was simple and sincere, but his willingness to give weight to political considerations and the fact that his nephews, especially his favorite, Cardinal de Châtillon, were attracted to Protestantism made him less outspoken in support of a policy of persecution. It is a common theme in histories of this era that Diane and Saint-André strongly encouraged Henry in his pursuit of heresy because they wished to receive the property confiscated from convicted heretics, but precise proof of that charge has yet to be found.[32]

A different explanation for Diane's antagonism to Protestantism is found in the *Histoire ecclésiastique*. The work states that prior to the auto-da-fé that marked the end of the Parisian entry festivities, Henry decided to interrogate one of the accused heretics, a Parisian tailor, to find out for himself what the "Lutherans" believed. The bishop of Mâcon, Pierre Du Chastel, who during Francis's reign was regarded as sympathetic to the Reform, led the interrogation and was forcefully answered by the tailor. Diane then sharply questioned him. He supposedly answered: "Madam, is it not enough that you have infected France without trying to mingle your poison and filth with something as sacred as the true religion?" As the story goes, Henry was so angered with this rebuke to his mistress that he decided to view the tailor's execution in person. As the flames mounted, the tailor stared at the king with such a resolute eye that Henry had nightmares about the execution afterward, and vowed never to view another execution.[33] Whether or not Diane's hatred of Protestants was due to this event, and the story lacks plausibility, in 1558 the papal nuncio was able to report that Madame la duchesse showed

great devotion to the church and was ardent in her desire to see the religious malcontents punished for their sins. Brantôme wrote that Diane was a very good Catholic and hated the reformers; they therefore slandered her to the best of their ability.[34]

It is, however, unlikely that Henry needed Diane's persuasion to prosecute religious dissenters. He took very seriously his coronation oath to drive heresy out of the realm, an oath that Charles de Guise had emphasized strongly at his *sacre*. That portion of the coronation oath dated from the era of the Albigensian Crusade, but Henry's coronation was the first time since the thirteenth century that it had any urgency.[35] Henry also took seriously his title *roi très-chrétien*, which meant, for him, being king of the most Catholic realm in Christendom. Whether Henry's harshness toward heresy was motivated by a desire to atone for his adulterous liaison with Diane, as some have suggested, is impossible to determine, but it appears more likely to have been a natural consequence of a deep but unthinking loyalty to the traditional faith and a sharp repugnance at what he perceived as the low social origins of the heretics and their support of sedition. In many ways a generous and kindhearted man, [36] he felt no incongruity in his harshness toward the Protestants.

From the beginning of his reign Henry worked to improve the effectiveness of heresy prosecution and prevention. A strong edict against blasphemy of April 5, 1547, reaffirmed the use of judicial torture, public whipping and the cutting off of the tongue for such an offense.[37] In November 1547 he reconfirmed the appointment of the Dominican Matthieu Ory as inquisitor for the realm.[38] In the next month a new edict prohibited the publication of books on religion that had not been approved by the Sorbonne and the possession of books on the Index of Forbidden Books. But the most significant step had been taken in October 1547, when Henry created a new chamber in the Parlement of Paris whose exclusive purpose was to hear heresy cases.[39]

Known from early on as the *chambre ardente* because of its zealous pursuit of heresy, the new chamber was created as a second *Tournelle* to relieve the case load on the original chamber, which had been hearing appeals in heresy cases as well as criminal cases. The first *Tournelle* was to become exclusively a criminal court.[40] Two of the presidents of the parlement, Pierre Lizet and François de Saint-André, were to preside over the new chamber's fourteen members on the rotating semester system. Lizet clearly was more hostile to

the Protestants, as most of the death sentences were issued when he presided. The new *Tournelle* bypassed the ecclesiastical courts entirely. It was both an appeals court and a court of first instance, receiving charges of heresy and blasphemy directly from the local *sénéshaux* and *baillis* of the provinces over which the Parlement of Paris had competence. These provinces, in north and central France, constituted about a third of the kingdom. Any discussion of the *chambre ardente* must bear in mind that the provincial parlements were responsible for heresy in the rest of the realm.

In the six months before the new chamber began to function in October 1547, the original *Tournelle* heard fifty-seven cases involving heresy and blasphemy; it sentenced two persons to death. In the seventeen months of its existence for which records exist, from May 1548 to March 1550 (the records for one six-month period are not extant), the court handed down thirty-seven death sentences, or 17 percent of those 215 cases that received a final disposition. Thirty-nine persons were completely exonerated, and the rest had sentences ranging from an admonition to lead a good Christian life (thirty-one persons) to public penance for their sin (sixty-seven persons) to a public whipping (forty-one persons). Twenty-one of those found guilty but not executed had their properties confiscated and were banished from the realm, while two persons were sent to the galleys.[41] Another 105 persons had their cases continued without resolution before the chamber closed in March 1550.

These figures (for a fuller analysis, see appendix B) are perhaps somewhat less severe than one would be led to expect from a court with such a reputation for harshness.[42] Nonetheless, one must also keep in mind that the cases under study came from only one-third of the realm. The other parlements and courts also condemned accused heretics to death in the period. The Parlement of Toulouse condemned at least eight in the two years 1550–1551, while Bordeaux executed eighteen between 1541 and 1559.[43]

While the new *Tournelle* was clearly a more efficient way to deal with heresy cases, it aroused the ire of both churchmen and other magistrates in the Parlement of Paris. The former resented the complete loss of jurisdiction over heresy except for accused clerics; among the latter, some opposed the increased authority of their colleagues and the innovations involved, and others objected to the use of capital punishment for heresy. In November 1549 Henry tried to reduce the contentiousness with an edict that gave church courts jurisdic-

tion over simple heresy where the accused had not manifested their beliefs in public misbehavior or sedition.[44]

Complaints over disputed jurisdiction continued to annoy the king, and rumors of heterodoxy in the parlement itself may have reached him. In response, still another edict was drawn up in June 1551. This last, the notorious Edict of Châteaubriand, clearly showed Henry's exasperation with the bickering over jurisdiction and his recognition that the measures taken thus far had failed to eradicate heresy.[45] The edict again made it clear that what was especially feared about heresy was its perceived affinity with sedition and public disorder. The edict was far more explicit about the power of judges to investigate private beliefs in order to prevent sedition, not only to punish it. New prohibitions on the printing, sale, and possession of dangerous books strongly suggested that the spread of Protestant books, especially from Geneva, was an effective means of proselytizing. Both the importing of books from Geneva and communications with the city were expressly prohibited.

The property of anyone who fled abroad to avoid prosecution for heresy was to be seized, and one-third of any property seized from heretics was to go to the informers. To ensure that there would be a public test of adherence to the established religion, the edict required public attendance at Sunday Mass, at which the articles of faith drawn up by the Sorbonne were to be read. In what can be termed the most "modern" aspect of the edict, proof that a would-be office holder or teacher was a good Catholic was to be required before appointment. After 1553, the nominees to the courts were required to produce witnesses who attested to their orthodoxy. Last, to ensure that the parlement would pursue heresy more vigorously, it was ordered to undergo self-examination every three months to root out any heterodox members. This procedure was called the *mercuriale*, from the day of the week on which it was to be held.[46]

In the edict Henry attempted to solve the problem of conflicting jurisdiction by closing the new *Tournelle* and returning heresy prosecution to the local courts—the civil courts for heresy cases involving sedition, church courts for simple heresy. But seditious heresy was interpreted so broadly that few cases were left to the ecclesiastical courts. The edict failed to end all of the bickering over heresy jurisdiction, but it remained, with only slight tinkering, the system of prosecuting heretical opinion to the end of Henry's reign. It made the law governing heresy much more explicit and easier to win convic-

tions, but nonetheless, it failed to accomplish the goal of eradicating Protestantism.

One reason for that failure was the nature of Henry's attitude toward heretics. Until the very end of his life he regarded heresy as a vice that infected the lower classes and was symptomatic of sedition and rebellion. He wrote to the Parlement of Rouen: "The Protestants have no other aim and no other effect than to spread plague and fire throughout our kingdom, to the ruin of the *gens de bien* and the wealthiest personages."[47] Henry found it hard to believe that a well born person, especially one close to him, would be attracted to Protestantism. The prejudice in favor of the nobility, so much a part of French society, was illustrated in the *chambre ardente* where only six persons called before that court were noted as noble, and none was executed. That attitude was evident also in Henry's failure to take action against several bishops who publicly became Protestant or were inordinately lax in enforcing the heresy laws. Henry showed some clemency in individual cases to heresy suspects, but they were all well-placed people. For example, immediately upon coming to the throne he pardoned Robert Estienne, the noted printer, who then fled to Geneva in 1551. In the records of the *chambre ardente* there are several examples of the king extending pardon to its suspects, but again to people of good position like the noted theologian Thibault Brosses. Shortly after the pardon Brosses was again being pursued by the authorities.[48]

A clear example of Henry's attitude was the case of the Cardinal de Châtillon. In September 1551, shortly after the Edict of Châteaubriand had been issued, the English ambassador reported that Châtillon "is a great aider of Lutherans, and hath been a great stay in this matter." He wrote a year later that the cardinal was in great honor in the court, and in fact Châtillon expected to be named protector of French affairs at the Curia. The factionalism of the French court made the move impossible, but his religious attitude was not a factor.[49] In 1553 female members of the court were involved in an episode where some ten ladies, including the wife of Saint-André, held a communion service among themselves. Henry got wind of it and was "much offended" but did nothing to the women.[50]

Henry's attitude against the Protestants was, therefore, rather more ambivalent that it usually has been portrayed. On one hand determined to eradicate heresy, on the other prepared to make allowances for high rank and the needs of diplomacy, Henry was not

able to pursue the goal of religious conformity with single-minded intent. The still uncertain attitude of Henry toward the church and its ties to Rome was noted in the report of Richard Morrison, then in Augsburg, in May 1551, at the height of the French dispute with Julius III. His words underline clearly the contemporary perception of the predominant role of a king in determining the religion of his realm:

> If the French King may by any means be brought to the setting out of God's glory to the licensing of true doctrine to be taught to the people, whether it be rightly meant or upon occasion done though it be to spite some others, as Paul sayeth he must rejoice to be glad, that Christ may, by any means, be set out to the people. The Papists are wonderfully afraid that their doctrine must come to the bar in France, and be as well there found guilty of a marvellous sort of crimes as hath been in England.[51]

That hope was, however, misplaced, for the most significant factor in Henry's failure to enforce religious unity, which he thought essential, was war, not any sympathy to Protestantism. War forced him to bring foreign Protestants into his army, required him to be accommodating to Protestant princes, and distracted him from his campaign against domestic heresy.

9 CHEF DES HOMMES DE GUERRE

As for the emperor the king hates him and declares openly his hatred. He wishes him every evil that it is possible to desire for one's mortal enemy. This virulence is so deep that death alone or the total ruin of his enemy can cure it."[1] Written in 1554, these words of the Venetian Giovanni Capello sum up succinctly Henry II's foreign policy—the destruction of Charles V's power and prestige.

Inheriting the Burgundian-Valois feud and the disputes over Italy, Flanders, and Navarre, Henry added to them a personal antagonism toward Charles that went to the core of his being, a result of his imprisonment in Spain. Nothing motivated Henry quite as much as the thought that some action he could take might injure the emperor. This is not to argue that Henry's foreign policy was an unthinking flailing at his enemy; Henry's anger for the most part manifested itself in a cold, calculating determination to make his enemy pay, at rather small risks for France. Furthermore, the circumstances of the geopolitical situation (with Habsburg lands bordering France at nearly every point) at the beginning of Henry's reign made such a policy virtually inevitable. While Henry's hatred may have bordered on the pathological, his cold single-mindedness, it can be argued, proved to be more beneficial to the French monarchy than the more fitful and less impassioned policy of Francis I.

From the first, Henry demonstrated his implacable antagonism. Shortly after his accession, he ordered Charles to come to his court to render homage for Flanders, ignoring the treaty of 1529 that had given it to Charles in sovereignty. Charles's pique at this insult was expressed in his statement that if he came, it would be at the head of 50,000 men.[2] From the first day of his reign Henry sought to harm

Charles's interests; but he did not want to get involved in a full-scale war immediately because his finances and forces were not prepared, nor was his only major ally, the Turks.[3]

No French king since Charles V was as experienced in war and military matters as was Henry at the moment of his succession, and none until Henry IV had as deep an interest in them. His opinion that the French army was not in shape for a major war in the first several years after 1547 must be regarded as credible. Part of the reason why the army needed more time to prepare for war was that the French had been very slow about making the transition from a force in which the heavily armored mounted man-of-war was regarded as the dominant element to one in which gunpowder weapons won the battle. Henry II may well have been greatly enamored of the chivalric romance *Amadis de Gaule*, but he made far less use of the cavalry than his father had. Nonetheless, he was also far too appreciative of the mounted, armored warrior and of the nobility who fought in that arm to seek to eliminate the cavalry. It is clear, however, that neither Henry nor his commanders ever contemplated using cavalry as the main arm in any major engagement.

With the exception of the chancellor, the major officers of the crown were first of all military commanders. The first in rank was the constable, "the count of the stables" of the Frankish kings.[4] He commanded the royal army in the king's absence and led the vanguard if the king was present with the army. The constable in the field ranked over even the princes of blood. His exalted military rank also meant that he was regarded as one of the major councillors of the king, although for two extended periods in the early sixteenth century, constables Charles de Bourbon and Anne de Montmorency were in disgrace and out of the privy council. The appointment was for life and brought an annual income of 24,000 livres. The task of administering the army with which the constable was entrusted was, by the mid-sixteenth century, so time-consuming that he had begun to lose his position as the primary strategist for the French army, as he had been in the late Middle Ages.

The actual command of armies in the field was often taken by the marshals, the two of the Middle Ages having been increased to three by 1547.[5] The marshals often were given major commands in provinces or theaters distant from the court, whereas the constable usually commanded when a French army was in action rather close to the court. In Italy, for example, Giovanni Caracciolo, Piero Strozzi,

and René de Brissac, successively commanders of the French forces there, were all named marshals. Accordingly, the marshals were not necessarily members of the royal council, even if Marshal Saint-André was a prominent member under Henry II. In June 1547 Henry attempted to give greater rationality to the system of command in an edict that divided northern and eastern France, where the greater part of the army was based, into three regions. A marshal was to have authority over military affairs and recruiting as well as over the provincial governors of each division.[6] There is no evidence that Henry made an effort to put his plan into effect, and by 1560 it seems to have disappeared.

The most ambiguous major military office was that of admiral. The Arabic word from which the term came has little to do with the sea, but perhaps confusion with the French *mer* gave it a naval connotation. In late medieval period the admiral had commanded the fleet, but in the sixteenth century he was primarily a commander of land forces. The two admirals of Henry's reign, Claude d'Annebault and Gaspard de Coligny, were associated largely with the army. There were also provincial admirals for Guyenne, Brittany, and Provence, and several vice admirals. Command of the fleets at sea was, however, usually in the hands of officers with such titles as captain-general of the galleys.

Although it appears that Henry was never to sea in his life, he took a strong interest in the navy. According to Charles de La Roncière, the fleet that Henry inherited was in "lamentable state."[7] From the first days of his rule, he set to rebuilding it. Naval matters were placed under one of the secretaries of state, Côme Clausse, who handled correspondence for the fleets of the Ponant (the Atlantic) and the Levant (the Mediterranean). The king was determined to put a fleet to sea at least as powerful as his enemy's. Thus, in 1549 five new ships were added to the fleet in the Atlantic, "built in the new style of the English men-of-war." In the Mediterranean, the new French galleys resisted the trend toward gigantism of the era. The willingness to think small was largely caused by financial restraints, but it was a sound decision, since the small galley was far better suited to the exigencies of Mediterranean warfare. In the first three years of his reign Henry budgeted some 1,060,200 livres for the navy. He wrote in September 1554 that, since one of the principal sources of royal power was to be strong at sea, he was ordering the building of a good number of round ships for the Atlantic and forty galleys for the

Mediterranean.[8] Henry was blessed with a captain-general of the galleys of the first caliber in Leone Strozzi, although his loyalty was none too reliable. La Roncière, the historian of the French navy, was so impressed with Henry's work in regard to the fleet that he called him the precursor of Colbert.

Henry was also aware of the importance of good maps and maritime charts for the enhancement of sea power. He provided a pension for the famed cartographer Oronce Fine and consulted him about a possible Northwest Passage. He encouraged the work of the Dieppe school of marine cartography, and one of its members dedicated to him a fine example of a world map (*mappemonde*). In 1556 Henry appointed Guillaume Le Testu to the position as royal pilot at Le Havre; his *Cosmographie universelle* is highly regarded as an early atlas.[9]

It is probable that Henry encouraged the building of a strong fleet because he wished to be able to strike at the source of so much of the emperor's wealth, the Americas. He was eager to seize the wealth that by 1547 was flowing in vast sums to Spain, or at least to disrupt its flow. Although Henry had agreed in 1547 to prohibit French seamen from sailing to Portuguese colonies at the request of the Portuguese king, a situation that lasted for three years, he refused to extend the edict to the Spanish lands. In 1549 a fleet sailed to the Caribbean with the quiet blessing of the king.[10] In 1553 Henry provided François Le Clerc, an experienced sea captain, with letters of marque and a fleet of ten ships and dispatched him as the first officially recognized privateer to the Caribbean. Le Clerc attacked isolated targets, but in July 1555 his second-in-command, the Protestant Jacques de Sores, attacked Havana with a part of the fleet and occupied it for eighteen days. De Sores so thoroughly plundered the city that a second French fleet that arrived in November found nothing left to take. Le Clerc's expedition remained active until the peace of 1559. Upon his return home with a substantial treasure, Le Clerc received a patent of nobility, anticipating Francis Drake's reward by two decades.[11]

After rescinding the edict prohibiting voyages to Portuguese colonies, in large part a consequence of the royal entry into Rouen in August 1550, with its display of Brazilian exotica, Henry was determined to assert the right of the French to sail anywhere and to establish colonies in unsettled lands.[12] Up to the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis, French corsairs were active across the world. The range of seas and lands in which they appeared may not have been matched

until the time of Colbert. During Henry's reign French ships were involved in what naval historians regard as a momentous event—the first battle between broadside-firing sailing ships. Several French and English ships joined together in a slaving expedition to the west coast of Africa, where they were confronted by a Portuguese fleet. In the battle that ensued, the Portuguese demasted the French flagship with cannon fire and gained the victory. Protestant seamen from the Norman ports were especially prominent in the largely clandestine and little studied naval activity of the 1550s.[13]

The admiral, despite his title, and all the other major military officers served as the general staff for the army. With heavy duties in administration, they took the field only at times of war or major crisis. Routine command of the forces was in the hands of commissioned officers with titles like *colonel-général d'infanterie*, *capitaine-général de l'artillerie*, *capitaine-général des galères*. Many of these officers were Italians, such as Piero Strozzi, the queen's cousin, who was successively captain of the Italians in the service of the French king, colonel of the French foot, and marshal.

In the royal accounts one finds also a *colonel-général des chevaliers*, who under Henry II was François de Guise. The office does not appear to have been very significant, as shown by its salary of 3,600 livres, but that ought not be taken as reflective of a lack of appreciation for the mounted man-at-arms in sixteenth-century France. The gendarmerie was recruited from the nobles of the sword as a permanent cavalry force. In times of full-scale war more cavalry, some 16,000 men, was made available through the *ban et arrière-ban*, the feudal obligation of the vassal to give military service to his lord.[14] The *hommes d'armes* were in fact no longer the dominant force on the battlefield, but tradition and noble pride dictated that they still be regarded as such. Encased in heavy plate armor astride great war-horses, they still depended on the long lance as their principal weapon and were still counted in terms of the number of lances present. Francis I's edict of 1534 established the number of support troops at three archers for every two *gens d'armes*. Thus, a company of 100 lances consisted of 100 knights and 150 archers. Companies were established at fifty lances, except for those of the dauphin, commanded by Jean d'Humières until he became old enough, and of several great nobles, whose companies consisted of 100 lances. By Henry II's time the archers were mostly from the lower nobility, who could not afford the plate armor of the knights. Despite their title,

their weapons by 1550 were the short lance and the pistol, not the bow.

The companies of the gendarmerie were commanded by members of the high-ranking noble families. The captains of *compagnies d'ordonnance* often held other major offices in the realm. In 1547 there were fifty-one companies, totaling some 5,975 men. Because service in the gendarmerie was a function of wealth as well as blood, its size could not be increased substantially. Thus in 1553, after a year of war, the number of men in the lance companies had increased by less than 1,000 to 6,900 men in all. Another 200 *gens d'armes* served as gentlemen of the king's household and bodyguards.[15]

Because of the more effective utilization of gunpowder weapons, and the difficulty of breeding enough great war-horses, the slow, heavily armored *gens d'armes* were rapidly becoming obsolete; but the kings of the sixteenth century dared not attempt to disband them or probably even admit to themselves the truth of the situation. Seeking a more mobile force, the French army also included a force of light cavalry armed with short lances and pistols and wearing little armor. Made up of companies of various nationalities, and commanded by a *colonel de la cavalerie legère* established in 1553, they numbered some 3,000 men early in Henry's reign. Henry made greater and greater use of them and recruited them heavily from Germany, having some 8,000 German *pistoliers* in service in 1558. Furthermore, there was a force of 2,000 mounted arquebusmen who were used largely to provide firepower for the gendarmerie.[16]

Despite the enduring prejudice in favor of the cavalryman, by 1547 the infantry had clearly come to dominate the battlefields of western Europe. In recruiting foot soldiers, the French monarchy was at a decided disadvantage because of the deeply ingrained medieval opposition to arming French peasants. Only among the Gascon peasants, whom the English had used extensively in the Hundred Years' War, was there a tradition of military service. Thus, the bulk of French *hommes à pied* was Gascon, which fact was revealed in the title of the commander of the French foot—*colonel des gens de guerre à pied français et gascons*. Furthermore, the French were slow to adopt the arquebus. Blaise de Monluc noted that in 1523 there were no arquebusmen in his unit, and he had to recruit several among deserters from the Spanish army.[17] As a result, the French depended heavily on foreign mercenaries. Nonetheless, after 1547 the vast number of Swiss pikemen recruited en bloc from the cantons

declined considerably, from the 15,000–20,000 that Francis I had hired, to 6,000–10,000. There were several reasons for the decline: the Swiss were no longer as overwhelmingly effective as they had been at the turn of the century; they were tardy in adopting the arquebus; and they were more expensive.[18] Henry II turned more and more to German *landsknechts* because they had a much higher proportion of arquebusmen and they were willing to serve longer without receiving their pay. The French monarchy also utilized Italian mercenaries, primarily in Italy.

The attempt in 1534 to create "legions" of 1,000 infantrymen failed to take hold, and in Henry's reign the foot was usually identified by the name of the captains, always noblemen, of the companies, or *enseignes*, which companies varied in size from 270 to 450 men. The permanent companies of French infantry were referred to as the *vieilles bandes*, with a higher proportion of arquebusmen than the temporary companies. Military captains like Blaise de Monluc and the baron de Fourquevaux did not have a very high opinion of the French foot soldier in comparison to the infantry of other nations.[19] They still regarded the gendarmerie as the true defenders of the realm.

Since, by mid-century the *gens d'armes* had little impact on the course of battle, one must look elsewhere to explain why the French army was largely successful in the wars of Henry II's reign. One major reason was the high quality of the French artillery. For a century before 1547 the French had led Europe in producing good field artillery pieces and continued to do so under Henry, notwithstanding the dramatic improvements in gun founding made by German founders in England after 1540.

In 1550 Henry appointed Jean d'Estrées (grandfather of the famous Gabrielle, Henry IV's mistress) as grand master and captain-general of the artillery. He supervised the founding of guns that could be fired 100 times in rapid succession, instead of having to be cleansed with vinegar every few firings. His contemporary, François de Rabutin, regarded him very highly.[20] It was probably his advice that prompted Henry to reduce the number of calibers of French guns to six in 1551.[21]

While Henry's heart may have been with the *gens d'armes*, the artillery fascinated him. During the siege of Ivoy in 1552 he ventured into the trenches with the gunners and touched off several cannon. Montmorency was furious with him for disregarding the clear danger

that both the enemy and the likelihood of a cannon bursting presented.[22] French success in Henry's wars depended heavily on the artillery because most of the major actions were sieges.

Henry had a largely successful record in war, and part of the explanation for that record was his own talent as a commander-in-chief. He was very knowledgeable about warfare and the military, and a significant proportion of the ordinances of his reign involved the army. As in most other aspects of French government, Henry faced the task of consolidating and regularizing the advances in the military begun in his father's reign. Henry had a keen eye for contemporary tactics, and if he had not been king, he might well have made a first-rate siege master. The king also had an unusual concern for the welfare of his men, especially for those who became invalids in his service.[23] An edict of May 1551 established a special service of old or injured soldiers to do tasks for the military that did not require complete physical capacity. They were to be paid five livres a month.[24] The evidence affirms Monluc's comment that Henry was the best king the soldiers had.

Another reason for Henry's success in war was the generally cautious use he made of his forces, at least in the context of his era. His war aims usually were limited and realistic, and he was willing to accept partial success or take small advances rather than gambling all on a complete victory, although his most brilliant victory, at Calais, was one of the greatest gambles in French military history. He was also well aware of the need to secure lines of communication and supply. Henry also, it should be noted, was the first French commander to use a map to plan a march. On the "Promenade to the Rhine" of 1552, he was shown a map of a region of Alsace and was so impressed with its usefulness, especially to determine the best route for his army, that he remarked that a commander of an army ought not march without a map, no more than a good pilot of a ship would sail without a compass.[25]

Henry was also fortunate to have the services of several first-rate captains of war and was shrewd enough to appreciate them. Blaise de Monluc was always in royal favor and rose from the captaincy of a Gascon foot company to colonel of all the French infantry in 1558. Another such commander was Piero Strozzi, whom Brantôme called a "great engineer and marvelously industrious."[26] He had risen to the rank of marshal before his death at the siege of Thionville in 1558. Montmorency's nephews, Gaspard de Coligny and François

d'Andelot, combined the élan of the French nobles with a good sense of tactics. But the greatest was certainly François de Guise. He had an extraordinary reputation for his concern for his men and the civilians caught up in war. During his expedition to Italy in 1557 a report noted that "everyone speaks of the prudence, valour, and humanity of the duke and his camp is abundantly supplied with everything." In particular, he was noted for his care and generosity for the wounded and captured enemy. Guise was always on the best of terms with his men and captains, yet was able to impose rigorous discipline on them. Such discipline enabled Guise to control the consumption of supplies both as besieged at Metz and as besieger at Thionville and secure victory. He also greatly reduced the pillage and cruelties usually associated with the taking of a town. One modern military historian has rated the band of captains under Henry as "unsurpassed in the France of their century. . . . Guise and his generation were in every way qualified to take over the role of conqueror which later fell to the generals of Louis XIV," had it not been for the civil war.[27]

Henry's philosophy of war, as reported by the Venetian ambassador Capello in 1554, was "to wage war always far from France. He spares nothing, neither trouble nor cost, to that end, for he judges that any loss at home is most serious and the weakest suffer the most." Henry certainly made an effort to carry his wars to foreign lands, and this point must be kept in mind for any discussion of Henry's campaigns, especially the Italian expedition of 1557. When the enemy did invade France, Henry's response, at least on one occasion in 1551, was to order his troops to attack a town in Flanders and do as much damage as possible "to show my enemy what happens when he attacks my lands."[28]

At the beginning of his reign, however, Henry was a little too unsure of himself and of his forces to take on the emperor in a full-scale war. Also, the treaty by which the French could recruit Swiss troops had expired with his father's death, and it was renegotiated only in 1549. Henry gave explicit instructions against any border incidents that might have led to war. Furthermore, he was distracted by a brief conflict with England over the town of Boulogne in Picardy, south of Calais. Henry and his captains regarded the English control of Boulogne as a serious threat, even more so than Calais, should England ally itself with Charles V in a war against France.

Calais, massively fortified, seemed to be irredeemably in English hands, but the Boulonnais had passed back and forth several times

between English and French control. In 1544 Henry VIII's forces had regained control, and a full-scale French effort, with Henry, as dauphin, nominally in command, had failed to dislodge them. In June 1546 a treaty ended hostilities with the town in English hands, but they agreed to return it to France for 2,000,000 écus in eight years' time.

In October 1547 Henry, now king, traveled to Picardy to reconnoiter Boulogne and was depressed to the point of tears when he saw how well the town was defended.[29] The thought of paying out the enormous sum needed to redeem Boulogne probably also troubled Henry, since it would give no return in glory.

With French troops fighting the English in Scotland by early 1549, Henry decided to try to take Boulogne by force. Hostile acts and war preparations marked the first months of 1549. An abortive attack made on an English strongpoint in May, led by Gaspard de Coligny, cost the French 200 dead and wounded. Henry for some time took the tack that he was unaware of the acts of his lieutenants against Boulogne, but the imperial ambassador accurately predicted that a full attack waited only for the conclusion of the Parisian entry festival.[30]

On July 14 Henry ordered 10,000–15,000 infantry to the region to frighten the English into making concessions. When bluster failed to gain anything, he led a still larger force personally into Picardy.[31] He and his captains had found it difficult to raise both the money and the manpower to invest the English forts of the region. Gascony was still smarting over its treatment in the gabelle revolt, and as a result Henry was able to raise only 1,000 Gascons.[32] The lateness in the campaigning season also bothered the French commanders, with good reason, since the weather forced the French to halt their attacks after taking several outlying forts. The imperial ambassador noted the ridicule that Montmorency took for this failure and the criticism directed at Henry that he had already spent more than the sum required for redeeming Boulogne.[33]

Both king and constable expressed their determination to press on with the war, but both sides seemed willing to negotiate in January 1550. On the French side, it was motivated by the hotly contested papal election of that moment. Whether a French or an imperial candidate was elected pope, trouble was sure to follow in Italy; and Henry did not want a war with England at the same time. Thus, on January 26, negotiations began, even as Henry was reported as

"against concluding the peace, as his wish has always been to lead his army to the reconquest of Boulogne, sword in hand."[34]

On March 24 terms were agreed upon and sent to the two sovereigns. The only significant clause called for the return of the Boulonnais to France for 400,000 écus. On May 16 Henry made a triumphal entry into Boulogne, presenting himself as a conquering hero, much to the annoyance of the imperial ambassador, who regarded the transfer as strictly a financial transaction.[35] The French expressed their amazement at the strength of the defenses of the town and congratulated themselves on the fine bargain they had made, since an assault on the town would have been considerably more costly. The Catholic rite was reestablished, and Henry gave a silver statue of the Virgin to the principal church.[36]

The successful, if less than glorious, conclusion of the Boulogne affair raised Montmorency's stock to perhaps its highest level. It was largely his policy that had been carried out, and it was largely his influence that created an alliance with England the next year, capped by a marriage compact between Edward VI and Henry's daughter, Elisabeth. His reward for these services was the elevation of his barony of Montmorency into a duchy-peerage, with the additional boon that the title would pass to a daughter in default of a surviving son.

Nonetheless, the constable's influence, with its tendency to oppose foreign adventures,[37] did not remain dominant when Henry's attention turned to Italy. There the Guises had greater influence. Their ancestors, the dukes of Lorraine, fancied themselves as kings of Naples, Sicily, and Jerusalem through the lineage of the dukes of Anjou. René de Lorraine, the grandfather of the generation at hand, freely used the title king of Sicily. When Charles de Guise received his red hat in 1547, he wanted to be known as the cardinal d'Anjou to emphasize the family claim to the Angevin inheritance. Paul III, however, refused the request. (He would be known as the Cardinal de Lorraine after his uncle's death in 1550.) Henry II was at that time rather uninterested in the French claim to south Italy, concentrating instead on Milan. In 1549 he had given letters of naturalization to the residents of Piedmont, the final step toward full incorporation into his realm.[38] The Guises hoped to take advantage of Henry's willingness to go to war for Milan to divert some French forces southward. Thus the Guises, while always ready to fight the English, preferred to see Henry's attention directed toward Italy.

The Guises found their opportunity to redirect attention to Italy in late 1550, when Charles V ordered Ottavio Farnese to give up Parma. Since Paul III was now dead, Charles saw no reason to humor the Farnese family. Julius III, despite his promises to Cardinal Farnese at the time of his election, found himself supporting the emperor. The Farnese turned to Henry II, who was eager to accommodate them. On May 27 a treaty between Henry and Ottavio Farnese provided the latter with 2,000 infantrymen, 200 *gens d'armes*, and a grant of 12,000 écus a year.[39] With both Charles and Julius outraged, war seemed inevitable.

Henry had been preparing for war in Italy by quietly slipping several of his best commanders into the peninsula. Paul de Termes was acting as ambassador to the Holy See. Piero Strozzi had slipped into Parma to aid Farnese, who was poorly regarded as a military man. Blaise de Monluc was given command of a fortress near Turin. Overall command of the French forces in Italy was given to Charles de Brissac, son of Henry's childhood governor; in 1550 Brissac was created both a marshal and the governor of Piedmont.[40]

Fighting broke out in June 1551, when Farnese invaded the Papal States and devastated the countryside around Bologna. The imperial governor of Milan, Ferrante Gonzaga, a bitter enemy of the Farnese, was named commander of the papal forces and led a combined imperial-papal army that drove Farnese's forces back. The pope's efforts to limit the war to this brief action failed in the face of the determination of both Henry and Charles to bloody the other's nose. A strong French force was already present in Piedmont, and Brissac supplemented it with Italian mercenaries. Henry soon strengthened his army further by sending six companies of lances. Present was the flower of the young French nobility—Jean d'Enghien and his brother Louis de Condé, Claude and René de Guise, and François de Montmorency, the constable's eldest son.

When the imperial army under Gonzaga laid siege to Parma in the summer of 1551, Brissac decided not to try to relieve the city, but to strike instead at three imperial strongholds, without a declaration of war. The reduction of Chieri was regarded as especially impressive in Monluc's effective use of artillery against what were considered to be excellent ramparts.[41] For the remainder of 1551 the two armies scrimmaged in Italy without significant results. Technically, Henry and Charles still remained at peace by maintaining the fiction that

they were fighting only as allies of Ottavio Farnese and Julius III, respectively.

It was clear, however, that the fiction could not be maintained for long. The festering hatreds were being aggravated by such acts as the massacre of several hundred Italian soldiers in the pay of France, a French fleet's seizure of a Spanish merchant fleet in the Mediterranean, and the open overtures that the French were making to the Turks.

Henry II continued the close ties with the Turkish empire that his father had begun, although the relationship began badly when Henry failed to send the sultan the usual diplomatic notice of his succession. Henry never engaged in as blatant an alliance with the sultan as allowing the Turkish fleet to winter at Toulon, although he offered it to them in 1552, but he hoped to coordinate his own strategy with Ottoman attacks on Charles V's lands. French ambassadors were in residence at Constantinople, and the sultan so respected one of them, Gabriel d'Aramon, that he took d'Aramon with him on a campaign against the Persians in 1548.[42] Henry's plans to execute a combined offensive in the summer of 1548 had failed, but in early 1551 an urgent effort was made to persuade the sultan to send his fleet against southern Italy. Simon Renard reported that the Turks had promised to attack when the French king made a move against Charles.[43] In September 1551 Henry wrote to his agent d'Aramon that he should urge the sultan to attack in Hungary and Italy the next spring. D'Aramon was to arrange for the Turkish fleet to join the French in a joint offensive against Naples.[44]

In the first four years of his reign, the king had been reluctant to get caught up in a large-scale conflict with Charles because of his doubts about the strength of his army, preferring to test and probe with limited forces. By the fall of 1551, however, Henry and his advisers were ready to commit themselves to a project that would require the use of the military forces that he had so diligently built up and that might lead to all-out war with Charles V—the expedition to the Rhine.

10 PROTECTOR OF GERMAN LIBERTIES

The close relationship between France and the Turkish empire vastly complicated Henry II's diplomacy in Germany, where it risked alienating his most useful allies, the Lutheran princes. The presence of the Protestant party in the empire offered the French monarchy an arena where a relatively small investment in funds and diplomatic activity promised large returns in creating problems for Charles V. Virtually from the first appearance of the Lutheran party in Germany, the French monarchy sought to use it to weaken Charles V's authority. Henry's reign, however, got off to a bad beginning in regard to Germany, when the emperor crushed the Lutherans at Mühlberg in early April 1547 and captured their leaders. But Charles let his religious convictions get in the way of statesmanship and imposed the Augsburg Interim on the empire. Its essentially Catholic position on almost all points enraged the Lutherans.

German distrust of Charles was exacerbated by the emperor's belated attempt to secure the title of Holy Roman Emperor for his son, Philip, as successor to his brother Ferdinand. Ferdinand had already been elected king of the Romans, the title of the designated successor, but Charles hoped to replace Ferdinand's son, Maxmilian, with his own in the line of succession. Philip's Spanish manners and reserve contrasted sharply with Maxmilian's outgoing personality, and his rigid Catholic orthodoxy frightened the Lutherans familiar with Maxmilian's more tolerant views. Charles's labors to secure his son's place in the line of succession alienated those Lutheran princes whom the interim had not already angered, as well as a number of Catholic princes.

Into this mass of alienated Germans came the leaven of French

diplomacy and promises of aid. French agents and diplomats in Germany affirmed the potential for French gains at the expense of the emperor. Henry and Montmorency decided to make the most of it by promoting the French monarch as the protector of German liberties. Henry, probably remembering the discussions in 1546 about being elected emperor, also entertained some hope of yet gaining that title for himself.

The news in June 1551 that the Turkish fleet was moving westward further strengthened Henry's eagerness to go to war. The dispatches of the imperial and the English ambassadors that summer were full of reports of preparations for war: the raising of taxes and loans, negotiations for alliances with England, Denmark, Poland, and the Lutheran princes, the comings and goings of Swiss and German mercenary captains, the movements of the French and the Turkish fleets. In early August, Renard wrote: "Nothing is talked here except of war." It was his second-to-last dispatch, for by mid-August he had been arrested and prohibited from reporting to Charles.[1] The absence of an imperial ambassador from the French court for nearly four years deprived historians of a most valuable source of information on Henry II.

The arrest and eventual expulsion of the imperial ambassador was a manifest declaration of war, but it occurred too late in the season for an offensive to be mounted. Henry did order his fleet of thirty-three galleys in the Mediterranean to raid Spanish shipping, but the French fleet was missing its commander, Leone Strozzi. He had abandoned French service because of a conflict with Montmorency over the appointment of Gaspard de Coligny as captain-general of the galleys.[2] In the southwest, Henri d'Albret was authorized to build up his forces to threaten an offensive against Haute-Navarre.

The crowning piece of the war preparations was the treaty with the German Lutheran princes, negotiated in early October 1551, between Maurice of Saxony and Bishop Jean de Fresse of Bayonne, the French representative to the Schmalkaldic League. Acting as the "defender of German liberties," France agreed to provide the Lutheran princes 240,000 écus immediately to raise troops and a monthly subsidy of 60,000 for an indefinite time. In return for that relatively small sum Henry received a prize of extraordinary value: the right to take possession of "those towns, which, although they have belonged to the Empire for all time, are yet not of German speech." They were identified as Cambrai, Toul, Metz, Verdun, "and any other

of the same kind." Henry was to govern them as a vicar of the Holy Roman Empire. The latter three were, of course, the famous Three Bishoprics of Lorraine, although the treaty mentioned only the cities, not the entire dioceses. The agreement was intended to provide for a temporary occupation of the towns to defend them from Charles V, who was declared to have been violating German liberties.[3]

A recent study of Henry's negotiations with the Germans argues, however, that Henry and his advisers had a much broader project in mind when they signed the treaty—nothing less than the creation of a new empire of the ancient Merovingian lands of France, the Low Countries, and the Rhine valley, with Henry as its emperor.[4] It would have been an empire whose crown Henry would have held by virtue of his coronation as king of France and not by election, but he would have been first among equals in regard to the German princes who would belong. The Cardinal de Lorraine designed a seal for this league/empire with the French monarch's seal surrounded by those of the German princes. In October 1551 the bishop of Bayonne reported that the princes were ready to recognize Henry as their "superior and protector." Henry's repression of Protestantism in his realm did not overly concern Lutherans like Jacob Sturm of Strasbourg, an important advocate of the alliance, who still in 1552 believed that Henry was sympathetic to them and could be convinced to be their patron and even perhaps institute the Reform in France. The Guises and the La Marcks served well as symbols of this new Franco-German union, since they were feudatories of the empire who were serving the French king. A propaganda campaign was begun to show that the Germans and the French were cousins and should be united against the Latin emperor Charles of Spain. The French propagandists presented Henry as a new Charlemagne, uniting the French and the Germans.

To what extent all of this was actually present in Henry's mind is difficult to say, but the dispatches between him and his envoys in Germany certainly appear to undermine the account found in the *Mémoires de Vieilleville* that presented Vieilleville as convincing a king who was reluctant to go to war because of the destruction and ruin that war would bring to his people. Vieilleville is quoted as arguing powerfully for seizing the opportunity to occupy the Three Bishoprics in order to create "an impregnable rampart for Champagne and Picardy" and open a free road to the duchy of Luxembourg and all the way to Brussels.[5] Vieilleville's account is appealing, since it

shows Henry in a more sympathetic way than is usual and calls into question the image of the king as a warmonger. But since it conflicts sharply with the diplomatic record of Henry's active involvement in the negotiations with the German princes, it serves better as an example of how the author of the memoirs appears to have distorted history in order to enhance Vieilleville's role in the major decisions of Henry's reign.

On January 15, 1552, at Chambord, Henry and the council formally ratified the agreement with the Germans and issued a declaration of war against Charles V at the same time. On February 11 the German Lutherans accepted a still stronger version of the alliance. On the following day the king went before the Parlement of Paris to announce that Queen Catherine would serve as regent if he should need to lead the French army against the emperor beyond the borders of the realm. The choice of the parlement for the announcement and the king's explanation to it of the reasons for the war were novel acts in the history of the monarchy. What, if anything, Henry meant by his appearance before the magistrates is unclear. His unexpected arrival upset the magistrates, who had not had time to prepare for his coming, but his appearance probably was a reflection of his high opinion of the parlement.[6]

Tradition dictated that the regent come from among the close members of the royal family; but the dauphin was only eight years old, and the princes of blood, the Bourbons, were not in high favor with Henry. Catherine de Medici was the only remaining possibility. While Henry tended to take little notice of his wife, except as the mother of his children, he had appointed her head of a council to govern France when he went to Italy in 1548. Although the term regent is used for her position in 1552, in reality she was again the head of a council that included Jean Bertrand, the *garde des sceaux*, and Admiral Claude d'Annebault. While her power clearly was less than that Francis I gave to Louise de Savoie as regent in 1524, it was greater than that Louise received in 1515, when the chancellor took the royal seals with him to Italy.[7]

Henry's address to the parlement did not mention Bertrand, but by April he apparently had emerged as presiding officer of the regency council, much to the annoyance of both Catherine and d'Annebault. The latter wrote to Henry complaining about it and about the queen's sense of humiliation at the degrading of her authority. There is no evidence regarding the disposition of the problem, but it must

have been favorable to Catherine. She threw herself into her job with enthusiasm; for example, she wrote to Cardinal de Bourbon, governor of Paris, telling him to arrest several preachers who had criticized the alliance with the German heretics. She involved herself so deeply in diplomatic and military matters that the constable advised her to moderate her efforts.[8]

Having made the necessary preparations, Henry left the court to review the French army near Châlons in early April. Public support for the war was enthusiastic; a large number of volunteers appeared in the ranks. The French cities had approved a subsidy of 1,200,000 livres to pay the wages of 50,000 foot soldiers for four months' service. A meeting of thirty bishops and six archbishops agreed to a tax of twenty livres per church steeple in the realm, which was to raise 1,400,000 livres. A large number of nobles gave the king gifts of silver plate and vessels for the war effort, although Henry seems never to have given any thought to taxing the nobility. Some 35,250 men were present for the review: 17,400 French infantrymen, 13,500 landsknechts, 1,260 lances (1,260 *gens d'armes* with 1,890 mounted archers), 200 light cavalrymen, and 100 mounted arquebusmen. Since the king was present, the 200 gentlemen of the royal household and the 400 archers of the royal guard were present as well.[9] Another 2,000 light cavalrymen and 400 mounted arquebusmen had already moved on to the east, giving a total of over 37,000 men available. A home defense force of 11,000 men, including 6,000 Swiss pikemen, was left under the command of Admiral d'Annebault.

After complimenting each arm on its fine appearance, the king proceeded to the testing of the artillery, some sixty pieces in all. It surprisingly went off without incident, which was taken as a good omen. Henry then moved to Joinville, the Guises' château, where his queen was seriously ill.[10] While waiting for her recovery he met with the duchess of Lorraine, Christina of Denmark, a niece of the emperor. She was serving as regent for her ten-year-old son. Henry constrained her to place the duchy and her son under the protection of the French monarchy, which gave him greater legal pretext for the invasion. Shortly after, at Nancy, she was pressured into giving up the regency to her brother-in-law, the comte de Vaudémont, who was far more pro-French. The young duke was sent to the French court, and his marriage to Henry's daughter Claude, at the proper age, was agreed upon.

The French army was divided, and the vanguard commanded

by Montmorency, very close to half of the forces available, crossed the Meuse to Toul. Charles V, then in residence in southwest Germany, had refused to believe that Maurice of Saxony and the German princes were conspiring against him. It was only in March 1552 that it had become obvious to him that he faced a serious threat from the Lutherans, to his person as well as his power. By the time the French army had crossed the Meuse, Charles was rushing almost in panic to the safety of Innsbruck. Thus, he had done nothing to strengthen the garrisons in the cities of Lorraine and Alsace. Weakly defended and sympathetic to France, the first towns in Lorraine that Montmorency approached quickly capitulated. At Toul, the bishop, a Frenchman, opened the gates to the constable without a shot fired.

The first resistance was met at a fortified abbey near Metz where a small Spanish garrison made a stand. It was taken by assault and burned. Four of the defenders were hanged for presuming to make a stand against so great a force. Bringing his forces to the walls of Metz, Montmorency demanded that the city open its gates. The city fathers agreed to permit the constable, his principal officers, and two companies of infantry to enter peaceably. Montmorency chose his best soldiers to form the two companies. Once in the city they seized the center of the town and a gate, and any resistance was impossible.[11]

Henry, who had moved the rest of the army eastward to Nancy, made his entry into Metz on April 17, Easter Sunday. According to the *Mémoires de Vieilleville*, the king asked Vieilleville to serve as governor of Metz, but he recommended that the city be left in the hands of its own mayor and council. Vieilleville argued that such a move would encourage the other towns of Lorraine and Alsace to submit peaceably. Montmorency, angry that he had not been consulted first, objected strongly and dismissed the need to treat Metz kindly to encourage the other towns to submit. He declared that they were no smarter than Metz and he would take Strasbourg and the other cities as easily as slicing butter. Henry, who usually conceded to the constable when he was adamant, agreed to appoint Artus de Brissac, a Montmorency client, as governor.[12]

This disregard for sound advice, it has been argued, was largely responsible for the failure of the expedition to the Rhine to occupy Alsace, since Metz proved that the French king was no more solicitous of the liberties of the empire than Charles was. The strategy of the alliance with the German Lutherans was that the French would push

on to the Rhine and wait there for an army of the German princes to join them. The combined forces were then to occupy the east bank of the Rhine, perhaps as far as Mainz, or, as another option, push into the eastern Low Countries.[13]

On April 20, the king left Metz for the Rhine. At Hagenau, north of Strasbourg, Henry performed one of those acts of generosity for which he justly had a good reputation. In the city he found the widows and children of several of the German captains whom Charles V had executed in 1548 for serving the French monarchy. The execution of the noted Captain Vogelsperger and his comrades was one of the grievances that both the French and the Germans had against the emperor. Henry distributed 10,000 écus among their families, gave commissions to several of the older sons to serve in his German companies, and found places as pages in his household for nine of the younger boys.

Despite this act of generosity and the fact that Hagenau submitted peaceably, the French found the territory east of the Moselle considerably more hostile. The *Mémoires de Vieilleville* may well have pointed out the reason. It noted that as long as the army moved through French-speaking land, the populace was very friendly, and the French wanted for nothing. As soon as the they entered German-speaking regions, the people became hostile. It was suggested that the arrogance of the French troops had much to do with the change in attitude.[14]

The city of Strasbourg let it be known that it had no intention of admitting the French army.[15] Only the king and forty of his gentlemen were to be permitted to enter, and the French troops were forbidden to come within cannon range of the walls. Since it was a well-defended city, Henry decided against attempting to storm it. The decision was prompted further by the arrival of a delegation from the German princes urging him not to proceed any further. The Germans made it clear that if the French did push on, the act would rally many in Germany to the emperor. Compounding the need for caution was the news that Mary of Hungary, Charles's sister and his regent in the Low Countries, had gathered a large force in Luxembourg that threatened the French lines of communication, and northern France itself.

Accordingly, having "watered his horses in the Rhine" as Henry had pledged to do, the French army turned back on May 13, although Maurice of Saxony urged Henry to remain on the Rhine in order to

rally the German princes.[16] On the return the French entered several towns in Luxembourg, but only in two cases, Ivoy and Damvillars, was sharp resistance encountered. On June 12 Henry entered Verdun, but the splendor of his entry had to be reduced because of the presence of the plague. In late June the king reentered his realm and recalled his authority from the regent and her council. On July 26 he formally discharged about half of the troops, sending most of those still in service, under the command of Antoine de Bourbon, on to invest Hesdin, an important fort in Artois in imperial hands. Henry was back in Fontainebleau by mid-August.

The Promenade to the Rhine, or the Austrasian Expedition, or the Voyage to Germany, the latter term used by Henry himself, [17] was one of the most successful military excursions in French history. At very little cost in lives or property the French monarchy had established its control over three strategic positions on its northeast borders and gave itself a foothold in Lorraine from which it would never be dislodged. Furthermore, the pro-Habsburg regent in Lorraine was replaced by a pro-French one, and the young duke brought to the French court to be wedded to the king's daughter. The French presence in Lorraine was irreversible.

Some historians have used the term "the natural borders of France" to define the goals that Henry had in mind for the expedition.[18] It is, however, not clear that Henry thought that way in 1552. Sixteenth-century monarchs thought largely in terms of dynastic claims and historical precedents. The Rhine was so distant from the French border of the time and so remote from any dynastic claim or precedent, except perhaps for the Frankish kingdom of Austrasia, that it is difficult to conceive of Henry having a premeditated plan of conquest of territory beyond those cities to which his treaty with the Germans gave him a claim. Henry did have an excellent eye for the strategic importance of forts and walled cities, and the occupation of Lorraine, if not Alsace, clearly had its strategic value for protecting northeastern France from attack from Germany or the Low Countries. Ultimately, however, the key motivation may well have been simply the desire to humiliate his bitter enemy by aiding Charles's German enemies.

Having decided for whatever reason to march to the Rhine, Henry showed considerable wisdom in turning back without trying to occupy the Rhineland, despite rumblings of discontent in the army at the decision to turn back when conquest seemed so sure. At numer-

ous times before and after in French history, French rulers failed to recognize the limitations of their power and pushed beyond them only to be met with defeat and at times catastrophe. It can be argued that Henry himself was guilty of that flaw in regard to the Italian expedition of 1557, but in 1552 the general intelligence of Henry's decisions deserves the recognition of historians.

After the Promenade to the Rhine, Henry II and his advisers expected that the revolt of the German princes would have so weakened Charles V that he could not retaliate. Unfortunately for them, those calculations were not accurate. The march of the French to the Rhine badly frightened the German princes, as did the advance of the Turks into central Europe, which the French had encouraged. Charles V, furthermore, was by no means as powerless as the French thought he was in April 1552. Although he was aging rapidly and nearly crippled with gout, Charles was still capable of vigorous action, especially if it involved striking back at the hated Valois. He swallowed his pride and agreed to have his brother Ferdinand negotiate with the rebel princes at Passau in June 1552. Maurice of Saxony, who by the act of discussing terms was breaking his alliance with France, agreed to march into Hungary to fight the Turks.

One Lutheran prince, Margrave Albert of Brandenburg, still remained allied with Henry. His substantial army of more than 15,000 men marauding in the Rhine valley posed a serious threat to the emperor, should he move to recover Lorraine. For a time Charles's pride and resentment prevented any approach to the margrave. Thus the assembling of an army to retake Metz had to be delayed. It was not until October that Charles, persuaded by the duke of Alba, who had arrived from Spain with a large force, agreed to treat with Albert. Winning him to the imperial side with amnesty and extensive concessions, Charles then threw all of his energy into preparing an army to recapture Metz.

The recovery of Metz could occupy the emperor's full attention because the other hot spots of Europe had cooled down, at least temporarily. In Italy the War of Parma had ground to a halt as a result of negotiations between Julius III and Cardinal de Tournon, back in royal favor after being absent since 1547. The pope also swallowed his pride and granted extensive concessions to the French-supported Farnese. The Farnese were confirmed in their territories for two years while further negotiations were to be carried on. An armistice that involved only the Farnese and the pope was agreed upon, but the

French and imperial forces, while not directly included, disengaged as well.

Shortly after the French success in the Parma conflict came a far more noteworthy gain in Italy. Encouraged by French agents and various *fuorusciti*—Italian political exiles who had the active support of the French queen—the people of Siena on July 26, 1552 expelled the Spanish garrison that held the city for Charles V. The cry of the rebellion was: "Francia! Francia!"[19] The newly restored republic immediately called on Henry II for protection against the expected return of the imperial forces. The French king was only too pleased to honor that request.[20] At the beginning of October Cardinal d'Este received a commission from Henry to serve as his lieutenant-general in Siena and was given 12,000 écus and 4,500 French infantrymen to defend the city. This unexpected turn of events gave the French a strong position in north-central Italy from which they could threaten Florence, where Cosimo de Medici was an imperial ally, outflank the imperial positions in Piedmont, or move quickly into the Papal States. Although all knew that Charles could not let the defection of Siena go unchallenged, in late 1552 other matters concerned him more. For a time no overt action against the city was in evidence.

Northern Italy was, therefore, relatively quiet in the fall of 1552. So also was the south. The Turkish fleet had anchored in the Bay of Naples in mid-June with the French agent d'Aramon aboard to coordinate a joint attack on some imperial position in the region. The French fleet, however, failed to leave Marseille in time to rendezvous with the Turks before the Turkish fleet left the area on July 22.[21] The sultan had also pushed a great offensive into western Hungary in the summer of 1552, but the arrival of Maurice of Saxony and other Protestant leaders in August blunted that attack and forced the Turks to retreat into winter quarters earlier than usual.

With other trouble areas either quiet or put on hold, Charles felt free to gather a huge force to retake Metz, although he surely was aware that the army could not reach the city until well after the campaigning season was over. Henry, of course, expected a counter-attack, although he hoped that the German Lutherans would occupy Charles's attention longer than they did. Thus he did not expect the attack until the next spring. In order to be prepared for it, Henry appointed François de Guise as his lieutenant-general in Metz in August 1552. At the same time he ordered that as much grain as possible be purchased in Flanders in order to deprive the enemy

of supplies. Piero Strozzi arrived at Metz several days later to serve as the chief engineer. Also present was the Frenchman Saint-Rémy, whom the *Mémoires de Vieilleville* called "the most ingenious in fortification building," praising his prominence in a discipline at which the Italians believed themselves to be the only experts. Montmorency had captured Metz so easily because of the weakness of its defenses, so Guise and Strozzi faced the major task of strengthening them to withstand the assault of a great army. Vieilleville argued that strong defenses, especially a powerful citadel, were essential for a city, not only for defense against an invader, but also to forestall the possibility of revolt or mutiny in the city.[22]

François de Guise showed himself at his best during the preparations for the attack on Metz. His courtesy to the Messians reduced their resistance to the extensive demolition of houses and churches necessary for the defense and overcame the problems caused by the presence of thousands of troops. According to the *Mémoires de Vieilleville*, some inhabitants aided in the demolition of their own homes. His example to his soldiers was also inspiring, appearing at all hours of the day or night to encourage his engineers and laborers on the walls. "He was not seen to waste a single hour" and took up shovel and pick himself to give example to his men, who numbered at least 6,000.[23]

The huge imperial army, nearly 80,000 men in number, moved into Lorraine in October. Henry's strategy was to send Montmorency with a force of 50,000 men to harass Charles's army and perhaps prevent it from reaching Metz or Verdun. The defense of the latter city had been entrusted to Saint-André. With the constable was one of the younger Guise brothers, the duc d'Aumale. He was captured and held for ransom; the demand for 60,000 écus complicated relations between France and the Habsburgs for the next two years.

The emperor also had devised a strategy that effectively foiled that of the French. An imperial army pushed into Picardy and laid siege to the fortress of Hesdin, which had changed hands twice in the previous year. Henry ordered 22,000 men from his forces in Champagne to Picardy, having received assurances from Guise that he had enough men to defend Metz. The decision was well advised, since the loss of Metz would have merely placed the frontier back where it had been a year earlier, along a string of powerful forts in Champagne. The permanent loss of Hesdin, on the other hand, would have

cracked the defensive perimeter that protected Amiens and, beyond it, Paris. Henry intended to go himself to Hesdin but was dissuaded.[24]

The defense of Metz was one of the great feats in the annals of the sixteenth century. François de Guise rightly has received much of the glory; he was the heart and soul of the French forces in the city. Henry, however, does deserve some reflected glory. He took a very active interest in the preparations for the siege and its course. Since the imperial forces never completely sealed off the city, a vast number of letters passed back and forth between Metz and the court. Those from Henry and Montmorency were filled with advice, recommendations, and notices of tactical moves that they were making to defeat the emperor. To what extent Guise followed the advice is impossible to say, but he always took time to thank the king and the constable profusely, and intimate that their suggestions were being carried out. The only request that Guise made was for more artillery.[25] Henry spent most of the time of the siege at Reims and Soissons in order to be close to the fighting; he then moved to Compiègne in order to be midway between the fighting in Picardy and Lorraine.

Slowed by foul weather, the imperial army had not reached Metz until October 14; by October 20 the city was under full siege. On November 20 Charles V finally arrived, carried on a litter. It was only after his arrival that the battering of the walls began in earnest. The imperialists concentrated on the south wall since the other three sides of Metz were protected by rivers. After several changes in the choice of points on the wall to concentrate their fire, they settled on the "Tour d'Enfer," which they hammered with forty great guns. On November 28 the tower and part of the curtain wall collapsed, leaving a breach some fifty paces across. The elation of the imperial soldiers was crushed when they saw that Guise had erected an earthen wall eight feet high behind the curtain wall. The shock of finding another formidable defensive work bristling with French arms so disheartened the imperial commanders that they refused to order an assault on the ramparts, despite Charles's insistence. They continued the bombardment of the wall at another point, caused it to collapse, and found it backed by a similar earthern wall.[26]

The imperial forces were completely demoralized, which condition the terrible weather of the last two months of 1552 did much to compound. They were said to be among the coldest and wettest months in memory, and the Spaniards and the Italians suffered espe-

cially severely. Charles's adamant refusal to admit defeat prolonged the misery of his army until Christmas, when he finally gave the order to retreat. In hope of a last-second miracle, Charles remained in the camp until January 1, when he began his return to Brussels.

When the French moved into the abandoned imperial camp, they found a most pitiable scene "like that of a badly beaten army rather than one that merely raised a siege."[27] In addition to a vast number of new graves, a great many men and horses lay unburied on the wet ground, intermingled with an equal or greater number of sick and wounded men. François de Guise, whose reputation as a great commander the defense of Metz irrevocably established, also firmly established a reputation for humaneness by his care for the unfortunate men left behind in the imperial retreat.[28] The French also found in the abandoned tent of the emperor six magnificent tapestries that were a century old and part of his legacy from the dukes of Burgundy. Their abandonment was highly symbolic, for in retreating from Metz Charles had also abandoned any hope of recovering the full inheritance of his Burgundian ancestors.

Guise rushed the news of the retreat of the enemy, once he was convinced of its truth, to Henry. In an effusive letter of praise the king told the duke that he would write a personal letter of thanks to all of the nobles and captains who had served in Metz. He also ordered food rushed to the city.[29] Henry had already received good news from Artois where, on December 19, 1552, Antoine de Bourbon took Hesdin in a two-day assault.[30] Late 1552 had also seen several small victories in Piedmont. One can imagine, therefore, the enormous joy at the French court in the first days of 1553. When Guise and other notables involved in the war in Lorraine arrived at Fontainebleau at the end of January, they were greeted as conquering heroes, and Henry ordered a commemorative medal to be struck in honor of the defense of Metz. In early February the court celebrated the marriage of Henry's legitimized daughter, Diane, to Orazio Farnese, who had been in Metz for the siege.

In the fall of 1553, because of his extensive borrowing of that year, Henry was awash in borrowed money. Nonetheless, he very rapidly disbanded his forces after the siege of Metz clearly had been lifted. He and his advisers were convinced that there was nothing to fear from Charles in the near future. Much of the available money was turned over to the celebrations of the victory at Metz and the

marriage of Diane de France. Rabutin wrote that the just-concluded war was spoken of only in murmurs, while all spoke openly only of festivals, games, and pastimes.[31] After a hard and often dangerous year, Henry clearly felt entitled to enjoy himself in the company of his friends and family.

11 WAR AND TRUCE

Henry II's decision to enjoy the victory at Metz with an extensive round of pleasure-taking and festivities, mostly at Saint-Germain-en-Laye, was the one point in his reign that he lost his concentration on the dominant goal of his reign—the ruin of Charles V. Convinced that Charles could not make a new enterprise in 1553, Henry failed to follow up on the victory at Metz, enabling the emperor to gather a substantial army in the Netherlands. In early April 1553 Charles directed it toward Picardy. Before Henry had a chance to react, the imperial forces invested the fortified town of Thérouanne, an isolated French outpost thrust between Calais to the east and imperial-ruled Flanders. Thérouanne was a valuable salient; in particular, it threatened any English army moving out of Calais. Accordingly, it was kept in good repair and well provisioned. Even with the surprise attack, it took the imperial forces over a month to reduce the fort. In late June the fortress fell to Charles's men, who razed it and captured 1,000 men, including François de Montmorency, the constable's oldest son.[1]

The fall of Thérouanne was a great shock to the French. Montmorency had made light of the attack on the fortress to the English ambassador, only to have to inform him the next day of its fall. When Henry heard the news, he was reported to have thrown himself on his bed and spoken to no one except Diane de Poitiers and Saint-André for a full day. Henry was said also to have been deeply angered at Montmorency for having assured him that the fort was in no danger. Henry had so completely disbanded his forces after Metz that it took the French well into the summer to organize an army.[2] The imperial army easily pushed on to Hesdin, putting that fort under siege for the third time in less than a year. The fortress had not been sufficiently

repaired after the French assault on it six months earlier, and a new fort in the area planned at an estimated cost of 100,000 écus had not yet been begun. Hesdin quickly succumbed to the imperial artillery, surrendering on July 19. It suffered the same fate as Thérouanne. Among those killed at Hesdin was Orazio Farnese, the recent groom of Diane de France, and the captives included Robert de La Marck, the son-in-law of Diane de Poitiers.

The death of Orazio Farnese sparked a major crisis at Henry's court. It left Diane de France a widow only a few months after her wedding. The constable hoped to make his bond with the king more secure by arranging for her marriage to his eldest son, François. Not only did Henry agree to the marriage, but he also named François governor of Paris and the Ile-de-France, although at that moment he was a prisoner in Flanders. Before he had gone off to the war in Picardy, however, he had privately pledged marriage to Jeanne de Piennes, one of Catherine de Medici's *filles d'honneur*. In both civil and church law of the time, such pledges of marriage were binding. After François was ransomed, his father was furious with him for thwarting his plans for aggrandizing the family and strengthening his position with the king. The constable went in a rage to his hotel in Paris where he spoke to no one for two weeks.[3]

Montmorency, however, was not about to concede defeat. He arranged for Mademoiselle de Piennes to be taken to a convent in hope that she could be persuaded to become a nun and release his son from his vow. The son was sent off to Rome to get a papal dispensation to allow him to marry Diane de France. After a protracted hearing, Paul IV, who usually did not allow his political needs of the moment to interfere with his judicial decisions, refused the dispensation. Montmorency then got a favorable opinion from the Sorbonne and persuaded Henry to issue a decree that all marriages, past and future, made without parental consent were invalid. François de Montmorency wrote to Jeanne de Piennes releasing her from his pledge and begging her to do the same for him. The constable had already arranged for her to marry Florimond Robertet, who became a secretary of state in 1560, and receive 40,000 livres from the king. François and Diane were married in May 1557.[4]

This affair had its implications for foreign policy, since Montmorency was much more determined to break the alliance with the papacy after Paul's refusal. It also had its implication at court, for the queen, always protective of her ladies-in-waiting, was furious with

the constable. She cast her weight on the side of the Guises in the debate over French involvement in Italy, ending the balancing act between her affection for her "best gossip" and her desire to see the *fuorusciti* victorious in Florence. But it did not harm her relationship with Diane de France, which always remained warm. It was Diane who saw to it that Catherine's last wishes were carried out, bringing her body back from Blois to be buried with Henry in Saint-Denis. Indeed, all of the court loved Diane, and she always remained on intimate terms with her siblings.

Henry hardly needed the tears of his daughter to rouse himself to action against the emperor, but the failure of French intelligence to inform him of Charles's activities prior to the attack on Thérouanne left him slow to respond to the imperial invasion. Montmorency was given most of the blame for the situation, although it may well have been an example of "the fiction of the evil adviser" at work, permitting the critics to avoid criticizing the king. The more malicious said that the constable was a coward for failing to follow up on the victory at Metz by pursuing the beaten imperials into Flanders and there would be no hard fighting as long as he was head of the army.[5]

The duc de Guise ought to have profited from Montmorency's discomfiture and well may have behind the scenes, but at least publicly he had largely withdrawn from view in the year after Metz. He had the good sense to avoid antagonizing the king by overplaying his triumphs and nourishing the king's envy, at least until 1558. Certainly one could forgive Henry for an occasional pang of envy in regard to his brilliant commander. One of the few boons that Guise asked for after Metz was that Henry give the governorship of Metz to Vieilleville, replacing Artus de Brissac, Montmorency's client. The constable's anger at Henry's agreement created a period of bad blood between him and Guise.[6]

Nonetheless, Montmorency clearly remained Henry's dominant adviser in this period; it is demonstrated by the fact that Guise was not called on to command a large French force for three years after the defense of Metz. It was Montmorency, along with Saint-André, who commanded the French army in Picardy in the campaign of 1553. The constable's tactical style is obvious in the campaign that the French undertook in August; he took a largely defensive posture, with little thought given to taking the offensive against a much smaller army. The army that he gathered at Amiens was some 36,000 strong, while Charles's was at best 25,000 men. Despite having the

larger force, Montmorency proceeded very cautiously, using it only to force the imperials to raise the siege of Doullens, less than twenty miles north of Amiens, in mid-August. Henry joined the army at that point, leaving Catherine as regent in his absence, but his presence failed to spark it to greater accomplishments.[7]

Henry and Montmorency were always very cautious in the use of the French army in Picardy, except for its use in the taking of Calais in 1558, but never so much so as in the campaign of 1553. By September Montmorency had become extremely ill, to the point that many thought he was dying, and his physical problems likely were reflected in the army's poor performance. Francis DeCrue, usually sympathetic to the constable, conceded his pitiful performance: "Commanding a magnificent army he seemed to search uselessly for an easy victory, recoiling before the slightest appearance of an obstacle."[8] He was the object of derision and lampoons.[9] Nonetheless, the army of Picardy remained Montmorency's command. For whatever reason, Henry refused to take it away from him, nor did the king suggest a more effective way to use it.

Although king and constable gave a poor performance in Picardy in the campaign of 1553, it can be argued that they were distracted by events in England that year. From mid-February on, the reports on the health of young King Edward VI were grave. The conclusive addition of England, a second-rate power in this era, to the French or the imperial side would not have too drastically affected the balance of power; but it would have reduced considerably the military and political problems of the side winning England's service and increased those of the loser. The threat to France of an England firmly allied to the Habsburgs was substantial. It would have given control of Calais, the "key to France," to Charles, threatened the French position in Scotland, and completed the Habsburg encirclement of France. On the other hand, an English-French pact would have effectively closed off the Channel to shipping between Spain and the Netherlands and presented the real possibility of the half-French Mary Stuart, the great-granddaughter of Henry VII, gaining the English throne at some point.

During the four years that the duke of Northumberland directed the English government, he favored France because of his fear of Charles's intrigues to place Mary Tudor on the throne. He was willing to concede Boulogne in order to remove a sore point, which permitted the two sides to draw closer in policy. The illness of Edward

threatened Northumberland's hold on power and the pro-French policy. Henry sent the capable Antoine de Noailles, the eldest of three brothers to serve there, to England as ambassador to try to turn the confusion in England over the forthcoming royal succession to his advantage. Charles likewise sent his best diplomat, Simon Renard, who for a time had been ambassador in France.

Charles's goal in the last days of Edward's life was to ensure the succession of his cousin Mary, a task that proved to be simpler than it appeared in early 1553. Henry's policy was more complex. He regarded Northumberland as a useful, if unreliable, ally and did not let the duke's support of Protestantism stand in the way of foreign policy. In order to keep him in power, which required excluding Mary from the throne, Noailles actively supported the accession of Lady Jane Grey, Northumberland's daughter-in-law. Of course the French expected to exact a price for their support: England was to turn over the Calais Pale and Ireland. In anticipation of the success of the conspiracy Montmorency reportedly sent a letter to the governor of Calais calling on him to surrender his forts to the French.[10]

Henry and his advisers were both genuinely surprised and deeply disappointed when word came from England in mid-July 1553 that Mary had been acclaimed queen. Coming in the midst of the imperial offensive in Picardy, it augured ill for the French. Even more ominous was the prospect of her marriage to Charles's son, Philip. The French did all that was possible to convince Mary to marry an Englishman, but to no avail.[11] The new queen and her mentor, the emperor, did make several concessions to try to ease French fears about the proposed marriage to Philip, but the marriage compact of December 1553 did nothing to reduce French anxieties.[12] England was for the foreseeable future going to be firmly in the Habsburg camp. Not only would the French fears about Calais and the Channel appear likely to be realized, but even more terrifying than the presence of Prince Philip in England as royal consort was the inheritance intended for the first son of the union. He would inherit the Netherlands and Franche-Comté along with England and, in default of Philip's son, Prince Carlos, surviving or having heirs, Spain, Naples, and Milan as well. The ultimate threat to the French monarchy was that such a child would also inherit the old English claim to the throne of France, a title that the English monarchs of this era still used. If a son of Mary and Philip wanted to make good that claim, he would have the full resources of the Habsburg empire behind him.

Little wonder, then, that Henry II, in conversing with the English ambassador on December 18, "showed by his gestures and drawling half-swallowed words that he was so exceedingly put out that he could not frame a reply or finish his sentences." It was left to the constable to put into intelligible form the French objections to the marriage.[13]

The danger to France of an England in Habsburg control had been made manifestly clear by the capture from the French of the small Channel island of Sark in September 1553 by a Dutch captain. As Simon Renard wrote to Charles V, "the island can afford the means to cause great damage and annoyance to the French," but the English had never attempted to seize it to avoid war with France. By the end of the year, the French had retaken the island, but its importance was demonstrated by the 1,000 man force dispatched to effect the recapture.[14]

The French had been conspiring against Mary even before the death of Edward. When they failed to prevent her accession and her marriage to Prince Philip, they turned to more active interference in internal English politics. E. H. Harbison has argued that the constable's illness in the fall of 1553 allowed the Guises to push a harder line against England. While it is true that Montmorency was absent from the court for about six weeks, Henry twice visited him at Chantilly for periods of five or six days and wrote to him every day they were apart. Furthermore, to argue that Henry needed the influence of the Guises to see the danger of the Spanish marriage is to underestimate seriously the political foresight of both the king and the constable.[15]

Ambassador Noailles had made contact with dissatisfied Englishmen, and instructions of November 23 gave him the authority to encourage dissent. In January (well after Montmorency's return to the court) Noailles was told to suggest to the disaffected English that a rebellion against the queen would get French aid. With promises of French money, munitions, and perhaps even soldiers, the conspirators organized what became known as Wyatt's rebellion. By mid-January Henry and Montmorency were convinced that there was going to be a rebellion in England and that France would get directly involved. The Atlantic fleet was ordered to prepare for action; royal officials were sent to the Norman coast; and Henry searched for money for a war.

In January 1554 the French were probably more eager to of-

fer military aid than the English rebels were to accept it, since aid from the ancient enemy would compromise any English faction.[16] A French courier was dispatched on January 26 to London with 5,000 écus and a pledge of support to the rebels.[17] By the time he arrived, the conspirators had already taken arms and called for a public uprising. The failure of even a small part of the populace to join the revolt doomed it to defeat, and by February 7 the rebel leaders were in chains. Prince Philip, already wedded to the queen by proxy, arrived in England in July 1554, and England was now securely, if only temporarily, in the Habsburg camp. Henry's efforts to suborn Englishmen into treason had failed, but the very fact that he had backed a rebellion against legitimate authority, which violated every instinct of the sixteenth-century prince, demonstrated yet again the depth of his hatred and fear of Charles V.

Henry, for his part, might have replied that Mary Tudor was not the legitimate ruler of England, a tack he took in regard to Siena, where his men and money had helped to topple the pro-Habsburg government in 1552. After Henry had declared the city a French protectorate, he rushed more men and money to Siena and installed Cardinal Ippolito d'Este as governor. Choosing d'Este proved to be a mistake because of his high-handed treatment of the Sienese. For six months, however, everything went smoothly for the French because the viceroy of Naples, Pedro de Garcia, had to delay a response to the loss of the city until he had gathered a large force of ships and soldiers. In January 1553 he marched northward and laid siege to Siena but was forced to lift it in June when the arrival of the Ottoman fleet off Naples required strengthening the garrisons in the south.

The relationship between the sultan and the French monarch was likely at its best in late 1552. In November, just after Charles had laid siege to Metz, Henry had written to Suleiman II requesting him to send his fleet against Italy the next spring and offering him the use of a French harbor to winter the fleet.[18] In the spring of 1553 the French naval captain and occasional diplomat Baron de La Garde was sent to Constantinople to coordinate a Turkish attack in conjunction with the French fleet. He was also to convince Suleiman to appoint a different commander for the Turkish fleet since Henry did not trust the current one.[19] The Ottoman fleet reached southern Italy in early June, resulting in the lifting of the siege of Siena. By early July it was off the coast of Tuscany, where the French galleys joined it.

With Siena momentarily out of danger, Paul de Termes, the

French military commander in Tuscany, and Ippolito d'Este persuaded Henry to use the vast naval power available to him for a new project—the conquest of Corsica.[20] The island held a crucial position in the lines of communication across the western Mediterranean. It was particularly important for the Spanish, since the presence of Moslem galleys south of Sardinia forced all traffic between Spain and Italy to pass by Corsica and usually to put into its harbors. Cardinal d'Este also advised that an attack on Corsica would deflect pressure from Siena. Henry himself defended the expedition on the grounds that the Spanish were about to occupy the island.

Corsica was governed by the republic of Genoa, which had been maintaining a precarious neutrality in the war. When the combined Turkish-French fleet appeared off Bastia and landed 4,000 infantrymen, it brought Genoa, with its considerable naval and financial resources, into the war on the side of Charles V. But Genoa found it impossible to reinforce its defenses on the island, and by the end of September 1553, only the fort of Calvi held out. Despite the easy military victory, the invasion of Corsica was costly to the French: it high-handedly violated the neutrality of Genoa and brought it into the war on the other side, and it gave the Christian world still another blatant example of the French fighting alongside the infidel against Christian forces.[21]

Despite the negative aspects of the occupation of Corsica, the French controlled the island for the next six years, and Henry set about establishing a government for it, appointing de Termes as governor. From the first years of his reign he had recognized the need to establish a better system of supervision over the provincial and overseas officials. The outbreak of the gabelle revolt when he was out of the realm impressed on him the need to improve his control over the provinces. Thus he expanded the system of sending *maîtres des requêtes de l'hôtel du roi* into the provinces. As the title suggests, they had originally received appeals and requests from the various levels of government to present to the king. By 1547 they had become the principal assistants to the chancellor in supervising the judicical system at the provincial level. Henry added six more to the eighteen in existence when he became king. In the edict that expanded their number, Henry also added to their duties and powers. They were obliged to undertake regular tours of the local courts and report any abuse of office by local officials. Already in 1548 the term *intendant* was in use for those *maîtres des requêtes* who were sent to supervise

the provincial governors. An edict of 1553 more specifically described their duties as attending to the matters of justice and finance.

Michel Antoine has declared that the true origins of the intendant ought to be sought in the governor's councils created by Henry in such lands as Piedmont and Corsica.[22] The king always moved quickly to incorporate newly occupied territory into the realm with the exception of the Three Bishoprics, which kept their old governments because Henry governed them as fiefs of the Holy Roman Empire. In Italy and Corsica he appointed French governors; and where local institutions did not correspond to the French, new ones based on French models were erected. Henry moved to impose tighter royal control over the new governors and their governments, necessary because of the greater distances involved. The solution Henry found to effect such control was to place royal officials in the governor's councils with the authority to supervise the officers of the new provinces. In Piedmont that official was called the *surintendant des finances*, in Corsica, the *intendant de la justice*. Both positions were filled by men of the long robe. The commission given in 1555 to Pierre Panisse, former president of the Cour des Aides of Montpellier, as intendant of justice and police in Corsica, used terms that were virtually identical to those used in the commissions for intendants of the next century. The fact that Henry, as a result of the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis, soon abandoned the occupied lands and uprooted their French officials did not destroy the principle established. After the strife of the religious wars, the French monarchs again turned to Henry's officers to secure tighter control over their provinces, giving rise to the intendant of the next century.

The success of the Corsican enterprise did compensate for the dismal campaign of the summer of 1553 in Artois. The king was determined to make a better showing in 1554. In the spring the French forces were divided into three armies that were sent into Artois, Hainault, and Luxembourg. One was commanded by Charles de Bourbon-Montpensier; a second by François de Nevers; and the largest by Montmorency. François de Guise appeared again only as a captain of a company of 100 lances. These armies devastated the southern Netherlands and captured several fortresses. The most important of these was Marienburg, which Montmorency stormed in late June; its name was changed to Henrienbourg. In late July the three armies were reunited, and Henry reviewed his forces on July 29. Since he intended to lead his army beyond the borders of the realm, he again

appointed a regency council with the queen at its head.[23] His intention was to march to Brussels, but Charles V's new commander in the Netherlands, Emmanuel-Philibert of Savoy, foiled that plan with his own strategy of marching toward Boulogne. The plan of attacking Boulogne appears to have been designed to show the English that the Spanish marriage of the queen could pay dividends.

The French army's march westward to defend the Boulonnais was halted by the imperial fort of Renti, to which Henry laid siege. The imperial forces moved into the area to relieve it. There then occurred the largest field battle of the year, although the French forces involved, under the command of Nevers, Coligny, and Guise, numbered only some 2,000 men. Guise had been sent to shadow the imperial army, but on August 13 he suddenly found himself facing the entire enemy force. By a clever ruse, using a forest for cover and well supported by infantry under Coligny, he inflicted a sharp blow on the enemy, but the inability of Henry and Montmorency to decide how to follow up that advantage prevented a possibly decisive victory. Charles was able to resupply Renti, and in mid-September Henry ordered the siege lifted and disbanded his army for the winter.[24]

The only meaningful result of the campaign of 1554 was the decision to build a fort at Rocroi. With Marienburg in French hands, a fort at Rocroi would control the only road across the Ardennes west of the Meuse river.[25] It soon became a formidable stronghold and was a major obstacle to any force pushing southward from the Netherlands for the next two centuries.

As seen by contemporary French, however, the campaign of 1554 was a great disappointment, since they had a clear advantage in manpower. The English ambassador Wooton remarked that, except for taking Marienburg, the French did nothing "to boast of in this expedition beyond the burning and spoiling of all sorts of poor people."[26] By the end of 1554 it was clear that Henry and Montmorency had become too cautious in the field; they were unwilling to commit their forces to battle even against what was described as "a beaten and almost flying enemy." It was suggested that the constable was more interested in ransoming his son than in defeating the imperials and that he realized his more talented rivals, François de Guise especially, would outshine him in battle and capture the king's favor.[27] Nonetheless, Montmorency still was the dominant influence at the court.

The failure of French designs in the Netherlands was com-

pounded by the greater disappointment of French plans in Italy. In August 1554 Cosimo de Medici of Florence, involved in the war because of Florentine claims on Siena and his hatred for Piero Strozzi, newly appointed governor of Siena, inflicted a serious defeat on Strozzi at Marciano. Strozzi's defeat was caused largely by the failure of the French-Ottoman fleet to bring him the 4,000 men that had been used a year earlier to invade Corsica. The missed opportunity was typical of the French-Turkish alliance, which promised great benefits to France but produced very few. La Garde, who served aboard the Turkish fleet as the French liaison, complained on several occasions about his inability to prevent the Turks from plundering the coastal towns of Italy and seizing Christians as slaves. John Mason, serving as English ambassador to the emperor in 1554, referred to the poor Christian souls who had fallen into Moslem hands by means of the French king. He wrote that Henry was gaining nothing by his alliance with the sultan except dishonor and the wrath of God.[28] La Garde received a cold reception when he returned to the French court in late 1554, because of the problems in the Mediterranean. Henry, however, had to continue to use him because Leone Strozzi, a more capable galley commander, had been killed in battle shortly after returning to French service earlier in 1554. But René de Guise, not La Garde, received Strozzi's title of grand prior.[29]

After his defeat at Marciano, Piero Strozzi, newly created marshal of France, was forced to retreat into Siena, and the city was besieged. Strozzi chafed under the inactivity of governing a city and had asked Henry for a coadjutor to govern Siena while he commanded in the field. The king consulted with Montmorency, Guise, and Saint-André since "all things passed through the hands of these three." After they had suggested candidates, Henry noted that no one had nominated Blaise de Monluc. Montmorency objected strongly because he greatly disliked Monluc and was annoyed at having his advice disregarded. But Henry stood fast and placed Monluc in Siena.[30]

Thus it was Monluc who was in command in Siena during the long and dreadful siege that lasted from September 1554 to April 1555. On April 12 Monluc and the French forces marched out with full military honors as the Spanish marched in. The loss of Siena was a serious blow, since Henry had hoped to use it as the center of his efforts to control Italy. Henry's failure to relieve Siena, despite numerous promises and false reports of relief, was also an embarrassment. The blame must fall firstly on Strozzi and Charles de Brissac,

the French commanders in Italy, for failing to make a real effort to lift the siege. Brissac was having some success in Piedmont and did not want to give up an opportunity for a great victory. Henry and his advisers were also surprisingly passive in light of the strategic and symbolic importance of Siena. The king's pledge to avenge the defeat of Strozzi went unfulfilled, largely because of lack of reinforcements from France, although he did send 500,000 écus to Siena in late 1554. A factor, however, in the loss of the city was the refusal of the principal French officers in Italy to agree on a plan of action. Henry was said to have complained bitterly about the feuds among his people, especially between Strozzi and d'Este.[31]

It may well have been that the strong words of support for Siena that Henry voiced were for the benefit of his wife, who took a passionate interest in the effort to defeat her hated cousin Cosimo. The year 1554 was the high point of the influence at the French court of the Italian exiles, who saw a French victory in Italy as a ticket home to Florence or Naples. The loss of Siena reduced their importance and created a clear rift between those determined to push Henry into redoubling his efforts in Italy and those who began to accommodate themselves to Charles V. Some of the Italians disappeared from the French court and dropped off the pension roll. Strozzi himself reached the French court in July 1555, where he was coldly received. Catherine de Medici advised him to withdraw and wait until his services were again needed. Monluc, on the other hand, received a hero's reception and was made a knight of the Order of Saint Michael, a very rare honor.[32]

The motif of Henry's reign seems to have been that a bitter blow to his schemes was quickly balanced by a great success. Thus, the loss of Siena was followed by the election of Paul IV. Julius III had died on March 23, 1555, and the cardinals of both parties rushed off to Rome for the conclave. The dean of the College of Cardinals, Cardinal Carafa, would have none of the delay that Cardinal d'Este had created in 1549 to give the French cardinals time to reach Rome. The conclave opened eleven days after Julius's death with all of the French cardinals and a majority of the imperial prelates absent. D'Este again was Henry's first choice followed by Tournon and Du Bellay. In late 1553 d'Este was reported to have boasted that he had a letter from the French king in his own hand promising to have him elected pope "by love or by force."[33] If a French partisan could not be elected, then the French party was to vote for Carafa or, surprisingly, Cardinal Pole.

Apparently, Pole's opposition to Mary Tudor's marriage had won him French support.[34] But the conclave was concluded before any of the ten French cardinals arrived. The reform party controlled the conclave and elected Marcello Cervini, whom both Henry and Charles had opposed in 1549. Henry had expressly forbidden the French cardinals to vote for Cervini because he was seen as too ardent a reformer, who would attempt to reduce the privileges and powers of the king and the French prelates in the French church.[35]

The French were prepared to admit that the new Marcellus II was a worthy choice, but they were not slow to jump at the opportunity to elect another pope when Marcellus died on May 1. All but two of the seven French cardinals who had gone to Rome a month earlier still were there, so the French party was considerably stronger. D'Este was still Henry's first choice, but Henry expressed himself strongly in favor of Pole, calling him "most worthy."[36] Pole, however, had remained in England, and his absence hurt his prospects, as did the old charge of heterodoxy first raised in 1549. Alessandro Farnese was again the key figure, and having decided that Pole was unelectable, swung his support to Carafa. A month earlier Prince Philip had declared Carafa "entirely unsuitable."[37] For that reason Henry backed Carafa, and the French cardinals gave him their votes. On May 23 Carafa was acclaimed as Paul IV. The French ambassador wrote to Henry: "Your holy intention and will have been served."[38]

The French and their allies were elated; the imperials were crushed.[39] Paul IV quickly demonstrated that becoming pope had not made him forget his hatred of Charles V and the Spanish. From the first, he acted against the interests of the Habsburgs and in favor of the French. It was clear that an alliance between pope and French king could be made at any time. In October 1555, cardinals Lorraine and Tournon were sent to Rome to negotiate a league with Paul. After several sharp exchanges with the imperial ambassador, Paul signed a treaty with Henry, the final draft of which the pope wrote in his own hand. It committed Henry to come to the defense of the Papal States and provide 350,000 *scudi* and 12,000 men in case of war. The pope would decide whether the forces would be directed against Naples or Milan, but both territories would be given to a younger son of Henry II. The treaty was so well-kept a secret that it was not until the middle of 1556 that the Habsburgs learned its details.[40]

In signing the alliance with Paul IV, Henry clearly was playing a double game, since he was at the same time deeply involved in

peace negotiations with the imperials. Since 1553 Julius III had made valiant efforts to bring the two warring sides to the peace table, but one side or the other always had a ripe opportunity to exploit against the other or a new grievance to repay.

Mary of England and Cardinal Pole made a serious effort in late 1554.[41] Mary hoped to avoid the looming war with France and sincerely wished to serve as peacemaker. By late 1554 Henry was much more willing to discuss peace because his campaign of the previous summer was largely a failure and Philip was now in England, increasing the likelihood that England would join his enemies. After long haggling over details of protocol, the conference began on May 23 at Mark, in the Calais Pale. Its beginning at a time when the campaigning season was under way was an encouraging sign.

Cardinal Pole and Bishop Stephan Gardiner served as mediators between the principal imperial representative, Cardinal Granvelle, and the French, Montmorency and the Cardinal de Lorraine. The Venetian ambassador reported that Lorraine was matched with the constable because there was some fear that Montmorency's eagerness for peace would warp his judgment on what was best for the king. Soranzo attributed this situation to the constable's desire to see his son freed, his respect for the emperor, and his general inclination toward peace. The rivalry between the constable and the cardinal "will prevent any agreement save such as shall be beneficial to the French crown." That consideration kept Lorraine from going to Rome for the papal election.[42] What is intriguing about the report is that, despite such misgivings about the constable's judgment, he was nonetheless named to the delegation. It demonstrates how securely he stood in Henry's affection and confidence.

Montmorency's attitude and the presence of Lorraine produced the interesting episode reported by the imperial delegation to Charles V. After Granvelle had appealed to the constable as a lover of peace and a prudent man of vast experience, Montmorency became effusive in his praise of the emperor. "He knew that in your majesty he had to do with a person who knows what is what. At this point the Cardinal [Lorraine] cast a glance at the Constable, who reddened a little, and added 'after my master.'"[43] This episode is strong evidence of Montmorency's respect for the emperor and his wish to be known as a man of peace.

Even the constable, however, was not prepared to concede all that the imperials demanded. Milan occupied the center of the discus-

sion, but Burgundy, Flanders, Naples, Boulogne, and Metz all were concerns of first importance and were discussed at length. With the word that Paul IV had been elected pope, the French saw that the situation in Italy had turned greatly in their favor. They lost interest in the peace negotiations, and the conference broke up in early June without any results.

The summer of 1555, therefore, saw the war carried on in half-hearted measures. Brissac took the Piedmontese fort of Casale in late June and the fort of Vulpiano in September. The Turkish fleet again joined the French in the sea off Italy, but the combined fleets could not prevent Genoa from resupplying the fortress of Calvi on Corsica, forcing the French to abandon their siege and allowing the Genoese to recover much of the island. A campaign on the northern borders of France accomplished nothing of note. Meanwhile, contacts between the two sides to explore the grounds for concluding a peace settlement continued.

It was the abdication of Charles V that enabled serious negotiations to begin again. Worn out in body, mind, and spirit, the aged emperor began to divest himself of his responsibilities in the fall of 1555. In October he surrendered sovereignty over the Netherlands to Philip and in January over the Spanish kingdoms. In September 1556 he wrote to his brother, Ferdinand, conceding the imperial title, but the formal transfer of the crown did not occur until 1558. The breakup of the Habsburg realms reduced one of the cardinal fears that Henry had had about Charles—that he intended to become universal emperor. Metz was also far less important a point of contention between Henry and Philip. Perhaps the most important result of the abdication was that Henry was no longer so distracted by his hatred of Charles and was able to negotiate with Philip in reasonably good faith. Henry, however, was not about to pass up a possible opening for sowing dissension in the enemy camp. In August 1555 he ordered a French envoy (de Gardes) to involve himself in the quarrel between Charles and Ferdinand over the division of the Habsburg lands in hopes of alienating the two branches of the family from each other.[44]

The basis for the continued contact between the enemies was the exchange of prisoners. The imperials held a number of very important Frenchmen, including François de Montmorency, the constable's son, his nephew, François d'Andelot, captured in 1551 at Parma, and Robert de La Marck, Diane de Poitiers's son-in-law. Discussions about ransoming the prisoners continued through the summer and

into the fall of 1555. In December these contacts were quietly turned into a more extensive peace conference at the abbey of Vaucelles in Hainault. Since it was officially still concerned only with the prisoners, the governor of Picardy, Admiral de Coligny, served as the chief of the French delegation. Both sides used that point as an excuse to keep the negotiations low-key and to threaten to withdraw when the discussion of important issues was not to their liking. Thus, on January 14, 1556, the report of the Venetian ambassador was very pessimistic, but a dispatch of the next day reported a French proposal for a truce of up to ten years.[45]

Two days later Coligny was reported to be returning to the French court, but on January 23 he turned back toward Vaucelles. According to Soranzo, "This has surprised everybody, but it is known that the Constable wishes for it [a truce], much more than he does for the League [with the pope]. It is supposed that if he can conclude this truce, his authority will enable him to persuade the King to accept it regardless of anything," even the alliance with the pope.[46]

By February 1 rumors were spreading that a truce had been agreed upon. In reporting the rumors, Soranzo made one of the most revealing statements about the lines of influence at the French court.

> Now that this negotiation seems to narrow itself, the conflicting passions in this court come to light; the adherents of the Constable, together with the public, being desirous of its conclusion; whilst, on the other hand, the dependants both of the Queen and of the house of Guise, together with those of Madame de Valentinois, demonstrate openly that for the benefit of his affairs his most Christian Majesty ought not to come to this agreement, but pursue the execution of the League, for which they say another opportunity will not so easily occur; and that although the Pope may not be able to furnish such great assistance as would be required, . . . yet nevertheless he cannot fail to be very useful . . . and as it is heard that the Cardinal of Lorraine will be here in a few days, they hope that, should the ratification not have taken place by that time, his coming may serve greatly to interrupt it, and having already heard something about these negotiations, he is expected to speed his journey.[47]

Despite the objections of most of the heavyweights of the court, on February 5 the five-year truce was published with all forces remaining in place and all prisoners exchanged, except for the two

highest-ranking Frenchmen, Montmorency's son and La Marck, and the highest-ranking imperial officer in French hands.[48]

The opposition of the Guises to the truce, while the source of a great altercation[49] between them and Montmorency, should not be interpreted simply as a consequence of the rivalry between them. Six weeks earlier the duc de Guise had written to the cardinal: "The Constable and I, we are getting on well together; he always shows me some sign of friendship as he did before your departure."[50] The dispute also ought to be explained in terms other than the Guises' ambition to win the throne of the kingdom of Naples, since the treaty negotiated with the pope would have given it to Henry's second son. But the duke expected to receive a commission as the king's lieutenant-general in Italy and command a substantial force there. He had not had a significant command since the defense of Metz four years earlier. One can presume that he was chafing at the bit to win greater glory. He also hoped to have substantial power in a French regime in Naples as regent for Henry's son.[51]

As for Cardinal de Lorraine, he had been sent to Italy to negotiate an alliance with the pope, the duke of Ferrara, and Venice. He had been most successful with the first two, although not the last. One can presume that he was reluctant to see the fruits of his labor lost and miss the opportunity to be hailed as a great diplomat. The Guises felt that his honor was at stake. Furthermore, the youngest Guise brothers had reached the age when they could command companies of lances, and they hoped to win glory in the field under the command of their oldest brother.

One has to wonder how accurate Soranzo's remark about Diane was, since her son-in-law waited to be ransomed. If true, it was likely a reflection of her usual support for the Guises against Montmorency. In regard to the queen, she was passionately interested in seeing her beloved cousins, the Strozzi, overthrow Cosimo de Medici and free Florence. Surrounded by Florentine exiles, she had as one of the consuming goals of her life to win for them the right to go home. Thus she threw her influence, which by this time seems to have become of considerable import, behind the Guises. The Venetian Capello wrote that if the liberty of Florence were restored, "the queen will have all the merit."[52]

With the formidable weight of all but one of the major figures of the court against the truce, why did Henry agree to it? Certainly the war had been expensive, costing the crown some 45 million écus.[53]

But he seemed to have had no trouble in raising funds to continue it. In early January he had borrowed 900,000 écus at 16 percent interest from the Italian bankers at Lyon and Rome. They agreed to advance him another 200,000 at no interest.[54] The king had already sent a large sum to the sultan as a gift to persuade him to bring a large fleet into Italian waters the next summer.[55] Several regiments of Swiss and German infantry had already been recruited. The alliance with the papacy was the final element needed to wage a major campaign.

Against these factors must be placed those that swung the decision in favor of peace. They were nicely summarized by Soranzo at the time of the Conference of Mark a year before. He said that the king was not much inclined to peace; but constable, the Cardinal de Lorraine, and others laid before him the poverty of the people, the death and captivity of so many of his subjects, the expense incurred; and they convinced him to treat of peace.[56] Certainly important was the need to ransom the prisoners, for Henry could not have forgotten his own captivity, nor the duty of the chivalrous lord to ransom his vassals. In his letter to the sultan explaining the truce, Henry cited the fear of Philip bringing England into the war.[57] Also a factor was the unrest among the French people over the heavy taxes needed for the war. But of most weight was certainly the influence of the constable. When Montmorency pressed hard for a point of policy, he rarely lost. The Guises, as influential as they were, had yet to win a policy disagreement with him. The constable remained the dominant influence on the king. When Philip's representative went to the French court in April to accept Henry's oath on the truce, it was obvious to him that Montmorency was in charge of royal policy.[58]

Several historians have noted what they regard as the strange situation at the French court at the time of the truce: two ministers had the right to conclude clearly contradictory treaties with foreign powers. Henry, they argue, could not adhere to one without compromising his honor on the other. Lucien Romier has gone on to write that this situation serves to refute those historians who have argued that Henry conducted his own policy and equally serves as proof of the vast powers of both parties.[59]

Yet one must not be too hasty to conclude that Henry was so easily manipulated by his favorites and was devoid of any political acumen. He had made what he regarded as good faith efforts to reach a peace at the Conference of Mark. If providence so favored him as to place on the papal throne so hostile a foe of the Habsburgs as

Paul IV, he had to put himself in a position to take advantage of it should the war continue. On the other hand, when the discussions of prisoner exchange suddenly blossomed into broader negotiations for a truce, he felt obliged to grasp the opportunity. If those negotiations had failed, then Henry had the treaty with the pope in hand for renewed war. Romier ought to have noted that the treaty with Paul remained in effect after the truce. Furthermore it was largely because of rumors that an alliance had been signed that Philip was convinced of the need to press for a truce.[60] While it is true that there is no direct evidence that such a sophisticated approach existed in Henry's mind from the beginning, it can be argued that Henry had skillfully manipulated the situation in order to secure a truce in which he kept all of the substantial French gains of the past five years.

12 DISASTER AT SAINT-QUENTIN

The Truce of Vaucelles had not healed the major irritants between French monarchy and Habsburg dynasty. All observers recognized that a pretext for resuming war would be easy to come by and that continued peace depended upon a determined effort by all parties, the small as well as the great, to ensure its continuance. Given the depth of the hatreds that engulfed Europe, it is not surprising that one of the lesser powers had the potential for touching off a new round of warfare, but it is rather surprising that it was the papacy that did it.

Paul IV was deeply dismayed by the news of the truce that arrived in Rome on February 14, 1556, since he had just concluded an advantageous defensive alliance with France. He called it a disgrace and declared that he had refused to take part in its negotiation.[1] Paul, and even more so his nephew, Cardinal Carlo Carafa, would not give up hope that the papacy could call on France to drive the Habsburgs out of Italy. Cardinal Carafa, hoping to use French power for the aggrandizement of his family, pushed even more actively for French intervention. But given Paul's volatile nature, he may well have been sincere when he announced in April that he was sending legates to the two courts to discuss peace and arrange for a new general council for church reform. If he was sincere, he could not have made a worse choice to go to the French court than Carlo Carafa. No legate ever reached the court of Philip II.

On June 14, 1556, Carafa arrived at Fontainebleau. Paul IV had spared no expense for his nephew's party in order to impress papal greatness on all. Henry, for his part, treated the legate as "if the mightiest prince of the world were passing through France."[2] The cardinal arrived at a French court that was extremely apprehensive

about the durability of the truce and badly divided over a course of action. Neither the constable's son François nor Marshal de La Marck had yet been ransomed because of haggling over the amounts. The situation worsened in May, when the duke of Arschot, the only remaining imperial prisoner in French hands, escaped from Vincennes. His escape, regarded by the French as a violation of his word of honor, especially angered Montmorency because Henry had pledged to him the duke's ransom to help pay his son's. François de Montmorency's ransom had been set at 100,000 écus but had been reduced to 80,000. Diane de Poitiers had agreed to collect the ransom for her son-in-law, La Marck, pegged at 80,000 écus, then 70,000. She declared that she could not pay that much, although Henry had given her 633 Turks captured along the Mediterranean coast. She sold them for 26 écus apiece in Corsica (a sum of some 16,500 écus).[3]

The concern that the continued captivity of the two captains caused Henry and Montmorency was obvious. They threatened on several occasions to resume the war if ransoms were not agreed upon, but the Venetian ambassador Soranzo recognized that the continued captivity of his son pressured Montmorency to work to maintain the peace, as it had earlier persuaded him to negotiate the truce.[4]

Another cause of apprehension at the French court when Carafa arrived was the relationship with England, where the French government was deeply involved in conspiracies against Mary and Philip. The increasing popular resentment against Philip and his Spanish advisers, the ever more numerous executions for heresy, and Mary's placing of English interests behind those of her husband had created a fertile field for the French ambassador Antoine de Noailles to cultivate rebellion. The most serious revolt was Sir Henry Dudley's.[5] In early 1556 Henry II had agreed to allow Noailles to enter into negotiations with Dudley. The truce of February did not halt the intrigue, because the French remained on the diplomatic offensive against the Habsburgs at all points. In March 1556 Dudley and several coconspirators crossed the Channel and met with Henry at Blois. He told them to go through with their enterprise, and should the truce collapse, he would aid them with men and money.

Shortly after the interview one of the plotters broke the conspiracy to the English government. A number of conspirators were taken; they confessed, implicating the French government and its ambassador. Despite that blatant casus belli, Mary ignored the opening for war. She genuinely wanted peace but was also unsure of how much

popular support she would have for war. Accordingly, Mary ignored the confessions that the conspirators had an understanding with the king of France and a pledge of aid. England remained nominally at peace with France, but at the time Carafa reached France, Henry could not be certain that war with England would not erupt at any moment.

While Carafa's announced purpose for traveling to France was to further peace, no one at the French court, according to the foreign ambassadors, believed that he had the slightest desire for it.[6] Dispatches from Rome on the views of Pope Paul were in a similar vein. The cardinal found, however, that the French were not at the moment interested in a war in Italy. Henry had made his decision in February in favor of the truce, and there was yet no good reason to change it, despite his irritation over the continued captivity of the two captains.

Montmorency remained strongly in favor of the truce, and he had a firm control over royal policy in the spring of 1556. In March Soranzo wrote that the king remained constantly alone with the constable, who decided everything, and in early July he reported that nothing of importance was decided except by the constable.[7] The Guises, for their part, felt humiliated by the repudiation of the policy formulated by Cardinal de Lorraine. They stayed in the background during these months as much as their massive egos permitted. But they had not conceded a thing to Montmorency. As Simon Renard reported on June 13:

> The Guises have all along been advising a breach of the truce in order to pursue the plans started in Italy by the Cardinal of Lorraine, arguing that precious time is being lost. At present, I hear that the King is holding conference every day as to whether or not to break on what pretext. It appears that the Constable insists that the season is too far advanced to do anything this year except to continue intriguing and making difficulties for your Majesty wherever possible, collecting money and making preparations. He is unwilling to allow the Guises to have the advantage over him in that he was the cause of the truce, which they try to represent as unfavourable to the King. . . . The Guises and their party consider that it would be a great mistake to miss the opportunity afforded by the readiness of the Pope and other potentates of Italy allied with the French to damage your Majesty; . . . the upshot will de-

> pend on the negotiations which Cardinal Carafa is coming here to undertake.[8]

Having learned the tone of the French court, Carafa played the role of the peacemaker for a time. But on July 5, while serving as godfather to Henry's short-lived daughter (a twin was stillborn), named Vittoria after the pope's mother, which pleased Paul enormously, Carafa vented his passionate hatred of the Spanish. All of the ambassadors present were shocked at the vehemence of his harangue.[9]

What had touched off the cardinal were events in Rome, where his uncle the pope was doing his best to present Henry with a fait accompli of war between the papacy and the Habsburgs. He excommunicated two members of a powerful Roman family, the Colonna, who were staunch imperialists, and declared their estates confiscated. He then conferred the estates on another nephew, Giovanni Carafa. Papal troops were dispatched to secure Paliano, which the Spanish in Naples regarded as their protectorate. Quickly following that was the arrest on July 7 of a Spanish courier with a letter from the Spanish ambassador in Rome to the duke of Alba, the Spanish viceroy in Naples, which advised Alba that the only way to deal with Paul was with 12,000 veteran troops. Its author also was quickly arrested. On several occasions in June and July Paul harangued the Venetian ambassador in Rome, to whom he freely opened his heart, with violent denunciations of Charles V and Philip II. He called them heretics and threatened to depose them and give their titles to Henry II.[10]

Paul probably was encouraged in his bravado by his nephew's reports from France. Carafa repeated Henry's words that he would defend the papacy at any price against all aggression. The constable, in bad temper over the delay in the ransom of his son, stated that he knew the imperialists were preparing for war but they would find the French in like manner. Ironically, as if to prove that Montmorency and the Guises could never agree, Cardinal de Lorraine declared that he would exert himself to the utmost for the quiet of Christendom and urged the pope not to make Paliano the cause of war.[11]

On July 25 word came from Brussels that François de Montmorency could be ransomed for 50,000 écus. The constable became more outspoken for continued peace. Accordingly, on July 30, Soranzo wrote:

> The King of France, for the present not wishing to break the truce, provided he can do so without loss of dignity, has often endeav-

> oured to satisfy the Legate with general expressions, assuring him that not only will he not fail in his promised protection, but that should the need require it, he, for the defense of the Holy Church, would pass into Italy in person, together with all his forces. . . . But the Legate does not cease urging the King to answer him more precisely, and having understood that his Majesty would wish him to depart, he says he will not do so until he obtains a clearer determination from the King, who diverts him with every sort of amusement.[12]

Carafa asked for a commitment from Henry for 350,000 écus, 300 or 400 *gens d'armes*, and 8,000 to 12,000 Swiss. Montmorency answered negatively for the king, on the grounds that he did not wish to break the truce. Furthermore, the king had already provided the pope with vast sums of money, and his captains Monluc and Strozzi were already in Rome. Henry had also sent 800 Gascon infantrymen to Rome, who arrived there at the end of July; they were told not to take the offensive. When the cardinal left the French court on August 17, he went away virtually empty-handed, although he wrote to the pope that he had gained nearly all he had wanted. A month later Henry did agree to contribute 350,000 écus to a war chest that was to be kept in Venice until it was needed. The dispatches of the French ambassador in the Netherlands strongly suggested that there would be no threat from that direction, since the situation there was miserable; no money or food would be available for a campaign against France.[13]

By the time Carafa left the French court, however, a new development strengthened Henry's resolve not to be dragged into war in Italy. The duke of Parma, Ottavio Farnese, had been reconciled with the Habsburgs and switched alliances. The reasons for his decision were several. Cardinal Alessandro Farnese had become annoyed at Henry's favoritism toward Ippolito d'Este; the Farnese were on better terms with Philip than with his father; and the Truce of Vaucelles had reversed the reciprocal seizures of property of five years earlier—that of Queen Eleanor by her stepson Henry and that of Margaret of Parma by her father, Charles V. The return of Margaret's lands removed the major obstacle to better ties between the Farnese and the Habsburgs, and negotiations resulted in an alliance. When, in early September, Henry received definitive word of the Farneses' decision, he was reported to have remarked bitterly: "The ingratitude of

the Italians surpasses all others." He confiscated Cardinal Farnese's benefices in France and gave most of them to Cardinal d'Este.[14] The defection of the Farneses not only hurt Henry emotionally, for he was deeply attached to them, but also cost him a strategic position in the peninsula.

While the defection of the Farnese was unfolding, the constable's son was released and returned to the French court, to the great joy of all. The ransom of La Marck was somewhat slower to be achieved. It was not until his wife traveled to Brussels to plead with his captors to accept 50,000 écus that he was released. He was freed for that sum because he was seriously ill, and he died several days after returning to France. His death left a marshal's baton available, which Paul de Termes expected to receive, but the third Guise brother, the duc d'Aumale, Diane de Poitiers's other son-in-law, also requested it.[15] Henry left the office vacant for the next two years and then gave it to de Termes.

Montmorency's joy at his son's ransom quickly turned to anger when he found out that his plan to have him marry Diane de France would be foiled by François's engagement to Jeanne de Piennes. The constable realized rather quickly that his son would probably need a papal dispensation from what was regarded as a legitimate marital contract, and his attitude toward the pope began to soften. Nonetheless, in early September he wrote to the French diplomats in Rome to tell the pope to make peace at any price.[16] But on the basis of the earlier pledges from the French monarch, Paul IV had already defied the viceroy of Naples, the duke of Alba, after Alba had issued what amounted to an ultimatum on August 27. A week later Alba's troops crossed the frontier into the Papal States.

Faced with an invading force vastly superior to his own forces and terrified by the prospect of a second sack of Rome, the pope searched desperately for help, even suggesting that the French use their good offices with the Turks to get them to attack Naples.[17] The news of Alba's invasion put Henry in a most difficult quandary—whether to send French troops to his aid and risk war with Philip, or lose the pope's friendship by refusing. Renard, Philip's ambassador in France, made a strenuous effort to maintain the truce, making promises beyond what, in fact, his master was prepared to give. The principal element of Renard's scheme was that Henry's second son be named duke of Milan as a vassal of the emperor. Even Cardinal de Lorraine was favorable to Renard's proposal, at least for a time. On

September 19 Soranzo reported that "the Cardinal of Lorraine keeps this scheme alive."[18]

On September 23, with a full report of events in the Papal States in hand, Henry called his council together to decide on a course of action. The constable urged him to declare that Alba's action had not broken the truce but to aid the pope with money. The Guises, and even more so Brissac, urged Henry to declare war if Alba did not withdraw immediately, since the king's honor depended on defending the pope. On September 28 Henry decided in favor of the Italian expedition. He emphasized, however, that he was only going to the aid of the pope and did not regard the decision as a violation of the truce.[19] Military preparations were hastened: a muster of the gendarmerie was ordered, and François d'Andelot and Gaspard de Coligny were sent to Picardy to inspect the defenses there. Henry, however, hoped that the truce could be maintained on the northern frontier even if fighting between French and Spanish forces occurred in Italy.

A letter was sent to Strozzi in Rome announcing the decision to send a French army to Italy. Commanded by François de Guise, it was to consist of 6,000 French foot and 6,000 Swiss, 500 lances, 600 light cavalry, and twenty-five artillery pieces. Brissac was to accompany Guise back to Piedmont. Annoyed because he had not received the command of the entire expedition, Brissac lost much of his enthusiasm for the campaign. The constable remained opposed to the war and was reported to have remarked: "We shall all ride across the Alps but come back on foot."[20] But he had just decided to send his son to Rome for the dispensation from his engagement, and his opposition was muted. Nonetheless, when word came that the duke of Ferrara objected to the financial demands on him and the role in the war designated for him, the first in a long series of problems that he would cause for the French in this endeavor, Montmorency seized on the news to try to convince Henry to change his mind. For her part, Catherine de Medici eagerly supported the decision for war, sending a messenger to Lyon to urge the Italian bankers to offer financial support for the campaign.[21]

Nearly a year after the idea first had been broached, the duc de Guise had his commission to lead an army into Italy. There is little evidence as to the goals that Guise himself had for it. The tradition that he intended to win Naples[22] seems to be refuted by letters between Guise and Henry that clearly stated that the purpose of

the expedition was to place the king's second son on the Neapolitan throne.[23] The office of *père et administrateur* for the young prince would have been Guise's, and it meant that he could have expected to be regent of Naples for a long time. François de Guise had too keen a sense of honor to violate the trust that his king had placed in him by claiming the throne of Naples for himself. Nonetheless, the Guises saw war, and particularly the expedition into Italy, as a means of establishing irrevocably the power and wealth of their house through their services to the French crown.

It would have been possible, as Montmorency insisted, for Henry to ignore the developments in the Papal States. Nonetheless, it is difficult to see how the king, with his sense of duty and honor and his fondness for the fight, could have failed to go to the pope's aid. With the pope firmly allied and Cardinal Carafa in Venice seeking to include that state in the alliance, the expedition seemed to promise a great return for rather little investment. Henry and his advisers were convinced that Philip could not muster much of a force for an attack in northern France or for war in Italy. Pope Paul had begun to speak of giving Naples to one of Henry's younger sons and Milan to another. He fantasized about bringing them to Italy as youngsters and making Italian princes out of them, thus ridding Italy of both the French and the Spanish. Paul also spoke of deposing Philip and giving his titles to Henry.[24] In accepting the pope's offer of Naples for his son, Henry was threatening to create a situation as dangerous to his successor as that created by Francis I in regard to Charles d'Orléans. Henry, however, had four sons to provide for, and such schemes touched a responsive chord. Soranzo reported in early 1557 that Henry talked of Naples incessantly and had a map of the realm in his chambers that he examined several times a day.[25]

The prominent Roman nobleman, Camilio Orsini, summed up nicely the factors that led to the decision to let Guise march into Italy: "It may come to pass that the youth of France, the incitements of the Guise family, the necessity for providing for his sons, the opportunity afforded by having a Pope so resolutely in his favour that centuries will pass before such another be found, the Emperor's retirement from politics, and King Philip's little experience of public business, might stimulate him [Henry] to war."[26]

Guise had not even reached Lyon when a new complication arose. In November 1556 Alba took Ostia, cutting off Rome from the sea. Cardinal Carafa, who was deeply suspicious about Henry's resolve,

accepted an offer of a ten-day truce from Alba. At the end of the period it was extended for another forty days, on the grounds that communications between Alba and Philip in Brussels took time. Carafa's explanation to Henry was that he was buying time until the French forces arrived. Henry was greatly annoyed, and his misgivings about the trustworthiness of the Carafas and the success of the Guise expedition increased apace. With so many of the voices that had favored war gone from the court, the constable's opinion that this was not a convenient time for war carried even more weight. Lorraine, fearful that Henry would recall Guise, lamented that if his brother were recalled before he gained a victory, "it would not be to his honor."[27]

Meanwhile, Guise and his army pushed on toward Italy, reaching Turin on December 28. There he remained for two weeks, holding council with his captains and several prominent members of the French party in Italy. By the time Guise took to the road again, Giulio Orsini, a special envoy from Cardinal Carafa, had reached the French court to explain to Henry the reasons for the truce with Alba and convince the king to commit himself to open war. His mission was completely successful. On January 31, 1557, the Truce of Vaucelles was declared to have ended. The breaking of the truce, however, appears to have had little to do with Orsini's mission, since the event that caused it occurred the same night that he arrived at Saint-Germain-en-Laye. In the early hours of January 6 troops under Admiral de Coligny, hoping to catch the garrison at Douai celebrating the feast of the Epiphany with too much drink, attacked the fortress. Finding the garrison on alert, Coligny retreated and instead attacked and burned a smaller fort at Lens.[28]

The attempt on Douai is shrouded in mystery. Most historians who have mentioned the attack (it is surprising how many ignore it entirely) declare that Coligny was following orders from the king. There is no contemporary evidence that supports that view, and Henry's actions afterward can be interpreted as trying to undo the damage that the attack caused. The Venetian ambassador provided the most immediate and plausible explanation for the incident. According to Soranzo, prior to January 5 Henry, annoyed at several incidents along the border, had ordered the border between Picardy and Flanders closed to the movement of cattle, trapping many Flemish herds on the French side. Spanish raids to get the cattle back prompted Coligny's decision to retaliate by attacking Douai.[29] (See appendix C for a further discussion of the attack on Douai.)

Henry's actions after the attack on Douai indicate that he did not wish it to spread into general war. He ordered that all prisoners taken be released and plunder returned. Writing to the commander of the fortress of Péronne on January 10, on the orders of the king, Montmorency told him not to do anything until they saw what was to follow. The constable wrote that the king hoped the enemy would not use the event as an excuse to break the truce.[30] Nonetheless, the drift toward war continued as further incidents on the northern frontier by both sides occurred. Carafa then wrote to Henry, predicting that Venice would join their alliance. With that optimistic, but in fact false, report in hand, on January 27 Henry ordered the arrest of the Spanish ambassador and embargoed trade with the Netherlands. Four days later an exchange of declarations of war formally ended the truce.[31]

It was recognized that the French people had not recovered from the burden imposed by the previous war, and the summer of 1556 had seen a disastrous famine caused by a drought. The king was forced to reduce the *solde des* 50,000 *hommes* by half. Nonetheless, Henry had little trouble raising money for the new war. From the Grand Parti of Lyon, Henry borrowed 1.5 million in gold at the same rate of interest and schedule of repayment arranged two years earlier. In addition to that sum, lent by mostly Italian bankers, the same amount was offered by a group of mostly German financiers. The king also took a forced loan from the merchants and "other persons of easy circumstance" throughout the kingdom, taking at least four écus but not more than twenty from each. It was expected to net nearly a million écus.[32]

From the municipal government of Paris, Henry also demanded a loan of 400,000 livres in rentes. The government also put up for auction the collection of the salt tax (the gabelles) for ten years, which was bought for a sum of 400,000 écus annually. It was the first time that the gabelles had been farmed for the entire realm. Henry also ordered the suspension of the payment of the royal pensions for three months. He proposed the creation of a parlement for Savoy; the sale of its offices was expected to net 200,000 écus. Last he reversed a decision made at the beginning of his reign that had left much of the royal revenue in the hands of the seventeen *receveurs-généraux* to pay the government's local expenses. The revenues for the year were again to be collected at the Louvre, despite the greater expense of transporting the cash to and from Paris. The purpose was to ac-

cumulate a war fund, while the payment of local expenses could be long delayed.[33]

The expected payoff for these huge expenditures, which would burden the monarchy with an incredible debt, was to win Naples for Henry's second son and perhaps Milan for the third. Brissac emphatically urged Henry to order Guise to join forces with him to attack Milan, which its governor, Ferrante Gonzaga, later admitted was very vulnerable in early 1557. The queen and the Florentine exiles argued that Guise's forces should attack Florence.[34] Paul IV insisted that Guise drive Alba out of the Papal States and then invade Naples. Henry, for whom the conquest of Naples was as acceptable as any of the other possibilities, conceded to the pope and ordered Guise to push on to Rome. The duke arrived there on March 2 only to find that nothing was ready for a campaign against the Spanish.

Henry's anger at that state of affairs was vastly compounded when Paul announced on March 15 the creation of ten new cardinals. Only one was a Frenchman—Jean Bertrand, the *garde des sceaux*, who had become a cleric after his wife's death. Although Antonio Trivulzio, the bishop of Toulon, and Lorenzo Strozzi, the brother of the marshal, were named, neither was regarded as a committed French partisan and certain to vote for the French candidate in the next conclave. Henry was furious, since he had what he regarded as a pledge from Cardinal Carafa that several French cardinals would be named at the next consistory. Henry had expected to see four new French cardinals as well as several from among the French partisans in Italy. The queen was furious at the passing over of her cousin Bernardo Salviati, and she and Henry had pushed for the red hat for Bishop Antonio Caracciolo of Troyes, son of the late French governor for Piedmont. Ironically, Caracciolo would become openly Protestant three years later. Even Bertrand's promotion was not especially useful for Henry, since his age (seventy-five years) and his duties made it unlikely he could attend the next papal conclave.[35] But the frequently expressed view that Cardinal de Lorraine was furious because he hoped to be elected pope after Paul fails to take into account the facts that Ippolito d'Este was still Henry's first choice and that, at age thirty-two, Lorraine was far too young to be elected.

Following closely on the bad news about the appointments of cardinals came word that Paul would not grant François de Montmorency's dispensation from his engagement to Jeanne de Piennes. The constable was furious but proceeded to make arrangements for

his son's marriage to Diane de France on the opinion of the theologians of the Sorbonne that a papal dispensation was not necessary. François de Guise was also upset, fearing that "the Constable may suspect him of having thwarted the dispensation by reason of the rivalry between them." Certainly François de Montmorency blamed Guise for the outcome and burned for revenge.[36]

By March 1557 Henry had good reason to question whether his alliance with Paul IV would yield any benefits. As the campaigning season approached, he had to focus more attention on Picardy. The king intended to keep the northern frontier as quiet as possible because his best military units and captains were in Italy. There was talk of establishing a local truce with the Spanish commander, but there was small-scale skirmishing on the frontier throughout the spring. Henry also took steps to try to ensure that Mary Tudor would not provide extensive aid to her husband. In late 1556 and early 1557 Ambassador Wooton's reports to the English government were filled with details of French plots to seize the Calais Pale and to aid English rebels. Henry himself told the Venetian ambassador in early March that Mary would have a difficult time aiding Philip, because "she will have so much to do at home that it will suffice her."[37]

Henry felt compelled to prevent close cooperation between England and Philip, since for nearly two centuries such an alliance between the English and the Burgundians had usually spelt disaster for the French. As Soranzo wrote on several occasions, the French feared the English forces the most, "even if they are not what they once were."[38] Although Henry expressed confidence, gained from the reports of Gilles de Noailles, brother to Antoine and new ambassador, that Mary would not declare war, he became involved in several plots to distract her from the continental war.

One way was to encourage the Scots to raid northern England. Several hundred additional Gascons were sent to Scotland to help defend it against reprisal attacks. Far more dangerous to Mary was the Stafford rebellion. Thomas Stafford, nephew to Cardinal Pole and claimant to the English throne through his grandfather, the last duke of Buckingham, had been in France for over a year requesting French aid for his rebellion. He had an audience with Henry II in March, although the king's memory of the interview exonerated himself from any part in the plot.[39]

On April 28 Stafford landed from several French ships on the English coast with about 100 English exiles and French sailors. They

seized Scarborough Castle and declared Stafford king. The local militia quickly overwhelmed them, and a month later Stafford went to the block. Henry disclaimed any role in the affair, maintaining that the company was supposed to be on its way to Scotland. Nonetheless, the incident occurred at a most inconvenient time for France. Philip II had been in England for a month, trying with increasing pessimism to persuade the royal council to declare war on France. All hesitation quickly ended when news of Stafford's landing became known. On June 7, a formal declaration of war was read in London. It declared that the king of France was implicated in all the plots and rebellions against Queen Mary and guilty of seizing English ships, merchants, and goods.[40]

At the same time as the declaration of war in London, an English herald appeared at the French court, but Henry was about to go hunting and put off receiving him for two days. On June 9 the king heard Mary's resolve to wage war on him by "fire, sword, and bloodshed." Henry refused to allow the herald to read Mary's justifications for war in order to avoid responding to them. Henry later told Soranzo that since it was a woman who declared war on him, he did not try to defend himself against her accusations. Clearly, it was an affront to his sense of honor.[41]

Almost entirely as a result of Henry's miscalculations, England was now in the war. The threat to Picardy was thus made substantially greater, and Henry became concerned about his defenses there. Prior to May 1557 his attention had been focused on Italy. He had believed that Philip could not mount a major offensive from the Netherlands because of the lingering effects of the previous war and the bad harvest of the previous year, and because he had also sent troops into Italy. At the end of May Henry replaced Antoine de Bourbon with Montmorency as commander in northern France and announced his intention to raise an army of 30,000 men. Because of the scarcity of provisions caused by the previous year's famine, he did not expect to have an army in the field before July, and in fact did not anticipate a major battle at all that summer.

At the same time as Henry and his advisers were becoming more concerned with the threat in the north, they were becoming disillusioned about the likely success of Guise's expedition as was Guise himself.[42] Having reached Rome, Guise found that there were vast differences of opinion among the pope, his nephews, the French diplomats present, and himself as to how to proceed. Guise found

himself arguing against Paul's insistence that he invade Naples immediately, because his army was smaller than Alba's and it lacked provisions. The failure of the Carafas to procure sufficient provisions for Guise's men was a major French complaint. Appraised of these problems, Henry wrote to the duke not to invade Naples. Before his letter arrived, the pope had prevailed on Guise, whose orders were to aid the pope in any way possible. On April 5 he rejoined his army to begin preparations for the move into Neapolitan territory. But Guise's luck had deserted him. Alba fought a war of attrition rather than risking all on one great battle. The rapid dwindling of the French-papal army from disease and desertion proved the wisdom of Alba's strategy.

By the end of May 1557 the French court was talking of the recall of Guise from Naples and sending him against Milan. Even Cardinal de Lorraine, beginning to despair of his brother winning glory in Italy, urged Henry to recall François and leave his younger brother, Claude, in command. Reports of Paul IV's negotiations with Philip II increased the anxiety of the court that the Italian expedition would come to disaster. There was concern that the aged pope would soon die and because of the recent promotions to the college of cardinals, a pope hostile to France might well be elected. In such an event Guise and his men would find themselves cut off from a place to retreat. French demands for several fortresses in the Papal States for such an eventuality went unmet.

On May 28 Montmorency, on orders from Henry, wrote to Guise to abandon the attack against Naples and take his army northward against Florence, Siena, or Milan, leaving it to the duke's discretion as to the choice.[43] Guise was to ensure the security of Rome before he left. This last point required that he keep his army in the Papal States for several more months. That delay enabled Piero Strozzi, after a lengthy audience with the pope, to hurry to the French court with ardent assurances from Paul. Again, the argument that abandoning the papacy to its enemies would dishonor the French monarchy carried the day. New orders of July 8 to Guise required him to do all that was necessary to protect Rome from Alba's forces for the indefinite future, despite being outnumbered by Alba's forces nearly two to one.[44]

By that time the threat of a major battle in northern France was becoming real. French preparations were aided by what was called the best wheat crop in memory. In July new venal offices were created in the parlements to raise a sum of 500,000 livres. The pope

The marriage of Henry and Catherine, by Georgio Vasari, Vecchio, Florence (Scala/Art Resource)

Catherine de Medici as a young woman, Civico Raccolta Bertarelli, Milan (SEF/Art Resource)

Catherine de Medici as an older woman, by François Clouet, Musée Tessé, LeMans (Giraudon/Art Resource)

Diane de Poitiers, anonymous, Palace of Versailles (Alinari/Art Resource)

Henry II, by François Clouet, Galleria Palatina, Florence
(Scala/Art Resource)

Anne de Montmorency, anonymous, Musée Condé, Chantilly (Giraudon/ Art Resource)

Francis I, by François Clouet, Galleria degli Uffizi, Florence (Scala/Art Resource)



Henry II attending the Mercuriale of the Parlement of Paris, from Tortorel and Perissin, *Grandes scènes historiques du XVIe siècle* (Paris, 1886)

The fatal tournament of Henry II, from Tortorel and Perissin



The death of Henry II, from Tortorel and Perissin

approved of the collection of eight *décimes* from the clergy, and Henry ordered an inventory of the church's objects of precious metal so that they could be collected and melted down, if necessary. They were said to be the last major source of money in the realm.[45] More money was borrowed at Lyon. Henry pledged the bankers that as a prince of honor, he would not fail to pay his interest as Philip had. He convinced Italian and German bankers to loan him 500,000 écus. That sum was barely enough to cover the expenses of Guise's army in Italy, which for the months of March, April, and May 1557 totaled some 434,000 écus.[46]

There was considerable speculation that Henry would go in person to command in Picardy; it is not clear why he did not. Instead, on July 28, the constable departed from the court to lead the army, taking with him all of the fighting men of the court, since Henry had made it clear to all of his servants who could bear arms that they should go. As a consequence, of his usual advisers, only Cardinal de Lorraine was present with him at the château of Compiègne near the frontier. Henry was obliged to attend to the details of raising and victualing troops himself. As of August 7, he still had hopes of joining his army in person.[47]

The size of the army that Philip II had on the frontier is a matter of dispute among the sources. Rabutin, who was present in the French army, put Philip's at 47,000 men; Soranzo reported 40,000; two Flemish documents put it at 53,000 and 60,000. For the French, the sources are in somewhat closer agreement. Rabutin placed French strength at 17,000–18,000 infantry and 5,000–6,000 cavalry; Soranzo, at 16,000 foot and 5,000 cavalry (although he noted the arrival of several thousand more infantry several days after he gave these figures); and an anonymous Spanish source, at 20,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry.[48] Regardless of the exact numbers, the French clearly were at a serious manpower disadvantage.

It appeared to the French that the main object of Philip's forces was either Marienburg or the new fortress of Rocroi.[49] But the commander of Philip's forces, Emmanuel Philibert, duke of Savoy, was merely feinting in the east; he had decided to strike into Picardy. On August 1 several enemy companies appeared before the fortified town of Saint-Quentin on the Somme river, some 120 kilometers northeast of Paris.[50] They were wearing white crosses in hope of deceiving the defenders, but, by a stroke of fortune, the company of 100 lances of the dauphin (who was not with them) had stopped there on their way

to join the constable. The *gens d'armes* stiffened the 500 militiamen of the town and its unprepared defenses and repulsed the attack. When Montmorency heard of the incident, he ordered Coligny to take 300 *gens d'armes* and two companies of infantry to the fort to secure it, since Saint-Quentin was a major bulwark in the defense of Picardy. Receiving the report that Saint-Quentin appeared weakly defended, the duke of Savoy rushed his entire army to invest it, but Coligny and about 800 men, after an all-night march, were able to slip by the enemy at daybreak into the town. Henry II was reported as being very angry with Coligny—the governor of Picardy—and his uncle for failing to reinforce so important a fort and told Montmorency that he expected him to do everything possible to hold it.

Consequently, on August 7, the constable rushed his army northward from Laon. Since he was so badly outmanned, Montmorency probably did not intend to give battle to Savoy. He meant to provide cover by which François d'Andelot, another nephew, could enter Saint-Quentin with 1,200 men. D'Andelot had made an attempt on August 4, but the Spanish had completely encircled the town and drove him off after a sharp exchange. Another attempt was made on August 10, covered by the entire French army.[51] At about 9:00 A.M., twelve French cannon opened fire on the enemy companies at the southwest corner of the town and drove them back from the Somme and the marshes that bordered the south end of the wall. But the rafts that were to ferry Andelot's men across the Somme were both too few in number and too far to the rear. By the time the French began to cross the river, the Spanish had regrouped in force, and their arquebusmen began to devastate the French. Only some 200 men and d'Andelot himself were able to enter the town.

Seeing that nothing more could be accomplished and not wishing to take on the much larger enemy army, Montmorency gave the order to withdraw, probably a full hour later than it ought to have been given. A large force of cavalry was seen crossing the Somme, but the constable thought it was the French returning from a skirmish, since the ford was supposed to be guarded by a company of his infantry. He refused to hasten his retreat in order to secure his cannon, of which he was in short supply. It was this second delay that apparently dealt disaster, since a woods that could have covered the French retreat was close by. Attacked by a vastly larger enemy, the French were overwhelmed. Several new companies of French foot panicked and crashed into the better disciplined German units behind them, end-

ing any chance of an orderly withdrawal. By 5:00 P.M., the massacre was over.

The extent of the catastrophe was revealed by the fact that the Spanish captured all but one of the fifty-seven standards of the French companies. At least 2,500 French soldiers were killed; among them was Jean d'Enghien, the younger brother of Antoine de Bourbon. More than 7,000 were captured. The list of notables included the constable himself, his fourth son, Gabriel, Marshal Saint-André, François de La Rochefoucault, Louis de Bourbon-Montpensier, and numerous others of the high nobility. The number of great prisoners taken at the Battle of Saint-Quentin or the Day of Saint Laurent, as contemporaries called it, having been fought on the feast of St. Lawrence, was the most devastating aspect of the defeat. Not only did it deprive France of most of its experienced captains not in Italy, but the need to ransom them had tremendous implications for future policy.

About half of the French army was able to reach safety under such captains as Louis de Condé, François de Nevers, and François de Montmorency. The news of the disaster was rushed to Henry at Compiègne, less than sixty kilometers from the battle site. It reached him early the next morning.[52] He ordered the court to Paris because Compiègne was unfortified. Henry remained there almost alone for two more days in order to receive full information about what remained of the army and to make provisions to cover for the defeat.

The defeat at Saint-Quentin was not quite as disastrous as that at Pavia a half-century earlier in terms of French casualties. In some respects, however, it was more catastrophic. It occurred on the frontier of the realm itself and opened up momentarily the entire north and the road to Paris to invasion. While the king himself was not captured as at Pavia, his alter ego was, and since Henry had a somewhat higher sense of honor than his father, ransoming the constable proved to be more costly. Third it forced Henry to recall Guise from Italy and resulted in the end of French military involvement in the peninsula.

Montmorency was burdened with most of the blame for defeat, although the Guises were criticized for having pushed the Italian expedition and deprived the defenses of the realm of its best manpower. The constable's failure at Saint-Quentin was not one of lack of daring to take on the enemy, as it had been earlier in Henry's reign, but one of slowness to comprehend the enemy's tactics and a hesitation

to make quick decisions on the battlefield, another fault that he had revealed earlier.

Henry II remained largely above the criticism, but there is no question that he deserved a good deal of it.[53] Entrusting the army to Montmorency, who in several earlier campaigns had already revealed the flaws that proved disastrous on August 10, was in retrospect an error. Henry and his advisers had given little attention to Picardy before the summer of 1557, focusing instead on Italy. His best commander and several of the best captains were bogged down in the peninsula with some of the best companies of the French army. (It must be noted, however, that contrary to numerous historians' opinions, the addition of Guise's men would not have made Montmorency's army equal in number to the duke of Savoy's.) Like his father, Henry had overreached, and he, his kingdom, and thousands of his soldiers suffered greatly as a consequence.

13 MARS REMAINS ASTRIDE

For two days Henry II was alone at the château of Compiègne in the wake of the bitter defeat at Saint-Quentin. Not one of his usual cadre of friends and advisers was present. Charles de Lorraine left for Paris on August 12, 1557, and Diane de Poitiers and Catherine de Medici were already in the city with Odet de Châtillon. Two secretaries of state, L'Aubespine and Clausse, remained with the king to write the vast number of dispatches that he sent in every direction.[1] It was the only time in his reign that Henry had to make decisions without consulting his close friends. His handling of the crisis demonstrated that he was capable of acting as his own first minister, although he clearly preferred not to. Perhaps the experience of deciding alone inspired greater confidence in his own abilities, for after August 10 he appears to have been far more decisive than previously.

The report of the ambassador of Ferrara that the king was crushed and dejected at the news of the defeat was probably true, [2] but he recovered quickly and acted decisively and intelligently to begin to repair the damage. The first order of business was to put together something of an army to defend Paris from the expected attack. Between 10,000 and 15,000 men were left from Montmorency's forces; but they were badly disorganized, and many of the mercenaries had slipped away. While momentarily very short of manpower, Henry was in this desperate situation for a fairly short time because a great deal of the manpower called to service in June and July had yet to reach northern France. Some 15,000 French infantrymen had been called up; they were dribbling into the camps one company at a time. The admittedly poorly trained cavalrymen available from the summoning of the *ban* and *arrière-ban* for the most part had not arrived; and a

large portion of the Swiss and German mercenaries under contract had not crossed into France. These reinforcements were, however, still days and weeks from joining the army, and the French elements were mostly ill trained. Therefore, the situation remained extremely dangerous for another month.

The best units were those fighting in Italy under several of the best French captains. Paul de Termes and Henri de Montmorency were ordered to rush from Piedmont to Picardy, while Brissac, who was to remain, was to put a part of his army into the French forts in northern Italy and send the rest home. François de Guise, Piero Strozzi, Blaise de Monluc, and the gendarmerie with them were the men that Henry wanted most to return. The king's message of August 11 reached Guise in the march of Ancona northeast of Rome on August 23. A second dispatch was sent on August 15.[3] Guise was ordered to rush to Rome to inform the pope that he was leaving Italy and to return to France as quickly as possible. Pope Paul was to be told to treat with the duke of Alba as best he could.

Guise was ill with influenza and had to be carried on a litter to Rome. He arrived there on August 31 and spent several days dealing with Paul, who was extremely irate at being abandoned by Guise and most of the French forces. Guise told him bluntly to make peace, although the pope swore he would shut himself up in Castel San Angelo and die there first.[4] Guise also had to make provisions for his French army. His brother, d'Aumale, was put in command of the bulk of the forces, which were to cross Italy and return to France. The best units were to go with Guise and Strozzi by sea back to France. By good fortune, twenty-two French galleys under Baron de la Garde were in Italian waters and available. It was only on September 15 that Guise took to sea for Marseille.

Meanwhile, Henry was working feverishly to prepare the defenses of Paris as best he could. Catherine de Medici was sent to the Parlement of Paris on August 13 to demand of the bourgeoisie of the city a large subsidy of 300,000 livres. Accompanied by Henry's sister Marguerite and many other ladies, all dressed in black as if in mourning, the queen gave her first important public address. It was a remarkable combination of flattery and cajolery:

> Her Majesty spoke with such earnestness and eloquence that every one was moved; and she said, in conclusion, that the most Christian King required a vote of 300,000 francs for the payment

> of 25,000 infantry for two months, adding that she would then retire, to leave them free, as usual, to deliberate, which she did by withdrawing into a chamber; but it was immediately voted to comply with her Majesty's demand, and when she returned to her place they freely promised her to pay these 300,000 francs, and, to give the most Christian King greater assistance, 100 of their city burgesses offered to give immediately 3,000 francs each, so that his Majesty might promptly avail himself of this sum.[5]

The representatives of the city asked that she use her good offices with the king in respect to their privileges; she replied that she would appoint the dauphin as their solicitor before the king.[6] Since it was traditional that the other French cities would contribute in the same proportion as did Paris, it was expected that the cities would provide the king with 1.5 million crowns.

The defeat of Saint-Quentin seems not to have affected the willingness of the Lyonnais bankers to loan money to the king. Henry told the Venetian ambassador Soranzo that they competed with one another to lend him 600,000 écus: 100,000 at no interest and 500,000 "at the usual terms." The king expressed his surprise that the German bankers were as eager as the Italians to lend him money. On August 21, after his audience with Soranzo, he apparently felt the situation sufficiently under control to go hunting for the first time since Saint-Quentin.[7]

One reason why Henry felt he could take the time to go hunting was the growing evidence that Philip II did not intend to push on to Paris until he had taken the fortified town of Saint-Quentin. After the battle on August 10, every observer, French and foreign, was convinced that a drive on Paris would follow immediately. Blaise de Monluc, when he heard of the defeat, thought the kingdom lost, and Charles V, at his retreat in Spain, fully expected that the next dispatch would bring the news of the fall of Paris.[8]

To the duke of Savoy's great disappointment, Philip refused to allow him to push on to Paris. Monluc attributed Philip's decision to the intervention of God addling the mind of the Spanish king, but Philip's decision was basically sound, even if a dash on Paris did have a good chance of succeeding for several days after August 10. He was aware of what had happened to his father in 1543, when Paris lay open to attack from the east. Charles could not move his army fast enough to invest the city. A Spanish contemporary said about Philip:

"Philip feared lest, like his father, he might march into France eating pheasant and leave it eating only roots."[9] The danger of leaving a force like the garrison of Saint-Quentin in one's rear was obvious, and, furthermore, Philip was on the verge of bankrupcy.[10]

On August 20 Henry told Soranzo that it appeared the Spanish army would not move before taking Saint-Quentin, which was well manned and supplied.[11] Coligny told the king that he had a six-week supply of food, and the discovery of a ditch full of wheat raised the estimate to ten weeks. He assured the king that he would be able to hold the town. Shortly before August 25 a company of arquebusmen slipped into the town by wading through water "up to their beards." The Spanish had begun to bombard the walls on August 14 but appeared to be making little progress. Since the French had stripped the region of everything of use to an army, the Spanish had to forage for food as far away as Noyon, some forty kilometers to the south.

Henry's renewed confidence was rudely shattered on August 29 with the news of the fall of Saint-Quentin. The king expressed sharp criticism of the admiral for the rapid fall of the town, for which modern historians have rebuked Henry. But, given the good garrison and Coligny's assurances, although its defenses were rather obsolete, Henry clearly expected it to hold out longer. The captured included Coligny, d'Andelot, who soon escaped, Jarnac, and Saint-Rémy, the noted artillery officer.[12]

Paris was again thrown into a panic, and numerous residents fled southward to Orléans. The king ordered the removal of the precious vessels from the abbey of Saint-Denis and made preparations to move the court to Orléans. He was advised to abandon Paris himself, but he refused to desert "so great a city." He increased the size of his bodyguard by 400 archers and ordered the clearing of all structures within 500 paces of the exterior of the city walls to prepare for a siege. Soranzo reported that Henry, both in appearance and language, revealed deep grief and he had said in private that those who were to execute his orders had failed to do so. In the future he would regulate his affairs in the way that God should choose to inspire him.[13] The road to Paris, however, was still blocked by several small fortified towns like Ham and La Fère, and, somewhat to the west, the great fort of Péronne was a threat to any force pushing toward Paris. Some enemy cavalry did penetrate to the outlying suburbs of Paris in search of food, since Picardy was virtually stripped clean.

On September 2 La Vigne, the French ambassador to the sultan,

arrived with the bad news that Suleiman was very angry with the French for agreeing to the Truce of Vaucelles at the same time as they had been urging him to send his fleet westward. As a result, the summer of 1557 had been the quietest in several decades in the western Mediterranean. The French badly needed the diversion of Spanish forces that the presence of a Turkish fleet created, and La Vigne was sent back to Constantinople with Henry's pledge not to make peace with Philip for at least a year, several costly gifts, and a request for a loan of 2 million écus.[14] Although Henry never felt truly obliged by his pledges to the Great Turk, it is worth noting that the beginning of serious peace talks the next year largely corresponded with the fulfillment of his pledge.

On September 8 more bad news arrived. The fortress of Le Châlet surrendered, relieving the Spanish of a serious threat to their supply lines.[15] A week later Ham also capitulated as the Spanish were about to assault it. The last obstacle on the direct road to Paris had been removed, but several nearby fortified towns continued to pose a threat to any dash on Paris. Equally distressing to Henry was the lack of any news about the duc de Guise's return to France.

Some good news finally appeared with the arrival of Paul de Termes from Italy. He took command of the French army until Guise's arrival. The available manpower was reported at 10,000 French infantry, 6,000 Swiss, and 500 cavalrymen; reinforcements from Germany, Switzerland, and Italy were expected to add another 13,000 foot and 2,000 horse shortly. Henry expressed his hope of taking command in person soon.[16]

From the moment the news came of Montmorency's defeat, Henry had taken over his responsibilities in regard to the army; for example, telling d'Humières at Péronne that he was sending him 200 pioneers to work on its walls but he could not send all the powder and artillery he had asked for. However, the king needed help for the constable's other administrative duties. Shortly after the defeat Cardinal de Lorraine was given the royal signet that enabled him to give routine orders for most administrative matters. Soranzo called Lorraine the prime minister but added that "many people doubt his ability to bear so heavy a burden."[17] Although it has been said that Lorraine ruled France for the next fifteen months, there is in fact little evidence of his hand in most major decisions, except for religion, where he always had vast influence.

On September 20 Guise, along with Piero Strozzi, 2,000 arque-

busmen, and 500 gendarmes, arrived at Marseille. The court was overwhelmed with joy at the news. His illness slowed down his progress, and it was only on October 9 that he arrived at the court. As Soranzo reported:

> The King was in the park playing at pallmall and on being told that his Excellency was coming he left the game and went to meet him. The Duke, having thrown himself at his feet, was received by his Majesty so lovingly, and with so many embraces, that he seemed unable to detach himself from his neck. . . . It may be credited that his Majesty felt very great joy at this arrival, and principally from now having a companion for his business and his toils, he alone having hitherto despatched the numberless affairs of recent urgency, rarely employing the Cardinal of Lorraine in military matters.[18]

Guise was given the title lieutenant-general of the realm, which gave him the authority of the constable without the title.[19] In the next several weeks the other three Guise brothers arrived from Italy, joining François, Charles, and Louis at the court; the family completely dominated it. Only Odet de Châtillon was present to protect the constable's interests, but soon it became increasingly clear that Henry had taken that task on himself.

With d'Aumale bringing with him the last significant French units from Rome, the pope was placed in an untenable position. On September 14 he agreed to peace terms with the duke of Alba that returned matters in Rome and Naples to the status quo before the war. Fernand Braudel has writen very emphatically about this cessation of hostilities, calling it a turning point in Western history, for it created an alliance that enabled the triumph of the Counter-Reformation, "which but for this alliance of temporal and spiritual forces would never have been assured."[20]

While successful in Italy, Philip saw the opportunity for complete victory in France slipping away. Desperately short of money, and with the campaigning season coming to an end, he began to disband his forces for the winter. On October 15 Henry received a report that he was returning to Brussels. Henry, on the other hand, was determined to use the army on which he had expended so much effort and money through the winter. This decision seems to have been entirely his. His advisers appear to have argued against it with much the same arguments they would use against the assault on Calais.

Although there is no hint of Henry's decision to attack the Calais Pale until November 1557, in hindsight it appears that he had from virtually the first days after Saint-Quentin thought of conquering Calais as a way to overcome the humiliation of that defeat, and as a valuable bargaining chip in any future peace negotiations. The reconquest of Calais was a long-held French dream, if for no other reason than the arrogant boast the English had written over the main gate: "Then shall the Frenchmen Calais win; when iron and lead like cork shall swim." Plans for an assault on the city were not lacking, and Henry from the beginning of his reign longed to bring them to fruition.[21] Coligny is said to have drawn one up in early 1557, and in June of that year Bishop François de Noailles, passing through Calais on his return from London, reported that its defenses were weak. The plans of the defenses of the town had been passed to the French sometime before November 1557, and they were given to Guise to plan his attack.[22]

Motivated by this information, Henry was without question the primary force behind the decision to attack Calais. The intelligence reports convinced him of both its feasibility and the importance of doing it in the winter. The governor of Boulogne, Jean de Seranpont, was ordered in October to reconnoiter the pale, and his presentation to the privy council on November 21 at Compiègne supported Henry's position. The king argued for the winter attack, not only on the point of surprise, but also in order to use the large number of mercenaries before their contracts ran out. No thought was given, it appears, to retaking Saint-Quentin, perhaps because Henry expected the Spanish to be prepared for such a move. The reaction of his principal captains to the planned attack on Calais was negative. Guise, in particular, objected to the proposed season for the attack. There was also a reluctance to risk the last forces available for the defense of Paris.[23]

Henry decided to get an opinion from a most experienced and respected engineer, Piero Strozzi. He and Seranpont went into the pale in mid-November to examine its defenses yet another time.[24] Strozzi's report to the royal council at Compiègne emphasized the vulnerability of Calais but cautioned the king about the proposed season.

> To this the King replied, that if it was feasible at all, he wished to show them that this was the best time to do it, because the city is a place full of water and marshes, where it is most neces-

> sary for assailants to have freezing weather; such weather would come in January or never. He added that what rendered the enterprise easier, was the small number of men there because they had no suspicion of attack. If they saw an army beginning to move in that direction at the commencement of spring, they could put more men into the garrison, but they would never do it now at a season so unusual for military operations. He added also that, in the spring, the sea was higher and therefore it was easier to help the besieged, and the swamps were fuller. In addition, the place was so far from the forces which must be assembled that the forces of the enemy would always get there before ours were mobilized, and that, if they had the least army in the world, there was no means of taking it. Besides the English were much occupied with the war in Scotland, and their best men were there, which stopped them from helping the city or doing anything to prevent its capture. These reasons, being entirely his own, and enforcing his will which was fixed on that point, gave him as much desire to try that enterprise as if our Lord Himself had inspired the idea against the counsel and opinion of everybody. It was impossible to turn him from it.[25]

Guise still was not convinced of the prudence of a winter expedition against Calais, and it was only on the direct order of the king that he agreed to lead it.[26] The ability of the French to keep the information secret from their enemies and their friends was amazing. On November 4 Soranzo realized that something was afoot; on November 20 he thought it was an attack against Luxembourg; only on December 6 did he pick up the rumor that the target might be Calais. As for the English, reports reached London in mid-December, and precise evidence was provided on December 21, but the near-paralysis that had struck the English government in the last year of Mary's reign prevented a quick response. Calais was badly undermanned in late 1557, but its commander, Lord Thomas Wentworth, was utterly convinced that the French would not attack in the winter. Thus, he dismissed the report of a well-placed spy in the French army who described precisely the French strategy for attacking Calais. He remained untroubled as late as December 29, despite information that the French were baking all their grain into bread at Ardres, the French fort closest to Calais.[27] It was only with the French attack on January 1 that Wentworth was convinced that Calais was their target.

With the enemy so unprepared, Guise's forces, numbering some 20,000–22,000 foot, 4,000 cavalry, and thirty pieces of artillery, faced what was essentially a peacetime garrison of about 2,500 men spread among a dozen strongholds.[28] The strength of the pale, however, lay in its defensive works rather than the size of its garrisons; that was especially true of Calais itself, which combined the presence of the sea, tidal flats, and marshes with man-made works to appear invincible. The preparation of the French was very thorough, to the point of having made pitch-covered mats to serve as bases for artillery pieces in the marshes. Nonetheless, it was largely the element of surprise of attacking in the winter that carried the day for the French. The cold weather also aided them by freezing some of the shallower marshes, enabling the French to cross easily with their equipment and guns.

Upon the sudden appearance of the French forces, the English pulled back from some of their smaller outlying forts. Guise's men thus advanced quickly to the fort of Rysbank, across the harbor from Calais. It surrendered on January 2, putting the French within cannon range of Calais Castle. Because of its position on the water's edge, surrounded by the fortifications of the city itself, the English regarded the castle as unassailable and had not done much to improve it when Henry VIII had modernized most of the forts in the pale. After two days of bombarding it from across the harbor, a breach was made in the castle wall. Using attacks on the city walls as diversions, Guise sent several companies across the neck of the harbor, which was fordable at low tide, to attack the castle. He rightly anticipated that the English defenders would be drawn off to the fighting elsewhere. His troops easily took the castle and held it against two fierce English counterattacks. The fall of the castle compromised the rest of Calais's defenses, and on January 8 Wentworth asked for terms.[29] Some 500 English soldiers were allowed to leave for the Flemish border, along with those inhabitants of the town who wished to leave. Wentworth and several officers were held for ransom, although he was eventually released for no ransom at all. An enormous amount of military supplies and commercial goods were seized, and Guise distributed the latter among his captains.

The secretary Florimond Robertet rushed with the news to Henry. He arrived at the Tournelles in Paris on the evening of January 9. The court was celebrating the marriage of the second son of the duc de Nevers, and the king was dancing when Robertet reached him.

Everyone made great displays of joy but no one as much as Cardinal de Lorraine. Robertet also informed Henry that Guise was leaving 5,000 troops in Calais under Paul de Termes and was moving on to the English fort of Guisnes, some ten miles from the coast. It was a modern fort, reasonably well manned for its size, under a capable commander, Lord Grey. With his own guns and some taken from Calais, Guise quickly made a breach in its walls, but it took three sharp assaults before it fell on January 20. The French then turned their attention to the last English position, the small fort of Hammes. The garrison, recognizing its inevitable fate, slipped away at night, leaving an empty fort for the French to enter.[30]

The moment Henry heard that Calais was in French hands, he was determined to go to it in person. He took with him the dauphin and Cardinal de Lorraine, leaving the queen to manage the government until his return. On January 24 he and his entourage made their entry into the town, going immediately to the principal church to reestablish the Catholic rite. While in Calais, he handed out rewards to the captains who fought under Guise. Piero Strozzi, in particular was heaped with praise and gifts; he was added to the *conseil des parties* and given confiscated estates worth 15,000 écus a year. Guise also gave him the right to the ransom of Lord Grey, who had fought so well at Guisnes. The family of François de La Rochefoucault, captured at Saint-Quentin, offered Strozzi 15,000 écus in order to exchange Grey for him. Guise's brother, d'Aumale, was appointed governor of Piedmont, replacing Brissac who was to return to France, and the duc de Nemours was to receive d'Aumale's command of the light cavalry. Cardinal de Lorraine, as a reward for his work and his brother's, received extensive lands in the pale. Henry returned to Paris on February 4.

As for the duc de Guise, his reward came in the form of the final commitment of the king to the marriage of the dauphin and Mary Stuart. Their marital compact dated back to 1548, but there was a steady and powerful opposition to the marriage, led by Montmorency. The marriage was seen as cementing permanently the place of the Guises at the court, something that a number of courtiers besides the Montmorencys had no desire to see occur. In November 1557 the Venetian ambassador had reported that Henry intended to hurry the marriage because he hoped it would give him a better claim to use the Scottish army against England the next summer, but "the

constable and all the men in his power continually seek to prevent it."[31]

Montmorency made a strong effort to derail the proposed wedding in December, sending Henry from captivity a proposal to have the dauphin marry Philip II's sister, while Henry's daughter Elisabeth would marry Philip's son, Carlos. The potential advantages of these unions caused Henry to halt preparations for the marriage ceremony scheduled for January 8. Other factors entered into that decision as well: the expected absence of the duc de Guise on the Calais expedition, the desire to have a great victory in hand before celebrating the wedding, and the forthcoming meeting of the Estates.[32]

With no further word from Brussels on the Spanish marriage proposals, and after the victory at Calais, Henry decided to proceed with the Scottish marriage. Some historians have argued that the marriage to Mary Stuart was a clear demonstration of the dominance of the Guises at court in early 1558.[33] Certainly they were at the peak of their authority under Henry II after the conquest of Calais. When the Venetian ambassador wrote to his government about sending congratulations to the king and Guise on their victory, he added that the Cardinal de Lorraine should also be included, since "this victory gives them such repute that the administration of France will remain in their hands forever."[34] But it must be noted that the value of the Scottish alliance had been further enhanced since it had been proposed in 1548. The French crown more than ever needed the help of the Scots against England, and the current situation in England made the marriage even more attractive. Edward VI had died; Mary Tudor was not expected to bear any children; and Princess Elizabeth could perhaps be kept off the English throne as a bastard, making Mary Stuart the successor. Even if Elizabeth were to get the throne, Mary or her children were in line for the succession immediately after her.[35] The potential for the aggrandizement of the Valois dynasty was so obvious that to argue that the Guises pushed Henry into agreeing to the marriage is to brand him a political ignoramus of the lowest caliber.

The date for the wedding was set for the end of April, to allow time for the Scottish ambassadors to cross over and Antoine de Bourbon and Jeanne d'Albret to reach the court from Béarn. On April 19 the formal betrothal took place. Francis pledged to espouse the queen of Scotland the next Sunday, and both signed the marriage contracts—

one public and one secret. The public contract gave the title of king of Scotland to Francis; until he inherited the French crown, he was to be called the king-dauphin. If Mary were to die without children, the throne was to pass to the Scotsman closest in blood to her. The subjects of each realm were to be naturalized as subjects of the other, as the Scots were in letters patent given by Henry in June 1558. If Francis died before Mary, she would have the option of returning to Scotland or staying in France with an income of 600,000 livres from lands in the Touraine. If the couple had only daughters, the eldest would rule in Scotland but could not in France because of the Salic law. The crowns of the two realms were joined together in their coat of arms, and in November, after Mary Tudor's death, they added England's to it.

The secret clauses were far more ominous for Scotland. One required that if Mary died without a child, her rights to England and Scotland were to pass to the Valois dynasty; should Mary die in the near future, Scotland and its revenues were to pass to Henry until he recovered the expenses of defending Scotland. Another clause stated that no agreement that Mary might make with the Scottish Parliament would annul the secret agreement.[36] The more sympathetic of Mary's biographers rightly relieve her of responsibility for the secret contract and blame Henry and his advisers for imposing it on the sixteen-year-old girl.

On April 21, 1558, one of the grandest festivals in French history marked the marriage of Francis and Mary at the cathedral of Nôtre-Dame. In the words of the ever-present Venetian ambassador:

> These nuptials were really considered the most regal and triumphant of any that have been witnessed in this kingdom for many years, whether from the concourse of the chief personages of the realm both temporal and spiritual thus assembled, there being present and assisting at all the solemnities the Cardinal Legate and all the other ambassadors, or from the pomp and richness of the jewels and apparel both of the lords and ladies; or from the grandeur of the banquet and stately service of the table; or from the costly devices of the masquerades and similar revels. In short, nothing whatever that could possibly be desired was wanting for the embellishment of such a spectacle, except jousts and tournaments, which were reserved for a more convenient opportunity.[37]

Among those present was Duke Francis of Lorraine, whose own engagement to Henry's daughter Claude would be celebrated in a week, and the four-year-old Henry of Bourbon, whose marriage to Henry's youngest daughter, Marguerite, had been agreed upon in April 1557.[38] Very prominent in all of the proceedings were all the Guises, except for Mary's mother, who felt it too dangerous to leave her realm at that moment. Duc François performed Montmorency's office of *grand-maître* to perfection, especially seeing to it that the crowd of nobles present did not prevent the crush of common people from seeing the splendor of the wedding. Like all royal ceremonies, a royal wedding was an opportunity to impress on the populace the power, wealth, and majesty of the monarchy. Guise several days later deeply annoyed Henry by asking for the permanent confirmation of the office of *grand-maître*.

The festivities continued for a week afterward; Henry clearly felt that an extravagant wedding for his oldest son was a necessary expenditure for the monarchy, even at a time when it was in serious financial difficulty. Raising the money for the Calais expedition had gone as well as anyone could have hoped for. Guise had been provided with 548,000 livres, only 2,000 less than he had requested. By January 7 all but 80,000 were in his hands. The money for the Calais army was in addition to the 378,000 livres that the garrisons of the forts in Picardy required. Once the pale was occupied, another 260,000 was needed for rebuilding the fortifications.[39]

Part of these expenses were covered by loans, as a great deal of the disbursements of the crown since 1551 had been. Henry had held back the payment of the Grand Parti at the last Lyon fair of 1557 in order to have cash for the army. The foreign bankers then refused to make him any new loans for a time. He turned to the townspeople of Lyon, who provided 500,000 livres at 14 percent interest. Repayment of the loan was to come from a 5 percent duty on silk cloth.[40]

It was the developing crisis in the royal finances that had led Henry to call a meeting of the Estates for January 1558 in Paris. Throughout its history, the Estates-General was very much an instrument that the monarchy used when it was having serious financial problems, although the previous time a full gathering of the three Estates had occurred, in 1484, its purpose was to establish the government during Charles VIII's minority. The paucity of meetings of the Estates in the sixteenth century was a result not only of the monarchs' fear that they might be forced to make concessions to the

Estates, but also a consequence of the existence of the provincial estates, which were more easily manipulated into granting the monarchy its demands. As of 1547, provincial estates continued to meet on a regular basis in the great provinces of the realm—Languedoc, Dauphiné, Provence, Guyenne, Brittany, Normandy, and Burgundy. Some of the smaller provinces on the fringes of the kingdom, such as Lyonnais and Foix, also had local estates, but in the vast central and northern part of the realm, they had disappeared.

The existing provincial estates met in their usual pattern under Henry II; he appears to have made no effort to suppress their activities. In 1555, for instance, he prohibited the Parlement of Toulouse from interfering in the affairs of the Estates of Languedoc. Another incident of 1555 was typical of the relationship. The king had ordered the creation of six new tax-collecting offices for the province of Burgundy, which were sold for a good price. The provincial estates protested, and Henry agreed to suppress the new offices for 20,000 livres and refunds to the purchasers. A letter of September 1552 to the royal officers of Brittany ordered them to assemble the provincial estates at Rennes and request of them the same subsidy as they had granted the previous year. He explained in some detail the expenses of the expedition to the Rhine and of the court to justify the request.[41]

The financial problems of late 1557 required more money than could be raised from the provincial estates, and on December 15 the king ordered the mayors of the cities to assemble in Paris. No specific reason was given for their convocation. Although elected delegates were not called for, some cities proceeded to choose their own. Their instructions were to protest against the heavy taxes. There were no elaborate *cahiers* of the sort that marked the Estates of later in the century, probably because there was so little time before the Estates met. The Estates of 1558 had a very limited membership, and many historians have been hesitant to call it an assembly of Estates-General, preferring the term Assembly of Notables. Most contemporary accounts, however, use Estates.[42] Five cardinals and thirty-five bishops represented the clergy; the *baillis* and *sénéchaux* represented the nobles, with the addition of a large part of the court nobility. The traditional third estate was divided into two: the mayors of the towns represented the populace, but the presidents of the provincial parlements and magistrates of the Parlement of Paris were present as a separate estate. Henry himself referred to the convocation as a meet-

ing of the Four Estates, and the spokesman for the parlementaires thanked the king for erecting a "fourth estate of his justice."[43]

On January 5, after separate meetings to elect speakers and to decide how to respond to the king's request for money, the Estates met in the Salle Saint-Louis in the Palais de Justice. Accompanied by three of the secretaries of state, the treasurers-general, and his son Francis,[44] Henry arrived to deliver a lengthy address. He stated the obvious: since the beginning of his reign he had been at war against the English and the Burgundians (note the term) with much success. In order to meet the expenses of these wars, he had been forced to sell some of his domain and impose heavy taxes and subsidies on his subjects. For their sake he hoped to win a good peace for the repose of the realm, but the pernicious designs of his enemies required a great effort to achieve such a peace. Since silver was the sinew of war, he prayed the Estates to provide the means to resist the enemy. He pledged himself on the word of a good king to secure a good peace and to order the affairs of the realm to the contentment of all.[45]

The Cardinal de Lorraine, speaker for the clergy, gave "a learned and grave address of an hour's length," in which he offered the king the lives and goods of the clerics for his needs. The speakers for the nobility, the parlementaires, and the towns all reaffirmed the cardinal's pledge for their respective estates. The last two speakers, however, called on the king to relieve the burden of taxes and reduce the disorder in the realm caused by war. The *garde des sceaux*, Bertrand, then took the floor to announce that the king was requesting the deputies of the towns to submit written statements of their grievances and reforms to their speaker, who would present them to the king.

Three days later Cardinal de Lorraine and the rest of the council met with the deputies of the towns to hammer out the size of the third estate's grant. The king, he said, wanted 3 million écus from the Estates-General. The towns were to provide 2 million, and the clergy the other third. The nobility and royal officials were able to avoid any new taxation. The two estates providing money were to come up with lists of enough men who could contribute 1,000 écus to reach the sums involved. Lorraine promised that the king would pay 8.3 percent interest and would reduce the taille and the tax on the sale of merchandise (the aides?). The deputies were encouraged to attach their *cahiers* to the roll of contributors. But they refused

to submit such a roll because they had no way of knowing who was wealthy enough to afford such a sum. It was finally agreed that each town would contribute an appropriate portion of the 2 million écus.[46]

The arrival the next day of the news of the victory at Calais so thrilled the clergy and the town representatives that they immediately offered to make a gift of the sums they had agreed to loan the king at interest. If the money were not enough to make a good peace, they were ready to provide more. Negotiations over the next weeks with the towns showed, however, that their contributions remained a loan.[47] In February Henry took steps to eliminate the taxes on exports, citing their requests.[48] On January 15, after a royal *séance* in the parlement to procure the registration of his edicts on heresy of the previous July, Henry was off to view his new town, and the meeting of the Estates was quietly ended.

The extraordinary demands of the war had forced Henry to call the Estates-General for the first time since 1484; it is not clear whether his success in getting what he wanted from them would have persuaded him to call them again soon. Obviously, he could not count on having so great a boost as the victory of Calais come at the most opportune moment to induce the deputies to be generous. However, the fact that a meeting of the Estates was called six months after his death by a government controlled by several of his closest advisers suggests that he might well have had it in mind. Certainly, the financial crisis at the time of his death dictated their convocation.

While the taking of Calais, the Estates, and the dauphin's marriage dominated the thoughts of the court in early 1558, the quest for peace was being quietly conducted. From the first the defeat at Saint-Quentin was interpreted as God's way of making the two great monarchs equal so that they could work out an equitable peace.[49] Also from the first Philip II hoped to use the captivity of Montmorency as a way to procure a favorable settlement. He intended to play on the constable's fear of being superseded in power and fear of the Guises' effect on Henry to induce him to persuade Henry to accept peace on Philip's terms. It was made clear that Montmorency's ransom depended upon the signing of a peace treaty. Thus, in early October 1557, the duchess of Lorraine visited him at Ghent to discuss "the means of coming to some agreement between the two kings." The idea of sending the constable to the French court on parole was already being bandied about. Not that he truly needed to worry about

losing Henry's affection. The king wrote several letters to him in his own hand and spoke of him "more than ever with much affection."[50]

Negotiating for peace was put largely in the hands of the Cardinal de Lorraine in the first months of 1558. Henry and the duc de Guise were too busy with military matters to attend to it. Although that may seem like putting the fox in charge of the chickens, given his advocacy of the war policy, he appears to have been diligent in the pursuit of a settlement. Now that his brother had raised the military reputation of his house to its highest possible level, Lorraine may well have been attracted by the prospect of being the statesman who brought peace to Europe. If successful, he could expect to place the king in a position of debt to the Guises almost impossible to repay and secure permanently his place at the head of the government. These considerations and his conduct in the months that followed force one to question seriously the opinion that "it is impossible to believe that Lorraine was seriously trying to make peace."[51]

After numerous contacts with the duchess of Lorraine, who was at Brussels, a conference between her and the cardinal was arranged for early May on the pretext that she was visiting her son in residence at the French court. There was much haggling over the location of a meeting since neither Cardinal de Lorraine nor Cardinal Granvelle, Philip's representative, was willing to cross the border into the other's territory on the grounds that it would look as if each was begging for peace. It was agreed to meet on May 14 in the abbey of Cercamp right on the border. According to the Venetian ambassador in Brussels:

> The common opinion is that some agreement may ensue, because on this side the King and all these Lords are much inclined towards it, and their suspicion that the French feigned a wish for peace, but did not really desire it, has much diminished, owing to the desire evinced for it by the proceedings of the Cardinal of Lorraine. Besides this, there are advices that the Turkish fleet will not put to sea in such force as was believed; so these respects render it credible that the French likewise will be content to make peace.[52]

Nonetheless, the meeting broke up abruptly with no results.

Cardinal de Lorraine did not return from Cercamp completely empty-handed. Granvelle told him that a letter written by Montmorency's nephew, François d'Andelot, to a Lutheran prince had

fallen into Spanish hands. He said that it requested that some move be made to aid the French Protestants, which proved that not only d'Andelot but also his brother Coligny were clearly Lutherans. Although Granvelle promised to show Lorraine the letter in twenty-four hours, he accepted his word without seeing it. It turned out to be a serious error, since the letter in question was simply a note from d'Andelot to Coligny telling him to remain steadfast in his faith. In July Lorraine admitted that he had been deceived.[53]

Motivated both by his hatred of heresy and the opportunity to embarrass the constable, Lorraine took the tale to Henry on May 18. Four days later the king called d'Andelot before him to deny the accusations; the principal one was that he refused to attend Mass. Henry reminded him of the love and offices he had given him and his family. D'Andelot responded that his goods and life were at the service of the king, but he could not retreat from his refusal to attend Mass. Henry became so angry that he could hardly refrain from striking him; but instead he picked up a plate from the table and smashed it on the floor. The king ordered his archers to arrest d'Andelot. Many men reportedly were irritated at his arrest, "bearing in mind the need of the war, doing his Majesty such good service as he does, he should have been treated with greater respect." More ominously the Reformed pastor in Paris wrote to Calvin on May 25: "Many commanders and soldiers are murmuring and threatening not to fight."[54]

Great pressure was put on d'Andelot by his family to make the submission demanded by the king. After two months under arrest he agreed to attend Mass, although he took no part in the service. The act of attending was sufficient for Henry, who immediately ordered his release.[55] Henry's treatment of the constable's nephew is further strong evidence of his attitude toward heresy—namely, that he regarded it as sedition and treason found among the lower classes. He found it most difficult to believe that those close to him or possessing high rank could become heretics. Despite persistent rumors about d'Andelot, he had been given the functions of the admiral's office in the absence of his brother and had been ordered to go to Normandy a month earlier to prepare the coastal defenses for an expected English attack. Indeed, it was said that Henry was more angry with Lorraine for forcing him to confront the situation than with d'Andelot himself. It has been argued that Henry's resentment about it caused the beginning of the decline of the authority of the Guises.[56]

By the time d'Andelot was released the last major fighting of

Henry's reign had ended. The king had kept most of his army intact through the winter and had vastly augmented it in the spring. He particularly sought to hire a large number of German light cavalry (the *reîtres*), whose principal weapon was the pistol. Henry had attributed much of the Spanish success at Saint-Quentin to them, and he was determined to draw as many as possible away from Philip and use them to teach the French how to fight in their style. By May 1, 1558, his army, augmented by 2,000 reîtres, was on the move eastward. On May 22 the duc de Guise left the court to join it, and five days later the first French units reached the outskirts of Thionville, a fortress directly south of Luxembourg in Lorraine. By June 1 a full-scale siege was under way.[57]

Despite the size of the army that the French put before Thionville, all was not going well for them. The Turks were not prepared to send a large fleet into the western Mediterranean that summer, despite Henry's earnest entreaties and the sultan's promises. At Lyon, Brissac found that he could not get the 400,000 livres from the financiers that he had been promised for use in Piedmont. In the English Channel a large English fleet was at sea, threatening the entire Atlantic coast of France.

Despite these potentially dangerous developments, Henry pushed forward with the assault on Thionville.[58] It was regarded as a well-defended position; Blaise de Monluc called it the best he had seen. Guise arrived on June 4; he was soon joined by Piero Strozzi and Monluc. The latter had been given the office of colonel of the infantry taken from d'Andelot. The French army had some 4,000–5,000 cavalrymen and 13,000–14,000 foot, mostly German.[59] They faced a well-built fort, defended by at least 2,000 men with considerable artillery. Thionville promised to be a much truer test of the French army than either Metz or Calais.

The French began to dig trenches toward the walls, but artillery fire limited their digging to the hours of darkness. Since the season made for few of those, progress was slow. After Monluc complained about the design of the trenches, Strozzi, as chief engineer, gave him permission to dig the trenches as he thought best. Accordingly, in Monluc's words: "At every twenty paces I made a back corner, or return, winding sometimes to the left hand and sometimes to the right, which I made so large that there was room for twelve or fifteen soldiers with their arquebuses and halberds. And this I did to the end that should the enemy gain the head of the trench and should

leap into it, those in the back corner might fight them, they being much more masters of the trench than those who were in the straight line."[60] Thus was created the *arrière-coin* of the siegemasters that was perfected by Vauban 150 years later. One military historian regards it as the only important advance in siegecraft of the era.[61]

On June 21 Guise's men took the outlying Tour-aux-Puces, which put them in position to mine the curtain wall. At that point the garrison asked for terms, and surrendered on June 22. The speed with which Thionville fell prevented the relief army dispatched by Philip II from coming to its aid. But the French had suffered a serious loss when Strozzi was killed by a musket ball fired from 500 paces while he was talking with François de Guise.

After the capture of Thionville, Guise pushed northward toward Luxembourg, while in the west Paul de Termes moved an army out of Calais into Flanders to draw Spanish forces away from Luxembourg. It was on Henry II's direct orders that de Termes made the move, since he had been informed that the forts and towns of western Flanders were weakly defended.[62] De Termes's army of 9,000 infantrymen and 1,500 horse bypassed the strong fort of Gravelines directly across the border and pushed on to Dunkirk, which fell in two days. The town had become the depot for English goods entering Flanders since the fall of Calais, and the French took vast plunder. After plundering several more towns in the region, de Termes turned back toward Calais. Unknown to him, a large force under the count of Egmont, assembled largely from the garrisons in western Flanders, had rushed to the coast to cut off the French withdrawal. De Termes first became aware of his precarious position when a charge by enemy cavalry forced him to form battle lines.

De Termes found himself facing an army several thousand men larger than his own on ground that offered no cover. It was, however, the appearance of a completely unexpected element that gave victory to Egmont's forces. An English fleet cruising the Channel saw the fighting, which came right down to the beach, and moved in as close as possible to blast the seaward wing of the French army. That wing collapsed immediately, and the rest of the army followed quickly. Only a small number of cavalrymen reached the safety of Calais. About 5,000 men were killed, and most of the rest captured. Among the French captains taken were de Termes and Seranpont. Had Egmont pushed on to Calais, he would have found it nearly undefended, but he preferred not to risk his army, which had been very

hastily assembled and therefore was poorly equipped and supplied. According to the Venetian Michiel, Henry blamed himself for ordering de Termes to move out from Calais, but in his report to Guise, de Termes admitted that he had advanced too far and had disregarded orders to ensure the safety of his army.[63]

Again, the two rival monarchs had seen two major battles go two different ways, and the two sides came away nearly equal in gains and losses. It seemed even more obvious that God was making clear His will for peace. But the war threatened to go on. Guise immediately dropped his plans for an attack on Luxembourg and rushed back into Picardy. There, on July 28, Henry reviewed the army of 40,000 men at Pierrepont near Laon.[64]

After the review, the army moved northward toward Saint-Quentin, but it was halted by the news that a large Spanish force was several miles away across the Somme. For the rest of the campaigning season, the two great armies were within ten miles of one another, but the only action was a little skirmishing and feinting. It may well have been physical and financial exhaustion that prevented a final, conclusive battle.[65] Certainly a factor, however, was the great danger of crossing a river in the face of a strong enemy. The two kings kept their armies in camp until November and then disbanded many of their companies. Thus, the long and bitter war sputtered ignominiously to an end.

14 PAX

By September of 1558 Henry II appears to have had a complete conversion to peace. He wanted badly to bring Anne de Montmorency back to the court; absence indeed made his heart fonder of the captive in Flanders. His letters to the constable, several of which were written in his own hand and with Diane de Poitiers, were full of professions of love. Furthermore, the monarchy was close to bankruptcy. Henry realized that it would be very difficult to raise the money needed to carry on the war. Another strong incentive for peace was the rapid growth of Protestantism in France. Finally, there is some suggestion that the king's physical strength was beginning to slip. He was afflicted with gout and bouts of vertigo and had spent much of the summer of 1558 in his tent with a cold.[1]

Yet another motive for ending the war was Henry's growing resentment of the Guises, although the weight of that factor is hard to determine. Their role in convincing him to send the duke to Italy with his army, the impudence with which they worked to improve their position and to aid their clients, their efforts to eliminate any competition, and their role in the case of François d'Andelot all contributed to Henry's desire to bring Montmorency back to the court.[2] Diane de Poitiers had also turned against the Guises. The captivity of the constable ruined the balance between him and the Guises, and she used her influence over the king in Montmorency's favor. The Venetian ambassador Michiel reported on November 15 that the constable had recently written to the Grande Sénéschalle "knowing what her influence can effect with the king, and at the present where there is an open rupture and enmity between her and the Cardinal of Lorraine, she being so united with the constable that they are one

and the same thing." This new alliance was sealed with the marriage of Diane's granddaughter to Montmorency's second son, Henri de Damville. Last, Coligny was ill in his bleak prison on the Flemish coast, where the dampness and cold winds were regarded as almost certain to kill him.[3]

Philip II and his advisers fully recognized the value of their two prisoners, Montmorency and Saint-André, in any peace negotiations. Philip made good use of their wish to be ransomed to push them into supporting Spanish peace proposals. Thus, Saint-André was paroled in early June 1558, "in hopes that he may effect something." In early September he returned to Flanders with Henry's commission to determine what terms the Spanish were demanding. He conferred with the constable, and they agreed to inform Philip of their king's desire for peace.[4]

It was at about this time that Simon Renard, the former ambassador in France, wrote a memorandum to Philip that, for its insights into the French situation and personalities, is worth quoting at length:

> It will be difficult to obtain restitution of places which the French have occupied, for they have spent 29 years and 50 million crowns to gain these places, lost great numbers of their nobility and people, and pledged all the Crown property. Without being reduced to extreme necessity, they will certainly not wish to give back what they have shown such determination in conquering. We have to deal with a prince who has little conscience, is ambitious and of a somber disposition, and much inclined to making war. The second person in the realm is now a prisoner. As he knows his master, he will take care not to give him any advice for which he might afterwards be blamed and which might cause the ruin of his house. The Constable is very sharp. It will be a mistake to allow him to go to France on the plea that he is at odds with the House of Guise, for the quarrel between them is not as serious as is made out. They understand each other far better than they allow it to appear, as will be seen in connexion with the ransom. It is easy to read the Constable's mind. His words, his expression, his changing colour immediately give him away. The safest course is to negotiate with him in a resolute and determined manner, without ever deviating from the object in view, and not to believe anything he says, but always to bring him back to the point. If

> possible, negotiations had better be carried on with him in writing. He always avoids this method if he can. The House of Guise has profited so much by the recent conquests and has made such a good business out of war, that its members will not easily be won over to the cause of peace and restitution.[5]

Despite Renard's caution against sending Montmorency back to France, Philip II decided to do it. He gave his ambassador in England his reasons: first because of Montmorency's years, next his illness, which it was feared would prove fatal, and third, "if he returns to France the Guises will not have so much power as now that they entirely control both war and finance, whereas if the Constable be there the war matters will be in his care, and he will probably remove the ministers and officers appointed by the others, and thus cause divisions and dissensions amongst them, which will be good for our affairs."[6]

Although Renard's comments on the principals at the French court were very perceptive, Philip was proven correct in his decision to parole the constable. On October 10 Henry, then at Amiens, received word that Montmorency was coming to see him. After waiting impatiently for most of the day, Henry rode out in late afternoon to meet him. About a league from camp he met the constable riding alone toward him. They embraced for a long time and rode back to Amiens, where Montmorency spent the night in the king's own chamber. The two were together for every moment of the two days that the constable had before his return.

Henry listened without response to Montmorency's explanation of the defeat of Saint-Quentin and to his sharp excoriation of the Guises for their war policy. He protested that he wanted nothing for himself while the Guises were taking "all the honors of land and sea." Henry proceeded then to add his own complaints about them. There were several witnesses to the conversation, so word of it quickly went back to the Guises. François was so crestfallen that he left the court to hunt at his own château. Ironically, it was exactly a year since Henry had welcomed Guise back to the court in virtually the same way. As for Henry, the pain of seeing Montmorency leave after so short a time was so great that he wrote him a letter in his own hand declaring that "nothing in the world can turn me from the love I have for you."[7]

The Guises' loss of favor exacerbated the tensions at court, since Montmorency's faction became active again after having remained

largely out of sight since Saint-Quentin. The only important ally that the Guises had was Queen Catherine, who supported them in order to prevent the concession of French interests in Italy. Catherine at this time was also upset with her husband, since she had not seen him for three months before she asked to join him at Amiens in October.[8]

Henry was then in Amiens, in part because he and Philip had agreed to a truce and the creation of peace commissions on October 6, 1558. The French commission included Montmorency, Saint-André, Cardinal de Lorraine, Bishop Jean de Morvilliers, and Secretary of State Claude de L'Aubespine. The Spanish negotiators were the duke of Alba, William of Orange, Ruy Gomez de Silva, Cardinal Antoine Granvelle, and Ulrich Vigilius, the president of the Council of the Low Countries. Henry ordered Chancellor Olivier to draw up an analysis of the previous treaties with the Habsburgs to prepare his negotiators. He gave the use of the town of Cercamp on the Flemish border to the commissioners, and the first meeting took place on October 12. From the first it was clear that Calais and Piedmont were the major points in dispute.[9]

When the first set of negotiations ended on October 29, the commissioners, including Montmorency and Saint-André, returned to the court to report to the king. On November 2 Henry spent two hours alone with the constable and had him again sleep in his chamber. Although it is assumed that the constable again advised peace, when the negotiators returned to Cercamp, they found themselves further apart than ever. When Henry was appraised of the impasse, he ordered an end to the negotiations. Resumption of the war seemed certain. That same night, letters to the king and Diane de Poitiers from Montmorency arrived. The next morning Henry went on a long hunt and returned for a long discussion with Diane. When he emerged, he called for a meeting of the *conseil des affaires*. He dramatically announced that he had resolved to make peace with Philip II. In order to gain it he was willing to give up the territories in Luxembourg, Italy, and Corsica that he controlled. He intended to keep only Calais and the Three Bishoprics. Henry ended with the statement that he had called the meeting to announce his decision, not to discuss it. When Bishop Charles de Marillac alone tried to protest, the king sharply ordered him to be quiet. New instructions were sent immediately to Cercamp.[10]

As can be imagined, the consternation of the Guises and Cather-

ine de Medici was immense. Only the day before, the duc de Guise had gained Henry's oath that he would never surrender Piedmont. When Catherine heard of her husband's decision, she rushed to him and begged him not to give up the French positions in Italy, even kneeling at his feet in order to turn him from his resolution and telling him that the constable had never done anything but evil. To this the King replied that the constable had always done well and that they had done evil who had ever counseled him to break the truce.[11]

François de Guise, seeing the fruits of his labors about to be lost, was nearly beside himself. He bluntly told the king that those who had advised him on his plans had lost their heads. He embarrassed Henry by publicly demanding that the king reaffirm his pledge to give him the office of *grand-maître*, which Montmorency expected to pass on to his oldest son upon his return to the court, and threatening to leave royal service if he did not receive it. Henry wrote to the constable: "Monsieur de Guise does not want peace, pointing out to me every day that I have more means for continuing the war."[12] It is true that Henry continued to look for money even after he committed himself to peace. At the end of November he contracted for a loan of 1.5 million crowns from the German bankers.[13]

It is easy to understand Guise's rage. He had won several brilliant victories for the king, and he now found his interests ignored in favor of one who had been disgraced in the field. Guise's humor became even blacker when, in December 1558, Henry offered to pay the 200,000 écus that the duke of Savoy demanded as a ransom for Montmorency—60,000 to be paid immediately and the rest over eighteen months. Saint-André's ransom was only 50,000 écus, but a hitch developed in the exchange and he was not freed until March 1559. Montmorency arrived at the court at Saint-Germain on December 21, after a triumphal march from the Flemish border "as if he were the king himself."[14] According to the Venetian ambassador: "Immediately upon his arrival at the court, there returned into his hands, not only all the affairs, the Duke de Guise and the Cardinal of Lorraine having withdrawn themselves entirely, but all that concourse of followers which he used to have heretofore, so that no difference between his past and present position is perceptible, he continuing his usual procedure, and with the same, and it may be said greater, authority in all his actions."[15]

Cardinal de Lorraine returned the signet to him the same evening

without any order from Henry. The cardinal, more flexible and politic than his brother, well recognized the dangers of pushing too far their resentment, but he did tell the king that he was withdrawing because he did not intend to become the constable's varlet.[16]

It was probably François de Guise's deep anxiety over his loss of favor that was responsible for a strange episode of December 24, 1558. Having asked two prominent courtiers to watch from hiding, he accosted François de Montmorency and challenged him to a duel for having maligned him. The young Montmorency, a smaller and less experienced person, swore that he had done nothing to dishonor Guise. Having thus avoided a fight, he reported to the king and his father what had happened. Henry was decidedly put out, but the constable laughed it off, which was regarded as making Guise's impudence even more obvious.[17] It is probable that the cause of Guise's rash action was the affair of the young Montmorency's secret marriage, since he had openly blamed Guise for his failure to get a papal dispensation.

The constable could easily laugh off his rival's indiscretion, since he had taken complete control of the government to an extent he had never had before Saint-Quentin. Henry was happy to give up the burden of attending carefully to the routine affairs, especially military matters, as he had been doing since August 1557. Montmorency placed his nephew, d'Andelot, in charge of the army in Picardy and ordered him to undo most of the changes effected by Guise. He also revoked a large number of the pensions and gifts given out by Cardinal de Lorraine. As for himself, he received from Henry the money for his ransom, the right to pass the office of *grand-maître* to his son François, and the governorship of Languedoc and a promise of a marshal's baton for his second son, Henri.[18]

Although the Guises had lost much of their authority in the government, the cardinal continued to serve as one of the negotiators at Cercamp to show, presumably, that all of the realm supported the desire for peace. Even with Henry's vast concessions, hammering out a treaty proved to be slow work. The major obstacle now was Calais, about which Henry had said that he would sooner give up his throne than surrender. Philip II could not accede to the French on Calais if he hoped to maintain any semblance of credibility as king of England. The news of the death of Mary Tudor on November 19, although hardly unexpected, threw the conference into confusion. It

was agreed to continue the truce for two more months and suspend the negotiations for the same length of time, until the new government in England could send its own representatives.

Mary's death relieved Philip of the need to be adamant about the return of Calais, although he continued to pay lip service to the idea in hope of maintaining his alliance with England. As for Henry, it mattered little whether it was Mary or Elizabeth who demanded the return of the town, but he and his advisers recognized that Philip's stake in it had been significantly reduced. However, Henry hoped for a better relationship with England under its new queen, so he could not brusquely deny her claim.[19] The French negotiators searched for a formula that would keep Calais in French hands while saving face for Elizabeth.

The French king's relations with the new English queen were, however, greatly complicated by the claim of his daughter-in-law to the English throne. Henry began the process of having Mary Stuart lay claim to the throne by making her observe the formalities required of the royal successor upon the death of the predecessor, such as the wearing of white, required of French princesses in mourning. It was decided not to push Mary's claim too stridently in hope that Elizabeth would become amenable to the French position on Calais. It was also proposed that if Elizabeth would agree not to marry a foreign prince, Henry would require Mary to concede her claim of precedence over Elizabeth in the English succession. It would appear, however, that Henry's proposals were designed to induce Elizabeth to refuse to marry Philip, who had proposed to her almost immediately after Mary Tudor's death. On December 31, 1558, the English ambassador in Rome reported that the French were trying to convince the pope to declare Elizabeth illegitimate and recognize Mary Stuart as queen of England. In January Mary and Francis definitely added the crown of England to their coat of arms.[20] The French behavior for the next six months strongly suggests that Henry had no intention of ignoring his daughter-in-law's rights to England.

In early January 1559 preparations were under way to resume formal negotiations. Because the abbey of Cercamp was too cold in winter, it was agreed to use the nearby château of Cambrésis (Cateau-Cambrésis). Before the commissioners returned to the peace table, the marriage of Henry's daughter Claude and Duke Francis of Lorraine was celebrated on January 22 "with no less pomp than that of the king-dauphin last year." The young duke had received 200,000

crowns from the estates of his duchy and reportedly spent most of it for his wedding. Since the duke was the Guises' cousin, they were very prominent at the festivities, and it marked a step in their return to favor.[21] Henri de Montmorency was supposed to marry Diane de Poitiers's granddaughter at the same time, but "for the greater satisfaction of his relatives and to obtain greater honor," it took place a week later at Chantilly.[22] Thus, the French representatives did not reach Cateau-Cambrésis until February 5.

On February 11 the first session of the resumed conference took place, and rapid progress was made, except for the problem of Calais. The arguments over the town became so heated that the constable advised Henry that he should begin to prepare for the possibility of resumed war by drawing loans from Lyon. Montmorency suggested that the king at least give the appearance of preparing for war by sending out captains on recruiting missions. Henry was assured that money for war could be obtained from the Lyonnais bankers.[23] Nonetheless, the negotiators continued their work, although the Cardinal de Lorraine told the Spanish that his king would never consent to the restoration of Calais.[24]

The nut of Calais was cracked on March 12, only a day after it appeared that the conference would break up in failure.[25] France and England agreed to a truce of eight years, at the end of which Calais would be returned to England. France was to provide a security of 500,000 écus for its return. Disputes over details of various matters continued to agitate the commissions for two more weeks, and on March 27 Lorraine and Ruy Gomez hurried off to consult their masters on the last unresolved issues. Both kings agreed to concessions on these final concerns so that on March 28 the news began to be broadcast that a peace had been agreed upon. On April 2 the agreement between England and France was signed, and on the next day the more substantial treaty between Philip and Henry.[26] These two treaties, known collectively as the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis, were the most comprehensive agreements drawn up prior to the Peace of Westphalia and established the legal and political status quo for Western Europe for the next ninety years.

The treaty between England and France called for peace, not just a truce as in the first drafts, with Calais remaining in French hands for eight years on security of 500,000 écus and several prominent French hostages, who were to rotate every two months. The French were to return sixteen cannon found in the pale, and since the peace

extended to Scotland as well, they were to demolish several forts on the Scottish border with England. The treaty would become null upon any violation by the forces of either side. Given the French record of ignoring similar provisions in previous treaties, Elizabeth could not have been optimistic that she would recover Calais in eight years, but she ensured that the return would not occur by occupying Le Havre in 1563. The French used the incident to refuse to concede Calais when the eight years had passed.

The agreement between the French and Spanish monarchs was far more complicated.[27] In regard to the northern frontier of France, Henry was to return four forts (including Thionville) in exchange for four forts (including Saint-Quentin) held by Philip. Henry gave up the duchy of Bouillon, held by Diane de Poitiers's grandson, to the bishop of Liège, while Philip kept Hesdin. The treaty did not recognize French rule over Lorraine, but France kept those parts of the Three Bishoprics of Lorraine it had occupied—namely, the three cities themselves. Since Philip was not the Holy Roman Emperor, he merely made a formal protest on behalf of his cousin Ferdinand. In Italy the French were to return to the duke of Savoy his ancestral lands of Bresse, Savoy, and Piedmont, retaining the small duchy of Saluzzo and for a time five fortresses in Piedmont, including Turin. The Spanish rights to Milan and Naples were recognized, and the French forts in Lombardy handed over to Spanish forces. In Tuscany all the French positions were turned over either to the duke of Mantua or the duke of Florence. Genoa was to recover all of Corsica. Despite Spanish insistence on including a clause prohibiting French seamen from sailing to the Americas, the treaty made no mention of the colonies, which was a victory for the French position.[28]

The treaty called for both monarchs to support a meeting of a general council of the church. That clause was the only one that touched on religion. Despite the persistent rumors that a secret agreement on destruction of Protestantism had been agreed on, no such evidence has ever been found. Such an agreement was hardly needed, for the two kings understood each other very well on the question of heresy.

Two marriages were also arranged in the treaty. In order to reduce the appearance of outright surrender of Savoy and Piedmont, a marriage between Duke Emmanuel-Philibert and Henry's sister Marguerite was agreed upon. Marguerite de France was still unwedded at thirty-six years of age. Her advanced age raised a question of whether she would have children, but marrying her was a precondition of the

duke's reclaiming his lands. He clearly regarded returning home to rule as being more urgent than the possibility of not having an heir for his recovered estates.

The other marriage involved Henry's oldest daughter, Elisabeth. Having just turned fourteen on the day of the treaty, she was a valuable pawn in her father's marriage diplomacy. Throughout the discussions prior to the treaty, it was expected that she would marry Don Carlos, Philip's only son, the same age as she. But with Mary Tudor now dead, the widower Philip had the option of his marriage to the princess inserted at the last moment.

No other treaty of the Ancien Régime has been as controversial as Cateau-Cambrésis. Contemporaries and historians ever since have been largely negative in their assessment of it. The principal French commanders, Guise, Brissac, Vieilleville, Monluc, and probably most of the nobility denounced it in no uncertain terms. At the end of March 1559 Brissac had sent DuVillars from Turin to protest the reports that the king was about to surrender Italy. Listening to Henry's defense of the proposals, Guise broke in to object: "I swear to you, Sire, that there is evil in taking this road. For if you do nothing but lose for the next thirty years you would not give up as much as now at a single stroke." The duke went on to say that most of the king's servants felt as he did.[29] DuVillars also recorded the words of Brissac when he arrived at Turin with the terms of the peace: "O miserable France! To what ruin and loss have you allowed yourself to be reduced!"[30] According to the *Mémoires de Vieilleville*, Henry conceded lands that had cost 40 million crowns and 100,000 lives to win. According to the memoirs, Vieilleville attacked the treaty to Henry's face and attributed it to the king's desire to see his sister wed, "who ought to end her days in a good convent." He also declared that Turin was as much a part of France as Lyon and its population spoke French just as well. Henry was depicted as not replying to Vieilleville. Tavannes, Monluc, and Brantôme denounced the treaty in similar tones.[31] All of these men, however, had been involved in the victories that Vieilleville declared were now blemished and were angered to see their glory diminished by the concession of their conquests.

Most French historians have also seen Cateau-Cambrésis as disastrous, or at best disadvantageous for France, if for no other reason than that the return of the soldiers from the foreign lands caused them to turn to fighting each other in the religious wars. In his assessment, Lucien Romier called attention to the fact that France had

not received clear title to Calais and the Three Bishoprics while conceding the same to the Italian lands and Savoy. Henri Lemonnier has argued that the loss of Savoy, Bresse, and Piedmont retarded for more than a century the French annexation of Franche-Comté.[32]

There were, however, a number of contemporaries besides Henry and Montmorency who regarded the treaty favorably. La Vigne, the ambassador to the sultan, said: "A second Salic law should be passed to have the first man who advises the renewal of the Italian wars . . . burnt as a heretic." Etienne Pasquier wrote: "Italy was never any use to us French except as a tomb when we invaded it." Claude Haton emphasized how badly the poor people of France and especially Picardy wanted peace, and he praised Henry for securing it. Michel de L'Hôpital wrote a *Carmen de pax* in favor of the treaty.[33] None of these men was a soldier, which may explain their willingness to praise the treaty, but one veteran warrior who did was François Rabutin, who concluded his commentaries on the wars of Henry's reign with a tribute to "this fortunate peace."[34]

The pros and cons of the treaty could be argued endlessly. On the one hand, Henry disgracefully abandoned the Piedmontese, whom the French had already begun to incorporate into their realm, the Corsicans, and the Sienese republicans to their enemies, and all of Italy to Spanish domination. On the other hand, France had extracted itself from the enormous sinkhole of French manpower and money that Italy had been for the past seventy years. On the one hand, the end of the foreign wars returned home a vast number of men of war who quickly turned to plying their trade in the religious wars. On the other, the French control of Calais made it more difficult for England to come to the aid of the Huguenots or any other rebel group. On the one hand surrendering Savoy and Bresse resurrected an independent duchy of Savoy, which caused serious problems for the French monarchy for the next two centuries. On the other, the retention of Calais and the Three Bishoprics effected the beginnings of a defensible northern frontier; the flanks, which had been the weakest sectors, had been converted into the strongest.[35] While the treaty did not give French seamen the right to navigate the waters of the New World, it placed no specific barrier to the French to claim such a right in the future.[36]

In regard to Savoy, while the long-term consequences of the reappearance of the independent duchy were troublesome for France, the immediate results seemed to be very beneficial for the French monar-

chy. According to the Venetian ambassador, the duke "is evidently tied and bound and more in the hands of the French than those of King Philip . . . all able politicians believe that he will be compelled to follow the will of the French" because of the fortresses the French still held in his duchy.[37] The concession of the French positions in the southern Alps did make the southeast of France more vulnerable to invasion, but past history had seen few significant attacks into that region. The French had far less reason to fear attack from that direction than they did from the Low Countries. There, the treaty put the French in a far better situation. Control of Calais put them in position to outflank the major fortresses of western Flanders, and control of Metz put them within easy striking range of Luxembourg, the key to the eastern Low Countries. From a strategic point of view the French had gained vastly more from Cateau-Cambrésis than they lost.

Henry has also been criticized for accepting the peace in order to make good marriages for his sister and daughter. Yet dynastic marriages were an important part of the political scene of the sixteenth century and often highly successful, as the Habsburgs well proved. The marriage of Elisabeth de Valois to Philip was in this regard most important, because it preempted the possibility of Philip marrying Elizabeth of England and continuing the Anglo-Spanish alliance, an even more frightening prospect because Elizabeth's age promised to make such a union more fruitful than Philip's with Mary Tudor had been. The absence of an Anglo-Spanish marriage increased the possibility that the papacy would excommunicate Elizabeth and enable Henry to put his son and daughter-in-law on the English throne as part of a crusade against heresy, something that Philip would have been hard-pressed to oppose.[38]

The hindsight of historians permits them to see that a marriage between Philip and Elizabeth Tudor was never a serious possibility; but if Henry had lived, she might well have found an alliance with Philip a mortal necessity. Henry would have leapt at any pretext to place Mary and Francis on the English throne. That conditional clause, "if Henry had lived," underlies the real defect of the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis from the French point of view. Its success depended upon a strong French monarchy to take advantage of the opportunities presented and to overcome its liabilities. Henry's death, a direct, albeit certainly not intentional, result of the treaty, exaggerated its defects while diminishing its benefits for France. It is hard to believe, for example, that so many of the French nobility would

have taken arms against Henry as did against his successors, thus reducing substantially or at least delaying the wars of religion. It is hard to believe, also, that Henry would not have been quick to take advantage of the revolt against Philip in the Netherlands. Henry's death was largely responsible for what Noel Williams has argued was the major flaw of the treaty—that it cost France its rank as a power equal to Spain and its claim to be arbiter of European affairs.[39] One must agree with him that such a development occurred after 1559; but rather than being a direct result of the treaty, it was largely a consequence of the weakness of the French monarchy after Henry's death.

15 "THIS LUTHERAN SCUM"

Henry II wanted peace badly in April 1559. Perhaps he conceded more than was necessary in order to gain the freedom of Montmorency and Saint-André, to relieve the enormous financial burden imposed by war, and to arrange good marriages for his sister and daughter; but it is difficult to escape the conclusion that he wanted most of all to turn his attention to the religious problems in France. Numerous ambassadors attested to the relationship between the signing of the peace and the onslaught of heresy trials. Cardinal de Lorraine told the parlement shortly after the treaty that it had been agreed upon so that the king could drive out the heretics, and Henry confirmed it with his own words in early June 1559.[1]

The conservative Catholics had reason to have become seriously concerned about the progress of French Protestantism since 1555. The kingdom seemed about to be overwhelmed by heresy. Reports from virtually every province gave strong, if at times exaggerated, accounts of the spread of Protestantism. Both the king and the constable stated on several occasions that France needed peace in order to attend to the presence of the heretics. When the imperial representative Lalaing was at the French court in April 1556 to receive Henry's oath to the Truce of Vaucelles, the king told him that he had not been able to deal with heresy because of the press of other business. He complained about Geneva, "which is a source of much evil because many heretics are received there and thence disseminate their errors throughout France."[2]

Even as the number of Protestants increased rapidly during the middle years of Henry's reign, the effectiveness of the legal system of repression had declined considerably. The number of heresy trials

and executions for the period 1555–1558 was less than for the previous four years, despite a much larger group of persons liable to such actions.[3] Henry had certainly not given up the effort to enforce religious conformity, but his edicts in this time span were ineffective. An edict of 1553 to reestablish a chamber for heresy in the Parlement of Paris, in effect rebuilding the *chambre ardente*, was not registered by the court, and Henry never ordered it to do so.[4]

Henry could hardly have been unaware of the growth of Protestantism in his realm. In 1554 he was told that three towns in France had "declared themselves heretic." The number of nobles fleeing to Geneva had reached 120 in 1555, and the Bourbon prince Louis de Condé and his entourage had visited that city on their return from Italy the same year.[5] Henry made another effort to stem the growth of the Reform in 1555. An edict designed to broaden the powers of ecclesiastical judges in heresy cases and to stop appeals to secular courts was presented to the Parlement of Paris for registration.[6] The parlementaires refused to accept it, and one of the presidents, Pierre Séguier, and a magistrate, Adrien DuParc, were sent to Henry at Villers-Cotterêts to defend the court's action. They were told when they arrived that the king was very angry with the parlement and had wondered aloud if he could find twelve of its magistrates who could serve as worthy judges of heretics.

Séguier's address of October 22 before the king, Montmorency, the Guises, Saint-André, and other notables was a masterpiece.[7] He presented the dangers of creating a system by which the administration of justice would be removed from the king's own judges and given to others who did not answer to the monarch. The edict threatened to cut off appeal to the king, who was the embodiment of justice in the realm. Séguier argued that the best way to deal with heresy was through the good examples of devoted priests and prelates in residence in their charges. Last, he raised the specter of the courtiers themselves falling under the jurisdiction of the heresy court and seeing their properties confiscated because of false witnesses, without the right to appeal to the king.

Henry was reported to have listened to Séguier's remonstrance without interrupting even a syllable. The next day he wrote to the parlement, seconded by Montmorency and Guise, praising Séguier's presentation and withdrawing the request for registration.[8] Eight months later, when the Sorbonnists complained to the king that the parlement was itself infected with heresy, Henry replied in irrita-

tion: "Do you want me to put you in the place of the Parlement and abandon to you the direction of my kingdom?"[9]

Despite these acts seemingly ending the effort to change the system of heresy jurisdiction, there was considerable activity behind the scenes to establish the Inquisition in France. In early 1557 the king requested from Pope Paul IV the authority to establish the Holy Office in his realm. The exact chronology of the negotiations and decisions that led to this request cannot be clearly established. Nor can it be determined whether the initiative came from France or Rome.[10] The first explicit mention of the Inquisition came in February 1557, in a letter from Henry to his ambassador de Selve in Rome, in which he told de Selve to ask the pope for a brief establishing the Inquisition. The language strongly suggests that this letter was not the first word on the matter.[11]

Paul IV responded in April with a brief that authorized the creation of the French Inquisition, with three cardinals—Bourbon, Châtillon, and Lorraine—as grand inquisitors. The choice of Châtillon has been questioned by some historians who note that he had already revealed a sympathy toward Protestantism and would openly convert in 1561. Following Theodore Beza, they argue that it was an effort to force the cardinal either to side openly with the Protestants or take part in their destruction.[12] Lucien Romier's explanation denies such a Machiavellian twist to the decision; he proposes that the three cardinals were chosen because they were the ones ordinarily present at the court and in the royal council.[13] Furthermore, it would have been near impossible for Henry to have taken so momentous a step without Montmorency's approval. While the constable was a firm Catholic, he would never have allowed Lorraine to so enhance his authority without some sort of counterbalance, namely, the addition of his nephew to the roll of inquisitors. The appointment of Châtillon despite his Protestant leanings reinforces the argument that Henry paid little attention to such matters when they involved a high-ranking nobleman. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that Bourbon or Châtillon would have taken an active part in the Inquisition's work, leaving the authority in Lorraine's hands.

On July 24, 1557, Henry issued a decree confirming the papal bull establishing the Inquisition. It imposed some limitations on the powers of the three cardinal-inquisitors. The most important was that appeals courts were to be established in all the cities with parlements and made up of twelve persons, six of whom had to be

parlementaires chosen by the cardinal-inquisitors. Séguier's remonstrance must have remained in Henry's mind. With that change, the parlement retained secular control over the Inquisition. Despite this bow to the sensibilities of the parlement, the magistrates refused to register it until January 1558. Even then the edict remained inoperative and was quietly rescinded in April.[14]

Henry was evidently not persuaded that the creation of the Inquisition was going to be effective; he may well have been aware of the unrelenting hostility to the tribunal by the magistrates of the law courts and, indeed, by a good part of the French clergy with its Gallicanism. Therefore, on the same day he accepted the papal bull, he issued the Edict of Compiègne, which greatly strengthened the penalties that the secular courts could impose on heretics.[15] Henry noted that previous edicts had failed to achieve religious conformity because of disputes over jurisdiction and the maliciousness and softheartedness of both ecclesiastical and secular judges. The edict did nothing to solve the first problem but sought to ensure that the second would no longer intrude by mandating the death penalty for those convicted of being obstinate or relapsed sacramentarians. That was the legal term for Calvinism and, accordingly, the Lutherans were exempted from the edict. Henry thus avoided a confrontation with his German allies and the vast number of German mercenaries in his army.

That the edict was directed principally against the Calvinists was made very clear by the clause that proscribed death for those who visited Geneva or had books published there. Other acts for which execution was mandated included blasphemy against images of Christ or the saints and illegal preaching and religious assemblies, whether private or public. The edict stated that because the number of heretics had increased so greatly, the nature of the crime had changed from secret opinion to open sedition. Therefore, the king announced his intention to use the force of arms as well as the judicial system to deal with heresy. The foreign war, however, made it impossible for Henry to make good this threat, which has been called a "manifest declaration of war" against the Protestants.[16] For Henry and the conservative Catholics, the identification of heresy with rebellion justified in their own minds the call to arms. The final clause of the edict proclaimed that the fines and goods confiscated from the condemned heretics would no longer be distributed by the crown but used to pay the costs of the court system, and the remainder was to

go to charity. It is unclear how carefully Henry kept to his own edict in this matter; in November 1557 the son-in-law of Jean Bertrand received the estate of a noblewoman executed for heresy.[17]

The opposition of the parlement and the defeat at Saint-Quentin three weeks after the edict prevented the enactment of its harsh measures. As before, Henry himself granted exemptions to the laws against heresy. In June 1557 ambassadors from four Swiss cantons arrived at the court to complain that several of the ministers of an Alpine region occupied by the French had been executed. Needing friendly relations with the Swiss, Henry agreed to allow the residents of the valley to practice their religion, since they had held it before they fell under French jurisdiction, but no ministers were allowed to preach. In early 1558 merchants from Protestant lands appealed to Henry that the Inquisition be denied jurisdiction over them. Again, the king agreed in order not to drive them off, especially the German bankers at Lyon who were making such vast loans to him. The Venetian ambassador reported that many French Protestants in exile in Switzerland were applying for merchant licenses in order to return home.[18] Henry took more direct action against the Protestants as well. On July 3, 1557, he ordered the *sénéshal* of Nîmes to assemble the *ban* and *arrière ban* of his district to arrest the rebels in the Cevennes, "who are assembled under arms to the number of 200 or 300 men."[19] There were continued reports of Protestant mercenaries in the French army harassing the Catholic clergy, disrupting services, and preaching, but Henry dared not take steps against them.

Given the king's very repressive edicts against heresy, it comes as a surprise that the only major French expedition to the New World during Henry's reign should have had a significant Protestant element involved in it. The Villegaignon expedition to Brazil has been seen by some historians as an attempt to create a place of refuge for French Calvinists, with the apparent blessing of the monarch. The point remains unproven but possible, since Henry was sympathetic to any attempt to colonize the Americas; for he claimed, as did his father, that the New World was open to all to settle. He also accepted the argument that a strong French presence anywhere in the Americas would weaken Spain by breaking its monopoly there.

The expedition to Brazil was planned and led by Nicolas de Villegaignon, a Knight of Malta who had spent over twenty years in naval action, including the command of the fleet that had brought Mary Stuart to France in 1549. That action had brought him to the atten-

tion of the king, who named him vice admiral of Brittany in 1553. He had a vast number of contacts among the French seamen, and their tales of the wealth and exotic character of the Americas convinced him to lead an expedition to Brazil.[20]

Whether Villegaignon was also motivated by the desire to find a haven for French Protestants is a point sharply disputed among his contemporaries and modern historians.[21] For some historians the Protestant character of the expedition is proven by the fact that Gaspard de Coligny had to have been involved, as admiral of France, a title he had received in late 1552 after the death of d'Annebault. As of 1554, however, Coligny had shown no sign of being sympathetic to the Reformation and as new governor of Picardy spent most of 1554 inspecting its defenses. There is no question, however, that a significant proportion of the colonists were Protestants. It may have reflected the greater appeal of Protestantism among seamen or the fact that, according to Claude Haton, many of the expedition members were drawn from prison.[22] Many of the prisoners of this era were religious dissenters.

After Henry II agreed to give Villegaignon three ships totaling 500 tons, and 10,000 livres, the vice admiral by various means found a full ship's company and sailed in July 1555.[23] The French reached Guanabara Bay, the site of Rio de Janeiro, where they found the Indians friendly and the climate suitable. They built a stronghold called Fort Coligny on an island in the bay. The colony was referred to as La France Antarctique, which name was intended to serve for all of South America.

As happened in most new colonies, Villegaignon faced a revolt that ended in several executions and a manpower shortage. A request for reinforcements made through Coligny, who was much more clearly involved in the second voyage than the first, persuaded the king to provide three new ships, which carried 300 persons, including five women, to the colony. Correspondence between the colonists and Geneva induced Jean Calvin to handpick two ministers and seven laymen to journey to Brazil. Whether Henry was aware that a significant proportion of the passengers were Protestant is impossible to determine, but it is again suggestive of how readily Henry acceded to those close to him, regardless of any religious implications.

In Brazil, however, the arrival of the more ardent Protestants boded ill for the colony. Villegaignon began to dispute points of theology with the ministers, although he did not necessarily maintain

the Catholic positions. Bad blood developed, and the commander began to take on the airs of a tyrant. In late 1556 a ship was dispatched back to France with a cargo of brazilwood and ten Indians, as well as a minister to get Calvin's opinion on several of the disputed points of theology. The Indians were given to Henry, who distributed them among his favorites. Before the Protestant minister could return to Brazil, the religious factionalism had broken out in violence. A number of the Protestants fled from the colony, and Villegaignon returned to France in 1559 to find more colonists. The death of Henry II and the outbreak of the French religious wars prevented the sending of reinforcements, and in 1560 the Portuguese attacked and destroyed Fort Coligny. It was not until 1567 that all of the French were driven out of the region. Further French efforts to colonize Brazil were made until 1615, but farther north toward the Amazon. The only remaining memorial to La France Antarctique is Villegaignon Island in Guanabara Bay.

It appears to have been widely known that Villegaignon's expedition was heavily manned by Protestants, and Henry presumably ought to have been aware of it. Does that mean that Henry, at least tacitly, acquiesced in a plan to settle the Huguenots in the New World? It is a possibility, since the major reason why future kings refused to allow them to migrate to the colonies was the fear that they would cooperate with the Protestant enemies of France. That threat surely did not hold in regard to Spain and Portugal; French Protestants would have been ardently determined to defend themselves against those Catholic powers.

To some extent, such speculation about Henry's intent in regard to the colony in Brazil is bolstered by his general attitude of "out of sight, out of mind" in regard to the Protestants. If such was indeed his attitude, several incidents in Paris, literally under the nose of the king, had to have vastly increased his concern. On September 5, 1557, some 400 "Lutherans" assembled in a house on the rue Saint-Jacques to celebrate the Lord's Supper. They were attacked by students of a nearby *collège* of theology, and municipal authorities were called out to end the tumult. Some 120 to 140 persons were arrested. "Amongst the prisoners were about 20 gentlewomen, some of them of great importance by reason of their nobility, but amongst the men there was no person of quality, though some friars, nuns, and other low people formed part of the congregation."[24]

Occurring less than a month after the disaster at Saint-Quentin,

the assembly probably reflected the situation after the defeat, either to pray for the realm, as Beza stated, or to take advantage of the king's weakness and preoccupation of the moment. Henry, clearly shocked by this manifestation of disregard for his authority, ordered the full machinery of the local court systems in motion to interrogate the prisoners. Both the *lieutenant criminel* and the *lieutenant civil* were put to work, confusing the distinction between the two. Because the event had occurred in Paris, "capital of our realm, we being in it," the king ordered the creation of a special commission of the parlement made up of two presidents and sixteen councillors, to hear the cases. Contrary to standard procedure, the *lieutenant civil* also took part in the deliberations of the panel. The parlement protested, and Henry agreed to withdraw him. Henry's handling of the legal aspects of this affair demonstrated again his willingness to ignore the usual procedures and create new ones to expedite the trying of heresy cases, but it showed as well his pattern of reversing himself upon protest from the parlementaires.

On September 27 three death sentences were handed down and carried out, against a lawyer and a tutor, both elders in the recently organized Reformed Church of Paris, and the young widow of another elder. But the great number of cases was bogging down the judicial system, and the king was coming under considerable pressure from foreign Protestants to be lenient. Theodore Beza had requested that the Protestant cantons ask the king for clemency and remind him of their services. Their embassy arrived at the court on November 4, 1557, about the same time as one from Count Palatine. At a time when Henry desperately needed Swiss and German troops, he could not ignore them. His reply of November 7 pledged his affection for them, although it gave no hint of clemency.[25] By that time the entire parlement had taken over the cases and had ordered the execution of four more persons—a physician, a minor government official, and two students. Henry did order that he be informed of any death sentence handed down, presumably in order to prevent the execution of any one whose death might have caused problems with foreign states or French nobles. As of February 7, 1558, some twenty-five persons from the assembly remained in prison; some had abjured; and most of the younger persons had been sent to monasteries to repent. An eighth person from the affair would be executed in July 1558.

When one considers that eight persons, none of whom was wellborn, were executed out of the 120–130 who were caught at a "sacra-

mentarian" assembly, it confirms the view that Henry found his drive to extirpate heresy enormously complicated by jurisdictional disputes and considerations of social status and foreign policy. Further foreign pressure was put on him in March 1558. Upon a request from Calvin, three German princes wrote to the king expressing their concern about the heresy trials in Paris. Cardinal de Lorraine, having received prior word of their intention, had written to the princes arguing that the French heretics, being Zwinglians and Calvinists, did not merit the solicitude of the Lutheran princes. Nonetheless, they sent their letter. Since perhaps half of the royal army was at this point German, the intervention of the princes was a disconcerting development. The king promised them that he would be accommodating, and seems to have reduced the pressure on the Huguenots for a time.[26]

In May the German princes sent two envoys to the court. They brought with them a confession of faith drawn up by Calvin. Henry again promised satisfaction in the request for clemency; but at the very time he gave his reply, another popular assembly of Parisian Protestants was taking place. It was known as the *Affaire du Pré-aux-clercs* because it took place on the playing fields of the university students. According to the report of the Venetian ambassador, Michiel:

> There assembled publicly a concourse of some three to four thousand individuals, though others estimate the amount at from six to seven thousand, of every grade and condition, men and women, old and young, noblemen, plebians and artificers, who marched in dense battalions, singing aloud, in the French tongue a sort of psalmody, the precise counterpart of that which is chanted in the churches of Geneva . . . adding at the close of each psalm an invective against the pope. For their defense, not only did they have a considerable force armed with pistols and other concealed weapons, but likewise several companies of cavalry, the greater part noblemen and adherents of great personages.

Included among the notables present were Antoine de Bourbon and Jeanne d'Albret. D'Andelot was reported to have been present also. The assemblies continued for three days, each day attracting a greater number of onlookers, finally reaching 10,000. Michiel noted the "extreme audacity" of those involved and wondered how the mischief could be stopped, it "having spread so far as it has and taken such deep root in the aristocracy."[27]

Cardinal Bertrand was ordered to restore order to Paris and investigate the affair. He offered a large reward to those who informed on the participants, but only about a hundred persons, all of the lower classes, were arrested. The authorities proceeded "with great consideration by reason of the quality and quantity of the great personages who openly favor similar opinions."[28]

The coincidence of the embassy from the German princes, the Affaire du Pré-aux-clercs, and the arrest of François d'Andelot infuriated Henry, and his anger was increased by reports that Antoine de Bourbon and the Protestants were continuing to solicit the support of the Germans for their cause. When he heard of the efforts of a civic leader of Metz to persuade the German princes to ask Henry for freedom of conscience, he was reported to have raged: "Do these people think they can tear my crown off my head?"[29] Very shortly after the Affaire du Pré-aux-clercs, Henry is said to have sworn to free himself of "this Lutheran scum," if he could get his foreign affairs in order. According to Claude Haton the open activity of the Protestants at Meaux moved him to threaten to burn them in their houses and scour the ground.[30] Since, however, Henry had just ordered Guise to attack Thionville, he dared not put into action any designs against the Protestants. The next year until the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis saw few heresy trials and executions.

The evidence continued to mount that Henry regarded the well-born as being above suspicion of heresy. He asked Antoine de Bourbon if he had been at the Pré-aux-clercs. Bourbon replied that he had gone there as an onlooker and defied anyone to show that he had done anything contrary to his dignity as a prince. Henry was so satisfied by the answer that he assigned him the confiscations in the provinces of the southwest.[31] D'Andelot, having been completely restored to favor, was made a knight of the Order of Saint Michael in October 1558, and the collar of the order was also offered to the Lutheran duke of Saxony. The duke refused it because accepting it required attendance at Mass, which d'Andelot did do.[32]

There was yet another powerful reason for Henry's determination to destroy the Reformation in France. In August of either 1557 or 1558 a young man named Caboche, who worked as a scribe in the royal chancery, tried to assassinate the king as he left the Sainte-Chapelle after Mass.[33] Shouting "Ha, Defiler. I must kill you!" or according to another version, "Stop, king! God has commanded me to kill you!" Caboche rushed at the king with his sword, aiming for

his stomach. Henry avoided the thrust by stepping backward, and his guards disarmed the man. They wanted to kill him on the spot, but the king ordered him taken to the prison in the Conciergerie. Henry returned to the Louvre thoroughly shaken.

According to Claude Haton, the attack on the royal person was part of a Protestant conspiracy to destroy a tyrant who persecuted the True Church. To that end Caboche had been promised a good sum of money. Haton also attributed the quick execution of the would-be assassin—by midafternoon the same day—to Protestant sympathizers at the highest levels of the court who wished to prevent him from revealing the conspiracy.[34] Henry wished to interrogate the prisoner but was surprised to find that he was already dead. One does not have to subscribe to Haton's conspiracy theory to recognize that a belief that such a plot existed was a plausible reaction to the event. Certainly, the attempt would be seen as a consequence of the presence of heresy, which in the opinion of the orthodox always encouraged sedition. Only a lunatic or a heretic would strike at God's anointed. The tenor of the times was such that the ardent Catholics would have preferred to believe that Caboche was a heretic. (For a further discussion, see appendix D.)

Henry clearly needed peace if he hoped to deal with heresy with the freedom and force that was needed. Already, in May 1558, he had expressed himself on the point; thus the influence of Montmorency on the decisions of the fall of 1558 to make peace may not have been as decisive as often argued. Having made peace in April 1559, Henry began to mobilize his resources against the Huguenots. The decision to use the full range of power available to the monarchy against Protestantism seems to have been largely Henry's. It is true that Montmorency had resumed his full authority immediately upon his return to the court in December 1558, as the new English ambassador Throckmorton reported the following June 7: "He rules all here as much as he ever did."[35] But while the constable was a sincere and conservative Catholic, he never had been associated with a policy of violent repression of heresy, and there is no evidence that he had changed. Furthermore, Montmorency had to be aware that all three of his beloved nephews were, at the very least, sympathetic to Protestantism. Throckmorton wrote on May 30, 1559, that the admiral had conducted him to Nôtre-Dame but had slipped away without hearing Mass.[36]

It is a commonplace in histories from the era that Cardinal de Lor-

raine was the dominant force responsible for the policy of repression. The sources from the spring of 1559, however, suggest that he had not completely recovered his credit with the king. Similarly, the roles of Diane de Poitiers and Saint-André in urging repression have been emphasized. The papal legate did note the attitude of Diane in his report of April 1, 1559: "She is full of the best zeal" on the question of purging the realm of heresy. The legate, encouraged by the response he received from the major figures at court, urged the pope to write personal letters to the king, Montmorency, Lorraine, Bertrand, and Diane.[37] Nonetheless, the problem of demonstrating the direct influence of the Grande Sénéschalle on policy decisions remains, as it has for the entire reign.

Others at the court who had some impact on Henry were his wife and his oldest son. The legate reported Catherine as responding favorably to his words on the need to eradicate heresy. As for Francis, now king of Scotland, he had to be concerned about recent reports from there about religiously inspired revolts. Lucien Romier adds Cardinal de Tournon and the Jesuits to those with influence on Henry. The first is plausible, although Tournon had never been close to the king and had once been out of favor for several years. His letter to Henry from Rome of July 9, before he had heard of his accident, enthusiastically defended both the peace treaty and the measures the king had taken against the Protestants. As for the Jesuits, Romier's argument that they were a powerful influence on the king's thinking is highly implausible. Although Henry did draw up, at the request of the Cardinal de Lorraine, a *lettre de jussion* to force the Parlement of Paris to permit their establishment in France, he seems to have had little to do with them, and they had little influence at the court. Even the arrival of the capable Ponce Cogordan at Paris in November 1558 did not change the situation that quickly, since he was then in disfavor with his superiors.[38]

Ever since the battle of Saint-Quentin, Henry had been acting far more as his own man. The return of the constable did not change that, even if he took over the more routine matters of government. Henry certainly was encouraged by those around him in his policy toward heresy, but the campaign to destroy Protestantism was largely Henry's.

Henry's resolve was made more firm with the news in April 1559 that the well-respected bishop of Nevers, Jacques Spifame, had fled to Geneva. In 1558 Henry had ordered an investigation into the charge

that Spifame had said "Receive the symbol of the Body of Christ" while giving communion. Before the investigation was completed, Spifame resigned his bishopric and fled to Calvin's city.[39] It is true that Henry had ignored the apostasy of at least two other bishops before Spifame, but the latter was from a wealthy Parisian family that had made large loans to the monarchy, making his defection a far greater threat to the monarchy.

It seemed to the king that the Parlement of Paris had become a serious obstacle to his goal of eradicating heresy. The parlement's objections and delaying tactics in registering edicts of repression and its reduction of sentences of convicted heretics were increasingly irritating to him. Henry had too much respect for the institution to change drastically the way it handled cases, but he expected it to purge itself of the suspect members who were promoting leniency and impeding the sentencing of suspects. The procedure for self-correction in the parlement was known as the *mercuriale*, taking place one Wednesday every three months, and it was supposed to be a routine but secret affair. It was largely intended to deal with disagreements over the handling of cases of any sort and disputes over jurisdiction among the several chambers.

Henry and several of the more conservative presidents saw it as a way to purge the court of its more liberal members. The event that triggered the demand for a *mercuriale* on the problem of heresy occurred in early March 1559, when the Chamber of the Tournelle under President Pierre Séguier reduced three death sentences to exile from France. Those who had levied the death sentences were enraged, as were Cardinal de Lorraine and the king. Lorraine went before the court to protest the lighter sentences and accused the magistrates of evading their responsibilities by returning accused heretics to the courts of the bishops, where they were usually released. It was an interesting comment on the lack of attention on the part of the bishops to their duties.[40]

On April 26 the parlement initiated a special *mercuriale* to investigate charges that some of its members favored the heretics and to settle the disputes over heresy jurisdiction among the chambers. In the meetings that continued through May several magistrates revealed opinions that were suspect. On June 7 two of the conservative presidents informed Henry of that fact. According to the *Mémoires de Vieilleville*, Cardinal de Lorraine strongly urged the king to appear in person in the court to see to its cleansing. He asked Henry how

it would appear to the Spanish king and the duke of Alba if he did not purge the corruption from his court, infected with heresy down to the ushers and clerks. Henry then agreed to attend the session the next day.[41]

All of the major courtiers and a company of royal archers went with the king on June 10 to the Salle des Augustins, where the parlement was sitting because the Palais was being decorated for the weddings. After taking the royal seat before the court, Henry gave a short address in which he declared that now, with peace in hand, he was determined to root out heresy.[42] He proclaimed his dissatisfaction with the prosecution of heretics up to that time and wanted to hear the advice of the magistrates on how best to proceed.

The procedure of the *mercuriale* had an important impact on the events that followed. The magistrates proceeded by seniority, and by the time Henry attended, only a handful of junior members had yet to speak. Several of the earlier speakers had already raised suspicions among conservative members with their calls for leniency, church reform, and a general council. It was the misfortune of several of the youngest and least orthodox magistrates to take their turn in the presence of the king. Claude Viole and Louis Du Faur set the tone by enumerating the abuses in the church and calling for a free general council. Du Faur was even bold enough to recall the words of the prophet Elias to King Achob: "It is you who trouble Israel" (I Kings 18:17–18). The boldest was Anne Du Bourg, a member of the court for only eighteen months. Du Bourg, who later acknowledged having received Easter communion in the Reformed Church of Paris, advocated suspension of all heresy trials until a council had met. He warned the king on the evil of burning at the stakes those whose only crime was to call on the name of Christ while adulterers, blasphemers, and murderers escaped punishment.

Henry became extremely angry at Du Bourg's words; it is assumed that he took the reference to adulterers as an attack on himself.[43] He conferred with the presidents of the parlement and demanded to see the full record of the previous sessions of the *mercuriale*, violating the traditional secrecy of the proceedings. After that he ordered the arrests of Du Faur and Du Bourg, certainly for the hardly subtle attacks on him. According to several Huguenot authors, Henry swore to see Du Bourg burned alive before his eyes. However, none of the immediate sources mention such an oath. The English ambassador, who reported Montmorency's words to Du Bourg, "Vous faictes

la bravade," made no reference to it.[44] It seems plausible that the Protestant writers, recalling how Henry was killed by being struck in the eye, could not resist a small invention to emphasize the obvious moral of how God punished the king for persecuting the saints.[45]

In the afternoon of June 10 Cardinal de Lorraine and the ultra-conservative magistrates prevailed on Henry to order the arrest of six more suspect members. One was Viole, who had spoken before the king; among the others, who had made their presentations previously, was Paul de Foix, a relative of the d'Albrets. Three of the accused escaped and went into hiding.

Throckmorton, who wrote a lengthy report for his government three days later, proposed a number of explanations for the events of June 10: to please King Philip and the duke of Savoy, to give great terror to others if such great men as magistrates of the parlement could be arrested, to raise a great deal of money from the goods of those who will be condemned. The Englishman added what he thought were important reasons: undercutting President Séguier, who was a close adviser of the constable, a motive attributed to the Guises; and preventing the Protestants from presenting their confession of faith to the king while the Spanish party was in Paris for the weddings.[46]

The English ambassador regarded this last point as being of major importance, since on May 26 the first national synod of the French Reformed Church had convened in Paris. The small but dedicated body of persons present had drawn up a confession of faith that several noblemen apparently intended to present to Henry during the marriage festivities.[47] The king seems to have received word of that project and was determined to prevent it in order not to be embarrassed before the duke of Alba.

The king continued to be deeply involved in the religious problems, meeting with the papal legate for the entire morning of June 12. The proceedings against Du Bourg and the other accused magistrates began on June 19, with the appointment of a commission by the king. It included several senior members of the parlement, the bishop of Paris, and a theologian of the Sorbonne. Ultimately, Du Bourg would be convicted and executed, partly on the argument that it would be an affront to the memory of the dead Henry II if he were acquitted.

In the last weeks of his life Henry made it clear that he intended to take a much more active part in eradicating heresy. He was reported as planning to go to the southwest provinces after the marriage festivi-

ties to lead the royal forces against Protestant strongholds in person, having been told that "Lower Normandy, Poitou, Limousin, Saintonge and almost the whole of Guienne and Gascony are freely exercising the Lutheran rites."[48] He was also making plans to strengthen greatly the French forces in Scotland to aid Marie de Guise against the Calvinists there. Schemes for an attack on Geneva were also under discussion, although hopes that Philip II would join were dashed by his fear of threatening his supply of Swiss mercenaries and the free passage of Spanish troops across the Alps.[49]

Had he lived, Henry might well have truly merited his reputation in history as the great persecutor of French Protestantism. As it was, however, with his death barely a month after these resolutions to eradicate heresy, Henry's policy toward Protestantism appears inconsistant and vacillating. He was quick to make allowances for the wellborn and constantly distracted by foreign intrigue and war. The Reform was, at the end of his reign, far stronger and better organized than it had been in 1547.

16 REQUIESCAT IN PACE

After the *mercuriale*, Henry turned his attention almost entirely to the upcoming weddings, but in early June 1559 there were several other problems that required his attention. Because any final decisions were put on hold until after the weddings, it is not clear how Henry planned to deal with these matters.

One problem was the constant rumor that the new Holy Roman Emperor, Ferdinand I, who had not been a party to the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis, was preparing a force of 20,000 men to recapture Metz for the Empire. A sum of 6,000 écus was sent to bolster the defenses of the city; the French regarded the threat of an attack on the city as very real.[1] Henry was also concerned with the dismantling of the forts in Savoy, Piedmont, and Corsica, and the return of their garrisons as required by the peace treaty, despite the very vocal opposition of his soldiers in those lands.[2]

The financial affairs of the realm also required attention. Fraud and shoddy bookkeeping had resulted in a deficit of "several millions of francs since the Constable's absence." The receivers and treasurers were suspected of having embezzled much of that sum.[3] The enormous debt that had been accumulated in the wars may have reached 43 million livres at his death, of which 16 million had been raised from the Grand Parti at the high interest rate of 16 percent. The city of Paris alone had been forced to create rentes to the sum of 3.1 million livres. Among the other forms of debts was an amount of 2,320,000 livres that was without interest.[4] The total indebtedness was about two-and-a half times the yearly income of the monarchy. Such a large proportion of the sources of revenues had been committed to repaying the loans that the monarchy could hope to have

less than 10 million livres a year available for its other expenses unless it defaulted on its debts. The privy council was said to have "sat hard" on finances on June 9, but there is no indication of how Henry intended to solve his cash flow problem.[5]

By mid-June, however, Henry's attention had turned almost exclusively to the forthcoming marriages. Besides his loyalty to his friends, the one constant of his character was his love of festivals. No other French king had as many major weddings to celebrate in as short a time or celebrated them as extravagantly. This occasion was, however, truly special. Not only would the marriages of the king's daughter and sister be celebrated, but also the representatives of Philip II were coming to swear to the peace treaty. Henry proceeded to borrow another 1.1 million écus, despite his already enormous indebtedness.[6]

In mid-May Cardinal de Lorraine had traveled to Brussels to swear the peace to Philip II, and a month later the duke of Alba headed to Paris to give Philip's oath and to serve as proxy for the Spanish king for his marriage to Princess Elisabeth. Ironically, Alba's official companions were William of Orange and Lamoral of Egmont, both of whom would soon become his mortal enemies.

According to the peace treaty, Philip had the right to decide whether to wed the princess himself or to give her to his son, Don Carlos. Immediately after the peace was agreed upon, Philip announced that he would take Henry's daughter as his third bride; there was talk of marrying Henry's youngest daughter, Marguerite, to Don Carlos. Despite the decision, contacts about a possible marriage between Philip and Elizabeth of England continued as late as May 4. The Venetian ambassador in Brussels noted that nothing would offend the French more than for Philip to cancel his French marriage for one with Queen Elizabeth.[7]

Once it was firmly settled that Philip would marry Elisabeth de Valois, Henry expressed the hope that his future son-in-law would come in person to Paris to claim his bride. Henry seems to have been deeply interested in the son of his despised enemy and was truly disappointed by Philip's curt reply that "the kings of Spain do not go after their brides." Alba was designated to be Philip's proxy. On June 4 an enormous throng of nobles and courtiers, numbering over 1,000 horsemen, left Brussels with Alba, Orange, and Egmont. They reached Paris on June 15, the same day that Emmanuel-Philibert of Savoy left Brussels for Paris to claim his bride. Upon Alba's arrival at

the Louvre, he began to prostrate himself before Henry, but the king refused to allow it, insisting on treating him as if he were Philip in person.[8]

Upon the arrival of the Spanish party, a full round of tournaments began. Henry and the French courtiers had been practicing for several weeks in order to impress their guests.[9] On June 18 the swearing of the peace took place in Nôtre-Dame, and four days later the marriage of Philip and Elisabeth was celebrated. The marriage contract called for a dowry of 400,000 livres for Elisabeth, to be paid in three installments six months apart. Henry insisted that she be treated as queen of Spain from the moment she was married, establishing for her a household made up of several of the greatest ladies of the realm. On the wedding night the grotesque ritual of the consummation of the marriage by proxy took place, in which Alba placed an uncovered foot under the bedcovers and touched the bride's foot. It would not be until January 30 of the next year that she would meet her husband in Spain.

The duke of Savoy had arrived in Paris on June 21, and on June 27 the official betrothal of Marguerite of France and the duke was done at the Tournelles. Her dowry was set at 300,000 livres. The marriage itself was scheduled for July 4.[10]

Henry could not let these great occasions pass without a grand tournament.[11] It was to last five days and take place in the rue Saint-Antoine in front of the Tournelles. The paving stones had been removed, and a great wooden amphitheater with raised boxes for the ladies built. On June 28 the dauphin's company of lances made the first jousts. On the next day the companies of *gens d'armes* of several other great nobles took to the lists. On the third day, June 30, a Friday, Henry himself entered the tournament.[12]

He had celebrated his fortieth birthday several months earlier, but he was still an imposing figure on horseback. His beard had taken on considerable gray, but he was regarded as being in fine physical shape, despite having something of a paunch. He had had, however, several bouts of vertigo in recent months, especially after strenuous exercise.[13] Historians have speculated that his accident may have been caused by vertigo brought on by fatigue. Henry was dressed in black and white to honor Diane de Poitiers, "the lady that he served," and rode a Turkish stallion that the duke of Savoy gave him. The tag of "Le Malheureux" surely was given the horse after the tournament.

Although Henry had jousted frequently in the past and as re-

cently as June 17, the portents of misfortune had become alarming. In 1555 Nostradamus had published his *Centuries*, in which one verse was taken to refer to Henry's death.[14] More directly applicable to the king and more foreboding were the predictions of Luc Gauier, the astrologer of the Medici family. He had predicted before Dauphin Francis's death that Henry would become king and that his reign would begin with a sensational duel. Thus his prediction that another duel would put an end to the reign was given credence. In a consultation made at the request of Catherine de Medici after 1547, he warned Henry about the danger of single combat in a closed field during his forty-first year. If he survived that danger, Gauier predicted that he would live to be sixty-nine years old. When Henry was informed of the prediction, he reportedly said: "It does not bother me to die at the hand of someone provided he be brave and valiant and that *gloire* remain to me." Since his royal status prohibited such a duel, Henry laughed off the prediction. The memory of the warning probably prompted the troubling dream that his wife had the night before his appearance in the tournament. She begged him not to participate, but he laughed that off as well.[15] There was not the slightest chance that he would have missed the opportunity to joust.

Joining several of the great nobles like the dukes of Guise, Nevers, and Nemours in the lists, Henry ran the prescribed three courses and against his first two opponents was adjudged the victor. In the third course, against Gabriel de Montgommery, captain of the Scottish Guards, he was shaken by the hard blow that the tall and powerful horseman had given him and was almost unhorsed.[16] Henry was determined to run against him again to make a better showing and refused to listen to those such as the queen, the duke of Savoy, and Montgommery himself, who urged him not to. As often happened when he was given unwanted advice, Henry became obstinate and ordered Montgommery to take up his lance again. At about five in the afternoon the two lancers ran at each other again. Each shattered his lance on the other, but the inexperienced Montgommery held on to his stump instead of dropping it immediately. As it glanced upward from the contact, it struck Henry's visor. The visor flew open—whether simply because of the force of the blow, or because Henry in his eagerness to joust again had forgotten to have it fastened, or because an inexperienced page had not fastened it right—and the shattered lance drove several splinters into the king's forehead over his right eye. The force and pain of the blow made Henry reel in his

saddle, and he probably would have fallen off if several nobles had not reached him immediately and lifted him off the horse. They stripped off his armor and helmet and saw the wound bleeding profusely with several splinters clearly showing. Throckmorton reported: "Marry I saw a splinter taken out of a good bigness." He further stated that Henry appeared almost benumbed and moved neither hand nor foot.

Montmorency, Guise, and several other great nobles carried Henry into the Tournelles. At the foot of the great staircase he said that he wanted to walk up, but he had to be supported by several men. Behind him another group of nobles carried the dauphin, who had fainted—a sad portent for the coming reign. Henry fainted before he reached his chamber but was briefly revived with vinegar and rose water. Before fainting again he forgave Montgommery as a valiant knight who had obeyed his command. The king said some fifteen words of prayer and struck his breast in contrition.[17]

Catherine de Medici, Montmorency, Guise, Cardinal de Lorraine, and the duke of Savoy remained with Henry through the night, "who had a very evil rest."[18] The Tournelles was sealed off, and only the highest placed nobles and the three official representatives of Philip II were permitted to enter. The best French physicians were called in, and Andreas Vesalius, the noted anatomist and physician to Philip II, was dispatched from Brussels on July 2 and arrived in Paris on July 3. Montmorency arranged for Vesalius to experiment on the head of a murder victim in Paris in order to show the constable the nature of Henry's wound.[19] The French physicians were supposed to have experimented on the heads of several executed criminals as well. Vesalius agreed with the French physicians that Henry's brain had not been pierced and expressed the opinion that he would live, but would probably lose the eye. On July 4 the English ambassador wrote to his court that Montmorency had told him that there was "good hope the king should be well shortly."[20]

For three days, July 2–4, the king did considerable talking and attended to a little state business. He asked for Montgommery, and when told that he had fled from Paris, he ordered that he be brought back at all costs to be told that the king did not blame him. On July 3 he asked for music in his chambers and made a vow to go on a pilgrimage to a shrine of the Virgin near Orléans. His physicians made him eat small pieces of bread and were pleased that the pain was not great. He also dictated a letter to the French ambassador in Rome announcing the results of the *mercuriale* and proclaiming

his intention to use royal forces to extirpate heresy.[21] Henry told the queen to proceed with the nuptials of his sister Marguerite, which were rescheduled for July 9.

Suddenly, in the evening of July 4, Henry's fever returned in full force.[22] Blood poisoning clearly had set in. By July 8 his case was hopeless, but he had enough strength to ask the dauphin to write to Philip II to call on him to protect his son and his people after his death. Francis was in the sickroom as much as his frail mental and physical constitution could bear. Presumably, Catherine de Medici was present a great deal of the time, but there is sparse mention of her presence.[23] It appears that none of the rest of Henry's family saw him after the accident. Diane de Poitiers came to the gates of the Tournelles, but Catherine had forbidden the guards to admit her.

Henry lingered on through July 9, recovering consciousness long enough to say a few last words to his son: "My son, you are going to be without your father but not without my blessing. I pray to God that you will be more fortunate than I have been." Francis fainted again and was later seen crying: "My God, how can I live if my father dies?" During the night of July 9 the physicians, convinced that desperate measures were in order, considered trepanning Henry's skull, but after removing the bandages they found so much pus that they decided it was hopeless. Meanwhile, the marriage of Marguerite de France and Emmanuel-Philibert took place in the chambers of her niece Elisabeth. Catherine was too disconsolate to attend.[24]

The next morning Henry was given the last sacraments, and at one o'clock in the afternoon he died. An autopsy done immediately afterward revealed that a splinter had indeed pierced Henry's brain, and the physicians expressed their surprise that he had lived as long as he did.[25]

His death precipitated a palace revolution almost identical to the one that had begun his reign. The major difference was that those who dominated the new king, the Guises, had already been prominent. Francis II had never liked Montmorency and had been forced by his father to call him "compère," a term of respect and affection that he clearly did not feel for the old constable.[26] Already, as Henry lay dying, the jockeying for power filled the corridors of the Tournelles. While Montmorency and his party must have expected a loss of authority when Henry died, they could not have been prepared for the nearly complete eclipse that followed. The constable, Admiral Coligny, and Saint-André were assigned to attend to the corpse of

the dead king for the forty days before the funeral. This assignment removed them from any participation in the affairs of state for that period and was a clear signal of their loss of influence. Montmorency took his loss of power with good grace. Heartbroken at the death of his friend and king, he may well have truly meant his refusal of Francis's offer to keep him at court, saying that he was old and tired.[27]

Diane de Poitiers also quickly disappeared from the court, having not been allowed to visit the dying king. Francis informed her that he had forgiven her the injuries she had caused him and his mother, but she was to live in retirement far from the court. He also ordered her to give up the jewels that Henry had given her, many of which had been taken from Anne de Pisseleu at Francis I's death. While the Guises probably had not forgiven her for her support of Montmorency in the last two years of Henry's reign, she was the mother-in-law of Claude de Guise, and they allowed her to live in quiet retirement at Anet, as Catherine also did once she became regent. Catherine did require her to give up the château of Chenonceaux and the last of the jewels she had received from Henry. Diane died in 1567.

"The house of Guise rules." So wrote Throckmorton three days after Henry's death. And it was clearly true. The cardinal was given charge of all the affairs of state, taking the signet back from the constable, and the duke received command of the military, taking all the powers of the constable except the title. Apparently on the advice of the Guises, François Olivier was recalled to his duties as chancellor, and Jean Bertrand, the friend of Diane de Poitiers, was dismissed. The royal councils were reconstituted without any of the Bourbons or Montmorencys. The Venetian ambassador noted a month later that the first thing every morning François and Charles de Guise, Olivier, and Catherine met with the king to "discuss privately all the matters of the greatest importance."[28]

Francis II stripped Coligny of his governorship of Picardy and d'Andelot of his colonelcy of the French infantry. Antoine de Bourbon, who had been in Béarn when Henry died and slowly made his way to Paris, hoped to take direction of the government as first prince of the blood. His arrival, six weeks after July 10, found the Guises solidly entrenched in power, to Antoine's great dissatisfaction. The other Bourbon princes were also complaining because of their exclusion from the royal councils. The resentment of those who were ousted from influence in this new palace revolution was a major factor in the coming civil wars.[29] The fact that Montmorency did not join with

his nephews suggests that his retirement was not a source of deep resentment on his part.

While all of the great courtiers of Henry's reign had reason to lament his demise, no one mourned him as greatly as did his widow. Catherine de Medici grieved for her husband for thirty years, always wearing black and frequently recalling his memory to her friends and family. Within a year of her own death, in early 1589, she told Henry of Navarre that she was not angry with him for having broken an appointment with her, because "it was the day when the king . . . was wounded; a wound that brought to me principally and to all the kingdom so much evil that I cannot think on that day I can do anything good."[30]

Although Throckmorton made his often-quoted remark about how the townsmen and people "do rejoice at the accident to the king, " it is probable that he was only reflecting his contacts with the Parisian Protestants. For them the fatal blow was a stroke of Divine Providence, lifting the terrible tempest of persecution.[31] For most Frenchmen the death of the king was a terrible shock. The bells of Paris, which had been ringing constantly prior to the accident, were silent throughout his death agony, and the population carried on their lives in subdued tones. Claude Haton wrote at great length describing the sorrow of the common people, even the laborers in the field, at the death of their beloved king.[32]

The obsequies of a French king were designed to provide a catharsis for the people in their sorrow at their loss, as well as to emphasize the continuity of the authority of the monarchy. They were drawn out over forty days.[33] On July 11 Henry's body was embalmed, and by custom, the heart and entrails removed. The heart was placed in an urn that was deposited at the high altar of the Church of the Celestins in Paris. His entrails were placed in a lead vessel and entombed in the sepulcher of the dukes of Orléans, also in the Church of the Celestins. The body itself was placed back in the deathbed in the Tournelles, where Montmorency and a vast number of princes, nobles, and prelates kept vigil. An effigy of the dead king was created and dressed very ornately. Laid out on a bed of honor in a *salle d'honneur* built in the park of the Tournelles, the effigy was surrounded by the symbols of royal power—the scepter, the crown, the hand of justice. On July 29 the corpse of the dead king replaced the effigy on the bed of honor, and the usual servants and courtiers were in attendance as if Henry were still alive. Meals were prepared and placed on a table,

and the food then given to the poor. Altars had been set up in the hall for the saying of requiem Masses, which were said constantly.

On August 4 the *salle d'honneur* was turned into a funeral hall draped in black. The royal corpse was placed on a funeral bier, still surrounded by the symbols of office. On August 6 the new king, with a great number of prelates and notables, came to bless his father's corpse with holy water. It was the only time that the successor was allowed to make a public appearance with the body of the dead king. Until August 11 a vast number of royal officials such as the parlementaires came to the Tournelles for the same purpose. After a last funeral Mass, the corpse was transported to Nôtre-Dame in a large, solemn procession, preceded by twenty-four criers who called for prayers for the dead king. There, the official requiem Mass was celebrated by the bishop of Paris, and the funeral oration given by Hieronimo della Rovere, bishop of Toulon.

On August 12 an enormous entourage of townspeople, clergy, and notables accompanied the coffin to the abbey-church of Saint-Denis. There, another series of funeral Masses and services were said, culminating with the final Mass of interment said by Cardinal de Lorraine, as abbot of Saint-Denis. The effigy of the king was removed from the coffin, along with the symbols of royal office, and the coffin was lowered into a vault. The various officers of the royal guards and gendarmerie and the principal officers of the court were called on, one by one, to place the insignia of their offices in the vault.[34] After everyone had done so, Montmorency, as the *grand-maître* cried, "Le Roi est Mort!" The royal herald took up the cry three times, adding "Let us all pray to God for his soul!" All went to their knees for a silent prayer for the dead king, "not without tears for having lost so good a king, so good a lord and master." After the length of time for three paternosters, Montmorency rose, retrieved the royal baton from the vault where he had placed it, and cried, "Vive le Roi!" The herald again repeated it more loudly three times and added: "Vive le Roi François, deuxième de ce nom, par la grâce de Dieu Roi de France très-chrestien!" The new reign had officially begun.

17 CONCLUSIONS

Henry II was dead at what would probably have been mid-reign, given the life spans of his forebears. One can only speculate on what he might have accomplished had he lived out his natural life, but the twelve years that he was king produced a record of achievement that serves to emphasize the loss that France suffered by his foolhardy insistence on returning to the lists on June 30, 1559.

In matters of diplomacy and war, Henry's accomplishments are obvious—the occupation of the Three Bishoprics and Calais and the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis. It is by no means certain that Henry really intended to withdraw completely from involvement in Italy, as required by the treaty, and direct French energies to the northern frontier. It was, nonetheless, the consequence of his labors, and it put the French in good position to make further gains in the north after the civil wars. The greater attention to the north was in large part a product of Henry's character, which was more interested in tangible gains like taking a fort and occupying a town. He was led in the direction where such victories were more easily gained, which in his era was to the north and east. His was not the sort of mind that thought in terms of schemes like a Franco-German confederation, which had struck the fancy of a number of humanists and diplomats. Henry's foreign policy was largely a product of pragmatism and antagonism, not imagination.

Practical thinking was also the mark of Anne de Montmorency, always the dominant influence on Henry. While the Guises had greater imagination, they usually were not able to persuade Henry to support their schemes, except for the Italian expedition of 1556 in which the payoff for the king was to have been a throne for one of his sons. Nonetheless, it is often very difficult to trace the lines of influence

on Henry. That fact is well demonstrated by the disagreement among several respected historians over which faction was responsible for the expedition into Lorraine in 1552. Some attributed the decision to the Guises, the others to Montmorency.[1] Perhaps Henry's role in these matters should be given greater emphasis, for it is clear that the king took a direct hand in decisionmaking. The constable certainly had a large part in forming Henry's decisions, even while in captivity, but that is not tantamount to saying that the king abdicated his own judgment to him.

Diane de Poitiers appears surprisingly absent from most major decisions. It is true that foreign ambassadors frequently referred to her place in Henry's heart and regarded her as very influential. Yet they rarely thought it necessary to report her views on major issues, except on the question of war or peace in late 1556. Of course, she may have been off-limits to their inquiries. Even more than Diane, Saint-André was a cipher in the diplomatic reports. On the other hand, while most of what has been written about Henry's indifference to his wife in their domestic life is accurate, he did give her a much greater role in politics than any other king of the century gave to his spouse. Catherine had a long and clearly fruitful apprenticeship in government before the king's death that served her well in the decades that followed.

The problem of the lines of influence is particularly crucial for Henry's reign because of the celebrated Montmorency-Guise feud. The feud, however, has been exaggerated as an element in decisionmaking. Certainly the two families battled bitterly for favors from the king for themselves and their clients, and more than one moment of pique was noted by observers. Nonetheless, Simon Renard seems to have been truly perceptive in his comment of 1557 that the two factions understood each other far better than they allowed it to appear. It almost appears that they had agreed to disagree on major points of policy in order to free the king from blame should whatever policy chosen go awry. Admittedly that possibility appears a little too Machiavellian for Henry's uncomplicated mind, but to treat the Montmorency-Guise contretemps as the major theme of Henry's reign, as Lucien Romier has, is to exaggerate badly the implications of their disagreements upon Henry's decisionmaking. As was suggested during the negotiations at Vaucelles, the rivalry between the constable and Cardinal de Lorraine was regarded as preventing any concessions unfavorable to France.

The issues over which the two factions argued largely involved foreign policy; concerning domestic policy it is far less apparent who advocated what. Neither Montmorency nor the Guises were the types to have been much concerned with administrative structures. It may well be that some of the secondary figures, like François Olivier and Jean Bertrand, had important roles in formulating policy regarding the functioning of the government. The fact that important changes in administration were implemented almost immediately upon Henry's accession suggests that he had formulated them before he became king and took an active part in such decisions. To a large extent, however, the administrative decisions of his reign involved rationalizing and refining the extensive changes made by Francis I. That was certainly true for the fiscal system. In enhancing and defining the office of secretary of state and creating the *siège présidial* as an intermediate court, Henry was more truly innovative and had a permanent impact on government structure. That was also true regarding the governance of conquered lands. The placing of intendants in the councils of the governors of the new provinces, with the authority to supervise the officers of the new acquisitions, established a principle that was not undermined by the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis. After the strife of the religious wars, the French monarchs again turned to Henry's offices to secure tighter control over their provinces, giving rise to the intendant of the next century. As Michel Antoine has maintained, "the true origins of the intendant ought to be sought in the governors' councils" created by Henry in such lands as Piedmont and Corsica. The twelve years of Henry's reign were, therefore, a period of solid, while not spectacular, accomplishment in government, extending to such matters as the planting of tall elms along the main roads of the realm.[2]

Despite being probably the most medieval in his outlook of any king since the end of the Hundred Years' War, loving to joust and deeply admiring the *gens d'armes*, Henry oversaw a number of key developments in the French military that marked its final transformation from a medieval force to an early modern one. The artillery was reorganized and integrated more closely into the army. Siegecraft was advanced through the appearance of Monluc's *arrière-coin*, which led in a direct line to Vauban's three parallels of the next century. The *trace italienne* began to appear in the new French forts, most notably at Rocroi, which needed little modernization before it played its role in one of the major battles of the Thirty Years' War

in 1643. Henry's insistence on attacking Calais in the winter was also highly unmedieval, although its success did not establish war as a winter sport. In the Dutch War of 1672, however, Louis XIV was advised specifically to follow his predecessor's example in order to reduce the defensive advantage that the wet terrain of Holland gave its defenders. The failure of the French cavalry at Saint-Quentin forced Henry to lose some of his faith in the armored man-of-war, and he began to shift to light cavalry, recruiting 8,000 German pistoleers and encouraging the training of French light horse.

It was, however, the nature of Henry's death that struck the hardest blow to the medieval tradition. Jousting was outlawed at the court, and the romances disappeared there. Both had served to emphasize the traditional skills and values of the medieval knight. With the old tradition of knightly combat in disfavor, without the opportunity to practice their skills in tournaments and impress the noble ladies, and without the romances to fire their imaginations, the nobles let the old style of combat die out. In the rest of Europe many of these developments in the military had already occurred, but it was in France, the birthplace of the feudal system, the knight, and the romance, where the system and the code of medieval warfare had lasted the longest. Certainly, the final demise of medieval warfare would have occurred rather soon anyway, for the trends were irreversible; but the decisions made by Henry II and the manner of his death definitely accelerated them.

The king left a record of achievement in government and the military that would be useful for his successors in the next century, but his immediate legacy to his sons was far less desirable: virtual bankruptcy and civil war. Royal finances were in a terrible state in mid-1559. The royal debt of perhaps as high as 43 million livres was between two and three times the annual income of the monarchy. What, if anything, Henry had decided prior to his death to do to solve the crisis is unknown, but there is no question that he would have found it easier to impose the hard choices necessary than his inexperienced sons did.

The financial crisis helped contribute to the outbreak of the wars of religion, but Henry's unfortunate and entirely unnecessary death was a more immediate factor. He left the throne in turn to his three weak and inexperienced sons, who lacked his ability and standing with the nobility. It is difficult to imagine Condé, the Châtillons, and other prominent Huguenot nobles taking the field against Henry,

even if he had continued the policy of religious repression of his last months. Certainly his sons did not have the claim on the affections of the warrior class that Henry had. The Venetian ambassador, Michele Suriano, told his government in 1562 that Francis II had put the kingdom entirely in the hands of the Guises and had had nothing to do with the other great nobles; thus the big men of the realm were supporting the Protestant party.[3]

While the great nobility probably would have remained loyal to Henry had he lived, his decision to use force to obtain religious conformity left his son with the beginnings of religious rebellion at the lower levels of society. By June 1559 the Huguenots in the provinces had already been organizing and arming themselves in anticipation of a large-scale drive by the king to crush religious dissent in the southwest. Sporadic violence had already occurred in the south, and any effort to destroy the Reformation by military means would have required a major effort and entailed much hard fighting. Nonetheless, a successful conclusion to such a campaign should not have been beyond the reach of an experienced and determined king in 1559 or 1560.

One must ask, however, how long Henry would have kept to such a resolution to eradicate heresy. He has been called vacillating in his conduct of foreign policy, but that designation is far more accurate in regard to his religious policy. Confronted by two rival institutions, the episcopacy and the parlement, which claimed primacy in judging heresy, Henry could not decide which to give final jurisdiction. On several occasions during his reign he issued decrees strengthening the authority of one of these two institutions, only to retreat in the face of loud protests of the other. He then proceeded to issue a new edict that largely undid the changes of the previous one. Such vacillation badly undermined the effectiveness of the heresy laws and tribunals and permitted Protestantism to flourish under Henry, despite his reputation for severe orthodoxy. Eventually, some blatant public display of heresy would again shock him into responding with a new and harsher edict and a declaration that he would see to the end of religious dissent in the realm. It was at such a point that matters stood at the moment of his death.

Whether he would have held to his resolve or allowed himself to be distracted again cannot be answered, but it was usually war that served as the distraction diverting him from pursuing the Protestants. No war was on the immediate horizon in 1559, although there

was some anxiety in England over a possible conflict with France, and the French thought Emperor Ferdinand was threatening war over Lorraine. Suriano, reporting in 1562, blamed Henry for the spread of the poison, as he called it, for being "busy with war and was also more pleasure-seeking than was suitable for a king. Henry ignored the problem and did not take the pains that his father did to keep the kingdom purged of the disease."[4] It is noteworthy that a well-informed diplomat of the time would regard Francis as more determined to eradicate heresy than Henry, even if it was probably not true.

Henry passed to his immediate successor both the policy of repression and the advisers who most firmly had advocated it. He might have been successful in implementing the policy, but his inexperienced son most certainly was not. The policy of repression was abandoned by Catherine de Medici once she became regent for Charles IX. By that time, however, decisions on religion made by Henry had begun to bear bitter fruit, and civil strife was well under way.

Although Henry took harsh, albeit inconsistent, measures against the Protestants, he had little interest in reforming the Catholic church to solve the problems that were encouraging the spread of Protestantism. Except for ineffective edicts that the Catholic clergy were to reside in their sees and curates, he was clearly hostile to the currents of Catholic reform. His motives in selecting whom to support in the papal elections were entirely political, and his relationship with the papacy was largely political as well. Although he did agree to the call for a general council that appeared in the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis, he had for the previous twelve years worked energetically to scuttle the convocation at Trent and prevent its resumption. His appointments to the episcopacy were in several respects the least worthy of the sixteenth century. His episcopal nominees included the highest proportion of lawyers and those without a university education, and the lowest of theologians and members of religious orders, of any king of the century. A third of his bishops resigned their sees, usually taking substantial pensions on the revenues of their bishoprics. The constant disruption that the frequent changes at the highest level of the church caused in the administration of the sees clearly aided the growth of Protestantism.[5]

Henry also ignored the apostasy or obvious sympathy of six or eight bishops to the Reformation until the flight of Jacques Spifame in April 1559 shocked him into recognition of the presence of het-

erodoxy in the episcopate. Yet after Spifame fled to Geneva, the king hoped to replace him with a court preacher whom the papal Curia later rejected as a suspect heretic. Even as Henry attended the *mercuriale* of 1559, he sought to persuade the pope to appoint the bishop of Amiens as legate to Scotland, despite his reputation as a Protestant sympathizer.

While it may well have been too late for Henry II to prevent the appearance of a dynamic Protestant party in France by active support of church reform and appointment of worthy and reform-minded prelates, he added to the problems of the French church by continuing to use it as a font of political patronage and refusing to recognize the need for reform. His several edicts requiring clerical residency went unobserved because the type of prelate he appointed to high church office involved diplomats, officials, and sycophants, not true churchmen. By both commission and omission Henry contributed substantially to the religious crisis that broke over the heads of his successors. By insisting on running again in the lists, he ensured that an inexperienced youth would be wearing the crown when the storm hit.

Because the violence of the religious wars followed almost immediately upon Henry's death, historians have seen his reign as the "sinister vestibule to the wars of religion," to use Jules Michelet's loaded phrase. His considerable accomplishments in government, war, diplomacy, and the military, and as a patron of artists and poets, have thus been largely overlooked.[6]

As a king and as a person, Henry II was a bundle of contradictions. In outlook still largely medieval, he oversaw a number of important developments that gave a more modern bent to the French government and military. He was a loving parent, his best characteristic, but a cold and indifferent husband; he was most loyal to his friends but unforgiving to his enemies; he was easily swayed by his advisers, yet often obstinate and stubborn. It was this last flaw that led to his death in the jousting lanes. The four decades following his death saw the near destruction of the monarchy and of nearly all for which he had labored. Had he lived out the natural course of his life, French history may well been changed considerably; and perhaps his accomplishments, not his failures, would have become the focus of attention of historians.

APPENDIX A

The Monetary System

In the sixteenth century the French monetary system was, as were those of all of Europe, very complicated and confusing. The *écu d'or soleil*, also known as the *écu au soleil*, was the principal and largest gold coin in circulation in France. It had roughly the same value as the *scudi* of the papal Curia. Most accounts, however, were expressed in terms of the *livre tournais*, a monetary unit of account. Its rival, the *livre parisis*, had largely disappeared by 1547. All references to the livre in this work are to the *tournais*. The livre (l) was divided in 20 sous (s), which in turn were divided into 12 deniers (d), 240 d to the livre. No such coins actually existed. In 1519 the écu was pegged at two livres; it rose to 2.25 l in 1533; to 2.50 l in 1550 (at which time the *henri* replaced the écu for ten years); and was set at 3 l in 1575. The monetary reform of 1577 declared that the écu was to be the unit of account as well as a real coin, but most accounts continued to be expressed in livres. Henry IV returned to the livre as the unit of account in 1602. Silver coins included the *franc*, worth one livre, and the *teston* and *quart d'écu*, both worth one-fourth of an écu or 15 sous at the rate established in 1577.[1] There were also a number of coins of silver mixed with copper used largely for retail trade. The most common coin in circulation was the *douzain*, worth 12 d.

APPENDIX B

The Decisions of the *Chambre Ardente*

The *arrêts* on heresy found in Weiss, *Chambre ardente*, covered the periods May 1548, to April 1549 and November 1549 to March 1550 and totaled 366. Many named more than one defendant, but, on the other hand, many deal with an accused person a second and even a third time. A number of *arrêts* deal with the procedures of the tribunal, and several note crimes not religious in nature. Finally, five *arrêts* involve cases of false testimony. In all, 325 persons were noted as charged with religious offenses. Torture was ordered for thirty-six persons to determine their guilt; six of them were eventually ordered to be executed. Table 1 shows the disposition of the cases of religious offenses.

J. H. M. Salmon has analyzed the occupations of those who were called before the *chambre ardente* as accused heretics.[1] His findings are shown in table 2. Twenty-nine women were also among the accused. Five of the women were condemned to death, but none of the nobles were. Artisans and small shopkeepers not only provided the largest proportion of the accused; they also made up the largest group of condemned. Eight persons condemned to death and identified by profession in the *arrêts* were artisans. A ninth was a player of instruments.

Although the *Livre des habitants* of the city of Geneva reveals that there was substantial migration from France to that city during Henry's reign, there are only twenty names on the rolls of new residents registered in Geneva that correspond to names of individuals called before the *chambre ardente*.[2] Only nine of them can be identified with certainty by home town and/or occupation as the same persons. One of the immigrants, in fact, appears to have been con-

TABLE 1 Cases heard by the *chambre ardente*

Disposition of cases	Type of crime					Total
	"Lutheran"	"Sacramentarian"	Heresy and sacrilege	Blasphemy	Other or unspecified charges	
Executed without *retentum*[a]	0	0	4	1	1	6
Executed with *retentum*[b]	1	6	20	1	3	31
Whipped, goods confiscated, banished	2	2	9	6	2	21
Whipped only	4	1	9	3	3	20
Public penance	10	5	15	21	16	67
Released with admonition	1	0	3	9	18	31
Acquitted	4	0	29	3	3	39
Case continued without resolution by March 1550	7	0	51	25	22	105
Total	29	14	143[c]	69	68	320 / 323

Source: Weiss, *Chambre ardente*.

[a] Execution by burning mandated.

[b] Execution by hanging, if the convicted heretic admitted his errors. It is not clear how many persons in this category actually took advantage of this means to procure a less painful death.

[c] This category includes three additional persons given only a fine.

TABLE 2 Occupation of persons indicted by the *Chambre Ardente*, 1547–50

Occupation	Number
Regular clergy	30
Secular clergy	25
Seigneurs	6
Royal officers	14
Advocats and procureurs	9
Merchants	16
Artisans and small shopkeepers	60

Source: Salmon, *Society in Crisis*, p. 87.

demned to death in Paris. Five persons condemned to exile appear on the Genevan registers.

The place of origin is noted for about a third of the accused. The *bailliages* represented in any number are few: Amiens, 30 persons; Paris, 24; Chartres, 10; Langres, 9; Sens, 8; Riom, 6; Blois, 6. It must be kept in mind, however, that the territory under the jurisdiction of the *chambre ardente* comprised only about a third of the realm.

APPENDIX C

The Attack on Douai, January 6, 1557

Did Henry II order Coligny to attack Douai, thus bearing responsibility for breaking the Truce of Vaucelles? Many modern historians, especially Coligny's biographers, have taken as proof of it the unequivocal statements by Jacques-Auguste de Thou and Agrippa d'Aubigné that the king gave the admiral an order to assault the enemy stronghold.[1] Both de Thou and d'Aubigné, however, wrote their accounts nearly a half-century later. I have not been able to find any earlier sources that clearly identified the king as responsible. Sources from close to the time of the event—the Venetian and the Spanish ambassadors, François Rabutin, the *Mémoires de Vieilleville*—provide various explanations for the attack, but none suggest that Henry ordered it.[2]

More significantly, the letters exchanged between the principal figures of the French government do not support the proposition, but neither do they provide clear evidence to settle the dispute in one way or the other. Still extant are several letters from Henry to the duc de Guise from both before and after January 6. It is plausible to assume that if Henry had intended an action to take place in Picardy, he would have informed Guise, but the letters give no hint. Nor do those written after January 6 suggest that the attack was done on royal orders.[3] On the other hand, two letters from Coligny to d'Humières, governor of Péronne, from shortly before the attack, do not give any indication of an impending action.[4] That fact suggests that the decision was made very close to January 6, regardless of who made it.

Two days after the assault on Douai, Coligny reported to the king. He began the letter by saying that nothing displeased him more than to have to tell him what had happened "at the place whence I come."[5]

The admiral then went on to say that the courier bearing the letter would give a full report—an excellent example of how that practice can frustrate the modern historian. He did state that he would not make a long discourse on the matter because the turmoil from "this enterprise" had already commenced, including complaints from some local nobles about losses of property and goods to the enemy. Coligny's attitude in the letter, which is the same in his other letters of the period, is one of neither blaming anyone else for the attack nor accepting responsibility himself for the decision.

On January 9 Montmorency wrote to d'Humières at Péronne that "my nephew the admiral has failed in his enterprise"; d'Humières therefore must be on the alert for what may happen next. Coligny, writing to d'Humières the next day, referred to "the enterprise made on the enemy" but again gave no hint of who made the decision. In the next several days Montmorency sent two more letters to Péronne with essentially the same content: the king has ordered me to tell you not to do anything on your part until we see what the enemy will do. Meanwhile, d'Humières was told to release any prisoners taken and return any goods.[6]

The last pertinent letter was sent by Coligny to d'Humières on January 17.[7] He clearly was very angry at both the order to return prisoners and goods to the other side and the fact that Montmorency had written directly to one of his captains, rather than going through him as proper procedure called for. Coligny asked whether those at the court could know as well as he the affairs of his province or learn as quickly as he what his neighbors were up to. He went on to say that the enemy had burned a village on the French side of the border, but it is not clear whether that event occurred before or after January 6. Montmorency's actions and Coligny's pique have several possible explanations. Lilliane Crété has taken them as evidence that the king and the constable ignored Coligny in decisionmaking and demonstrated their ingratitude to him for having followed orders against his better judgment.[8] On the other hand, Montmorency's actions can be seen as revealing royal anger at Coligny, whether for failing in the attack or making the decision by himself is undeterminable. Coligny's letter does demonstrate his strong sense of the autonomy of the provincial governor and suggests that he was capable of making major decisions affecting his province on his own.

The cumulative evidence does not reveal a definite answer to the question of who decided to attack Douai, but it seems to me that

the documentation supports more heavily the inference that Henry did not give the order to Coligny. The king and the constable were clearly upset at the timing of the attack, at the least, and were actively involved in damage control afterward. With his best troops and captains in Italy with Guise, Henry would have been foolhardy to stir up action on the northern frontier. But, of course, the same point applies to Coligny. While the evidence seems not to support the existence of a direct order to assault Douai, it does not rule out the possibility of a long standing order to Coligny to take advantage of any weaknesses in the enemy's position on the frontier.

In the months that followed, both the king and the constable treated the admiral rather coldly, and perhaps his valiant but quite rash actions at Saint-Quentin may have been an effort to get back into their good graces. But regardless of whether such is true, it does not reveal whether their attitude was sparked by the failure of the attack on Douai or by a solo decision by Coligny to strike at the fortress.

In all, the matter is an interesting historical problem, because it reveals how difficult it is to find precise information on decision-making during Henry's reign, despite the existence of a rather large number of pertinent letters. It does seem, however, that the evidence does not support the conclusion that Henry II gave Coligny a direct order to attack Douai.

APPENDIX D

The Assassination Attempt on Henry II

There are a number of questions and problems concerning the episode of Caboche's attack on Henry II that must be resolved if historians are to include it as an event in his life. The first is the paucity of references to it in contemporary or near-contemporary sources. Claude Haton's *Mémoires* have the fullest discussion of the attempt on the king's life, but his emphasis on the attack as motivated by a Protestant conspiracy dictates great care in using his account. If it were the unique source, it might well have to be discounted. But two other sources refer to the attempt. Both Jean de Serres and Jean de Glaumeau were Protestants.[1] Their much shorter versions essentially summarized the information on the attack found in Haton, although neither mentioned a conspiracy of any sort. Serres used the name Caboche; Glaumeau did not. The memoirs of both Haton, from Provins in Champagne, and Glaumeau, from Bourges, remained in manuscript form and were very obscure until their publication in the nineteenth century. It is highly unlikely that either could have drawn the story from the other, or that Serres took it from either. A fourth source that very briefly mentioned the attempt was Pierre Mathieu, in his *Histoire de la mort de Henri IV*, who could have very easily drawn on Serres.[2]

Given what appear to be certainly two, if not three, corroborating sources on the fact of the attempt on Henry's life, the conclusion that it occurred is appropriate. There are, however, other problems. One is Caboche's social status. Haton called him *un gentilhomme* and stated that he was degraded from the nobility before he was hanged. Serres and Glaumeau referred to him simply as a young man who because of his fine hand, worked in the royal chancellery as a clerk. The name Caboche appears in the recherches de noblesse of the seventeenth

century for four different families, including a Picard family that claimed to have as an ancestor one Adrien Caboche, *ecuyer*, alive in 1540. Ivan Cloulas has found a reference to a heresy trial in Meaux for Gilles and Jean Caboche, who were sentenced to death in 1556. He suggests that Adrien Caboche was probably a younger brother of the two, who was seeking revenge.[3]

Perhaps the most confusing aspect of the story is its date. Haton clearly placed it in 1558. In speaking of the death of Henry II, he referred to the attack of Caboche *l'an dernier passé*, and it is placed among events of 1558. However, neither Henry nor Coligny, two principals of Haton's version, were in Paris in the summer of 1558. Serres stated that the event occurred shortly after the battle of Saint-Quentin, and Glaumeau put it in August or September of 1557. Henry was in Paris after the defeat at Saint-Quentin, but he was there in the summer of 1556, as well. Coligny was absent from Paris from August 1556 to April 1559. Either the attempt occurred in August 1556, or Coligny was not involved in the condemnation of Caboche.[4] Haton placed himself in Paris at the time and should not have been mistaken in the date or whether Coligny was at the court. Perhaps his anti-Protestant bias led him to include the admiral in the story to discredit him.

Most of the details of the judgment against Caboche and his execution come from Haton, although Serres and Glaumeau both confirm that he was quickly hanged. It likely was the speed with which he was dispatched that explains the paucity of references to the event. Furthermore, he was executed in private, according to Glaumeau, because he made *des propos grans et merveilleux*, a further hint that Caboche was a Protestant. Haton said that the magistrates of the parlement who passed judgment on him were sworn to secrecy. The speed and the secrecy would explain why there is no record of his trial in the records of the parlement, in which the editor of Haton's *Mémoires* searched in vain, and why the references to the event are so few.

Given the corroboration from three very different sources, it can be concluded that there indeed was an attempt on Henry II as he went to or came from Mass at the Sainte-Chapelle at some point in his last three years, but probably 1557. The further details, as largely supplied by Haton, must await corroboration from other sources, as unlikely as finding any new ones at this point in time would be.

APPENDIX E

Maps



Northern Italy in the sixteenth century


Lo Biocco
MILAN
Morignono
Povia
PIACENZA
PARMA
Trent
MANTUA
Padua
VENICE
Po
FERRARA
BOLOGNA
N
0 25 50
Miles
FLORENCE
PISA
SIENNA
Montolcino
Marche d'Ancona

France in 1547

Places of captivity of French princes in northern Spain (Fortresses used as prisons of the princes are indicated by an *.)

Northern France in 1547



Calais pale and its forts



The French attack on Calais

NOTES

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE NOTES

Alberi Eugenio Alberi, ed., *Relazioni degli ambasiatori veneti al Senato durante il secolo decimosesto*, 1st series, 6 vols. Florence, 1830–1862.

AN Archives Nationales, Paris

ANG *Acta Nuntiaturae Gallicae*, 16 vols. Edited by J. Lestocquoy, et al. Rome, 1962–1985.

Archives curieuses Cimber et Danjou (Louis Lafaist) eds. *Archives curieuses de l'histoire de France*, vols. X–XIV. Paris, 1834–50.

BSHPF *Bulletin de la Société de l'histoire du Protestantisme français*.

BN Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.

Cloulas Ivan Cloulas, *Henri II* (Paris, 1985).

CLP *Calendar of Letters and Papers of the Reign of Henry VIII*, 21 vols. Edited by James Gairdner. Reprint Vaduz, 1965.

CSPF Edward *Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series of the Reign of Edward VI*. Edited by William Turnbull, Reprint Nendeln, Liechtenstein, 1979.

CSPF Elizabeth *Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series of the Reign of Elizabeth*, vol. 1. Edited by Joseph Stevenson. Reprint Nendeln, Liechtenstein, 1966.

CSPF Mary *Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series of the Reign of Mary*. Edited by William Turnbull. Reprint Nendeln, Liechtenstein, 1967.

CSP Italy *Calendar of State Papers relating to English Affairs existing in the archives of Venice and Northern Italy*, vols. 1–7. Edited by Rawdon Brown. Reprint Nendeln, Liechtenstein, 1970.

CSP Spain *Calendar of Letters, Despatches, and State Papers Relating to Negotiations Between England and Spain*, vols. 1–15. Edited by Royall Tyler. Reprint Nendeln, Liechtenstein, 1969.

DBF *Dictionnaire de Biographie française*, 15 vols. Paris, 1932–.

Lubinskaja A. Lubinskaja, *Documents pour servire à l'histoire des querres d'Italie*. Moscow, 1963.

Petitot Claude Petitot, *Collection complète des mémoires relatifs à l'histoire de France*, 130 vols. Paris, 1818–1829.

Weiss C. Weiss, *Papiers d'état du Cardinal de Granvelle*, 6 vols. Paris, 1840.

PREFACE

1 Hauser, *Les sources de l'histoire de France au XVIe siècle*, 4 vols. (Paris, 1909), 2: 158.
2 (Paris, 1944), p. 324.
3 (London, 1910). Williams is also the author of *The Brood of False Lorraine: The House of Guise* (London, 1914), which covers many of the same events, but in a slightly more scholarly fashion.
4 (Paris, 1887).
5 *Guerres de Religion*, vol. 8 of *Oeuvres Complètes* (Paris, 1980), 66.
6 *La lutte contre la Maison d'Autriche. La France sous Henri II* (1519–1559), vol. 5, pt. 2, of Lavisse, *Histoire de France* (Paris, 1911).
7 Neale, *The Age of Catherine de Medici* (New York, 1962), p. 39; Roelker, Review of R. J. Knecht, *Francis I* (Cambridge, 1982), in *The Sixteenth Century Journal*, 13 (1982), 125. Knecht's own assessment of Henry is not quite that negative, but his *French Renaissance Monarchy: Francis I and Henry II* (London, 1984), virtually ignores him.
8 (Paris, 1913–14).
9 (Paris, 1985).
10 (Moscow, 1963). See also V. N. Malov, "Les archives d'un secrétaire d'Etat de roys, princes et ambassadeurs sous les règnes de François I et Henri II," *Bibliothèque de l'école des chartes*, 135 (1977), 313–39.
11 *Mélanges de l'école française de Rome*, 94 (1982), 759–818.
12 (Strasbourg, 1983).

1 SECOND SON

1 Alberi, 2: 401–3, for the Venetian ambassador Soranzo's description of the realm. He said that there were 130 cities in France, with Paris the largest at 400,000 people. See also Georges Duby, *Histoire de la France urbaine*, 4 vols. (Paris, 1981), 3: 33, who places the population at 20 million for all of France. Other sources for the following paragraphs are Pierre Chaunu and Richard Gascon, *Histoire économique et sociale de France*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1977); Gascon, *Grand commerce et vie urbaine au XVIe siècle Lyon et ses marchands*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1971); and E. Leroy Ladurie, *The French Peasantry 1450–1660* (Berkeley, Calif., 1987). Ladurie, p. 9, argues that the population reached 20 million by 1560, which number he regards as the highest population that preindustrial France could support.
2 For a more negative assessment of the French economy in the middle decades of the sixteenth century, see Henry Heller, *The Conquest of Poverty: The Calvinist Revolt in Sixteenth Century France* (Leiden, 1986). Heller's thesis is that economic distress was a major factor in the appeal of Protestantism to the urban population. To demonstrate his point, he examines seven towns where it was strong. By concentrating on those towns, however, he may be extrapolating local economic troubles into widespread ones.
3 *Journal de Jean Barillon*, ed. Pierre de Vaissière, 2 vols. (Paris, 1894), 2: 78. Another useful source on the court at Henry's birth is the *Journal de Bourgeois*

de Paris sous le règne de François I, ed. L. Lalanne (Paris, 1854), pp. 79–80. Since the king of England was his godfather, the English ambassador's reports in CLP, III-1, 99ff., are also informative.

4 *Journal de Bourgeois de Paris*, p. 80. The king's first child, born in 1515, had died two years after her birth.

5 The best account of Francis's life is by R. J. Knecht, *Francis I* (Cambridge, 1982), despite the fact that it is more truly a political history of his reign. Others include Jean Jacquart, *François I* (Paris, 1981); C. Terrasse, *François I: le roi et le règne*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1945–70); and D. Seward, *Prince of the Renaissance, The Life of Francis I* (London, 1973).

6 The full statement by Gaspard de Tavannes is: "Alexandre voit les femmes quand il n'a point d'affaires, François voit les affaires quand il n'a plus de femmes." *Mémoires*, in Petitot, 23: 279.

7 Marguerite d'Angoulême, *Nouvelles Lettres de la Reine de Navarre*, ed. F. Genin (Paris, 1842), pp. 116–17. On the Spanish captivity of the two princes, see below, chapter 2.

8 Pierre Jourda, ed., *Correspondance de Marguerite d'Angoulême* (Paris, 1930), 1, no. 474.

9 For example, she described to Briçonnet the fatal illness and death of Henry's older sister, Charlotte, in September 1524. *Lettres de Marguerite d'Angoulême*, ed. F. Genin (Paris, 1841), pp. 168–69.

10 *Nouvelles Lettres*, p. 71.

11 As king, Henry had a serious dispute with his aunt and her husband over the choice of a husband for their daughter, Jeanne d'Albret; but there appears to be no reason for the condescending tone of "my good old aunt" that Nancy Roelker, *Queen of Navarre Jeanne d'Albret* (Cambridge, Mass., 1968),. p. 73, gives to the phrase *ma bonne tante* in Henry's letter to Montmorency in October 1548. See the letter in H. de La Ferrière-Percy, *Marguerite d'Angoulême, Son livre de depenses 1540–1549* (Paris, 1862), pp. 128–29.

12 BN, Fonds français 26,272, fol. 596. The household of the dauphin and the princes received 60,000 livres for wages and expenses; that of the queen, 160,000; of the king, 543,000. See Cloulas, pp.34–35, for the menu of the princes' table in 1525.

13 Charles Marchand, *Charles Ier de Cossé Comte de Brissac* (Paris, 1889), pp. 9–11.

14 CLP, III-2, no. 2035.

15 See Pierre Jourda, "Un humaniste italien en France," *Revue de seizième siècle*, 16 (1929), 40–57.

16 A. L. Herminjard, *Correspondance des réformateurs dans les pays de langue française*, 10 vols. (Geneva, 1866–69), 3: 219–21.

17 *Nouvelles Lettres*, p. 71.

18 Brantôme, *Oeuvres complètes*, ed. L. Lalanne, 11 vols. (Paris, 1867), 3: 289.

19 Niccolo Tommaseo, *Relations des ambassadeurs Vénitiens sur les affaires de France au XVIe siècle*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1838), 1: 287, 375.

20 Brantôme, *Oeuvres*. 3: 289.

21 Mezeray, *Abrégé chronologique*, 6: 722. Report of Sir John Mason, June 23,

1551, printed in Patrick Tytler, *England under the Reigns of Edward VI and Mary*, 2 vols. (London, 1839), 387; CSP Spain, X, 214.

22 Ernest Quentin-Bauchart, *La Bibliothèque de Fontainebleau et les livres des derniers Valois à la Bibliothèque Nationale* (Paris, 1891), pp. 77–134.

23 Noëll, *Henri II*, pp. 42–43. One has to wonder if Noëll and others who made similar comments about the poetry written in Henry's hand in BN, Fonds français 3143, would have changed their evaluation had they known that at least one of the sonnets was probably Joachim Du Bellay's. See Geoffrey Hope, "The Verses of Henri II: A Note of Attribution," BHR, 44 (1982), 127–31.

24 Alberi, 2: 426.

2 HOSTAGE

1 Karl Brandi, *The Emperor Charles V* (London, 1963), pp. 51, 143; Henry Kamen, *Spain 1469–1714 A Society of Conflict* (London, 1984), p. 69.

2 For a discussion of the formulation of the Concordat of Bologna, see Knecht, *Francis I*, pp. 48–65.

3 On the Battle of Pavia, see ibid., pp. 161–72; V. F. Bourrilly, ed., *Mémoires de Martin et Guillaume Du Bellay*, 4 vols. (Paris, 1908–19), 1: 332–57; F. L. Taylor, *The Art of War in Italy, 1494–1529* (Cambridge, 1921), pp. 99–102.

4 See Francis's letter in Jean Duhamel, *La Captivité de François Ier et des Dauphins* (Paris, 1958), pp. 127–31. Francis proposed that he would again become king upon any future repatriation to France with his son's coronation then held in abeyance until the father's death.

5 That it was a ploy was the opinion of F. Mignet, *La rivalité de François Ier et de Charles-Quint*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1875), 2: 160.

6 In Aimé Champollion-Figeac, ed., *Captivité du Roi François Ier* (Paris, 1847), pp. 300–3. Louise was probably not aware of a second similar oath of reservation of January 1526, when Francis had agreed publicly to accept the Treaty of Madrid.

7 CLP, IV-1, 896–97. Taylor states that Madame Louise went by water from Blois to Amboise with the dauphin and his brother, indicating that they had joined her at Blois and not at Amboise, as Knecht, *Francis I*, p. 191, and others state.

8 CLP, IV-1, 896–97.

9 The protocol further dictated that the boats be of precisely the same size and have the same number of rowers and that ten gentlemen armed with a sword and dagger be in each boat.

10 Report of Jean de Selve to the Parlement de Paris, in *Captivité du Roi François*, p. 522.

11 Ibid. According to the imperial ambassador, "In France [people] have a bad opinion of their king, whom they do not love. They say that they would have much preferred his remaining in prison; and at Bayonne, when the Dauphin and his brother left, there was much sadness shown." CSP Spain, III-1, 615.

12 Duhamel, *La captivité*, pp. 153–55; Marchand, *Charles de Brissac*, pp. 13–15; Jean Plattard, "Humaniste Theocrenus en Espagne," *Revue du seizième siècle*, 16 (1929), 68–69.

13 CSP Spain, III-1, 706–7.

14 For a discussion of the second point, see Knecht, *Francis I*, pp. 206–7.
15 CSP Italy, IV, 29. The Venetian ambassador said that the escape plot involved the use of false keys. He stated that the French denied any plot and complained that the accusation was an excuse to confine the princes more rigidly to force Francis into an agreement. See also the documents in Martin Fernandez Navarette et al., *Coleccion de Documentos Ineditos para la Historia de España* (Madrid, 1842), 1: 242–44; 2: 209–58. Most of the documents are letters from Charles to his Spanish officers, admonishing them to keep a strong guard on the two princes.
16 Marchand, *Charles de Brissac*, appendix 1.
17 CLP, IV-2, 1512, 1515, 1517.
18 Ibid., p. 1527.
19 Ibid., p. 1585.
20 Ibid., p. 1770; CSP Spain, III-2, 550–52. A letter of René de Brissac to the king, of March 1528, reveals that the French nobles in the princes' entourage were scattered in various fortresses, while their servants were sent to the galleys. These latter, in the number of forty-one, were the victims of a shipwreck that put them in the hands of the Turks. Charles V rescued ten of the unfortunate Frenchmen during his expedition against Tunis in 1535. Marchand, *Charles de Brissac*, appendix 1, p. 535 and note.
21 CLP, IV-2, 1770. The report added: "The Princes are very well."
22 CSP Spain IV-2, 573, 627.
23 There are, however, the two curious letters from Charles V to the constable of Castile and his brother, dated February 2 and 3, 1529, in CSP Spain, III-2, 883–84: "Constable, our cousin, &c.,—Your letter of the 28th ulto. has been duly received. Secretary Cobos gave us an account of what you had done respecting the French Princes. We approve of all the measures proposed, with the single exception of that which concerns the household of the Princes, for although We wish them to be as well served and entertained as possible at our own expense, yet We object to their having so many titled officers about their person as come daily from France for the purpose of attending on them. Three or four gentlemen to serve at table and minister to their wants are a sufficient household for them.—Burgos, 2nd February 1529." The second, shorter letter of the next day contained the same advice. The content of the letters strongly suggests that they date from 1528, but since they are addressed to Don Pedro, constable of Castile, a position he apparently gained only upon his father's death in October 1528, the date of 1529 remains plausible. Nonetheless, the fact that they were written from Burgos, where Charles was on January 31, 1528, and not from Toledo, where he was on February 6, 1529, seems to clinch the earlier date. It seems impossible that Charles could have covered the 320 km from Burgos to Toledo in three days. It is likely, therefore, that the editor of the CSP Spain erroneously dated the letters.
24 CLP, IV-3, 2413, 2524.
25 Ibid., p. 2504. The princes seem to have been moved rather rapidly from one castle to another prior to Pedraza. At least eight places are mentioned in the sources; they fall in a pattern of being further and further into the interior of Castile.

26 Letter of M. de Clermont to Montmorency, August 2, 1529, BN, Collection Clairaumbault 329, fol. 269. Also in Marchand, *Charles de Brissac*, appendix 1, pp. 538–39. It states that the spy saw the princes at Villalpando on July 10 and 12, where they were in 1528, not 1529. Clermont also informed Montmorency of the departure of Charles V from Spain, which occurred in July 1529. The positive dating of the letter to 1529 provides three options for interpreting the information on the princes: it took a whole year for the report to reach Clermont; the spy gave the wrong place-name; or they really were in Villalpando in the summer of 1529. Cloulas, p. 44, ascribes the letter to 1528, but without explanation.

27 Brandi, *Charles V*, pp. 276–80.

28 "Lettre de l'hussier Baudin à la reyne-mère Loyse de Savoie," *Le Cabinet Historique*, 2: 217–225. A manuscript copy of the report is in BN, Fonds Morel de Thoisey 338. Also Mignet, *Rivalité*, 2: 484–88. Baudin's report gives no date for his visit to the princes, but it prompted a sharp letter from Louise of Savoy to Margaret of Austria dated October 6, 1529. On September 27, before Louise's letter, Empress Isabella wrote to the constable of Castile, ordering him to spend 2,000 *ducados* on clothes for the princes and 8,000 for food. Navarette, *Coleccion*, 2: 237.

29 Probably at the time the princes were removed to Pedraza. According to Plattard, "Theocrenus en Espagne," p. 69, Tagliacarno spent the remainder of his time in Spain at Villalpando, where he tried to secure a position at the Spanish court.

30 I am indebted to Dr. Thomas Ollendick for this point. Dr. James T. Axtell has informed me that his study of white captives of Amerindian tribes suggests that children could forget their mother tongue that quickly, although he agrees that the two brothers being together reduced the likelihood in this situation.

31 Whether because of Louise of Savoy's letter to Margaret of Austria of October 6, 1529, and Margaret's subsequent letter to Charles, (in Mayer, *The Great Regent*, p. 278), or because Charles decided that, with the peace agreed to, there was less need for harshness, is unclear.

32 Marchand, *Charles de Brissac*, pp. 17–18, and appendix 1, pp. 539–41.

33 Clausse described this routine as being in effect on the day he and Brissac arrived at Pedraza, indicating that their French attendants had been returned to the princes before then. An account of the salaries for the attendants of the two princes for 1529 indicates that the sum of 29,900 livres was paid out. BN, Fonds français 3010.

34 Writing to Montmorency on March 28, Côme Clausse reported that on the previous Thursday the princes had left Pedraza. The entourage was traveling at a rate of only four leagues a day because of the bad roads. Marchand, *Charles de Brissac*, appendix 1, pp. 547–49.

35 François, *Cardinal de Tournon*, pp. 77–82; Knecht, *Francis I*, pp. 221–23; Williams, *Henry II*, p. 57.

36 Sebastian Moreau, "La prinse et delivrance du Roi François," *Archives curieuses*, 2: 422–37; Francis Decrue, *Anne de Montmorency à la cour, aux armées et au conseil du roi François I* (Paris, 1885), pp. 145–53. Montmorency was in charge of the exchange.

37 Navarette, *Coleccion*, 2: 238, gives two Spanish contracts to provide meat and staples for the princes; they indicate a plentiful amount for their table.
38 Moreau, "La prinse et delivrance," p. 436.
39 Duhamel, *La captivité*, pp. 174–75.
40 Brantôme, *Oeuvres*, 3: 273.
41 *Henri II*, pp. 61–62. The reference to the Venetian ambassador is from Baschet, *La diplomatie Vénitienne*, p. 430.
42 Again, I thank Dr. Thomas Ollendick for his advice on these points.
43 Monluc, *Commentaires et lettres*, ed. A. de Ruble, 2 vols. (Paris, 1887), 2: 318.

3 HUSBAND AND DAUPHIN

1 The king had declared that July 5 was a day of thanksgiving and celebration "en soient faictz les feux de joye." Processions and celebrations lasted for more than a week and "n'est point mémoire d'homme avoir veu demonstre une plus grand joye au peuple et gens de Paris." *Journal d'un Bourgeois de Paris*, p. 412. The court did not reach Paris until December 1530.
2 Lucien Romier, *La carrière d'un favori, Jacques d'Albon de Saint-André* (Paris, 1909), p. 12. See Cloulas, pp. 57–59, for a fuller description of the princely household. In late 1532, after Dauphin Francis had been crowned duke of Brittany, his household was separated from his brothers, with members of the Brissac family dominating it. Marchand, *Charles de Brissac*, p. 28.
3 Jourda, "Un humaniste Italien," p. 49; DBF, 12: 94.
4 Reproduced in E. Charavay, "Les enfants de François Ier," *Revue des documents historiques*, 2 (1875), 41–47.
5 Brantôme, *Oeuvres* 3: 240.
6 CSP Italy, IV, 225. The Peace of Cambrai called for the marriage of the dauphin to the same princess.
7 Ibid., p. 494.
8 Ibid., p. 726. The English also were apparently pleased to be free of the proposed union, since the imperial ambassador in London wrote that the English court expressed its pleasure at the impending marriage between the duke of Orléans and Catherine de Medici because it would please the pope and free it of a problem. CLP, V, 188.
9 On September 1, 1532, a member of the English court stated unequivocally that the marriage between Henry and Mary would take place. CSP Italy, V, 797.
10 Francis I had promoted the marriage between Catherine's parents to further his interests in Italy. Although it is clear that her French ancestry had little influence on her upbringing, because of the death of her mother soon after her birth, numerous contemporaries and modern historians conveniently have overlooked it in referring to Catherine as "the Italian shopkeeper's daughter." A marriage between Henry and Catherine was not an entirely new idea since, as early as December 1523, it was reported that Pope Clement VII had suggested it to the French ambassador. Pastor, *History of the Popes*, 9: 269.
11 Because Catherine had limited influence as queen, and because there is a vast number of biographies of her, I will not detail her life before 1534. The

best account of her childhood is Alfred von Reumont, *La jeunesse de Catherine de Médicis* (Paris, 1866).

12 CSP Italy, IV, no. 650.

13 Ibid., no. 723.

14 Ibid., nos. 378, 848, 876. The original marriage contract was drawn up at the Château of Anet, the home of Diane de Poitiers, as the court was visiting her husband, Louis de Brézé, at the time. The irony of this circumstance has been noted by a number of historians, including Williams, *Henri II*, p. 73.

15 Pope Clement, of course, had just gone through the annulment case of Henry VIII, in which one of the key points was whether Henry's older brother had consummated his marriage with Catherine of Aragon. On the marriage ceremony, see Terrasse, *François Ier*, 2: 199–206; Ivan Cloulas, *Catherine de Médicis* (Paris, 1979), pp. 54–57; Williams, *Henry II*, pp. 83–87. On the bridal chamber visitation, see *Relation anonyme des cérémonies du marriage . . .* (Marseille, 1533).

16 On the value of Catherine's lands in France, see CSP Italy, IV, no. 926.

17 See the report of the Venetian ambassador in 1535, where it was stated that the entire nation felt that the pope had deceived the king. Baschet, *La diplomatie Vénitienne*, p. 469.

18 CSP Spain, V-1, no. 232.

19 Baschet, *La diplomatie Vénitienne*, p. 469.

20 Brantôme, *Oeuvres*, 3: 270–73.

21 The best scholarly treatment of Diane de Poitiers is the introduction to G. Guiffrey, *Les Lettres inédites de Dianne de Poytiers* (Paris, 1866).

22 Regnier de La Planche, *Histoire de l'Estat de France sous François II*, p. 233; Brantôme, *Les Dames Galantes*, ed. Maurice Rat, (Paris, n.d.), p. 64.

23 Diane was mentioned as one of the ladies who attended Queen Eleanor at her entry into Bordeaux on July 11. Denys Godefroy, *Le cérémonial françois*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1649), 1: 771, 773–74. I owe this reference to Patricia Thompson. The tradition cited by Jehanne D'Orliac, *The Moon Mistress: The Duchess de Valentinois* (Philadelphia, 1930), p. 103, that Diane had comforted Henry at Bayonne before he went into exile in 1526, appears far less plausible. The nature of Louise of Savoy's quick trip to Bayonne made it unlikely that Diane would have joined the entourage.

24 Marino Cavalli, the Venetian ambassador, wrote in 1547, at the time of Henry's accession to the throne, that the king had for Diane, then forty-eight years of age, real affection, "but one thinks that there is nothing lewd there but it is as between mother and son." Tommaseo, *Relations*, 1: 287.

25 Cloulas, p. 78; Williams, *Henri II*, pp. 123–24, argues for late 1536 on the grounds that his brother's death that year now made Dauphin Henry a conquest worth winning for Diane.

26 Brantôme, *Oeuvres*, 3: 270–73.

27 The autopsy report by the royal physicians is given in Charavay, "Les enfants," p. 63, n. It is rather uninformative on the prince's death, which appears to have been caused by a respiratory problem, perhaps pleurisy. There is no suggestion of poison. The squire's confession and the judgment against him is in Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, 3: 215–17.

28 Report of Marino Giustiniano, in Tommaseo, *Relations*, 1: 63. Giustiniano pointed out that the marital compact by which Brittany passed to the Valois dynasty called for a younger son of the king to serve as its duke because the Bretons did not want to come directly under the king. Thus, Henry's request did have a legal basis, although his mother, the last autonomous ruler of the duchy, had willed it to her oldest son. Knecht, *Francis and Henry*, p. 3.
29 Tommaseo, *Relations*, 1: 104–5.
30 Romier, *Saint-André*, p. 25; Matteo Dandolo, cited by Cloulas, p. 60.
31 Decrue, *Montmorency sous François I*, pp. 276–80.
32 The nature of this liaison is unclear. Some historians, for example, Seward, *Prince of the Renaissance*, p. 192, have used the term rape for it. But the contemporary sources most likely to be well informed indicate that Henry seduced the daughter of his host in a town in Piedmont. Cloulas, pp. 96–97. See also Diane de France's biography in DBF, 2: 1213–17, and J.-C. Sournia, *Blaise de Monluc* (Paris, 1981), p. 81. Sournia writes that the girl entered the convent afterward. Montmorency is supposed to have told Catherine de Medici that Diane looked the most like Henry of all his children.
33 *Mémoires de la vie de François de Scepeaux sire de Vieilleville*, vols. 26–28 of Petitot, 26: 192–98. The memoirs were said to have been written by Vieilleville's secretary, Vincent Carloix, but C. Marchand, *Le maréchal de Vieilleville et ses mémoires* (Paris, 1893), argued that they dated from about 1600 and are rather unreliable. Henry's two companions supposedly told him the story because of his grief at the sight of the coffins of his father and two brothers on their way to final burial in Saint-Denis. However, Vieilleville may not yet have returned from a diplomatic mission to London at that time. Romier, *Saint-André*, p. 49, n.
34 CLP, XIII, 935. The English ambassador included Queen Eleanor and "almost all the Cardinals" in Henry's faction.
35 Génin, *Lettres de Marguerite d'Angoulême*, pp. 274–75.
36 The crowning insult to Montmorency was Francis's order that he carry the recalcitrant Jeanne d'Albret to the altar for her marriage to the Duke of Cleves, "a task so far below his rank." Roelker, *Jeanne D'Albret*, p. 55, citing Brantôme.
37 This point was made clear in Tavannes, *Mémoires*, 23: 312–13, where he reported himself as telling Charles, who had been ordered by the king to lift the siege of Ivoy near Luxembourg: "Your brother will get Perpignan; you, only disgrace." Charles ordered the siege continued and took the fortress. Tavannes later advised Charles to ask to have Guise replaced with Marshal d'Annebault "to show that the victory belonged to him alone," p. 331. See also Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, 1: 193.
38 Ibid.
39 On the Peace of Crépy, see CLP, XIX-2, 128–30; Knecht, *Francis I*, pp. 370–71; Brandi, *Charles V*, pp. 518–22. The French alliance with the sultan had extended to permitting the Turkish fleet to winter at Toulon in 1542, completely scandalizing Western Christendom.
40 ANG, 3: 138. Tavannes, *Mémoires*, 23: 384, noted that Charles hoped to get Burgundy from his father and the emperor. Tavannes, when writing his memoirs, repented of his encouragement of this proposal, "being then still young."

41 CLP, XIX-2, 443. See Ribier, *Lettres*, 1: 578–80, for the text of Henry's protest. Also, Williams, *Henri II*, pp. 158–59.

42 Alberi, 1: 83. It is usually said that Diane de Poitiers easily persuaded Henry not to seek an end of his marriage because she feared a new wife might prove to be a true rival for his affections, while Catherine passively accepted the relationship between Henry and Diane. One wonders, however, how readily Henry did reject the possibility of a divorce, given the strength of his rivalry with his brother, who was next in line for the throne because of Henry's lack of a son.

43 ANG, 3: 25.

44 The physician Jean Fernel advised Henry to sleep with his wife during menstruation, although children conceived in such circumstances were thought likely to become lepers. Fernel received 10,000 écus for each of Catherine's pregnancies. Eugène de France, *Catherine de Médicis, ses astrologues et ses magiciens-envouteurs* (Paris, 1911), pp. 37–44. See F. Bourquelot, "Notice sur le Journal de Jean Glaumeau," *Mémoires de la société des antiquités de France*, 22 (1858), 199–200, for a description of the celebration of the birth of the dauphin in Bourges.

45 Tavannes, *Mémoires*, 23: 389; ANG, III, 389–91; Cloulas, p. 126.

46 *Mémoires de Vieilleville*, 26: 71–73. Vieilleville was reported as cautioning Henry that "he was selling the skin before the bear was dead." The memoirs describe at length Francis's rage at the report.

47 ANG, 6: 58; Sarah Hanley, *The Lit de Justice of the Kings of France* (Princeton, N. J., 1983), pp. 92–93.

48 Romier, *Origines politiques*, 1: 9–10. It seems to me, however, that Romier exaggerated when he spoke of Henry living "as in exile at the court of his father," p. 11.

49 Monluc, *Commentaires* (Paris, 1964), pp. 142–43. Monluc's statement and that of the papal nuncio, ANG, 6: 58, disprove what the Venetian ambassador, Contarini, wrote about Henry in 1551: "His father . . . not only did not train him in the business of state but did not even summon him to his council." Baschet, *La diplomatie Vénitienne*, pp. 431–33.

50 Pariset, *Relations*, pp. 48–49; Gustave Zeller, *Le Réunion de Metz à France*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1926), 1: 88–89.

51 ANG, 6: 100. This episode is the only known incident in which Henry involved himself in foreign affairs prior to his accession. On the symbolism of the motto, see V. Hoffman, "*Donec Totum impleat orbem* Symbolisme impérial," *Bulletin de la Société d'histoire de l'art français* (1978), pp. 29–42.

52 Baschet, *La diplomatie Vénitienne*, 1: 385–87. Henry was, however, susceptible to numerous fevers, as frequently recorded by the papal nuncios. ANG, 1, 3, 6: passim. Saint-Mauris, the imperial ambassador in France, also noted that he was often subject to abdominal flux. CSP Spain, II, 517.

53 Monluc, *Commentaires et lettres*, ed. A. de Ruble (Paris, 1887), 2: 318.

54 See Knecht, *Francis I*, p. 418, n., on demonstrations of joy among the populace at Francis's death.

55 The last hours of Francis I are described in Knecht, *Francis I*, pp. 416–19; ANG, 6: 175–76; R. Doucet, "La mort de François I," *Revue historique*, 113

(1913), 309–16; C. Paillard, "La mort de François I et les premiers temps du règne de Henri II d'après les dépêches de Jean de Saint-Mauris," *Revue historique*, 5 (1877), 84–120. Several additional dispatches of Saint-Mauris are in CSP Spain, IX, 73ff.

56 Dispatch of the English ambassador, Nicolas Wooton, in Tytler, *Edward and Mary*, 1: 38.

57 *Mémoires de Vieilleville*, 31: 193–97; Williams, *Henri II*, pp. 188–92. Cloulas, p. 139, disputes the authenticity of the statement attributed to Henry: "Voila donc le bélêtre qui mène l'avant-garde de ma félicité!" He argues that it is too slick for Henry's rather unpolished personality.

58 BN, Collection Clairaumbault 341, fols. 58–61. See also Ralph Giesey, *The Royal Funeral Ceremony in Renaissance France* (Geneva, 1960), for a description of Francis's funeral and an explanation of the symbolism involved, since Francis's funeral is the focus of this work. Saint-Mauris reported that the obsequies cost 400,000 livres. Paillard, "Mort de François," p. 110. But quittances of September 27, 1548, authorized the payment of only 101,333 livres. AN, K 89, fol. 11. Henry paid 9,110 livres to Germain Pilon, "sculptor of Paris," for statues of his brothers. AN, K 89, piece 2.

4 VIVE LE ROI HENRI

1 The dispatches of the imperial ambassador, Saint-Mauris, in Paillard, "Mort de François," and in CSP Spain, IX, are the most important sources about the changes at court. Also valuable are the reports of the papal nuncio, Dandino, ANG, 6: 175–84.

2 See the inventory of crown jewels made at Francis's death, in Marchand, *Charles de Cossé*, appendix 2, p. 549.

3 CSP Spain, IX, 75.

4 Ibid.; Decrue, *Montmorency*, p. 7. Decrue meant this as a general statement about the French monarchy in the sixteenth century, not just about the accession of Henry II, to which it is usually taken to refer. Comparison with the beginning of Francis's reign is inappropriate because there were so many vacancies in major offices in 1515, including the positions of constable and two marshals. One must also keep in mind that Henry was the only French king of the century to come to the throne in a peaceful succession as a mature adult with established opinions, friends, and advisers.

5 Saint-Mauris, CSP Spain, IX, 74; Knecht, *Francis I*, pp. 414–15.

6 Saint-Mauris, CSP Spain, IX, 115. See also François, *Tournon*, pp. 228–35.

7 Isambert, *Recueil des lois*, 12: 179–180. On the governors, see Robert Harding, *Anatomy of a Power Elite* (New Haven, 1978), pp. 17–39.

8 Salmon, *Society in Crisis*, p. 24.

9 Harding, *Anatomy*, p. 29.

10 On these councils, see Doucet, *Les Institutions*, 1: 140–49; Sutherland, *Secretaries of State*, pp. 39–42; Salmon, *Society in Crisis*, pp. 66–67.

11 No two lists of the membership are the same. The above is taken from G. Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d'estat*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1616), 2: 1. See also ANG, 6: 180.

12 Doucet, *Les Institutions*, 1: 145.
13 Decrue, *Montmorency*, pp. 5–7. For the edict reestablishing Montmorency in Languedoc, see Devic et al., *Histoire générale de Languedoc*, 12 vols. (Toulouse, 1889), 12: col. 529.
14 ANG, 9: 101; 6: 197. Montmorency went on, however, to say that he could not stand by while the majesty of the French king was being injured by the emperor.
15 Brantôme, *Oeuvres*, 8: 129. Regnier de La Planche, *Histoire de l'estat de France*, p. 330.
16 CSPF Edward, p. 56.
17 CSP Spain, IX, 75; letter of Guillaume Bochetel to Claude de L'Aubespine, April 4, 1547, in Fauvelet Du-Toc, *Histoire des secrétaires d'état* (Paris, 1667), pp. 25–27. Bochetel stated that Montmorency "incontinent a embrassé tout le fait des affaires."
18 Tytler, *Edward and Mary*, 1: 36.
19 Ibid.
20 Romier, *Origines politiques*, 2: 119. For a recent study of the Guises, see Jean-Marie Constant, *Les Guises* (Paris, 1984), pp. 21–54, for Henry II's generation.
21 For the more positive view of Guise as a politician, see David Potter, "The duc de Guise and the fall of Calais, 1557–58," *The English Historical Review*, 388 (1983), 495–96.
22 Cited by Bouillé, *Histoire des ducs de Guises*, 1: 245; and Romier, *Origines politiques*, 1: 47, n. The only modern work on Charles de Lorraine is H. O. Evennett, *The Cardinal of Lorraine and the Council of Trent* (Cambridge, 1930). Evennett's portrayal of Lorraine as a high-principled and moderate man willing to seek accommodation with the Protestants, especially at the time of the Colloquy of Poissy, has come under considerable fire but has yet to be effectively refuted.
23 Bouillé, *Histoire des ducs de Guises*, 1: 151.
24 The ambassador of Ferrara, February 4, 1547; cited by Romier, *Origines politiques*, 1: 50.
25 Nicolas Boucher, *Caroli Lotharingii . . . Litterae* (1577); cited by Evennett, *Cardinal of Lorraine*, p. 5.
26 The often-cited story, found first in Regnier de La Planche, *Histoire de l'estat de France*, p. 261, and given credence in De Thou, *Histoire universelle*, 1: 237, that Francis warned his son about the Guises, "whose aim was to strip him and his children to their doublets and his people to their shirts," strikes me as apocryphal, in part for the reason given by Van Dyke, *Catherine de Médicis*, 1: 39, that the two Guises in question were both too young to be the object of such special attention at the king's deathbed. Furthermore, it was Francis I himself who had raised the Guises to the level of an important family in France because of the valuable services rendered the crown by Claude de Guise. There was no reason for Francis to be so hypocritical. Third, no contemporary account, several of which give a detailed account of Francis's last words, contains this story.
27 Lubinskaja, p. 234; CSP Spain, IX, 74–75. Saint-Mauris went on to say that Montmorency chose the archbishop of Reims because he was of princely rank

and because the constable had been accused (during Francis I's reign) of wanting to do everything himself.

28 On the Saint-Andrés, see BN, Collection Clairaumbault 341, fol. 93; Fonds Dupuy 86; Alberi, 2: 437; CSP Spain, XIII, 413; Romier, *Jacques d'Albon*. In July 1547, Henry gave Jacques de Saint-André 10,000 écus confiscated from a Parisian merchant for violating an edict. *Catalogue des actes de Henri II*, 1: 657.

29 De Thou, *Histoire universelle*, 1: 158.

30 Doucet, *Les Institutions*, 1: 106.

31 De Thou, *Histoire universelle*, 1: 158, 329; Devic, *Histoire de Languedoc*, 12: 551–53; de Ruble, *Antoine de Bourbon*, 2: 13–14. Zeller, *Reunion de Metz*, 1: 131, cites several major contributions by Olivier to royal diplomacy after 1551 and argues strongly against the view that he had been disgraced, an opinion shared by Helene Michaud, *La Grande Chancellerie et les écritures royales au seizième siècle* (Paris, 1967), p. 26.

32 ANG, 6: 176; Du-Toc, *Secrétaires d'état*, pp. 44–45; Sutherland, *Secretaries of State*, pp. 29–31; Doucet, *Les Institutions*, 1: 161.

33 *Catalogue des Actes de Henri II*, 1: no. 1,000; Du-Toc, *Secrétaires d'état*, p. 38; Sutherland, *Secretaries of State*, pp. 27–28.

34 Noël, *Henri II*, p. 132. Michel Antoine, "Un tournant dans l'histoire des institutions monarchiques: le règne de Henri II," *Colloque franco-suédois* (Paris, 1978), is nearly as positive in his assessment of Henry's administrative reforms.

35 CSP Spain, IX, 77, 133. Saint-Mauris reported that Henry was acting "most dutifully in a filial fashion" in regard to Eleanor's properties. The papal nuncio reported in October 1548, that within ten days Queen Eleanor was going to Brussels. ANG, 6: 402. In 1552, however, Henry seized Eleanor's French revenues and gave them to Charles V's daughter Margaret. She had married Ottavio Farnese, and Charles had seized her lands in Italy because of her husband's alliance with Henry. Romier, *Origines politiques*, 1: 238.

36 BN, Fonds français 10934.

37 Alberi, 2: 73; CSP Spain, IX, 115; E. Bellaud-Dessalles, *Les évêques italiens de l'ancien diocèse de Béziers* (Toulouse, 1901), pp. 17–62.

38 Van Dyke, *Catherine de Médicis*, 1: 56; CSP Italy, VI-2, 1099.

39 Tytler, *Edward and Mary*, p. 37; BN, Collection Clairaumbault 341, fol. 93; Cinq cens de Colbert 23, fol. 26v. Henry promised to give the young d'Humières a sum equivalent to the income of the office.

40 Jean-Daniel Pariset, *Relations entre la France et l'Allemagne au milieu du seizième siècle* (Strasbourg, 1983), p. 205. Paillard, "Mort de François," pp. 111–12. Saint-Mauris further reported that, after discussing business, Henry would sit in Diane's lap and play a guitar, touch her breasts and gaze at her as a man completely captured with love.

41 "Histoire particulière de la cour de Henri II," BN, Fonds français 17472, fol. 147. See De Thou, *Histoire universelle*, 1: 154, for the view that Blondet informed Diane on the choicest pieces throughout Henry's reign.

42 Saint-Mauris, in Paillard, "Mort de François," p. 110, put the sum at 300,000 francs (the equivalent of the *livre*), but Brantôme says 100,000. Either sum

appears to have been only a fraction of the total due to the new king. Saint-Mauris noted that Francis I had given the money to his mother, and some courtiers thought the sum should have been given to Henry's sister, Marguerite. There is no entry regarding the gift in the *Catalogue des actes de Henri II*. On the gift of Chenonceaux, see *Catalogue des actes*, 1: 592; the gift of the Valentinois, BN, Fonds Dupuy 654, fol. 60.

43 *Mémoires de Vieilleville*, 26: 186–87; Tavannes, *Mémoires*, 23: 410. Many of the royal gifts are noted in AN, P 2648, "Creances du chambre de comptes."

44 ANG, 6: 176. It was the consensus of the contemporary reports that Montmorency was the dominant person in policymaking, but a minority opinion placed Charles de Guise in that position; e.g., the Florentine ambassador in August 1547, cited by Romier, *Origines politiques*, 1: 50.

45 *Mémoires de Vieilleville*, 26: 178–79.

46 Desjardins, *Négociations avec Toscane*, 3: 189; Baschet, *La diplomatie Vénitienne*, p. 437.

47 The Venetian ambassador, Contarini, in 1552, cited by Baschet, *La diplomatie Vénitienne*, p. 440. Contarini made this comment in the context of noting Diane's ascendancy by 1552.

48 See Battifol, *Century of the Renaissance*, pp. 130–31.

49 "Histoire particulière," BN, Fonds français 17472, fol. 151. The modern edition of this work, usually attributed to Claude de L'Aubespine (*Archives curieuses*, 3: 281), is apparently in error in giving the phrase as "par la Royne mesme." This error has been repeated by numerous historians since, especially to emphasize Catherine de Medici's subjugation to Diane.

50 Saint-Mauris, June 1547, in Paillard, "Mort de François," p. 117; Romier, *Origines politiques*, 1: 37. Romier's account is challenged by the correspondence in Lubinskaja, pp. 260ff.

51 CSP Spain, IX, 131–32.

52 Paillard, "Mort de François," p. 117; Romier, *Origines politiques*, 1: 45, n.

53 Romier, ibid., 1: 38, citing the reports of the ambassador of Ferrara, whom he regarded as very close to the Guises. Romier writes that "one cannot imagine an animosity more vexing and tenacious." On the accusation of poison, see Romier, ibid., 1: 81. Nonetheless, Guise seems to have worked well under the constable in a number of military expeditions.

54 CSP Spain, XIII, 413; Weiss, 5: 226.

55 Alberi, 2: 63.

56 For the duel and its circumstances, see BN, Fonds français 4740, fols. 1–83; *Mémoires de Vieilleville*, 26: 198–200; Brantôme, *Oeuvres*, 5: 87–88; Williams, *Henri II*, pp. 193–206.

57 Jarnac is said to have been in permanent disfavor, but in April 1557 he received a gift of 260 écus from Henry. BN, Fonds français 21405, fol. 315.

58 The best source on the sixteenth-century rite is Godefroy, *Le cérémonial françois*, which described at length the various coronations of the era. See also BN, Fonds français 21716, 24047; and Richard Jackson, *Vive Le Roi! A History of the French Coronation from Charles V to Charles X* (Chapel Hill, N. C., 1984), pp. 86–87. Jackson points out that the French use the word "sacre," consecration, as the common word for coronation. Ibid., p. 3.

59 The ampulla was said to have been brought to Saint-Rémy for the baptism of

Clovis by a dove. It had been used since the tenth century for the coronation. A pin was used to take out a minute quantity of the solidified oil for each coronation. The ampulla was destroyed in 1793.

60 Henry's coronation was the occasion of a heated row, caused by Louis de Montpensier representing the peerage of Champagne. He maintained that, as a Bourbon and a prince of blood, he ought to have the first place before the other lay peers. Henry refused to humor him, but the episode was the first shot in a long battle that eventually led to victory for the princes of blood. See Jackson, *Vive Le Roi*, pp. 155–67.

61 The oath can be found in *The Coronation Book of Charles V of France*, ed. E. S. Dewick (London, 1899), col. 19. Jackson, *Vive Le Roi*, pp. 59, 211, 249, n.10, proposes that Henry did not swear the oath that contained the clause against heresy. The *ordo* of his coronation contained the phrase "I promise these three things!" at the beginning of his oath. Jackson takes the phrase as evidence that Henry took an early medieval oath that lacked the clause on heresy. It is not clear, however, why Jackson assumes that the heresy clause was the one omitted.

62 Ernst Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies* (Princeton, 1957), p. 222, notes that the specific rubric "Le roy espousa solemnellement le royaume," appeared for the first time in 1547. See also Jackson, *Vive Le Roi*, pp. 86–87.

63 Jackson, *Vive Le Roi*, pp. 48–52.

64 Alberi, 2: 173.

5 THE FIRST YEAR

1 CSPF Edward, pp. 50, 194, 289; CSP Spain, XIII, 295. For a vivid description of the sixteenth-century royal hunt, see W. L. Wiley, *The Gentleman of Renaissance France* (Westport, Conn., 1971), pp. 137–44; and Ivan Cloulas, *La vie quotidienne dans les Châteaux de la Loire au temps de la Renaissance* (Paris, 1983), pp. 154–94. For a more general look at the life of the French nobility, see Jean-Marie Constant, *La vie quotidienne de la noblesse française aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles* (Paris, 1985). The court also had to move at times because the châteaux, when lived in for any length of time, began to stink and had to be cleansed. CSP Italy, VI-1, 87, 320.

2 Brantôme, *Oeuvres*, 3: 276; AN, K 91, piece 29, KK 286, fol. 52. There is no evidence in the financial records that Henry's personnel for hunting had salaries of 150,000 écus a year (387,500 livres) as the Venetian ambassador reported for Francis I in 1546. In 1559 the sum of hunting expenses appears to have been some 68,000 livres. BN, Fonds Dupuy 27, fol. 8.

3 CSP Edward, p. 16; Tytler, *Edward and Mary*, p. 80.

4 CSP Spain, IX, 209.

5 The roll of the royal household is in BN, Collection Clairaumbault 1216, fol. 49ff. For its organization, see Doucet, *Les Institutions*, 1: 125–27. On Francis I's household, see Knecht, *Francis I*, pp. 89–91. See also Mack Holt, "Patterns of Clientele and Economic Opportunity at Court during the Wars of Religion: The Household of François, Duke of Anjou," *French Historical Studies*, 13 (1984), 305–22.

6 Alberi, 2: 420–21; AN, K 113; BN, Fonds français 25753, which has the *comptes*

de bouche (expenditures for food) for six months of 1558. The sum was 5,332 livres. For a more complete description of the royal alimentary habits, see Cloulas, *La vie quotidienne*, pp. 181–88.

7 Brantôme, *Oeuvres*, 3: 279. Monluc, *Commentaires et lettres*, 2: 143.

8 Monluc, ibid., pp. 130–33.

9 The importance of Boulogne in the diplomatic calculations of the time was well summarized in 1547 by Mary of Hungary, the regent of the Low Countries: "Upon this point [Boulogne] depends the principal problem of how English affairs will generally turn out. If the English give up Boulogne, it may be fairly assumed that in the future they will tend to the side of France then to us whereas if they retain it, the contrary will be the case." CSP Spain, IX, 40. On the retaking of Boulogne, see below, pp. 142–43.

10 Ibid., pp. 132, 176; October 15, 1547.

11 CSP Scotland, I, 41–43.

12 Charles de La Roncière, *Histoire de la Marine française*, 4 vols. (Paris, 1906), 3: 432–43.

13 BN, Fonds français 3134, fol. 12. CSP Spain, IX, 312, 576. Marguerite d'Angoulême's remarks must be put in the context of her resentment in late 1548 over Henry II's refusal to allow her daughter Jeanne to marry Prince Philip of Spain, and the fact that he had had her correspondence opened to ensure that a secret marriage compact was not being arranged.

14 CSP Spain, IX, 206.

15 Ribier, *Lettres*, 2: 74–75; Pastor, *History of the Popes*, 13: 372–79.

16 CSP Spain, IX, 209–13.

17 ANG, 6: 276–80; Baumgartner, "Henry II's Italian Bishops: A Study in the Use and Abuse of the Concordat of Bologna," *Sixteenth Century Journal*, 11 (1980), 49–58.

18 Charles Aubertin, *Le roi Henri II à Beaune en 1548* (Beaune, 1888), pp. 17, 27. See BN, Fonds français 3120, fol. 63, for Henry's announcement that he intended to go to Italy and that he was establishing his wife with a council at Mâcon to govern his realm.

19 Williams, *The Brood of False Lorraine*, pp. 90–91.

20 Decrue, *Montmorency*, p. 55. See also BN, Fonds Français 3120, fol. 63.

21 DeCrue, ibid., p. 97; Henri Martin, *Histoire de France*, 16 vols. (Paris, 1860), 13: 380.

22 Romier, *Origines politiques*, 1: 90–104. Romier has exaggerated the dependency of Ippolito d'Este on the Guises. D'Este was a member of a well-placed family with an ancient bloodline. Romier seems to have taken coincidence of mutual interests for dependency.

23 Lubinskaja, pp. 21, 56–57.

24 CSP Spain, IX, 561. Paradin, *Histoire de nostre temps* (Lyon, 1550), p. 710. Saint–Mauris's report on the first hint of revolt is a month earlier than any other.

25 This description of the salt tax revolt and its aftermath is based largely on Decrue, *Montmorency*, pp. 62–67; *Mémoires de Vieilleville*, 26: 261–84; Paradin, *Histoire de nostre temps*, pp. 730–42; and especially S. Gigon, *La révolte de la gabelle en Guyenne, 1548–1549* (Paris, 1906).

26 According to the papal nuncio, Henry had intended to remain in Piedmont until about September 10 and return to Lyon by the 25th. ANG, 6: 31–36. The commission to Montmorency is dated September 12. *Catalogue des actes de Henri II*, 2: 360.
27 *Mémoires*, 26: 262. Gigon argues that it is highly unlikely that Montmorency, admittedly a cruel man in such circumstances, would have been as vindictive as the report presented. Gigon, *Révolte de la gabelle*, pp. 151–52. See Henry's letters to the constable in Ribier, *Lettres*, 2: 163–83.
28 The story related by De Thou, *Histoire universelle*, 2: 344, that Montmorency forced the leading citizens of Bordeaux to dig up the body with their bare hands is probably apocryphal.
29 See the letter of an English agent in France in Gigon, *Révolte de la gabelle*, pp. 215–16; and also CSP Spain, IX, 594.
30 For example, De Thou, *Histoire universelle*, 2: 345–47; the author of the *Mémoires de Vieilleville*; Belleforest, *Chroniques et annales de France* (Paris, 1585), pp. 443–46. Brantôme, *Oeuvres*, 3: 304–5.
31 See Decrue's spirited defense of the constable in *Montmorency*, pp. 67–69.
32 Tytler, *Mary and Edward*, 1: 357–58.
33 Ibid.
34 CSP Italy, VI-2, 1245.
35 Haton, *Mémoires*, 1: 106–07.
36 Daniel Hickey, *The Coming of French Absolutism: The Struggle for Tax Reform in the Province of Dauphiné 1540–1640* (Toronto, 1986), pp. 23–24.
37 Cited in J. H. Shennan, *Government and Society in France 1461–1661* (London, 1969), p. 113; Bodin, *Six Books of the Republic*, p. 41.
38 La Popelinière, *Histoire de France*, p. 53v.
39 *Mémoires de Vieilleville*, 26: 236–37; Haton, *Mémoires*, 1: 28–29.
40 These comments are based largely on Brantôme's many references to the character of Henry II, whom he greatly admired.

6 SILVER IS THE SINEW OF WAR

1 For these paragraphs see especially Richard Gascon, *Grand commerce et vie urbaine au XVIe siècle, Lyon et ses marchands*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1971), 2: 542–72, 659; Jean Jacquart, *La crise rurale en Ile-de-France* (Paris, 1974), pp. 762–63; Braudel, *La Méditerranée*, 2: 217; Chaunu, *Histoire économique*, 1: 920–21; Ladurie, *French Peasantry*, passim.
2 On the financial system, see especially Martin Wolfe, *The Fiscal System of Renaissance France* (New Haven, 1972). See also R. Doucet, *L'état des finances de 1523* (Paris, 1923); and *L'état des finances de 1567* (Paris, 1929); and L. S. Van Doren, "War Taxation, Institutional Change and Social Conflict in Provincial France—The Royal Taille in Dauphiné, 1494–1559," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 121 (1977), 70–96. Van Doren's work demonstrates the hazards of making generalizations on the fiscal system of sixteenth-century France by showing that Dauphiné usually was an exception to any generalization.
3 Henry II's edict of May 7, 1554, ruled that even royal letters patent granting

noble status were inoperative unless they were examined and registered by the *Chambre des comptes*. Wolfe, *Fiscal System*, p. 270.

4 Wolfe, *Fiscal System*, p. 99.

5 BN, Fonds français 3127, fols. 91ff.; Gigon, *Révolte de la gabelle*, p. 17. There were two types of taille: *réelle* and *personnelle*. The former was levied on eligible property, even if it was purchased by a noble or cleric, whose persons and other property were exempt. In the most of the realm except the Midi the *taille personnelle* was in force, which enabled non-taillable persons to take eligible property off the tax rolls when they bought it. A point of confusion about the tailles is the common but mistaken identification of the *taille réelle* with a land tax and the *taille personnelle* as a head tax. Wolfe, *Fiscal System*, pp. 314–16. In 1550 the tailles were assessed at 4,000,000 livres. BN, Fonds français 3127, fol. 97.

6 In 1550 the sum asked from the cities for the *soldes de* 50,000 *hommes de pied* was 1,200,000 livres. *Registres de ville de Paris*, 4: 281.

7 BN, Fonds français 3127, fol. 91; Alberi, 2: 417. See also Doucet, *Les Institutions*, 2: 557–61; Wolfe, *Fiscal System*, pp. 318–19.

8 BN, Fonds français 3127, fol. 91; Gigon, *Révolte de la gabelle*, appendix A; Wolfe, *Fiscal System*, pp. 340–41.

9 BN, Fonds français 3127, fol. 91; Fonds Dupuy 958, fol. 49. The latter has only 14 of the 17 *généralités*, while Fonds Dupuy 958, fol. 57, has a complete roll for 1559. A comparison of the fourteen *généralités* found on both rolls showed that their receipts increased by an average of 23 percent in the twelve years.

10 AN, K 90, fol. 20; ANG, 9: 119; V. Carrière, *Introduction aux études d'histoire ecclésiastique locale*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1936), 3: 256; Alberi, 2: 408; P. Gagnal, "Les décimes et les dons gratuits," *Revue d'Histoire de l'Eglise française*, 2: (1911), 465; J. Clamageran, *Histoire de l'impôt en France*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1867–76), 1: 130–31. The roll of *décimes* for 1516 is in BN, Fonds français 17657.

11 See, for example, ANG, 9: 119; CSP Spain, X, 334, 579, 591; CSPF Edward, p. 246.

12 BN, Fonds français 3127, fol. 91; Fontanon, *Ordonnances*, 3: 97; Wolfe, *Fiscal System*, pp. 116, 311.

13 Bernard Schnapper, *Les Rentes au XVIe siècle* (Paris, 1957), pp. 42–43, 172–73. Wolfe, *Fiscal System*, pp. 92–93. It is often assumed that only the king created rentes, but it was possible for cities and individuals to do so also. See, for example, Archives départementales d'Ille-et-Vilaine, G. 13, for examples of rente contracts between the bishop of Rennes and several bourgeoisie.

14 Knecht, *Francis I*, pp. 382, 389, citing Jean Bodin, *Les six livres de la Republique* (Paris 1577), p. 683.

15 This view has drawn heavily from Bodin, who was influenced by the wish to represent the reign of Francis I as the golden age of French finance, in contrast to the fiscal mismanagement of his own day. See Richard Ehrenberg, *Capital and Finance in the Age of the Renaissance* (New York, 1963,), pp. 295–97, who argues against Bodin's view.

16 Paillard, "Mort de François," p. 118. See similar statements from Henry's first year in CSP Spain, IX, 213; and ANG, 6: 191.

17 AN, KK 112. According to Michel François, "Albisse Del Bene surintendant général des finances françaises en Italie," *Bibliothèque de l'école des chartes*, 94 (1933), 337–60, the sums in Del Bene's accounts represented money borrowed from the bankers in Lyon.
18 On royal borrowing at Lyon, see Wolfe, *Fiscal System*; Ehrenberg, *Capital and Finance*, pp. 216–18, 281–306; R. Doucet, "Le Grand Parti de Lyon au XVIe siècle," *Revue historique*, 171 (1933), 471–513; 172, 1–41.
19 See, for example, CSPF Edward, p. 59.
20 Ehrenberg, *Capital and Finance*, p. 301. He gave the sum in écus as 1,463,375. Ehrenberg's calculation is confirmed by the papal nuncio's report that the French king had borrowed 1.5 million in gold. ANG, 9: 140. See also CSPF Mary, p. 19.
21 ANG, 9: 141. The *scudi* was an Italian coin about the equivalent of the écu.
22 CSP Spain, X, 469.
23 Bodin, *The Six Books of a Commonweale*, ed. Kenneth McRae (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), p. 674. Bodin stated that Henry eventually had to pay 18 percent interest.
24 On the Grand Parti, see R. Doucet, "Grand Parti"; and Wolfe, *Fiscal System*, pp. 110–11.
25 CSP Italy, VI-2, 956. As Doucet pointed out, there has been a great deal of confusion over the system of amortizing the loans. Several sixteenth-century authors, and Ehrenberg, *Capital and Finance*, pp. 303–5, mistakenly calculated the interest on the entire principal for the entire length of the loan. Although the loans were to be paid up in less than eleven years, more than twenty years later Henry III was still paying on them. *Lettres de Henri III*, ed. Michel François et al. (Paris, 1984), 4: 44.
26 A contract is printed in Doucet, "Grand Parti," pp. 35–41.
27 CSP Italy, VI-2, 956. Doucet, "Grand Parti," p. 510, found loans of only 400,000 écus for that time.
28 Doucet, ibid., p. 510; CSP Italy, VI-3, 1365. The Venetian report stated that Henry had not paid for two fairs and the sum involved was 200,000 écus, equaling two payments of the original loan of the Grand Parti. The financiers agreed to make Henry a loan of that sum under the same terms.
29 BN, Fonds français 4523, fols. 43–51; Lot, *Armées françaises*, pp. 241–53. The accounts for 1554 are incomplete, but the partial sums available suggest a slightly higher total for that year.
30 AN, KK 112.
31 CSP Spain, X, 73. The badly debased coins apparently had ceased being struck by the time of the complaint.
32 Gascon, *Grand commerce*, 2: 568–72.
33 On venality, see Doucet, *Les Institutions*, 1: 191; R. Mousnier, *La venalité des offices sous Henri IV et Louis XIII* (Paris, 1971).
34 CSPF Mary, p. 52.
35 Isambert, *Recueil des lois*, 14: 77–78; Doucet, *Les Institutions*, 1: 264–67; Paul Bondois, "Les Chancelleries présidials au XVIe Siècle," *Revue du Seizième Siècle*, 1 (1913), 521–28.

36 Doucet, 1: 170; Maugis, *Histoire du Parlement*, 1: 194–201. When the parlementaires objected to the semester system and a new tax on their revenues, Henry told them that the public need was the worst in 500 years.

37 Jean-Richard Bloch, *L'anoblissement en France au temps de François I* (Paris, 1934). In 1548 Henry issued a total of nine patents. *Catalogue des actes de Henri II*, 2: passim.

38 On the *aumôniers*, see Doucet, *Les Institutions*, 2: 803–12; and "Pierre Du Chastel, grand aumônier de France," *Revue historique*, 133 (1920), 212–57; 124, 1–57.

39 BN, Fonds français 10393, fols. 3–4; AN, KK 106, 111. Cloulas has found the sum of 9,700 livres for 1549. Cloulas, p. 361.

40 BN, Collection Clairaumbault 1216, fol. 49, for 1556. A number of almoners served without salaries.

41 AN, KK 111, fols. 1–16.

7 LIFE AT COURT

1 On the royal entries, see Théodore Godefroy, *Le cérémonial françois*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1649); Lawrence Bryant, "The French Royal Entry Ceremony: Politics, Society and Art in Renaissance Paris," Ph.D. diss., University of Iowa, 1978; and V. E. Graham, "The Triumphal Entry in Sixteenth-Century France," *Renaissance and Reformation*, 22 (1986), 237–56.

2 Bryant, "Royal Entry," pp. 6–14. Bryant points out that by the time of Louis XIV, most of these rights were exercised across the entire realm upon a new king's accession and were no longer associated specifically with the royal entry. At the time of Henry II the new king did have the right to fill a vacant benefice in every diocese.

3 Knecht, *Francis I*, p. 96.

4 On the Lyon entry, see *La magnificence de la superbe et triomphante entrée de la noble et antique cité de Lyon au tèschrestien roy de France Henri deuxiesme* . . . , ed. Georges Guigue (Lyon, 1927); Louis Bourgeois, *Quand la cour de France vivait à Lyon* (Paris, 1980), pp. 267–87.

5 Comment of Henri Estienne, cited by Wiley, *Gentleman of Renaissance France*, p. 65.

6 Brantôme, *Oeuvres*, 3: 250.

7 *L'Entrée de Henri II à Rouen* 1550, ed. Margaret McGowan (New York, n.d.), fol. C, p. viii; Baschet, *La diplomatie Vénitienne*, pp. 442–43. Guiffrey, *Lettres inédites*, p. 157, n., pointed out that Henry used the monogram in his letters to Diane, clinching the H-D interpretation for him. Williams, *Henri II*, p. 230, and Marcel Mayer, *Le Château d'Anet* (Paris, 1952), p. 48, accept the H-D interpretation. Noëll, *Henri II*, p. 94, and Bourciez, *Moeurs*, argue for the C-D-H monogram. For a further discussion of the topic, see Quentin-Bauchart, *Bibliothèque de Fontainebleau*, pp. 185–88.

8 CSP Spain IX, 327; Brantôme, *Oeuvres*, 3: 250.

9 The extant letters of Henry to Diane are in Guiffrey, *Lettres inédites*, pp. 219–29. The following translation is in Williams, *Henri II*, pp. 253–54. None of Diane's letters to Henry have survived, perhaps because it was considered

bad form for a lover to keep his mistress's letters, although the mistress could keep her lover's.

10 The following is one of four poems to Diane written entirely in Henry's hand, according to Guiffrey, *Lettres inédites*, p. 228.

> Hellas, mon Dyu, combyen je regrète
> Le tans qui j'é pertu an ma jeunèse;
> Conbyen de foys je me fuys fouèt
> Avoyr Dyane pour ma seul mestrèse;
> Més je cregnoys qu'èle, quy est déese,
> Ne se voulut abéser juques là
> De fayre cas de moy, quy sa(n) sela
> N'avoys plésyr, joye, ny contantement
> Juques à l'eure que se délybèra
> Que j'obéyse à son coumandemant.

Hope, "The Verses of Henri II," 127–31, has demonstrated that the first of the poems found in BN, Fonds français 3143, fols.6–9, was a sonnet of Joachim Du Bellay's copied by Henry in his own hand. Hope is prepared to agree that the less polished style of the other three, including the one cited above, increases the probability that they were authored by the king.

11 Baschet, *La diplomatie Vénitienne*, p. 440. On Lady Fleming, see Cloulas, *Catherine de Médicis*, pp. 89–90. Henry II is said to have had another illegitimate child in 1558; but since the mother was married, he did not recognize it as his.

12 Pelf: Trash, Waste, OED. Tytler, *Edward and Mary*, 1: 361. In October 1552 Marie de Guise wrote to Cardinal de Lorraine that Lady Fleming was still seeking to return to the French court, an event she knew would annoy all of the major figures of the court. She pledged that the woman would not go to France. CSP Spain, X, 588, n. The letter was one of several that had been seized from a French courier and sold to the imperial government.

13 For example, the nuncio Santa Croce, from September 1552 to May 1554, mentioned her only twice, and both times in reference to her sons-in-law. ANG, 9: 112, 199.

14 Henri Chambard, *Histoire de La Pléiade*, 4 vols. (Paris, 1961), 2: 267–317; Isidore Silver, *Ronsard and the Hellenic Renaissance in France* (Geneva, 1981), p. 351.

15 Cited by Williams, *Henri II*, pp. 252–53. L'Orme received a small abbey from Diane in 1548, although she kept a portion of the revenues for herself. The abbey was originally intended for Cardinal de Châtillon. Guiffrey, *Lettres inédites*, p. 22.

16 Mayer, *Anet*, p. 16.

17 Françoise Bardon, *Diane de Poitiers et le Mythe de Diane* (Paris, 1963).

18 *Lettres de Catherine de Medici*, 8: 181. In 1561 Catherine wrote to her daughter, Elisabeth, that before Henry's death she had no problems except "not being loved as much as I wanted to be by the king your father." Ibid., 10: 494.

19 Guiffrey, *Lettres inédites*, p. 78.

20 Tommaseo, *Relations des ambassadeurs Vénitiens*, 1: 287. Catherine's jealousy

clearly was kept well under control, but according to Brantôme, at one point it got the best of her. She ordered a hole cut in the floor of her apartment at Saint-Germain so she could see what was happening in Diane's apartment directly below. *Dames galantes*, p. 176.

21 Cited by Romier, *Origines politiques*, 2: 313–14. See below, pp. 221–23, for the debate over whether to make peace in late 1558.

22 Van Dyke, *Catherine de Médicis*, 1: 96–98.

23 BN, Cinq cents de Colbert 4, fols. 61, 95; Ancel, *Nonciatures*, p. 99, where the influence of Catherine on Henry's Siennese policy is described.

24 Ribier, *Lettres*, 2: 605; AN, KK 89, fols. 18–29.

25 Baumgartner, "Henry II's Italian Bishops," pp. 49–58.

26 Guiffrey, *Lettres inédites*, passim. For Henry's reaction to Claude's accident, see BN, Fonds français 3140, fol. 79.

27 See the some fifty letters from Henry to d'Humières in BN, Fonds français 3120; Collection Clairaumbault 341; Cinq cents de Colbert 23. The packets also include the appointments of the sons of the great nobles such as Saint-André as pages in the dauphin's household.

28 BN, Fonds français 3120, fols. 12, 69; CSP Spain, IX, 326, 559; XIII, 255. In November 1548 he had gone to Saint-Germain without the court in order to enjoy the company of his children alone. See Léon de Laborde, *Les comptes des bâtiments du roi (1528–1571)*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1877), 2: 291ff., for the accounts for building and repair at Saint-Germain from 1547 to 1550. A total of 22,200 livres was expended, much of which went for improvements to the children's rooms.

29 Catherine de Medici, *Lettres*, 1: 18, n.

30 Marguerite de Valois, *Mémoires*, p. 5; David Buisseret, *Henry IV* (Boston, 1984), p. 3.

31 BN, Fonds français 3134, fol. 126; Alberi, 2: 421. For further details about the household of Henry's children, see de Ruble, *La première jeunèsse de Marie Stuart*, pp. 60–62.

32 CSPF Mary, p. 187. According to the Venetian Capello, the dauphin "n'aime guère les lettres ce qui déplait fort a sa majesté. On lui a donné de très-bons précepteurs." His brother Charles was noted as loving letters. *Relations des ambassadeurs Vénitiens*, p. 373.

33 "Letters from Henry II to Henry's Cousin Mary Queen Dowager of Scotland," *Miscellany of the Maitland Club* (Edinburgh, 1834), 1: letter 9.

34 Ibid., letter 13.

35 CSP Spain, IX, 45, 191, 276; Paillard, "Mort de François I," pp. 98–99. See also Roelker, *Jeanne d'Albret*, pp. 71–72.

36 CSP Spain, IX, 311–12. Roelker, *Jeanne d'Albret*, p. 73. Marguerite d'Angoulême complained to Saint-Mauris after the wedding that she would have preferred her daughter marry Prince Philip but Henry refused to hear a word of it.

37 CSP Spain, IX, 325.

38 See the program for a tournament in honor of the king's coronation in Noëll, *Henri II*, p. 80.

39 Baschet, *La Diplomatie Vénitienne*, p. 445.

40 *Amadis de Gaule*, ed. Edwin Place, 4 vols. (Lexington, Ky., 1974). Bourciez, *Moeurs polies*, p. 89.
41 H. I. Martin, "What Parisians Read in the Sixteenth Century," *French Humanism*, ed. L. Gundersheimer (New York, 1970), p. 138.
42 For excellent discussions of the Paris entry of 1549, see Lawrence Bryant, "The French Royal Entry Ceremony," and Ian McFarlane, *The Entry of Henry II into Paris 16 June, 1549* (Binghamton, N.Y., 1982). The latter includes a reprint of the official description of the entry: *Cest l'ordre qui a esté tenu à la nouvelle et ioyeuse entrée. . . .* (Paris, 1549). See also *Registres de ville de Paris*, 3: 158–85; V. E. Graham, "The Triumphal Entry in Sixteenth-Century France," *Renaissance and Reformation*, 22 (1986), 237–56.
43 CSP Spain, IX, 209; Bryant, "Entry Ceremony," p. 89, n. 45.
44 Belleforest, *Chroniques*, p. 576; cited by McFarlane, *Entry*, p. 25.
45 See the illustrations in *L'ordre à la ioyeuse entrée*, pp. 14, 37.
46 Bryant, *Royal Entry*, p. 20.
47 McFarlane, *Entry*, pp. 65–67.
48 Hanley, *The Lit de Justice*, pp. 127–33.
49 On the parlements, see E. Maugis, *Histoire du Parlement de Paris à l'avènement des rois Valois à la mort d'Henri IV*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1913–1916); J. H. Shennan, *The Parlement of Paris* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1968).
50 According to Hanley, *The Lit de Justice*, historians have incorrectly used the term *lit de justice* to describe the ceremony in which the king ordered the parlement to register his edicts; the proper term is the royal *séance*. The *lit* was a ceremony at which major constitutional questions were addressed. It seems to me, however, that Hanley has drawn a distinction that probably would not have been understood by Henry's contemporaries.
51 McFarlane, *Entry*, pp. 58–60. McFarlane argues that the entry probably prompted Du Bellay to hasten the publication of the *Défense* in order to take advantage of the coming festival. Both Du Bellay and Pierre Ronsard wrote poems for the entry, but they clearly had not been commissioned.
52 Alberi, 2: 426. Henry's death prevented the construction of a vast domed edifice at the crest of Montmartyre, planned by Philibert de L'Orme, that uncannily prefigured Sacre-Coeur. Cloulas, p. 385.
53 AN, K 91, fol. 40; Pierre Guilbert, *Description historique du château de Fontainebleau*, 2 vols. (Marseille, 1978), 1: 11–14, 57–58; Sylvie Béguin, *L'Ecole de Fontainebleau* (Paris, 1960); Cloulas, pp. 365–85. In 1558, a year of dire financial straits for the monarchy, Henry expended 146,953 livres for new building and repairs of existing structures. Fontainebleau received 31,935. Laborde, *Comptes des bâtiments*, 1: 355–80.
54 BN, Fonds Dupuy 27, fol. 3; Marianna Jenkins, "The Henry II Wing of the Louvre," *The Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies*, 7 (1977), 289–307. In 1558 Henry budgeted 24,000 livres to the new wing of the Louvre. Laborde, *Comptes des bâtiments*, 1: 355.
55 *Catalogues des actes de Henri II*, 2: 179; Anthony Blunt, *Philibert de L'Orme* (London, 1958), pp. 28–87.
56 Alastair Smart, *The Renaissance and Mannerism outside Italy* (London, 1972), pp. 185–86. See also Robert Wolf, *Renaissance and Mannerist Art* (New York,

1968), pp. 144–57; and David Thomson, *Renaissance Paris Architecture and Growth 1475–1600* (Berkeley, Calif., 1984), pp. 83–97.

57 Smart, *The Renaissance*, p. 185.

58 AN, K 89, fol. 2; Edwin Panofsky, *Tomb Sculpture* (London, 1964), pp. 79–80, 147. Pierre Bontemps received 230 livres for the figures of Henry's brothers.

59 BN, Fonds français 21450, fol. 6.

60 Stephan Grancsay, "Royal Armorers: Antwerp or Paris," *Bulletin of the Metropolitan Museum of New York*, 18 (1959), 68–80; Cloulas, pp. 347–48.

61 Quentin-Bauchart, *Bibliothèque de Fontainebleau*, pp. 23–33, and the descriptions of the books, pp. 77–134. I have had the good fortune to examine Henry's copy of Copernicus's *De Revolutionibus*. It is still today truly an exquisite example of bookmaking.

62 While Brantôme stated that Henry especially cared for the works of Ronsard (*Oeuvres*, 3: 287), it is clear from his poetry that his efforts to gain financial support from Henry were not as successful as Ronsard hoped, and he consequently turned to other members of the court. Nonetheless, he did receive 1,200 livres annually as a pension, and several minor church benefices. Isidore Silver's comment, in *Ronsard and the Hellenic Renaissance*, p. 345, that Ronsard would have done much better under Francis I because Francis "would not have forgotten that Ronsard's father . . . had been for four years one of the guardians" of the French princes in Spain is contradicted by the evidence that shows that Henry was far more remindful of his companions in Spain than Francis had been.

63 Antoine d'Artigny, *Nouveaux Mémoires d'histoire*, 7 vols. (Paris, 1749–50), 5: 204; BN, Fonds Dupuy 27, fol. 3.

64 For example Ronsard:

> Le Plus grand Roi qui se trouve
> Soit en armes ou en lois.

Oeuvres complètes, ed. Gustave Cohen, 2 vols. (Paris, 1950), 1: 368. On the Pléiade and Henry II, see especially Henri Chamard, *Histoire de La Pléiade*, 4 vols. (Paris, 1961), 2: 266–317.

65 Abbé Tollemer, *Le Journal du sire de Gouberville* (reprint Paris, 1972), pp. 401–20. Gouberville escorted one of the younger daughters of Montmorency to a ball given by the king.

66 BN, Fonds Dupuy 27, fol. 3; Paul Bandois, *Henri II et ses Historiographes* (Paris, 1927); Orest Ranum, *Artisans of Glory* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1980), pp. 70–75.

67 Quentin-Bauchart, *Bibliothèque de Fontainebleau*, pp. 77–134.

68 See Baumgartner, "Scepticism and French Interest in Copernicanism to 1630," *Journal for the History of Astronomy*, 17 (1986), 77–86. Henry II's copy of *De Revolutionibus* is in the Bibliothèque Nationale; Tyard's well-annotated copy is in the Bibliothèque Municipale of Vienne.

69 Haton, *Mémoires*, 1: 110; Brantôme, *Oeuvres*, 3: 285; AN, K 92, fol. 19. The document placed all six scholars in the university, but Ramus and two of the lesser-known men on the list, Jean Cinquarbes, a teacher of Hebrew and Syriac, and Pasquier Duhamel, a mathematician, were all at the Collège de

France. DBF, 8: 1315; 12: 19. Cinquarbes had received his appointment in 1555.

70 Baschet, *La diplomatie Vénitienne*, p. 436. Brantôme's final comment on Henry was: "Voyla le grand roy aymoit les armes et les lettres." *Oeuvres*, 3: 289.

8 LE ROI TRES-CHRETIEN

1 For Henry's orders to the parlementaires to attend the procession, see AN, K 90, fol. 18.

2 Louis Madelin, "Les premières applications de Concordat de 1516," *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire d'école française de Rome*, 14 (1897), 323–85.

3 Romier, "La crise gallicane de 1551," *Revue historique*, 108 (1911), 225–50; 109 (1912), 27–55.

4 CSP Spain, X, 29. According to Simon Renard, who had replaced Saint-Mauris as imperial ambassador, François de Guise had persuaded Henry to support d'Este, since a Frenchman or so obviously a French client as Salviati could not get elected. See ibid., IX, 401ff.; X, 1–39; and CSP Italy, V, 274ff; for detailed accounts of the French and imperial interference in the conclave. See also Baumgartner, "Henry II and the Conclave of 1549," *The Sixteenth Century Journal*, 16 (1985), 301–15.

5 Ludwig von Pastor, *The History of the Popes*, 36 vols. (St. Louis, 1951), 13: 30, n.; Ribier, *Lettres*, 2: 249–68. A partial register of *décharges* for 1549 with an entry for Guise's sum is in AN, JJ 259.

6 Spain, X, 2–4, 14–16, 29–30.

7 Evennett, *Cardinal of Lorraine*, pp. 26–33; Nuncio Antonio Trivulzio, cited by Romier, *Origines politiques*, 1: 227. See also Venard, "Une réforme gallicane?" p. 203.

8 Bishop Charles de Marillac to Henry in 1551, cited by Evennett, p. 27.

9 CSP Spain, X, 54, and passim; CSP Edward, pp. 170–72; ANG, 6: 475ff.; Romier, "La crise gallicane." For a French view that recalling the council to Trent made Julius a "slave" of the emperor, see M. François, *Correspondance du Cardinal François de Tournon* (Paris, 1946), p. 259.

10 ANG, 6: 23, 275–76; R. Ancel, *Nonciatures de France. Nonciatures de Paul IV* (Paris, 1909), pp. ivi–ivii; Lubinskaja, p. 94. The amicable settlement of the problem did not result in Del Monte receiving his episcopal revenues from Marseille. The papal nuncio raised the issue several times until 1553, but without success. ANG, 9: 46–47.

11 Henry's letter is in J. Roserat de Melin, *Antoine Caracciolo évêque de Troyes* (Paris, 1923), pp. 396–98. Desjardins, *Négociations avec Toscane*, 3: 250; CSPF Edward, p. 93; Venard, "Une réforme gallicane?" p. 204; Romier, "La crise gallicane," 241–45.

12 CSPF Edward, p. 127. The author of this report, an Italian agent for the English government in Rome, stated that the last point was not thought to be very probable.

13 CSP Spain, X, 343. Isambert, *Recueil des lois*, 13: 211–14; Venard, "Une réforme gallicane?" pp. 204–5. Julius's letter is in ANG, 6: 474. The editor of

ANG, 6, argues, p. 477, n., that Romier, *Origines politiques*, p. 255 n., was mistaken in his statement that the letter lacked the usual diplomatic formalities. He presumes that Romier had seen only a copy; but CSP Spain, X, 343, seems to support Romier's position.

14 On Du Moulin, see BN, Fonds français 4737, fol. 18; and Donald Kelley, "The *Fides Historicae* of Charles Du Moulin and the Gallican View of Historical Tradition," *Traditio*, 22: (1966), 347–403. The book was condemned in September 1552.

15 CSP Spain, X, 344–45. Renard attributed the plan largely to Chancellor Olivier, who had been called to the court specifically to give Henry advice on how to respond to Julius's letter. Bishop Jean de Monluc was also seen as having a role. ANG, 6: 506. Evennett, *Cardinal of Lorraine*, pp. 38–39, argues that Lorraine refused the offer of the patriarchate in 1551 but, according to Renard, it had not been offered to him.

16 Tytler, *Mary and Edward*, p. 420. In the same dispatch, Pickering repeated with clear relish the harsh words spoken by Montmorency against the pope. On Amyot at Trent, see Ribier, *Lettres*, 2: 344–45.

17 Tournon, *Correspondance*, pp. 271–78; Venard, "Une réforme gallicane?" pp. 215–25.

18 BN, Fonds français 23102, fol. 92v.

19 ANG, 9: 50–59, and passim. For a further discussion of the Mirepoix dispute and the clause of *ad Sedem Apostolicam*, see Baumgartner, "Henry II's Italian Bishops," *The Sixteenth Century Journal*, 9 (1980), 54–55.

20 Ribier, *Lettres*, 2: 612; Pastor, *History of the Popes*, 14: 4–15, 56.

21 Pickering to the English Court, September 4, 1551, in Tytler, *Edward and Mary*, p. 420.

22 Lubinskaja, p. 32; Church, *The Italian Reformers 1534–1564* (New York, 1932), p. 184.

23 CSP Spain, X, 307.

24 CSPF Edward, pp. 120, 342–43; Masone et al., to the English Council, June 20, 1551, in Tytler, *Edward and Mary*, pp. 399–402. Masone related how the French negotiators responded with uproarious laughter when the original English demand for a dowry of 1,500,000 crowns was presented. The marriage compact is in Thomas Rymer, *Foedera, Conventus . . . Acta publica inter Reges Anglicae* (London, 1749), 6: 207–10.

25 See CSP Spain, X, 309, for the objections of "several people on the French side" against an alliance of the king's daughter with a schismatic and excommunicated prince.

26 CSP Spain, X, 309–10; CSPF Edward, p. 130; ANG, 6: 129.

27 Baird, *Rise of Huguenots*, 1: 283–85; CSPF Edward, p. 200; Pariset, *Relations*, pp. 48–49.

28 Venard, "Une réforme gallicane?" pp. 201–5.

29 E. de Moreau et al., *La Crise religieuse du XVIe siècle* (n.p., 1950), p. 273.

30 Baird, *Rise of Huguenots*, 1: 52. See also Donald Kelley, *The Beginning of Ideology of Consciousness and Society in the French Reformation* (Cambridge, 1981), p. 171; and Baumgartner, "Heterodoxy and Humanism in the French

Episcopacy Under Francis I," *Proceedings of the Western Society for French History*, 8 (1982), 57–68.

31 Isambert, *Recueil des lois*, 12: 676–81; Sutherland, *The Huguenot Struggle for Recognition* (New Haven, 1980), pp. 32–39, 337–338; Knecht, *Francis I*, pp. 397–99. Raymond Mentzer, *Heresy Proceedings in Languedoc 1500–1560* (Philadelphia, 1984), p.34, argues that the edict of June 1539 was in large part the result of the execution for heresy of the inquisitor for Languedoc in 1538.

32 Aubigné, *Histoire universelle* (Geneva, 1981), p. 221; De Thou, *Histoire universelle*, 2: 181; Romier, *Saint-André*, p. 199, citing LeLaboreur, *Additions aux mémoires de Castelnau*, 2: 75. On the question of Diane's use of her client, Blondet, the treasurer of the *Epargne*, to keep her informed of judicial confiscations, see above, p. 56. There are a number of sources that show that Diane received property of convicted heretics as gifts from the king, but there is no contemporary proof that she requested it.

33 *Histoire ecclésiastique*, 1: 50–51; also Jean Crespin, *Histoire des martyrs*, 3 vols. (Toulouse, 1885–89), 1: 538–39. Contrary to a number of historians, who cite Beza and Crespin, they did not call him a "court tailor" but a "poor" tailor, whose name was unknown. Stories of this sort from contemporary Protestant sources are difficult to deal with. Like most hagiographical writing, they are often greatly embellished, if not apocryphal. In this case one has to wonder how a "poor tailor" would have known who the woman was, especially since the court had not been in Paris since long before Francis I's death. See Mentzer, *Heresy Proceedings*, p. 121, for a discussion of the problem of embellishment in the Protestant martyrologies.

34 ANG, 14: 104, December 24, 1557. See also the statement in ibid., p. 195, March 1559, about the opposition of Diane, "full of the best zeal," to the heretics.

35 "Item de terra mea ac luridicone mihi subdita universos hereticos ab ecclesia denotatos pro veribus bona fide exterminare studeba," in *The Coronation Book of Charles V of France*, ed. E. S. Dewick (London, 1899), col. 19. On the thesis of Richard Jackson that Henry did not swear the clause on heresy, see above, chapter 4, n. 61. Weiss, *Chambre ardente*, pp. lxi–lxii, implies that this portion of the oath was an innovation for Henry's coronation, a point repeated more explicitly by other historians, such as Sutherland, *Huguenot Struggle*, p. 41. The proper translation of "exterminare" is "to drive out," not "to exterminate."

36 De Thou, *Histoire universelle*, 1: 496.

37 Weiss, *Chambre ardente*, p. lvii and note. Immediately upon coming to the throne Henry ordered the arrest of those responsible for the destruction of the Waldensian villages in 1545. This act probably should be regarded as motivated by the rivalries at the court in 1547, rather than by any reluctance on Henry's part to use violence against heretics. Eventually, one of the accused was executed.

38 AN, K 90, fol. 4; BN, Fonds français 4737, fol. 33. Weiss, *Chambre ardente*, p. lxiv. Ory's duties as inquisitor apparently required him to investigate suspected heretics and report them to the proper authorities.

39 See Weiss, *Chambre ardente*, pp. 418–21, for the document creating it. It is rather surprising to see Weiss speculating that the Clausse who notarized the document was one Engebert Clausse, whom Francis I had appointed *procureur général* of the Inquisition. Obviously it was the royal secretary Côme Clausse.

40 In this respect Henry was following the example of his father, who had created a similar chamber in the Parlement of Rouen in 1545. Ibid., p. xxxiv. The first use of the term *chambre ardente* is unknown; it is found in the *Histoire ecclésiastique*, 1: 87, "qu'on appeloit chambre ardente."

41 Weiss, *Chambre ardente*, has both full *arrêts* and summaries of the sentences against those charged with heresy. Linda Taber, "Royal Policy and Religious Dissent within the Parlement of Paris," unpublished diss., Stanford University, 1982, pp. 13–14, is the only work that has made an analysis of the chamber's sentences published by Weiss. She found a somewhat smaller number of death penalties—twenty-seven. The smaller figure appears to be a result of a confusion between the number of *arrêts* (27) ordering the death penalty and the number of persons named in them (37).

42 In comparison to the *chambre ardente*, to take just two events of Francis I's reign, twenty-four "Lutherans" were condemned to death as a result of the Affair of the Placards in 1534, and fourteen heretics of Meaux in 1546, to say nothing of the hundreds of Waldensians condemned under Francis I.

43 Mentzer, *Heresy Proceedings*, pp. 120–23, n. 42. The Parlement of Grenoble was regarded as the most lenient. Moreau, *Crise religieuse*, p. 272.

44 In response to the edict sixty-eight persons held in prison in Paris were turned over to their bishops for trial. Weiss, *Chambre ardente*, pp. 376–79. No record exists of any further proceedings for those persons.

45 For the text of the edict, see Isambert, *Recueil des lois*, 13: 189–208. For discussions of it, see Sutherland, *Huguenot Struggle*, pp. 44–46; Taber, "Royal Policy," pp. 18–19; and Baird, *Rise of Huguenots*, 1: 279–82.

46 See the analysis of the appointments to the *Cours des monnaies* in C. Kaiser, "Les cours souveraines au XVIe siècle: Morale et Contre-Réformation," *Annales*, 37 (1982), 18–19. Kaiser notes that the concept of the mercuriale was not new to Henry's reign. It dated from 1493 and applied to the supervision of morals as well as procedure. Ibid., pp. 23–26.

47 Quoted in Jonathan Dewald, "The Perfect Magistrate: Parlementaires and Crime in Sixteenth-Century Rouen," *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte*, 67 (1976), 298.

48 Weiss, *Chambre ardente*, pp. 339–342.

49 Tytler, *Edward and Mary*, p. 420.

50 CSPF Edward, p. 250. For a further discussion of the involvement of several women of the court in the Reformation, see Roelker, "The Role of Noblewomen in the French Reformation," *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte*, 63 (1972), 168–95.

51 Ibid., pp. 100–1. Morrison also reported that a proclamation had been recently issued in France that "no one shall speak ill of the English for their religion."

9 CHEF DES HOMMES DE GUERRE

1 Giovanni Capello, in Tommaseo, *Ambassadeurs Vénitiens*, 1: 385. Capello went on to note that Henry had a high regard for Charles's brother, Ferdinand. By focusing his hatred on Charles, Henry probably then found it possible to deal more easily with Ferdinand and Philip II after Charles's abdication in 1556.

2 *Mémoires de Vieilleville*, 16: 247.

3 CSP Spain, IX, passim; CSPF Edward, p. 16; Tytler, *Edward and Mary*, pp. 329–30.

4 On the French army and its major officers, see especially Doucet, *Les Institutions*, 1: 112–24; 2: 608–50; Ferdinand Lot, *Recherches sur les éffectifs des armées françaises des guerres d'Italie aux guerres de Religion 1494–1562* (Paris, 1962); Harding, *Anatomy*, pp. 21–31.

5 The marshals received a pay of 20,600 livres a year. AN, KK 127, piece 36.

6 Isambert, *Recueil des lois*, 13: 19–22.

7 On the French navy under Henry, see La Roncière, *Marine française*, 3: 453ff.; J. Fournier, "Les Galères de France sous Henri II," *Bulletin de géographie historique et descriptive*, 2 (1904), 174–95; Doucet, *Les Institutions*, 2: 659–60. The admiral's pay was 10,000 livres. BN, Fonds Dupuy 27, fol. 41.

8 BN, Fonds français 25724, fol. 11. CSP Spain, XI, 20. According to Fonds français 3127, fol. 61, the sums for the navy were a little lower: 1,400,000 for the three first years of the reign. The best work on galley warfare is John Guilmartin, *Galleys and Gunpowder* (Cambridge, 1974).

9 David Buisseret, "Monarchs, Ministers and Maps: Sixteenth and Seventeenth-Century France," a paper presented at the Newberry Library, Chicago, November 1985. I wish to thank Dr. Buisseret for providing me a copy.

10 BN, Fonds français 18153, fol. 18; *Catalogues des actes de Henri II*, 2: 78; CSP Spain, IX, 400.

11 La Roncière, *Marine française*, 3: 574–76; Louis Doucet, *Quand les François cherchariant fortune aux Caraïbes* (Paris, 1981), pp. 56–58. Le Clerc's exploits were largely responsible for the development of the Spanish fleet system across the Atlantic.

12 On the entry of Rouen, with its display of Brazilian exotica and wealth, designed to persuade the king of the value of trade with Brazil, see F. Denis, *Une fête brésilienne célébrée à Rouen en 1550* (Paris, 1850). For a further discussion of overseas expeditions in Henry's reign, see Baumgartner, "Adam's Will Act II: Henry II and French Overseas Expeditions," *Proceedings of the French Colonial History Society*, forthcoming.

13 Guilmartin, *Galleys and Gunpowder*, pp. 85–94; La Roncière, *Marine française*, 3: 480–87.

14 BN, Fonds Dupuy 27, fol. 41; Alberi, 2: 407. The *ban* was defined as the king's right to call on his immediate vassals; the *arrière-ban* as those vassals calling on their vassals, down through the system of subinfeudation. The terms were virtually inseparable in the sixteenth century. See Henry's edict concerning both of February 1548, in Isambert, *Recueil des lois*, 13: 40–49. On the archers, see La Popelinière, *Histoire de France*, p. 30. See also Hans

Delbrück, *History of the Art of War within the Framework of Political History*, trans. W. J. Renfroe, 4 vols. (London, 1985), 4: 117–38.

15 Lot, *Armées françaises*, pp. 247–48. Dandolo in 1547 put the number of men in the gendarmerie a little higher, at 7,000 men. Alberi, 2: 413. The salaries of the gendarmerie came to nearly 3,000,000 livres in 1550, a year when the companies were at 80 percent of full strength. BN, Fonds français 3127, fol. 3.

16 BN, Cinq cents de Colbert 23, fol. 42v; Doucet, *Les Institutions*, 2: 644–45. A "harquebusier à cheval" was paid fourteen livres a month. Ibid., 16, fol. 153.

17 Monluc, *Commentaires*, pp. 34–35. Actually they were Gascons who were in the service of Spain.

18 A Swiss infantryman cost the king 11.5 livres a month, a German, 9, and a French foot soldier, 8.5. These rates are calculated from BN, Fonds français 3090, fol. 12, which included the pay of the captains—usually 100 livres a month—and other officers, so the ordinary foot soldier was paid less than the above sums.

19 Fourquevaux, *Instructions sur le faict de la guerre . . . de 1548*, ed. Gladys Dickinson (London, 1954).

20 Brantôme, *Oeuvres*, vol. 1; Rabutin, *Commentaires des guerres en la Gaule Belgique (1551–1559)*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1932), 1: 53, 98, 224. On Estrées, see *Discours des villes, chasteaux et forteresses batues, assaillies et prises par la force de l'artillerie durant les règnes des roys Henri second et Charles IX* (Paris, 1568), in BN, Collection Clairaumbault 1080.

21 Carlo Cipolla, *Guns, Sails and Empires* (London, 1965), p. 29, n. As an example of the enormous range of guns available, see the list of artillery pieces surrendered by the English at Boulogne in 1550. Rymer, *Foedera*, 6: 217.

22 Brantôme, *Oeuvres*, 1: 164.

23 See above, chapter 6.

24 Doucet, *Les Institutions*, 2: 647.

25 *Mémoires de Vieilleville*, 26: 441–43. Buisseret, "Monarchs, Ministers, and Maps," discusses Henry's involvement in the drawing of the great plan of Paris in 1550, designed largely to establish new city limits for Paris.

26 Brantôme, *Oeuvres*, 1: 168.

27 CSPF Mary, p. 308; Christopher Duffy, *Siege Warfare: The Fortress in the Early Modern World 1494–1660* (London, 1979), pp. 50–51.

28 Baschet, *La diplomatie Vénitienne*, p. 449; BN, Mélanges de Colbert 16, fols. 18r–v.

29 CSP Spain, IX, 524–25; BN, Fonds français 3127, fol. 49; 6611, fol. 3. Henry is reported to have proposed to Edward VI that he would ensure the marriage between the English king and Mary Stuart in exchange for the Boulonnais. CSP Spain, IX, 236.

30 CSP Spain, IX, 380. As early as January 1548, Henry called for meetings of several provincial estates to provide subsidies for the recovery of Boulogne. *Catalogues des Actes de Henri II*, 2: 19–20.

31 Ibid., 402–4. The English ambassador at the imperial court was trying to persuade Charles V to come to the aid of Boulogne, as he was committed by treaty to do for Calais, but Charles refused.

32 Ibid., p. 422.

33 Ibid., pp. 443–44.

34 Ibid., 10: 44–45. But, see Henry's letter to La Rochepot of February 6, 1549, in which he stated his preference for peace. BN, Fonds français 3134, fol. 3.

35 CSP Spain, X, 92–93. See the treaty in Rymer, *Foedera*, pp. 182–84. For an English view of the Boulogne affair, see A. F. Pollard, *England under the Protector Somerset* (New York, 1966). The English spent £1,500,000 in taking and defending Boulogne. P. 265.

36 Du Parcq, *Henri II*, p. 42. The French infantry alone in Picardy cost 3,019,373 livres, or 1,341,943 écus, for the two years of the Boulonnais affair. Lot, *Armées françaises*, p. 251, citing BN, Fonds français 4523. The pay of the *gens d'armes* was 2,650,000 livres, and the cost of artillery and siegeworks 434,490 livres, for a total of 6,103,863 livres or 2,712,820 écus. But a large part of that sum would have been paid out even in peacetime. In short, it seems that, financially, Henry came out about even by refusing to wait to redeem Boulogne in 1554.

37 In late 1550, when the dispute over Parma was beginning to boil, imperial ambassador Simon Renard wrote: "Were it not for the advice of the Constable and the unpropitious season, the king would have taken the field, so eager is he to fight." CSP Spain, X, 307.

38 Romier, *Origines politiques*, 1: 47; Cloulas, p. 184.

39 Romier, *Origines politiques*, pp. 245–60; François, *Tournon*, pp. 249–55.

40 Reports in Alberi, 4: 79, and *Mémoires du Sieur François de Boyvin, Baron Du Villars*, vols. 28–29 of Petitot, *Collection complète des mémoires*, 28: 385, attributed Brissac's appointment to the influence of Diane de Poitiers, against the wishes of Montmorency, who wanted to gain the office for Gaspard de Coligny. But that supposition has to be questioned on two points: Henry hardly needed Diane's prodding to be mindful of any member of the Brissac family, which had been intimately associated with him since his infancy; second, Brissac's brother Artus was a client of Montmorency's, as reported in *Mémoires de Vieilleville*, 26: 411, of whom the constable was particularly protective.

41 Monluc, *Commentaires*, pp. 192–97. See also Sournia, *Monluc*, pp. 95–97; Paul Courteault, *Blaise de Monluc historien* (Geneva, 1970), pp. 193–203.

42 Lubinskaja, p. 70; Charrière, *Négociations de la France dans le Levant* (Paris, 1848), 2: 146–48. On the relationship between Henry and the sultan, see the letters and reports in Charrière; Lubinskaja; and Ribier, *Lettres*, vol. 2. The words of Cardinal Du Bellay to Montmorency set the tone for the Franco-Turk alliance: "Servez-vous des corps des Turcs et laissez les âmes aux théologiens." Ribier, ibid., 1: 613.

43 CSP Spain, X, 333–34.

44 Ribier, *Lettres*, 2: 310. See also the letter of Nicolas de Villegaignon to Montmorency, in which he discussed the operations to be undertaken with the Turkish fleet. Charles Marchand, *Documents pour l'histoire du règne de Henri II* (Paris, 1902), piece 1.

10 PROTECTOR OF GERMAN LIBERTIES

1 CSP Spain, X, 333–34; CSPF Edward, pp. 146–62. See also Marillac's letters in Guise, *Mémoires*, pp. 44–61. François de Guise received copies of all of his

dispatches in this period. On Marillac's embassy in Germany, see Pierre de Vaissière, *Charles de Marillac: ambassadeur et homme politique* (Paris, 1896), pp. 134–94.

2 CSPF Edward, pp. 176–77. The defection of her cousin caused Catherine de Medici a great deal of embarrassment and concern, and she spent a great deal of effort trying to reconcile him with her husband. *Lettres*, 1: 45, 46.

3 Pariset, *Les relations*, pp. 84–87; "France et les princes allemands," pp. 252–84. See also Zeller, *Réunion de Metz*, 1: 145–80; Brandi, *Charles V*, pp. 603–4. The Germans proposed to Henry that the insignia of their league be a white cross with the seal of the French king surrounded by the words: Vindex Libertatis Germanorum. Pariset, "France et les princes allemands," p. 264.

4 Pariset, "France et les princes allemands," pp. 259–81; and *Les relations*, pp. 84–114.

5 *Mémoires de Vieilleville*, 26: 383. The memoirs have a lengthy description of the reception of the German representatives who came to France for the formal signing of the treaty.

6 See Isambert, *Recueil des lois*, 13: 260–62, for Henry's appearance before the parlement. See also Hanley, *The Lit de Justice*, pp. 136–37. Hanley maintains that the objections and annoyance expressed by the magistrates at the unannounced visit of the king proves that his relations with the parlementaires were contentious. But, as Henry told them, his appearance was only to inform them, not to seek advice or judge. There was no need for the elaborate ceremony of a *lit de justice*.

7 Cloulas, *Catherine de Médicis*, pp. 110–11; Knecht, *Francis I*, p. 42. The creation of the regency council of 1548 is in BN, Fonds français 3120, fol. 63. The biographers of Catherine de Medici consider the appointment to the council of Bertrand, considered Diane de Poitiers's creature, as evidence of Diane's domination of the regency council. Any evaluation of that assertion must keep in mind that the *garde des sceaux* was required to notarize all royal edicts.

8 Ribier, *Lettres*, 2: 387–88; Cloulas, *Catherine de Médicis*, p. 111; Van Dyke, *Catherine de Médicis*, pp. 64–66.

9 BN, Fonds français 3130, fols. 1–9; Cloulas, pp. 313–14; Lot, *Armées françaises*, pp. 128–30, and appendix 7. Lot used a contemporary muster roll to calculate the French manpower. The confusion over the exact size of the army is made clear in Henry's letter to de Fresse of April 8, in which he stated that he had 8,000–9,000 cavalry and nearly 35,000 foot. Pariset, "France et les princes allemands," p. 292. The contemporary memoirs are also hopelessly confused on the number of men. They include *Mémoires de Vieilleville*, 26: 400–402; Rabutin, *Guerres Gaule-Belgiques*, 1: 32–120; Guise, *Mémoires*, 70–74; Paradin, *Continuation de l'histoire de nostre temps* (Lyon, 1555), pp. 28–33.

10 Rabutin, *Guerres Gaule-Belgigues*, 1: 39. Rabutin stated that "for the love of the queen," Henry remained at Joinville until she was well.

11 Montmorency to the Hôtel de ville of Paris, *Registres d'Hôtel de la Ville* (Paris, 1886), 3: 300. Zeller, *Réunion de Metz*, 1: 351–53, downplays the importance of Montmorency's ruse, arguing that Metz was in no way prepared to resist such a large force, nor did it have any good reason to try.

12 *Mémoires de Vieilleville*, 26: 405–12.
13 Pariset, *Relations*, p. 113. Others, like Zeller, *Réunion de Metz*, 1: 243–44, have been less convinced that Henry ever had such a far-reaching plan.
14 *Mémoires de Vieilleville*, 26: 413. For a detailed itinerary, see Paradin, *Continuation*, pp. 50ff.
15 As early as 1547, an Italian agent of the French monarchy had examined the defenses of Strasbourg. Pariset, "France et les princes allemands," p. 230, n. 6.
16 Pariset, *Relations*, p. 140.
17 Bondois, "Un récit officiel de la campagne de 1552," p. 124. The document is a letter of Henry to his high officials in Brittany.
18 There is some question whether the concept of the natural frontiers of France could have been found in Henry's era. There are a number of contemporary sources that suggest it was. A Venetian ambassador of the time described France as defended on all sides by seas, mountains, and rivers. Baschet, *La diplomatie Vénitienne*, pp. 456–57. See also De Thou, *Histoire universelle*, 2: 117; G. Daniel, *Histoire de France*, 16 vols. (Paris, 1779), 8: 55; Zeller, *Réunion de Metz*, 1: 115, 421–27. Zeller maintains that the idea was expressed for two decades before 1552.
19 Tournon, *Correspondance*, pp. 279–84; Ribier, *Lettres*, 2: 406–7; François, *Tournon*, pp. 279–86; Romier, *Origines politiques*, 1: 320–22; communication from Dr. Delamar Jensen, who is preparing an edition of previously unpublished letters of Catherine de Medici. See Romier, ibid., pp. 317–19, for a discussion of a meeting two weeks prior to the revolt between the principal French representatives in Italy, the major *fuorusciti*, and several Italian condottieri. Both François and Romier call Tournon the architect of the Sienese revolt.
20 The formal letter accepting the obligation of protection was dated December 18, 1552; cited by Romier, *Origines politiques*, 1: 327.
21 Ribier, *Lettres*, 2: 406–7; Charrière, *Négociations*, 2: 209–12.
22 *Mémoires de Vieilleville*, 27: 19.
23 Bertrand de Salignac, *Le Siège de Metz par l'Empereur Charles V*, in vol. 32 of Petitot, *Collection complète des mémoires*, pp. 272–76. The forces at Metz included twenty-four companies of footmen and one of light cavalry. Guise, *Mémoires*, p. 120. The English ambassador put the manpower in Metz at 5,000 infantry and 500 cavalry. CSPF Edward, p. 229.
24 CSPF Edward, p. 231; Guise, *Mémoires*, pp. 107, 118–24.
25 Guise, *Mémoires*, pp. 77ff. According to Decrue, *Montmorency*, p. 135, the constable was later accused of not having done everything possible to aid Guise out of envy; but the contemporary correspondence gives no hint of such a problem. Furthermore, two of Montmorency's sons were with Guise.
26 On the events of the siege, see Guise, *Mémoires*, pp. 99–157, for the duc de Guise's reports to Henry; and Salignac, *Siège de Metz*. See also G. Zeller, *La siège de Metz par Charles-Quint* (Nancy, 1943).
27 Salignac, *Siège de Metz*, p. 388; Cloulas, p. 332.
28 All of the contemporary sources note Guise's solicitude for the imperial wounded; the most extensive and authoritative account is in the memoirs

of the noted surgeon Ambroise Paré, sent into Metz by Henry II during the siege. *Oeuvres*, 3 vols. (Paris 1840), 3: 696ff.

29 BN, Fonds français 3130, fol. 48; Guise, *Mémoires*, p. 154. I have not been able to determine if any of the letters to the captains in Metz are extant.

30 On the assault of Hesdin, see Rabutin, *Guerres Gaule-Belgiques*, 1: 167–69. The victory at Hesdin was clearly the highlight of Antoine de Bourbon's military career. Contrary to Roelker, *Jeanne d'Albret*, p. 91, Charles V was not present at Hesdin and thus was not forced to flee before Bourbon's forces.

31 Rabutin, *Guerres Gaule-Belgiques*, 1: 191. La Popelinière, *Histoire de France*, p. 44v, stated that the marriage was an occasion of rare magnificence.

11 WAR AND TRUCE

1 BN, Mélanges de Colbert 16, fol. 63v; CSPF Mary, p. 149; DuVillars, *Mémoires*, 29: 162–74. The bishopric located in Thérouanne was transferred to Boulogne in 1559.

2 CSPF Edward, pp. 289–90; ANG, 9: 150. The slowness of the French response disproves the nuncio's statement of March 1553 that the French were preparing for some enterprise the coming summer, probably against Naples. He noted that Henry expected to take in 18,000,000 livres from taxes and the sale of offices that year.

3 On the Montmorency-Piennes affair, see Brantôme, *Oeuvres*, 3: 231; CSPF Mary, p. 263; CSP Italy, VI-1, 682–83; Van Dyke, *Catherine de Médicis*, 2: 83–85; Decrue, *Montmorency*, pp. 177–82.

4 CSP Italy, VI-2, 987, 1120; Isambert, *Recueil des lois*, 13: 469–71. Some have found the edict to be directed against Protestant children marrying other Protestants contrary to their parents' wishes; e.g., Kelley, *Beginning of Ideology*, p. 72. The edict contains nothing to support that interpretation directly, but it is possible that Montmorency used that argument with Henry to get the edict. See Barbara Diefendorf, *Paris City Councillors in the Sixteenth Century* (Princeton, N.J. 1983), pp. 156–68, for a further discussion of the law and its impact on the later sixteenth century.

5 Baschet, *La diplomatie Vénitienne*, p. 450.

6 *Mémoires de Vieilleville*, 27: 109–21.

7 See Lot, *Armées françaises*, pp. 139–41; and Rabutin, *Guerres Gaule-Belgiques*, 1: 221–24, for a breakdown of the various arms in the army. See François, *Tournon*, p. 304, on Catherine's appointment as regent. Tournon was named to assist her.

8 Decrue, *Montmorency*, p. 146.

9 CSPF Mary, p. 131.

10 CSP Spain, XI, 208–9. This report came from Simon Renard, who became exceptionally close to Mary after her victory. She permitted him to read all of the dispatches from the English ambassadors across Europe, and his experience in France enabled him to make intelligent comments on affairs in France in the absence of an imperial ambassador because of the war.

11 René de Vertot, *Ambassades de Messieurs de Noailles en Angleterre*, 5 vols. (Leyden, 1763), 2: 164–82; CSP Spain, XI, 172ff. E. H. Harbison, *Rival Am-*

bassadors at the Court of Queen Mary (Freeport, N.Y., 1970), p. 80, suggests that Noailles would have been more successful if he had argued that Mary should not marry at all.

12 See the compact in Rymer, *Foedera*, 15: 387–88.

13 CSP Spain, XI, 467. Renard had been allowed to read Wooton's dispatch about his meeting with Henry and largely repeated it for Charles. His description of Henry's reaction is more succinctly, but also more dramatically, put than Wooton's, in Tytler, *Edward and Mary*, 2: 261–76. The anger of the French was all the greater because Cardinal Pole had told them that the marriage would not take place.

14 CSP Spain XI, 233–37, and passim.

15 Harbison, *Rival Ambassadors*, p. 115; ANG, 9: 218, 225, 234; CSPF Mary, p. 52.

16 Vertot, *Ambassades de Noailles*, 3: 61–85; CSPF Mary, pp. 56–65; Harbison, *Rival Ambassadors*, pp. 118–30.

17 Vertot, *Ambassades de Noailles*, 3: 34–37.

18 Charrière, *Négociations*, 241–42. Whether Henry meant the winter of 1552 or of 1553 is not clear, but it was far too late in the season for a galley fleet to transverse the Mediterranean at the time he wrote.

19 Ibid., pp. 260–62; CSP Spain, XI, 51.

20 Charrière, *Négociations*, pp. 275–84; Ribier, *Lettres*, 2: 450–53; ANG, 9: 214–228; Michel Antoine, "Institutions françaises en Italie sous le règne de Henri II: gouverneurs et intendants," *Mélanges de l'école française de Rome*, 94 (1982), 776–77; Pierre Heinrichs, *L'Alliance française-algériene au XVIe siècle* (Lyon, 1898), pp. 76–122. One of La Garde's letters to Henry suggests that he, de Termes, d'Este, and the Turk commander, Dragut, made the decision to attack Corsica before advising the king. On that point see also ANG, 9: 218.

21 I must disagree with Romier, *Origines politiques*, 1: 384–88, that the invasion of Corsica was a Guisard enterprise, undertaken while the constable was too ill to control affairs of state. De Termes, in Ribier, *Lettres*, 2: 450, indicates as early as August 3 that thought was being given to the invasion, long before Montmorency became incapacitated. He left Henry's side only on October 18.

22 Isambert, *Recueil des lois*, 13: 313; Hubert Méthivier, *L'Ancien Régime en France* (Paris, 1981), p. 80; Gabriel Hanotaux, *Origines de l'institution des Intendants des provinces* (Paris, 1886); Antoine, "Institutions françaises en Italie sous le règne de Henri II," pp. 759–818; and "Genèse de l'institution des intendants," *Journal des Savants*, (1982), p. 290. See also Malov, "Les archives d'un secrétaire d'Etat sous les règnes de François I et Henri II," pp. 313–39.

23 Rabutin, *Guerres Gaule-Belgiques*, 1: 271; Tournon, *Correspondance*, pp. 291–92.

24 Rabutin, *Guerres Gaule-Belgiques*, 1: 308–22; Lot, *Armées françaises*, pp. 145–47. According to Brantôme, *Oeuvres*, 2: 287, a dispute between Guise and Coligny over credit for the victory permanently soured the relationship between the two former friends. See Delaborde, *Coligny*, 1: 129–30.

25 Rabutin, 2: 23; CSP Spain, XIII, 242.

26 CSPF Mary, p. 115.

27 Tommaseo, *Ambassadeurs Vénitiens*, 1: 379; Decrue, *Montmorency*, pp. 158–62.
28 CSPF Mary, p. 118.
29 Ibid., p. 137. Diane de Poitiers had to intercede with the king before he would receive La Garde.
30 Monluc, *Commentaires*, p. 252. Monluc stated that he heard the full story from Saint-André.
31 Romier, *Origines politiques*, 1: 446.
32 Ibid., pp. 426–54; Sournia, *Monluc*, pp. 149–50. Henry gave Monluc a gift of 2,000 écus and an annual pension of the same sum.
33 Ribier, *Lettres*, 2: 604–5. See also CSP Italy, VI-1, 95.
34 CSP Spain, XI, 462.
35 Ribier, *Lettres*, 2: 606.
36 Ibid., p. 607.
37 CSP Spain, XIII, 155.
38 Ribier, *Lettres*, 2: 611–12: For a longer description of the election of Paul IV, see Pastor, *Popes*, 14: 56–57.
39 The imperial ambassador in Rome wrote to Charles: "So this man is pope. He will have to understand that he must be a good father to all; otherwise he will find that he has bad sons." CSP Spain, XIII, 180.
40 Ribier, *Lettres*, 2: 615–27; CSP Italy, VI-1, 309–10; Pastor, *Popes*, 14: 105–90. Henry's mandate to Lorraine and Tournon is in Guise, *Mémoires*, pp. 257–59. See also François, *Tournon*, pp. 318–22.
41 See Harbison, *Rival Ambassadors*, pp. 228–50, for the English peace efforts. See also CSP Spain, XIII, 173–217; CSP Italy VI-1, 86–104; and Vertot, *Ambassades de Noailles*, pp. 286–356.
42 CSP Italy, VI-1, 60, 66. Chancellor Olivier was early on named as one of the six French negotiators, but it is likely that he was the person noted as being ill and unable to take part. Ibid., p. 68; CSP Spain, XIII, 167.
43 CSP Spain, XIII, 203. The report does not support Harbison's contention that Lorraine cut Montmorency off because he was about to make extensive concessions to the emperor. *Rival Ambassadors*, p. 248.
44 Charles Marchand, *Documents pour l'histoire du règne de Henri II* (Paris, 1902), piece 1. Henry did write a cordial letter to Charles in 1556 after his retirement. The abdication of the emperor creates the problem of how to refer to Henry's enemies after it. I will use Spanish, although many of Philip's advisers were still Flemish, as was much of his army.
45 CSP Italy, VI-1, 315–16, 320. See also CSP Spain, XIII, 254–57; Weiss, 4: 513–34; Delaborde, *Coligny*, 1: 152–75.
46 CSP Italy, VI-1, 324.
47 Ibid., p. 335. Soranzo had made a similar statement on January 12; ibid., p. 314. Lorraine had been in Italy to organize the league in question.
48 For the text of the agreement, see Ribier, *Lettres*, 2: 626–31. The French copy has the date of February 5, the imperial copy, February 6. For both see CSP Spain XIII, 258.
49 Soranzo's term. CSP Italy, VI-1, 329.
50 Guise, *Mémoires*, pp. 251–52. This was a private letter to his brother; there

was no reason for Guise to dissemble. Concerning the truce negotiations, he wrote that he hoped they would not proceed so fast as to prevent the cardinal from completing his work in Italy. He also appears to suggest that Diane de Poitiers was more supportive of peace than Soranzo was.

51 See the royal commission in Guise, *Mémoires*, pp. 255–56, where he is designated as "père et legitime administrateur de nostre fils le duc d'Orléans." The editor of the memoirs placed the commission at the end of 1555, but the context suggests a year later.

52 See her letter to the duke of Ferrara, *Lettres*, 1: 581–84. Capello is cited by François, *Tournon*, p. 309.

53 CSP Italy, VI-1, 343. See Renard's report of May 8, 1556, in which he described at considerable length the financial difficulties of the realm "devoid of silver." Renard was convinced that financial difficulties were the sole reason for Henry's consent to the truce. Weiss, 4: 556–57.

54 CSP Italy, VI-1, 314–30. The interest on a loan of 400,000 écus was to be paid by consignment of 64,000 per year from the salt works of Normandy. The Venetian ambassador referred to the Lyon bankers as "the Florentine outlaws."

55 Charrière, *Négociations*, 2: 361.

56 CSP Italy, VI-1, 79. Note that Lorraine was said to be of the peace party at that time.

57 Ancel, *Nonciatures de Paul IV*, 1: 337; Charrière, *Négociations*, 2: 361.

58 CSP Spain, VIII, 259–66. See also CSP Italy, VI-1, 369.

59 Romier, *Origines politiques*, 2: 46. See also Decrue, *Montmorency*, pp. 187–89.

60 CSP Spain, XIII, 254, 256–57; CSP Italy, VI-1, 311.

12 DISASTER AT SAINT-QUENTIN

1 CSP Italy, VI-1, 345, 353. Paul declared that his rigid stance had persuaded the imperialists to make the concessions that made the truce possible.

2 CSP Spain, XIII, 271. Simon Renard had, a month earlier, returned to France as ambassador. A half year later he would again be expelled.

3 CSP Italy, VI-1, 449, 552; VI-2, 724–25. The sultan requested their release shortly after their sale. Henry ordered that those still in Corsica were to be freed, but few if any were. One has to wonder whether this incident contributed to the difficulty Henry had in getting Turkish cooperation in the next war.

4 Ibid., pp. 263–65, 458.

5 On the Dudley conspiracy, see CSP Italy, VI-1, 283–452, passim; CSPF Mary, pp. 222–30; Vertot, *Ambassades de Noailles*, 5: 73, 253; Harbison, *Rival Ambassadors*, pp. 260–96.

6 CSP Italy, VI-1, 459; Weiss, 4: 572.

7 CSP Italy, VI-1, 369, 533.

8 Weiss, 4: 572, 594; CSP Spain, XIII, 269; Romier, *Origines politiques*, 2: 60–61.

9 Weiss, 4: 628–29; CSPF Mary, p. 240; CSP Italy, VI-1, 507–9; Harbison, *Rival*

Ambassadors, p. 296. Henry disavowed the legate's harsh words. Weiss, 4: 632.

10 CSP Italy, VI-1, 418–525; Pastor, *Popes*, 14: 124–34; Ancel, *Nonciatures*, 2: 422–26.

11 Ancel, *Nonciatures*, 2: 420–21; CSP Italy, VI-1, 499, 502, 520. In a letter to his brother, Lorraine gave his opinion that "we will perform the truce for the time that is accorded and longer if it please God." Guise, *Mémoires*, p. 287. Delaborde, *Coligny*, 1: 220–26, argued that the admiral strongly opposed the sending of aid to the pope, but his letters to Paul IV, printed in H. Patry, "Coligny et La Papauté en 1556–1557," BSHPF, 51 (1902), 577–89, show that after an initial reluctance to see the truce he had negotiated broken, he supported the decision.

12 CSP Italy, VI-1, 548.

13 Ancel, *Nonciatures*, 1: 617–19, 627; CSP Italy, VI-1, 548; Romier, *Origines politiques*, 2: 74; Pariset, *Relations*, pp. 175–76.

14 CSP Italy VI-1, 559–60, 603–4; Romier, *Origines politiques*, 2: 75–90.

15 CSP Italy, VI-2, 864.

16 Ribier, *Lettres*, 2: 656.

17 Pastor, *Popes*, 14: 142–43.

18 CSP Italy, VI-2, 595, 612, 625, 634–36. See also Lorraine's letter to Guise of July 27, in which he told his brother that affairs were then so tangled that he was most happy that he was not involved in them. Guise, *Mémoires*, pp. 288–89.

19 CSP Italy, VI-2, 641, 649. According to Soranzo, Brissac was the most outspoken for war. But, see Bishop Charles de Marillac's defense of the decision, "Discours sur la roupture de la trefve," in *Archives curieuses*, 3: 173–201. Marillac blamed Philip for violating the truce by attacking the Papal States. I have not been able to find the source of Romier's statement, in *Origines politiques*, 2: 100, that Lorraine accused Montmorency of making a liar out of the king.

20 CSP Italy, VI-2, 715, 750; Etienne Pasquier, *Lettres historiques*, ed. D. Thickett (Geneva, 1966), p. 22.

21 Romier, *Origines politiques*, 2: 101.

22 As presented by ibid., p. 115. It is a commonplace in the Protestant historians of the era and most modern historians.

23 Guise, *Mémoires*, pp. 256, 302, 347. See also Weiss, 4: 604. The pope and Lorraine had agreed to the idea in December 1556.

24 CSP Italy, VI-2, 735.

25 Ibid., p. 953.

26 Ibid., p. 831. A month earlier Orsini was convinced that Henry would keep the truce. Ibid., pp. 753–55.

27 Ibid., p. 863.

28 Ibid., pp. 902, 916; CSPF Mary, p. 281; Rabutin, *Guerres Gaule-Belgiques*, 2: 86–87. According to one story, an old woman spotted the French and raised the alarm.

29 CSP Italy, VI-2, 916, 1357; Aubigné, *Histoire universelle*, p. 62. De Thou, *Histoire universelle*, 2: 456, is the earliest account to blame the king. Rabutin, *Guerres Gaule-Belgiques*, 2: 87, blamed the Habsburgs for increasing their

forces on the frontier and threatening an attack on Picard towns, but he made no suggestion that Henry had given any order. Curiously, Lucien Romier is one of those who do not mention the attack on Douai.

30 BN, Fonds français 3135, fol. 67; Harbison, *Rival Ambassadors*, p. 314.

31 BN, Collection Clairaumbault 350, fol. 110. Montmorency to Henry, January 27, states that Philip had already arrested the French ambassador in Brussels. For Renard's arrest, see Weiss, 4: 762; and CSP Italy, VI-2, 934.

32 Weiss, 4: 663, 698; CSP Italy, VI-2, 956.

33 *Registres de l'hôtel de Ville de Paris*, 5: 469, 472–73, 479; Wolfe, *Fiscal System*, p. 110.

34 CSP Italy, VI-2, 1128; Pastor, *Popes*, 14: 156. Duke Cosimo, fearful of a French attack on Florence, had begun negotiations with Henry, but after Guise's army had marched past, he broke them off. Romier, *Origines politiques*, 2: 139–40.

35 CSP Italy, VI-2, 978–79; Pastor, *Popes*, p. 201; Ancel, *Nonciatures*, 2: 342, 357–58.

36 CSP Italy, VI-2, 1032, 1037; II, 157.

37 Ibid., p. 967.

38 Ibid., pp. 1042, 1149.

39 Ibid., pp. 1106–7. On the Stafford rebellion, see also CSPF Mary, pp. 294–300, 326–27; CSP Spain, XIII, 295–96; Vertot, *Ambassades de Noailles*, 5: passim; Harbison, *Rival Ambassadors*, 270–96.

40 CSP Italy, VI-2, 1041. Soranzo protested to Henry the seizure of Venetian goods bound for England, but he reported that his protest was ignored, largely because of the presence of Admiral de Coligny. Coligny "did his utmost to have the prize legalized, to favor his sailors and encourage them to fresh plunder . . . and the admiral will make much profit."

41 Ibid., pp. 1148–51; CSP Spain, XIII, 295–96. What appears to be the original of the declaration of war is in BN, Collection Clairaumbault 350, fol. 148. The French account was printed and is reproduced in *Archives curieuses*, 3: 213–18. Wooton was expelled with a present of 1,200 écus; and the herald, who had come to France without the proper passport, prompting Montmorency to say that he ought to be hanged as a spy, received 200.

42 The following paragraphs are based largely on CSP Italy, VI-2, 1017–108; BN, Collection Clairaumbault 350, fols. 148–209; Romier, *Origines politiques*, 2: 141–78; Pastor, *Popes*, 14: 152–65.

43 Guise, *Mémoires*, pp. 358–59.

44 Ibid., pp. 369–70; BN, Collection Clairaumbault, 350, fol. 148; Pastor, *Popes*, 14: 163; Ancel, *Nonciatures*, 1: cvii; CSP Italy, VI-2, 1187–88, 1238–39. The defeat at Saint-Quentin a month later ended this saga of vacillation.

45 CSP Italy, VI-2, 1201–16; CSP Spain, XIII, 301. An anonymous report's reference to the king's plan to collect all of the revenues of the clergy probably referred to the eight *décimes*.

46 BN, Fonds français 20454, fol. 39. The sum given is 1,084,784 livres.

47 Rabutin, *Guerres Gaule-Belgiques*, 106–7; CSP Italy, VI-2, 1242.

48 Rabutin, *Guerres Gaule-Belgiques*, 2: 104–5; CSP Italy VI-2, 1234; Lot, *Armées françaises*, pp. 155–58. These figures hardly justify Romier's use of the term *une armée immense* under Montmorency. Romier, *Origines politiques*, 2: 179.

49 BN, Collection Clairaumbault 350, fol. 209. This letter from Montmorency to d'Humières in Péronne reveals that the perceived threat to Champagne forced Henry to pull forces out of Picardy.

50 For the Battle of Saint-Quentin, see Rabutin, *Guerres Gaule-Belgiques*, pp. 124–31; Gaspard de Coligny, "Discours sur le siège de Saint-Quentin," in Petitot, *Mémoires*, 32: 417–67; CSP Italy, VI-2, 1243–48; CSP Spain, XIII, 313–15; Lot, *Armées françaises*, pp. 163–66; Emmanuel Lemaire et al., *La Guerre de 1557 en Picardie* (St. Quentin, 1896), pp. xli–xlvi; C. W. Oman, *The History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century* (reprint New York, 1971), pp. 254–66; Decrue, *Montmorency*, pp. 203–6; G. Le Cocq, *Histoire de la ville de Saint-Quentin* (reprint Marseille, 1977), pp. 127ff.

51 Saint-André sharply protested against the plan to Montmorency. Romier, *Saint-André*, p. 124. It is the only point on which I have found him ever taking a stand.

52 It was announced to Henry at his *lever* by Sieur Descars. Claude de La Chastre, "Mémoire du voyage de M. Le Duc de Guise en Italie . . . La prinse de Calais et de Thionville," in Petitot, *Collection complète*, 32: 479.

53 The "Histoire Particulière de la cour de Henry II" contains this ditty:

> Le peuple excuse Henry, maudit Montmorency,
> Hait Diane, surtout ceux de Guise aussi.

13 MARS REMAINS ASTRIDE

1 "Mémoires d'Etat des Affaires et Histoire de France soubs la fin du Règne de Henri II," BN, Fonds Cinq cents de Colbert 26. Other copies are BN, Fonds français 4742, and Fonds Dupuy 561. The author was almost certainly the secretary of state, Florimond de Robertet de Fresne, whose name appears in the title of Fonds français 4742. One of the secretaries stated that 200 dispatches and letters were written in the two-day period. See Sutherland, *French Secretaries*, p. 86.

2 Romier, *Origines politiques*, 2: 181. La Chastre's comment that Henry wasted no time with regrets or useless complaints rings less true; furthermore, the author was with Guise in Italy at the time. Guise, *Mémoires*, p. 479.

3 The first dispatch seems not to be extant; the second is in Ribier, *Lettres*, 2: 701–2. See also several letters to and from Guise in this period, in Guise, *Mémoires*, pp. 377–90. The French ambassador in Rome received the news of Saint-Quentin on August 17.

4 *Registres de ville de Paris*, 4: 496–98; CSP Italy, VI-2, 1278–314.

5 Ibid., p. 1250. See also Cloulas, *Catherine de Médicis*, pp. 111–12; and Furgeot, "L'attitude de Henri," pp. 478–80.

6 CSP Italy, VI-2, 1250. Soranzo told Catherine in an audience on August 20 that the whole city was giving her "infinite praise," p. 1256.

7 Ibid., p. 1257; Furgeot, "L'attitude de Henri," pp. 485–87.

8 Monluc, *Commentaires*, p. 412; Braudel, *The Mediterranean*, 2: 944.

9 Cited by Bouillé, *Histoire des ducs de Guise*, 1: 400.

10 The danger of simply masking a fort and moving beyond it was made clear in the days after August 10 by the example of Le Châlet, a small French fort on

the road between Brussels and Saint-Quentin, which Savoy had not taken the time to reduce in early August. Sorties by its garrison badly disrupted supplies to the Spanish army; 25,000 crowns for the Spanish soldiers were seized on August 24. CSP Italy, VI-2, 1261. See also Lemaire, *Guerre en Picardie*, p. xlvii.

11 On the siege, see Coligny, *Discours sur le siège de Saint-Quentin*, pp. 417–67; CSP Italy, VI-2, 1258–62; Lemaire, *Guerre en Picardie*, pp. xlvii–lxxii; Le Cocq, *Histoire de Saint-Quentin*, pp. 129ff. The number of men that Coligny had in the fort is a matter of dispute. He said that he had only 800 men of war, foot and horse, not including the militia. Coligny, *Discours*, p. 463. The Venetian ambassador in Brussels reported eighteen companies of well-chosen men. If the defenses of the city were obsolete, as has been argued, Coligny was partly responsible, since he was governor of Picardy. He had been in the city at least twice in the previous two years.

12 BN, Fonds Dupuy 561, fols. 70r–71v. See Rabutin, *Guerres Gaule-Belgiques*, 2: 152–53, for a complete list of the dead and captured captains. An anonymous Spanish account stated that the final assault cost the French 800–1,000 dead and 500 captured. It also detailed the large amounts of powder, grain, cannonballs, and the fifty cannon seized. Philip II wrote to his sister that the city had had 1,000 infantry and 300 cavalry as defenders. He did not include the city militiamen. Lemaire, *Guerre en Picardie*, pp. 59–93, 293.

13 BN, Cinq cens de Colbert 16, fol. 69r; CSP Italy, VI-2, 1267.

14 Charrière, *Négociations*, 2: 405–11; CSP Italy, VI-2, 1277–78, 1330; Braudel, *The Mediterranean*, 2: 940–41.

15 The garrison of Le Châlet was accused of accepting generous terms from the Spanish so it could escape with the 25,000 in gold taken from the Spanish three weeks earlier. CSP Italy, VI-2, 1303. The baron de Solignac was arrested on Henry's orders, but there is no evidence of a trial. BN, Cinq cens de Colbert 26, fol. 75r; Colbert 23, letter of September 7, 1557; Guise, *Mémoires*, p. 395; Lemaire, *Guerre en Picardie*, pp. lxxxviii–xli.

16 CSP Italy, VI-2, 1266–72.

17 Ibid., p. 1267; BN, Cinq cens de Colbert 16, fol. 64v. See Henry's dispatches to d'Humières in Péronne, which show his close attention to military matters. Ibid., 23, passim.

18 CSP Italy, VI-2, 1341. See also ANG, XIV, 89; Guise, *Mémoires*, p. 391.

19 Guise, *Mémoires*, pp. 387–90. The document is undated but is placed between two items from September 1557. The version reprinted in Villars, *Mémoires*, 30: 485, is dated October 5. See also BN, Cinq cens de Colbert 26, fol. 81r.

20 Braudel, *The Mediterranean*, 2: 942.

21 For a short summary of the earlier French schemes, see Potter, "The duc de Guise," pp. 483–85.

22 See Noailles's letter from ten years later, in Charrière, *Négocitations*, 3: 476. See also Harbison, *Rival Ambassadors*, p. 334; Anon., "The Loss of Calais," *North British Journal*, 90 (1866), 443; Potter, "Duc de Guise," p. 484. According to N. Juge, *Nicolas Denisot Du Mans* (Paris, 1907), pp. 113–23, Denisot went to Calais as a tutor and drew plans of its defenses in 1557 that were used by the French in 1558.

23 Paul van Dyke, "François de Guise and the Taking of Calais," *American His-*

torical Association Annual Report, 1 (1911), 103–7, has gathered the evidence proving that it was Henry who pushed for the winter attack on Calais.

24 It appears that Strozzi went into the pale on November 16, if Soranzo's report about his secret trip with a single servant refers to his reconnaissance of Calais, as seems likely. CSP Italy, VI-3, 1371; BN, Cinq cens de Colbert 16, fol. 97r.

25 "Mémoires d'estat des affaires," 101r–3v. The translation is from van Dyke, "Guise and Calais," p. 106. On the decision to attack Calais, see also CSP Italy, VI-3, 1371–72, 1381.

26 BN, Cinq cens de Colbert 16, fol. 102v; La Place, *Commentaires*, 1: 9.

27 CSP Italy, VI-3, 1359, 1385; CSPF Mary, pp. 348–52; Anon., "Fall of Calais," pp. 446–47. This last article seeks to absolve Mary Tudor of the burden of blame for the loss of Calais.

28 CSP Italy, VI-3, 1410. See also the English documents in Edward Arber, *An English Garner: Ingatherings from our history and literature*, 8 vols. (London, 1877–97), 4: 143–214; and *Le discours de la prinse de Calais*, in *Archives curieuses*, 3: 238–47. Guise's letters from this period are in BN, Fonds français 23191.

29 See Arber, *English Garner*, for the terms. An English report put the dead at 800 English and 4,000 French.

30 CSP Italy, VI-3, 1416–17, 1437–38; BN, Fonds français 4742, fols. 36r–v; Potter, "Guise and Calais," pp. 492–94 and n. 7. See also Michiel's report of an audience with Henry after his tour of Calais in which Henry spoke very knowledgeably on the details of the defenses of Calais and the mistakes made by Wentworth, CSP Italy, VI-3, 1444–46.

31 CSP Italy, VI-3, 1365–66.

32 Romier, *Origines politiques*, 2: 221. Romier notes that there is no evidence that the marriage proposal came from Philip. It may have been simply a ploy on the constable's part to delay the dauphin's marriage.

33 For example, ibid., p. 222.

34 CSP Italy, VI-3, 1423.

35 See BN, Cinq cens de Colbert 26, fols. 108r–v, for a contemporary assessment of the political ramifications of the marriage. One may wonder why Henry insisted on marrying his eldest son and successor to Mary. Perhaps the answer is that his second son was only eight.

36 CSP Italy, VI-3, 1487; Fraser, *Mary Queen of Scots*, pp. 77–79.

37 CSP Italy, VI-3, 1486–87. See also BN, Cinq cens de Colbert 465, fol. 328; *Discours du Grand et Magnifique Triomphe Fact au Marriage de très-noble Prince François . . . et Marie d'Estreuart*, in *Archives curieuses*, 3: 251–59; *Registres de ville de Paris*, 4: 535–39; Williams, *Henri II*, pp. 321–26; de Ruble, *Jeunesse de Marie Stuart*, pp. 148–50.

38 CSP Italy, VI-3, 1501. See Roelker, *Jeanne d'Albret*, pp. 112–13 for the evidence that Antoine de Bourbon had initiated the idea. The marriage was, of course, celebrated in August 1572.

39 Potter, "Guise and Calais," pp. 497–99. Potter has a most valuable discussion of how money and other supplies were raised for the Calais expedition. One

source he missed was a toll Henry placed on merchandise exported from Saint-Malo that was to raise 50,000 livres. BN, Fonds latin 2241, fol. 16.

40 BN, Cinq cens de Colbert 16, fol. 94r; CSP Italy, VI-3, 1423; Doucet, "Le Grand Parti," 171: 511–13.

41 BN, Cinq cens de Colbert 16, fols. 130r–31v; J. R. Major, *Representative Government in Early Modern France* (New Haven, 1980), especially pp. 88–89, 164; Bondois, "Un récit officiel."

42 *Registres de ville de Paris*, 5: 512–13. On the Estates of 1558, see especially Major, *Representative Institutions in Renaissance France 1421–1559* (Madison, Wis., 1960), pp. 144–47, 176, n.; and also CSP Italy, VI-3, 1423; Hanley, *Lit de Justice*, p. 137 and n. 21; Rabutin, *Guerres Gaule-Belgiques*, in Petitot, 32: 164–68. The Taurines edition of Rabutin, which I have been citing, excised Rabutin's description of the Estates.

43 Rabutin, *Guerres Gaule-Belgiques* (Petitot edition), p. 167.

44 De Thou, *Histoire universelle*, 2: 554, stated that the dauphin was present to pledge himself to fulfill whatever his father promised the Estates.

45 Rabutin, pp. 165–67; *Discours des Estats tenuz à Paris par le très chrestien roy de France, Henry second, au moys de Ianvier, ceste presente année mil cinq cent cinquante huict* (Paris, 1558); Major, *Representative Institutions*, p. 145.

46 *Discours*, pp. 9–10; *Registres de ville de Paris*, 4: 517.

47 Major, *Representative Institutions*, p. 147.

48 Isambert, *Recueil des lois*, 13: 506–9; Georges Picot, *Histoire des Etats Généraux de 1355 à 1614*, 4 vols. (reprint Geneva, 1979), 2: 5–7; *Registres de ville de Paris*, 4: 519–20. Grain and munitions were excluded.

49 See Catherine de Medici's remarks of August 25, in CSP Italy, VI-2, 1256.

50 Ibid., VI-3, 1346, 1476; BN, Cinq cens de Colbert 16, fol. 164r; Guiffrey, *Lettres inédites*.

51 Sutherland, *French Secretaries*, p. 90.

52 CSP Italy, VI-3, 1492. See also Romier, *Origines politiques*, 2: 268–70. There seems to be no basis for De Thou's accusation that Lorraine made a treacherous secret agreement with the Spanish at Cercamp. *Histoire universelle*, 2: 563. His account also wrongly placed the duc de Guise at the conference.

53 Romier, *Origines politiques*, 2: 270–72. According to Baird, *Rise of the Huguenots*, 1: 316, d'Andelot was in fact fully committed to Protestantism by that time, having taken two Calvinist ministers with him to Brittany a month earlier.

54 CSP Italy, VI-3, 1504–6; BN, Cinq cens de Colbert 16, fols. 172r–74v; *Opera Calvini*, 17: 179.

55 See the letters of d'Andelot, Jean Calvin, and Simon Macar, a minister in Paris, on these events in BSHPF, III, 238–55; also *Histoire ecclésiastique*, 1: 91–92.

56 Williams, *Henri II*, p. 326.

57 Rabutin, *Guerres Gaule-Belgiques*, 32: 194–95. On the siege of Thionville, see ibid., 2: 198–213; Monluc, *Commentaires*, pp. 423–44; "Le siège et prinse de Thionville . . . ," in *Archives curieuses*, 3: 263–72; BN, Fonds Dupuy 561, fols. 86–102; CSP Italy, VI-3, 1506–8.

58 Charrière, *Négociations*, 2: 475–76; CSP Italy, VI-3, 1505.
59 Lot, *Armées françaises*, p. 174.
60 Monluc, *Commentaires*, English translation by Ian Roy (Hamden, Conn., 1972), p. 179.
61 Duffy, *Siege Warfare*, p. 51.
62 CSP Italy, VI-3, 1520. De Thou attributed the decision to the privy council. *Histoire universelle*, 2: 574.
63 On the defeat at Gravelines see de Termes, "Discours du voyage de Dunquerque," in Du Villars, *Mémoires*, 30: 176–85; Rabutin, *Guerres Gaule-Belgiques* (Petitot), 32: 196–203; Oman, *The Art of War*, pp. 274–81. CSP Italy; VI-3, 1519–21, provides evidence of the presence of the English fleet that, surprisingly, none of the French sources mention. Oman relied on an English account of twenty years later.
64 On the review, see Rabutin, *Guerres Gaule-Belgiques*, 2: 224–28; Monluc, *Commentaires*, p. 455, and Lot, *Armées françaises*, pp. 176–85.
65 Oman, *The Art of War*, p. 280.

14 PAX

1 J. B. Gail, *Lettres inédites de Henri II, Diane de Poitiers . . . au Connétable Anne de Montmorency* (Paris, 1818), pp. 15–29; DuVillars, *Mémoires*, 30: 217. There is some confirmation of this point in CSP Italy, VI-3, 1528; Michiel reported on September 3 that the king was troubled with a toothache and a sore throat.
2 See DuVillars, *Mémoires*, 30: 189, for an episode in which Cardinal de Lorraine refused to reward a client of Brissac's; and p. 217, for the Guises' efforts to keep all others from the presence of the king when he was ill.
3 CSP Italy, VI-2, 1359; VI-3, 1545. See also the letter of Ercole Strozzi in Romier, *Origines politiques*, 2: 311, n. Coligny was being poorly treated because the rupture of the truce was attributed to him and "all the persons who have been prisoners in France accuse him of cruelty, avarice, and baseness, by reason of the shameful way in which he treated them." CSP Italy, VI-2, 1359.
4 CSP Italy VI-3, 1506, 1513; Romier, *Saint-André*, pp. 135–38.
5 Weiss, 5: 226–27; translation in CSP Spain, XIII, 413. Romier, *Origines politiques*, 2: 298–99, has quoted part of this document but gave no notice of the comment about the relationship between the Guises and Montmorency.
6 CSP Spain, XIV, 16.
7 Gail, *Lettres inédites*, p. 15; Romier, *Origines politiques*, 2: 300–303, citing the ambassador of Ferrara. See also ANG, 14: 138–39.
8 CSP Italy, VI-3, 1524.
9 BN, Fonds français 3153, fol. 147v, for the authority given to the French commissioners. See also Ribier, *Lettres*, 2: 778; CSP Italy, VI-3, 1532–37; Weiss, 5: 229–30; Cloulas, p. 501.
10 ANG, 14: 155–56, is the principal source for this episode. See also CSP Italy, VI-3, 1545–47; Gail, *Lettres inédites*, p. 28; and Romier, *Origines politiques*, 2: 312–13.
11 Report of the ambassador of Ferrara, in Romier, *Origines politiques*, p. 314,

n. It was after this that the incident involving the queen and Diane, noted above, p. 98, occurred.

12 Ibid., p. 314; Guiffrey, *Lettres inédites*, p. 155, n.

13 CSP Italy, VI-3, 1562. It was to be repaid by ten *décimes* of the clergy over three years.

14 Ibid., pp. 1563, 1570.

15 Ibid., p. 1558. See also ANG, 14: 168.

16 Romier, *Origines politiques*, 2: 324. Lorraine seems not to have made good on his threat.

17 CSP Italy, VI-3, 1572–73. It may have been this episode that led the ambassador of Ferrara to write that the quarrel between the two factions nearly came to swords. Romier, *Origines politiques*, 2: 326.

18 CSP Italy, VII, 8–9; Romier, *Origines politiques*, 2: 327.

19 CSP Italy, VI-3, 1564.

20 CSPF Elizabeth, I, 16–17, 314, 324; ANG, 14: 173.

21 CSP Italy, VII, 19–20; ANG, 14: 175–83. The nuncio's reports suggest that the Guises had remained active in governmental affairs after Montmorency's return, since he cited them frequently.

22 CSP Italy, VII, 20.

23 Ibid., p. 38–44; ANG, 14: 185.

24 Weiss, 5: 436–581; Forbes, *A Full View of the Public Transactions in the Reign of Elizabeth* (London, 1740), 1: 1–66. Another element in the French intransigence on Calais was that the cardinal had put the Guise arms on the house in Calais that Henry had given him and it would have been a dishonor to take them down. See BN, Fonds français 4737, fol. 66, for the gift of the house.

25 DuVillars, *Mémoires*, 30: 269.

26 BN, Fonds français 3139, fol. 74; Weiss, 5: 547–87; CSP Italy, VII, 58–60; Forbes, *Public Transactions*, 1: 66–84; Decrue, *Montmorency*, pp. 226–27.

27 On the treaty, see especially A. de Ruble, *Le Traité de Cateau-Cambrésis* (Paris, 1859).

28 Frances Davenport, *European Treaties bearing on the History of the United States*, 3 vols. (reprint, 1967), 1: 219–22. Davenport found in the Spanish archives evidence of an oral agreement between the French and the Spanish that interlopers in Spanish waters were there at their own risk. Any violence that resulted was not to be regarded as breaking the peace.

29 DuVillars, *Mémoires*, 30: 267.

30 Ibid., p. 274.

31 *Mémoires de Vieilleville*, 27: 408–10; Tavannes, *Mémoires*, 32: 7–10; Monluc, *Commentaires*, 462–63; Brantôme, *Oeuvres*, 3: 271, 282; 8: 129–32. See also De Thou, *Histoire universelle*, 2: 662.

32 Romier, *Origines politiques*, 2: 345–47; Lavisse, *Histoire de France*, 5: 175–78.

33 La Vigne, quoted in Battifol, *Century of the Renaissance*, p. 152; Pasquier, *Lettres historiques*, p. 26; Haton, *Mémoires*, 1: 78–79. The destruction in Picardy is revealed by the decline in tax receipts from the generality of Amiens, from 188,496 livres in 1547 to 67,654 in 1559, a span during which they increased across the realm by 23 percent. BN, Fonds Dupuy 158, fol. 49.

34 Rabutin, *Guerres Gaule-Belgiques*, 2: 242.

35 This last point is the opinion of Duffy, *Siege Warfare*, p. 54.
36 Davenport, *Treaties*, 1: 219–20. The Spanish would fall back on the Truce of Vaucelles to try to prevent the French from colonizing North America, but it had no legal value since it was to hold only for five years and in fact had been broken within a year.
37 CSP Italy, VII, 62.
38 Braudel, *Mediterranean World*, 2: 946–49.
39 Williams, *Henri II*, p. 333.

15 "THIS LUTHERAN SCUM"

1 CSP Italy, VII, 63; ANG, 14: 193–95; Pasquier, *Lettres historiques*, p. 30; Romier, *Origines politiques*, 2: 355, 362, citing Henry's letters patent of June 2. See also the letter of Pastor Macar in Paris to Calvin, in Jules Bonnet, "La Réforme sous Henri II, lettres inédites," BSHPF 26 (1877), 99.
2 CSP Spain, XIII, 84, 262–64; CSP Italy, VI-1, 364–69.
3 Based on *Histoire ecclésiastique*, 1: 44; Baird, *Rise of Huguenots*, 1: 287. In Toulouse there were 447 heresy cases from 1551 to 1554; from 1555 to 1558 there were 120, declining to seven cases in 1558. Mentzer, *Heresy Proceedings*, p. 170.
4 ANG, 9: 143; Romier, *Origines politiques*, 1: 502; Taber, "Royal Policy," p. 18.
5 Geisendorf, *Livre des habitants*, 1: passim; Robert Kingdon, *Geneva and the Coming of the Wars of Religion in France* (Geneva, 1956), pp. 58–60.
6 No copy of the edict is extant. De Thou, *Histoire universelle*, 2: 375, provides the most detail on its clauses.
7 A summary of Séguier's address is in Guise, *Mémoires*, pp. 246–49. See also Maugis, *Histoire de Parlement*, 2: 3–6; and Taber, "Royal Policy," pp. 18–22. The term Inquisition was used, but it appears that Séguier meant any church-based heresy court and not the "Holy Office of the Inquisition."
8 Guise, *Mémoires*, pp. 249–50.
9 Quoted by Romier, *Origines politiques*, 2: 249.
10 Sutherland, *Struggle for Recognition*, pp. 53–55, presents a plausible case that Paul IV and Lorraine worked out the call for the Inquisition while the cardinal was in Rome in late 1555. Conclusive evidence, however, is lacking.
11 Ribier, *Lettres*, 2: 677–78.
12 Williams, *Henri II*, p. 335; Baird, *Rise of Huguenots*, 1: 300.
13 *Histoire ecclésiastique*, 1: 65; Romier, *Origines politiques*, 2: 244.
14 Sutherland, *Struggle for Recognition*, pp. 54–55, 344.
15 Isambert, *Recueil des lois*, 13: 494–97.
16 Sutherland, *Struggle for Recognition*, p. 55. See also Taber, "Royal Policy," pp. 22–23.
17 La Place, *Commentaires*, p. 4
18 CSP Italy, VI-2, 1201, 1216, 1217; VI-3, 1463. What appears to be such a license can be found in AN K 910, piece 2.
19 Devic, *Histoire de Languedoc*, 12: col. 559.
20 See Paul Gaffarel, *Histoire du Brésil français au seizième siècle* (Paris, 1878);

Regina Tomlinson, *The Struggle for Brazil, 1500–1550* (New York, 1970). For a further discussion of the French overseas activity during Henry's reign, see above, chapter 9, and Baumgartner, "Adam's Will Act II: Henry II and French Overseas Expeditions," *Proceedings of the French Colonial History Society*, (1987), forthcoming.

21 Jean de Léry, *Histoire d'un voyage fait en la terre du Brésil*, ed. Jean Morisot (Geneva, 1975). De Léry, who sailed to Brazil on the second voyage to the colony, was a convinced Protestant and wrote that Villegaignon wished "to serve God according to the reformation of the Gospel, " p. 2. The modern editor, p. xix, doubts that point and accepts as more likely the opposite opinion of Villegaignon's almoner, André Thevet, in his *Les singularités de la France antarctique*, ed. Frank Lestringant (Paris, 1983). See also *Histoire ecclésiastique*, 1: 88–91; La Popelinière, *Histoire de France*, pp. 117v–22v; and A. Heulhard, *Villegaignon roi d'Amerique* (Paris, 1897).

22 Haton, *Mémoires*, 1: 38.

23 BN, Fonds français 5128, piece 6.

24 On the Affair of the rue Saint-Jacques, see BN, Cinq cens de Colbert 23, fols. 82r–v; *Histoire ecclésiastique*, 1: 66–67; CSP Italy, VI-2, 1303; Romier, *Origines politiques*, 2: 252–56; Haton, *Mémoires*, 2: 51–53; Taber, "Royal Policy," pp. 24–28. Romier, 2: 254–55, printed a list of those arrested, totaling 128 names. No noblemen were among them, but there were several notables, such as the son of Guillaume Budé.

25 Romier, *Origines politiques*, 2: 264 n.; Beza, *Correspondance*, 2: 254–63.

26 *Histoire ecclésiastique*, 1: 80.

27 Ibid., p. 81; BN, Cinq cents de Colbert 23, fol. 171v; CSP Italy, VI-3, 1500–1.

28 CSP Italy, VI-3, 1505; "Lettres inédites," BSHPF, 26 (1877), 100–1.

29 Macar to Calvin, "Lettres inédites," BSHPF, 26 (1877), 100.

30 Report of the ambassador of Ferrara, May 22, 1558, in Romier, *Origines politiques*, 2: 286–87. The ambassador got his information from Blaise de Monluc, so it was secondhand.

31 CSP Italy, VI-3, 1507; Monluc, *Commentaires*, p. 1148, n. 5. The purpose of the grant was to allow Bourbon to carry on his fight to recover Haute-Navarre from Spain.

32 Romier, *Origines politiques*, 2: 289.

33 The principal source for this incident is Haton, *Mémoires*, 1: 86–89. For a discussion of the sources, see appendix D.

34 Ibid., p. 88. Haton included Condé and the three Châtillon brothers in the conspiracy and specified the admiral as having a major role in the quick condemnation of Caboche. However, Coligny was not in Paris from late 1556 to April 1559.

35 Forbes, *Transactions*, 1: 118.

36 Ibid., p. 115.

37 ANG, 14: 195, 197. There is no mention of Saint-André in either report.

38 Romier, "Mort de Henri II," p. 121; Ribier, *Lettres*, 2: 806–8. In a private communication, Dr. A. L. Martin has informed me that his study of the Jesuits in France in this era contradicts strongly Romier's thesis.

39 "Acta Consistorialia," BN, Fonds latin 12559, fol. 23; ANG, 14: 182–83; Forbes, *Transactions*, 1: 119; André Delmas, "Le procès et la mort de Jacques Spifame," *Bibliothèque d'humanisme et renaissance*, 5 (1944), 105–37.

40 Sources for the mercuriale of 1559: *Mémoires de Vieilleville*, 27: 401–6; De Thou, *Histoire universelle*, 2: 60–67; La Place, *Commentaires*, pp. 12–19; the letters of Pastor Macar in *Opera Calvini*, 17: 504ff.; *Le Vraye histoire contenant L'inique jugement . . . contre Anne du Bourg*, in *Memoires de Condé* (Amsterdam, 1743), 1: 217–304; Forbes, *Transactions*, 1: 126–29. Among modern accounts see especially Noël Didier, "Paul de Foix à la mercuriale de 1559," *Mélanges de l'école française de Rome*, 56 (1939), 402–35; M. Lelièvre, "Le procès et le supplice d'Anne du Bourg," BSHPF, 37 (1888), 281–95, 337–55, 506–29. The best account in English is Taber, "Royal policy," pp. 45–62.

41 27: 401–2. According to the memoirs, Vieilleville in the evening before the mercuriale had persuaded Henry not to go, but early the next morning Lorraine and six other prelates convinced him again to go to the parlement, lest he endanger his soul by not doing his duty.

42 Ibid. The author of these memoirs used the term *lit de justice* for Henry's appearance in the court. See also Didier, "Paul de Foix," p. 414, citing a contemporary report. Kaiser, "Les cours souveraines," p. 19, states that it was probably the second time that a king had attended a mercuriale and was certainly the last.

43 *Mémoires de Condé*, 1: 627; La Place, *Commentaires*, p. 14, and drawing from him, De Thou, *Histoire universelle*, 2: 671; and *Mémoires de Vieilleville*, 2: 406.

44 Forbes, *Transactions*, 1: 126.

45 See Baird, *Rise of the Huguenots*, 1: 341; and Nancy Roelker, "Family, Faith, and *Fortuna*: The Châtillon Brothers in the French Reformation," in Richard Demolen, ed., *Leaders of the Reformation* (Toronto, 1985), p. 251, as examples of precisely that use of the story.

46 Text taken from CSPF Elizabeth, I, 309–10. See also Forbes, *Transactions*, 1: 127. According to Forbes's text, Throckmorton called Séguier a Protestant. Curiously, the editor of the CSPF left out Throckmorton's statement that one further reason was the influence of the cardinals who, considering the evil handling of their ministers in diverse places of the realm, saw the need to remedy the situation.

47 *Histoire ecclésiastique*, 1: 97. The Confession of Faith is given on pp. 97–107. see also P. de Felice, "Le Synode national de 1559," BSHPF, 105 (1959), 1–8.

48 CSP Italy, VII, 86.

49 CSPF Elizabeth, I, 272, 327, 341–49. See also Baird, *Rise of the Huguenots*, 1: 328–29.

16 REQUIESCAT IN PACE

1 CSP Italy, VII, 87; Forbes, *Transactions*, 1: 115, 121, 124; BN, Mélanges de Colbert 16, fol. 129.

2 See Romier, *Origines politiques*, 1: 370–75, for a full discussion of the situation.

3 CSP Italy, VII, 86.
4 Bodin, *Republic*, p. 675, gave the total indebtedness as 41,830,000 livres. Doucet, "Grand Parti," p. 9, accepts the figure of 43,000,000 that Michel de L'Hopital gave to the Estates of 1560. The Venetian ambassador reported that the royal debts amounted to 38,000,000. Tommaseo, *Ambassadeurs Vénitiens*, 2: 407.
5 Forbes, *Transactions*, 1: 121, 123. BN, Fonds Dupuy 958, fol. 57, shows that expected royal income in 1559 was to have been 18,050,000 livres.
6 Forbes, 1: 123.
7 CSP Italy, VII, 72–80.
8 Williams, *Henri II*, pp. 339–41.
9 Forbes, *Transactions*, 1: 141.
10 See Guise, *Mémoires*, pp. 442–49, for the ceremonies and their costs. The marriage contracts for the two princesses are in BN, Fonds Dupuy 7, fol. 102, and Fonds Dupuy 156, fol. 5. See also de Ruble, *Traité*, pp. 238–39.
11 AN, K 92, fol. 25, for the king's order to the city of Paris to pay the expenses of the tournament.
12 On the fatal tournament, see Forbes, *Transactions*, 1: 150–51. Throckmorton was an eyewitness and stated that he was the only ambassador present on June 30, which makes the loss of the dispatches of the Venetian ambassador until July 12 less costly. See also Haton, *Mémoires*, 1: 101–4, who was in Paris but not an eyewitness; *Discours de la mort du roi Henri II*, in *Mémoires de Condé*, 1: 212ff.; ANG, 14: 209–12; Pasquier, *Lettres historiques*, pp. 33–34; the letter of Bishop Antonio Caracciolo, in Williams, *Henri II*, pp. 341–42; Romier, "Mort de Henri II," pp. 140–57.
13 Forbes, *Transactions*, 1: 92.
14 Le lion jeune le vieux surmontera
En champ bellique, par singulier duelle,
Dans cage d'or les yeux lui crevera,
Deux classes une puis, puis mourir, mort cruelle.

In Charles Ward, *Oracles of Nostradamus* (London 1940), p. 91. Ward has an interesting commentary of how the death of Henry fulfilled the quatrain. Nostradamus's *Centuries* was dedicated to Henry II, but it is not clear that the quatrain was taken as referring to the king before his death.
15 See Brantôme, *Oeuvres*, 3: 280; De France, *Catherine de Médicis ses astrologues*, pp. 53–60; and the collection of "Prédictions astrologiques," in BN, Fonds français 14772–73. Pasquier, *Lettres historiques*, p. 34, noted that an Italian seer, Hieronimo Cardano, had predicted the manner of Henry's death in 1534.
16 Montgommery rode against Henry because he had done so well in his earlier matches. Haton, *Mémoires*, 1: 105.
17 The order of events after the accident differs somewhat in the various accounts. Haton, p. 194, for instance, stated that Henry pardoned Montgommery before he was carried into the Tournelles. I follow the account of Antonio Caracciolo in Williams, *Henri II*, pp. 342–43, which seems the most consistent with the other accounts. It is clear from all the contemporary reports that Henry was able to speak after the accident, contrary to later versions.

18 Forbes, *Transactions*, 1: 152; Romier, "Mort de Henri II," p. 140.

19 G. Roviglio to the duke of Ferrara, in Romier, *Origines politiques*, 2: 384. Roviglio was part of the entourage of Alphonso d'Este, the duke's brother, who was at the French court. Since d'Este was permitted to enter the Tournelles, Roviglio's reports and those of the ambassador of Ferrara have to be regarded as far better informed than other contemporary accounts.

20 Forbes, *Transactions*, 1: 154.

21 Lemmonier, *Histoire de France*, 5: 247, quotes part of the letter but gives no source. Given the nature of the letter and the absence of any other reference to it, one has to wonder whether there is an error for June 3 in Lemmonier's text. It would fit far better for that date.

22 For the last days of Henry II and his death, see ANG, 14: 212–18; and the Ferrarese sources cited in Romier, "Mort de Henri II," and *Origines politiques*, 2: 384–90. The Ferrarese representatives are the only sources that have any claim to having been reasonably close to the scene.

23 *Mémoires de Vieilleville*, 27: 416–17, presents a very melodramatic account of Catherine's last visit to Henry's deathbed.

24 ANG, 14: 218; Romier, *Origines politiques*, 2: 388, citing the ambassador of Ferrara. These reports correct the common account that the marriage took place in the church of Saint Paul in the presence of the weeping queen.

25 Ambroise Paré, *Oeuvres*, 2: 25. Paré was one of those who performed the autopsy.

26 Romier, *Origines politiques*, 2: 342, citing the ambassador of Ferrara. The point is affirmed by Tavannes, *Mémoires*, 24: 256.

27 Forbes, *Transactions*, 1: 157; CSP Italy, VII, 108–9. Michiel noted that none of the constable's sons, nephews, or clients were present at the court after July 10.

28 CSP Italy, VII, 109.

29 CSP Italy, VII, 116. "The Prince [Charles de Bourbon] has been seen with M. d'Andelot, whom he formerly hated mortally . . . and he has several times held long conferences, not only with the Constable's nephew, but with the latter's brother the Admiral."

30 Cited by van Dyke, *Catherine de Médicis*, 1: 106–7.

31 CSPF Elizabeth, I, 345. Morel to Calvin, *Opera Calvini*, 27.

32 Haton, *Mémoires*, 1: 106–7. Haton also has a lengthy panegryic to Henry, pp. 107–11. See also Romier, *Origines politiques*, 2: 389. There are, as well, tributes to Henry as a great and good king in the memoirs of the military men like Monluc, Tavannes, Brantôme, and Vieilleville. The poems written in tribute to him are studied in D. J. Hartley, "La Mort du roi Henri II (1559) et sa commémoration poétique," BHR, 47 (1985), 379–88.

33 An official description of Henry's obsequies is "Le Tréspas et ordre des obséques, funerailles et enterrement de feu de très-Heureuse mémoire le Roy Henry deuxième de ce nom," in *Archives curieuses*, 3: 309–48. Further details can be found in BN, Fonds français 2762, 4339–41. See also Giesey, *Royal Funeral Ceremony in Renaissance France*, and Knecht, *Francis I*, pp. 419–22, since Henry's funeral ceremonies were identical to his father's in all but the smallest details.

34 Gabriel de Montgommery, as captain of the Scottish Guards, was called on to produce the insignia of his office. There is no indication that he was present. "Tréspas et ordre," p. 345.

17 CONCLUSIONS

1 For Guise influence, see Zeller, *Réunion de Metz*, 1: 117–19; and Pariset, *Les relations*, 205–6. For Montmorency, see Romier, *Origines politiques*, 1: 294; and Decrue, *Montmorency*, p. 112.
2 Antoine, "Institutions françaises en Italie sous le règne de Henri II." Bourquelot, "Notice sur le journal de Jean Glaumeau," pp. 202–3. These elms were called "les ormes de Henri," but the term has usually been taken to refer to Henry IV.
3 Alberi, 4: 139.
4 Ibid.
5 These points about Henry II's episcopal appointments are developed further in Baumgartner, *Change and Continuity in the French Episcopate: The Bishops and the Wars of Religion* (Durham, N.C., 1986), especially pp. 33–37.
6 Except by Noëll, *Henri II*, p. 324. His conclusion is a panegyric to Henry as the creator of a second French Renaissance and founder of a new French society.

APPENDIX A

1 See Frank Spooner, *The International Economy and Monetary Movements in France 1493–1725* (Cambridge, Mass. 1972), pp. 101, 163; Knecht, *Francis I*, pp. 432–33.

APPENDIX B

1 Salmon, *Society in Crisis*, p. 87. Contrary to Salmon, the tribunal did not name all of its victims Lutherans (p. 89), nor were the majority ordered tortured.
2 Geisendorf, *Livre des habitants*, 1: passim.

APPENDIX C

1 De Thou, *Histoire universelle*, 2: 456; d'Aubigné, *Histoire universelle*, 9 vols. (Paris, 1886), 1: 65. Among those who stated that Henry gave the order, see, e.g., Delaborde, *Coligny*, 1: 242; Crété, *Coligny*, p. 55. Many historians never mention the attack on Douai as a factor in the resumption of war, and, most curiously, Lucien Romier is one of them.
2 CSP Italy, VI-2, 916, 1357; Weiss, 4: 667; Rabutin, *Guerres Gaule-Belgiques*, 2: 87.
3 BN, Fonds français 20422, fols. 77, 79; Archives du ministère des affaires étrangères, correspondance politique, 14, 15.
4 BN, Fonds français 3155, fols. 41, 47.
5 BN, Fonds français 6611, fol. 55.

6 BN, Fonds français 3135, fols. 51, 55, 67. Seventeenth-century copies of these and other letters to d'Humières can be found in Collection Clairambault 350, fols. 6, 9, 11, 207, 208.
7 BN, Collection Clairaumbault 350, fol. 406.
8 Crété, *Coligny*, p. 55.

APPENDIX D

1 Jean de Serres, *Recueil des choses mémorables advenues en France* (Paris, 1598), p. 53; Felix Bourquelot, "Notice sur le journal de J. Glaumeau," *Mémoires de la société des antiquités de France*, 22: (1856).
2 Pierre Mathieu, *Histoire de la mort de Henri IV*, in *Archives curieuses*, 15: 61.
3 F. de La Chenoye-Desbois, *Dictionnaire de la Noblesse*, 19 vols. (Paris, 1863–76), 3: 396; Cloulas, *Henri II*, p. 559. Cloulas accepts the point that Caboche was a nobleman.
4 Cloulas accepts September 1557 as the date of the attack. The only other modern historian who mentions the episode is Noëll, *Henri II*, p. 175. He repeats Haton's version without hesitation.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The following bibliography is largely a list of works cited in the notes, but in several cases works important for understanding Henry's era that I had no occasion to cite are included. Furthermore, a number of works of lesser significance cited in the notes are not included.

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Frederic J. Baumgartner is Associate Professor of History, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, Virginia.

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